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California Supreme Court Survey
January 1990-September 1990
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inAform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ....................................
The attorney-client privilege applies in Public
Utilities Commission proceedings and is not waived
when a utility states that its attorneys believe a
contract is valid and enforceable: Southern California
Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission ...........
CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................
A. A good faith settlement precludes the nonsettling
defendantfrom pursuing an indemnity action
against the settling defendant on the basis of
implied contractual indemnity. An orderfrom the
court of appeal setting a case for oral argument is
to be treated as "an alternative writ or order to
show cause" as requiredfor a final decision under
the CaliforniaRules of Court: Bay Development, Ltd.
v. Superior Court ....................................
B. An otherwise privileged communication made in
connection with a judicial or legislative proceeding
need not have been made in the "interestof justice"
in order to invoke the protection of California Civil
Code section 47, subdivision 2: Silberg v. Anderson...

628

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ...................................

648

A.

B.

Voter approval of a ballot measure specifying the
maximum number of low income housing units to
be built, but providing no other details regarding
the proposed housing project, satisfies the
requirements of articleXXXIV of the California
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reveal unpublished information pertinent to the
defense if the criminaldefendant's right to a fair
trial outweighs the newsperson's interests in
nondisclosure: Delaney v. Superior Court .............
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reporters with absolute immunity from contempt in
a civil casefor refusing to produce unpublished
photos received from a nonconfidential source.
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other than contempt: New York Times v. Superior
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information in police possession regardingan
unidentified informantfor purposes of challenging
the veracity of statements made in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant only upon a
preliminaryshowing of reasonabledoubt as to the
accuracy of material statements made by the
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This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases
imposing the death penalty. Rather than a case-bycase approach, this section focuses on the key issues
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subdivision (a), must be evidenced by an express
declarationcontaining language that explicitly
acknowledges the spouses' intent to change the
"ownership or control" of the property: Estate of
MacDonald v. MacDonald .............................
VIII.

.......................................
The cost of providing unemployment insurance
coverage on behalf of local government employees is
not subject to subvention under the California
Constitution, articleXIII B, or parallel statutes.
However, local governments may tax and spend as
required to effect the legislation:City of Sacramento
v. State ..............................................
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ...................................
A projectfor the increase or initiationof passenger
services on a rail line is exempt from regulation in
the California Environmental Quality Act
requiringan environmental impact report where
the rail line has already been constructed along the
rail right-of-way and the rail operator has not
obtained a certificate of abandonment: Napa Valley
Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n ............
X. HEALTH LAW ............................................
Acute care hospitals with clinical psychologists on
staff may give those psychologists primary
responsibilityfor the admission, diagnosis,
treatment and discharge of mental patients:
California Association of Psychology Providers v. Rank
......................................................
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A. A stipulation of an insured's liability signed by the
insured, insurerand third party claimant, and
entered as a judgment, constitutes a final judicial
determination requisitefor a third party claimant
to sue an insurerfor unfair practices under section
790.03(h) of the CaliforniaInsurance Code:
California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance
Bureau v. Superior Court .............................
B. Proposition103's mandatory renewal provision does
not apply to nonrenewal notices sent by insurers
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who have complied with statutory withdrawal
application requirements:Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Gillespie ..............................................
XII.

JUVENILE LAW ...........................................

Welfare and Institutions Code section 281 and
CaliforniaRule of Court 1450(c) create exceptions to
the hearsay rule for social studies that are admitted
into evidence and relied on by a juvenile court in
determining the court'sjurisdiction over a minor
under Wefare and Institutions Code section 300: In
re Malinda S . ........................................
X III.

PRIVACY .................................................

No judicialproceedings privilege exists for either
litigants or attorneys to record private
conversationsfor use in anticipatedlitigation:
Kimmel v. Goland ....................................
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A. No joint tenant in personal property may
unilaterallysever his or her interest in the joint
tenancy and nullify the other joint tenant's
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immunity under Civil Code section 846: Hubbard v.
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recover damages: Garcia v. Superior Court ...........
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interference with prospective economic advantage,
due to a defendant inducing a contractingparty to
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undertake litigation to terminate the contract
according to its terms, must allege that the party
brought the litigation without probable cause and
that the litigation concluded in the plaintiffs favor:
Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Bear Stearns &
843
Company .............................................

I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The attorney-clientprivilege applies in Public Utilities
Commission proceedings and is not waived when a
utility states that its attorneys believe a contract is valid
and enforceable: Southern California Gas Company v. Public
Utilities Commission.

In Southern California Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission,' Southern California Gas Co. (SoCal) requested and received
permission from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to negotiate
the buyout of an undesirable long-term gas contract with Getty Synthetic Fuels Inc. (Getty). 2 Later, the PUC refused to approve the 17.4
million dollar buyout without first reviewing confidential documents
concerning the negotiations, leading SoCal to abandon its attempt for
informal PUC approval. Instead, SoCal applied for a formal consolidated adjustment mechanism (CAM) proceeding3 requesting authorization to recover the costs of the buyout and a finding that the gas
purchases were reasonable.4 The PUC suggested that the gas contract had been breached by Getty and that a buyout by SoCal was
therefore unnecessary5 and again requested the confidential documents. SoCal continued to resist production stating that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege.6
The presiding administrative law judge ordered production of the
documents and the PUC upheld the order, ruling that SoCal had implicitly waived its attorney-client privilege by statements in its CAM
application indicating that SoCal attorneys believed the contract was
enforceable and could not be unilaterally terminated. 7 The Califor1. 50 Cal. 3d 31, 784 P.2d 1373, 265 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1990). The unanimous decision
was delivered by Justice Broussard with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Panelli, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Kennard concurring.
2. In August 1984, SoCal had entered into a long-term gas supply contract with
Getty. The purchase price was based on a "cost-plus" formula which made the Getty
price much higher than other available sources. In March 1984, during an informal
phone conversation with the PUC, SoCal stated that its attorneys had looked over the
contract and found no way it could be unilaterally terminated without a buyout. In
response, the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates requested the identities of staff
members consulted, the basis of the staff's concurrence and copies of the notes and
memoranda regarding the buyout negotiations. Id at 35, 784 P.2d at 1374, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 802.
3. In a CAM proceeding the PUC determines whether costs incurred by a utility
were reasonable and prudent and whether they may therefore be passed on to utility
users through a rate increase. Id. at 35 n.3, 784 P.2d at 1375 n.3, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 803
n.3. For a discussion of public utility regulatory procedures, see generally B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw §§ 889-914 (1990); 53 CAL. JUR. 3D
Public Utilities §§ 80-104 (1987).
4. Southern Calif Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 35, 784 P.2d at 1374, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
5. Id. at 36 n.4, 784 P.2d at 1375 n.4, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 803 n.4.
6. Id. at 36, 784 P.2d at 1375, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
7. Id.
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nia Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies in PUC proceedings and whether SoCal
had waived the privilege.8
In its decision, the court first held that the attorney-client privilege 9 applies in the regulatory settinglo stating "the policy underlying
the privilege rules requires their recognition in all proceedings of any
nature in which testimony can be compelled by law to be given.""
Additionally, the court held that SoCal had not waived its privilege
in the CAM proceedings.12 SoCal had not put the advice of counsel
directly at issue by arguing that its attorney's support for the plan
was evidence that the buyout agreement was reasonable.13 Further,
the court held that the information requested was not vital to the
PUC's determination as to whether or not the buyout agreement was
14
reasonable, and thus overruled the PUC's decision.
8. Id. at 36, 784 P.2d at 1375, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
9. The attorney-client privilege is codified in section 954 of the California Evidence Code, which states in pertinent part: "the client... has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer .... CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West Supp. 1990). See also J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Attorney-Cient Privilege §§ 2290-2329 (1985); 27
CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 24 (1987) (attorney-client privilege).
10. Southern Calif. Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 38, 784 P.2d at 1376, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
The court cited the United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (holding that the privilege applies in proceedings with the Interstate Commerce Commission and denying the
commission's argument that its investigatory powers permit it to examine confidential
communications between a regulated company and its attorneys).
11. Southern Calif Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 38 n.8, 784 P.2d at 1376 n.8, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 804 n.8.
12. Id. at 42, 784 P.2d at 1379, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 807. For information regarding the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see generally 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence § 442
(1987) (discussing claim of privilege and waiver). See also Merritt v. Superior Court, 9
Cal. App. 3d 721, 731, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1970) (in a suit for wrongful failure to
settle a claim where a plaintiff contends that the defendant confused his attorney, that
attorney's state of mind has been put in issue and is discoverable despite the attorneyclient privilege). But see Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 609, 691 P.2d 642,
653, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 897 (1984) (information was not put directly in issue where the
substance of the protected communication is only one of many forms of evidence available to solve an issue).
13. Southern Calif Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 42, 784 P.2d at 1379, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
SoCal had expressly stated it would not rely on this argument. Id. The court also discussed the possibility of a statutory or express waiver of the right. Id. An express
waiver is possible where "[the] holder of the privilege, without coercion, had disclosed
a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by
anyone...." CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (West 1966). See also 31 CAL. JUR. 3D, Evidence
§§ 432 & 442 n.6 (1987) (discussing waiver of the attorney-client privilege). See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 794 (1966 & Supp.
1984).
14. Southern Calif Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 43, 784 P.2d at 1380, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 808.

In upholding the attorney-client privilege, the court sought to protect the ability of regulated companies to obtain adequate legal advice
without fear that information divulged to attorneys would later be
discoverable by the PUC. 15 The SoCal decision rejects the PUC's
ability to deny regulated companies the protection of evidentiary
privileges, thereby preserving the companies' rights to fully and
openly discuss matters with their attorneys.
MATTHEW J. STEPOVICH

Ii. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. A good faith settlement precludes the nonsettling
defendant from pursuing an indemnity action against
the settling defendant on the basis of implied contractual
indemnity. An orderfrom the court of appeal setting a
casefor oral argument is to be treated as "an alternative
writ or order to show cause" as requiredfor a final
decision under the CaliforniaRules of Court: Bay
Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the California Legislature codified the good faith settlement bar to further litigation in California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6.1 Since 1980 the California Supreme Court has reviewed
and explained the application of section 877.6 on four occasions. 2 In
The first California case to recognize the implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege was Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 554, 187 Cal. Rptr.
137 (1982), where a civil suit was brought to recover under a fire insurance policy
where the plaintiff had been indicted for arson. That court held that the discovery of
the information was essential for a fair resolution of the case because a conviction for
arson would be a complete defense to the claim and thus, the privilege did not apply to
prevent the plaintiff's deposition from being taken. Id at 560, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
15. Southern Calif Gas Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 45, 784 P.2d at 1381, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1991) [hereinafter section 877.6].
Two years after the California Supreme Court decided American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), the Legislature
added section 877.6 to the Code. California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 codified
the supreme court's decision in American Motorcycle that a tortfeasor who enters into
a good faith settlement "must be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative
indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor." American Motorcycle, 20
Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
2. See Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co., Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 817, 760 P.2d
399, 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 216 (1988) (under § 877.6, a good faith settlement precludes
subsequent actions for total equitable indemnity); Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court,
43 Cal. 3d 858, 875, 741 P.2d 124, 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 637 (1987) (good faith settlement standards apply to a sliding scale settlement); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698 P.2d 159, 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1985) (a good
faith settlement must be in the "reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability").
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3
its most recent decision, Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court,
the supreme court defined and broadened the concept of good faith
settlement by including implied contractual indemnity claims in the
category of equitable indemnity claims subject to section 877.6. The
court's decision in Bay Development extends the bar against a nonsettling defendant seeking damages from a settling defendant to implied contractual indemnity where there has been a good faith
4
settlement.
Prior to Bay Development, the lower courts were divided in applying the good faith provision to settlements involving implied contractual indemnity.5 Justice Kennard, writing for the majority in Bay
Development, resolved the lower courts' inconsistencies and recognized that a party is more likely to settle when assured there will be
no further litigation involving liability to other defendants. 6 She affirmed the court's desire to encourage settlements and protect the interests of all parties in an action. 7 The court denied the nonsettling
defendant the ability to seek indemnity from a settling defendant absent an express contractual provision, where the settlement was
deemed in good faith8
Bay Development, Ltd., ("Bay Development") initially sought relief from the dismissal of their indemnity claim by extraordinary
writ. Before addressing the substantive issue in this case, the court
decided the question of jurisdiction raised by the interpretation of

3. 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990). Justice Kennard wrote
the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Broussard and Panelli concurring. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the concurring opinion joined by Justice Arabian and in part by Justice Eagleson. Justice Eagleson wrote a separate dissent.
4. 1& at 1032, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The settlement was determined to be in good faith where the settling defendant paid $30,000 on a potential liability of $75,000 to $1,000,000. Id. at 1028, 791 P.2d at 299, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
5. Compare Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 291,
235 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376-77 (1987) (implied contractual indemnity claim barred by good
faith settlement); IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438,
440 (1986) (good faith settlement precludes action based on implied contractual indemnity) with County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 447 (1984) (good faith settlement is not a bar to a claim based on implied
contractual indemnity); Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal.
App. 3d 1227, 1238-39, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 179 (1985) (action for implied contractual indemnity is not a claim for contribution).
6. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1019, 791 P.2d at 292, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
7. Id. at 1019-20, 791 P.2d at 293, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The courts' "good faith
determination plays a key role in harmonizing the objective of encouraging settlement
with the objective of promoting a fair apportionment of loss among multiple
torfeasors." Id. (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 1032, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 732.

California Rules of Court 24(a). 9 Generally, a court of appeal decision becomes final thirty days after filing.10 However, rule 24(a) contains an exception that makes a decision final "immediately after
filing upon the denial of a petition for a writ... without issuance of
an alternative writ or order to show cause."'" A party must file its
petition for review in the supreme court within ten days after the decision becomes final in the court of appeal.12 In Bay Development,
the court of appeal set the writ for oral argument, and after hearing
oral argument issued a written opinion. The lower court did not issue an alternative writ or order to show cause. Had the exception to
rule 24(a) been applied literally, Bay Development's petition for review would have been filed too late and the supreme court would not
have had jurisdiction. The court did not, however, interpret the rule
so restrictively. It decided the exception was applicable to "summary
denials of writ petitions," and not where "the Court of Appeal sets a
writ matter for oral argument, hears oral argument and resolves the
9. CAL. R. CT. 24(a) (West 1990) [hereinafter Rule 24]. This rule states:
[WHEN DECISIONS BECOME FINAL] All decisions of the reviewing courts shall
be filed with the clerk, who shall forthwith transmit a copy of the opinion to
the lower court or tribunal and to the parties.
A decision of the Supreme Court becomes final 30 days after filing unless
the court orders a shorter time or, prior to the expiration of the 30 day period
or any extension, orders one or more additional periods not to exceed a total
of 60 additional days.
A decision of a Court of Appeal becomes final as to that court 30 days after
filing, except that the decision becomes final as to that court immediately after filing upon the denial of a petition for a writ within its original jurisdiction
or a writ of supersedeas, without issuance of an alternative writ or order to
show cause, or the denial of an application for bail or to reduce bail pending
appeal, or the denial of a transfer to a Court of Appeal in a case within the
original jurisdiction of a municipal or justice court; but the denial of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus that is filed on the same day as the decision in a
related appeal becomes final as to the Court of Appeal at the same time as the
related appeal.
When a decision of a reviewing court is final as to that court, it is not thereafter subject to modification or rehearing by that court, except that when the
date of finality falls on a holiday or other day the clerk's office is closed, the
decision may be modified or rehearing granted or denied until the close of
business on the next day the clerk's office is open. If an opinion is modified
without change in the judgment, during the time allowed for rehearing, the
modification shall not postpone the time that the decision becomes final as
provided above; but if the judgment is modified during that time, the period
specified herein begins to run anew, as of the day of modification.
10. IL
11. Id.
12. California Rules of Court 28(b) states in pertinent part:
TIME FOR FILING PETITION A party seeking review must serve and file a petition within 10 days after the decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final as
to that court, but a petition may not be filed after denial of a transfer to a
Court of Appeal in a case within the original jurisdiction of a municipal or justice court.
CAL. R. CT. 28(b) (West 1990).
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matter by full written opinion."'

II.
A.

3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

ProceduralIssue Under California Rules of Court 24(a)

The California Supreme Court, court of appeal and superior courts
i
all have original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandate. 4

Rule 24(a) governs writs and dictates when the decision of a court becomes final.15 Rule 24(a) was amended to make a court's decision final immediately where the court denied a writ without issuing an
alternative writ or an order to show cause.' 6 The impetus behind the
change was to allow a party to immediately file a petition for review,
where the writ had been denied, without waiting thirty days for the
order to become final.i7 The California Supreme Court considered
rule 24(a) further in Palma v. United States Industrial Fasteners,
Inc.'s The Palma decision allows the court of appeal to issue a peremptory writ instead of an alternative writ.' 9 However, the Fourth
13. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1024, 791 P.2d at 296, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
14. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 10. This section states in part: "The Supreme Court,
courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas
corpus proceedings. Those courts also have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition."
15. Rule 24(a), supra note 9.
16. 8 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs, § 213 (3d ed.
1985). Rule 24(a) was further amended in 1989 to state that "the denial of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus that is filed on the same day as the decision in a related
appeal becomes final as to the Court of Appeal at the same time as the related appeal."
Rule 24(a), supra note 9.
Section 1087 of the California Civil Procedure Code states:
The writ may be either alternative or peremptory. The alternative writ must
command the party to whom it is directed immediately after the receipt of the
writ, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be performed,
or to show cause before the court at a time and place then or thereafter specified by court order why he has not done so. The peremptory writ must be in a
similar form, except that the words requiring the party to show cause why he
has not done as commanded must be omitted.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1087 (West 1990).
17. 8 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 213(b) (3d ed.
1985).
18. Palma v. United States Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681 P.2d 893, 203
Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984). The Palma decision discussed notice procedure and approved the
practice of "routinely request[ing] informal opposition prior to the issuance of an alternative or peremptory writ." Id. at 180, 681 P.2d at 898, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
19. Id. at 178, 681 P.2d at 897, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 630. See section 1088 of the California Civil Procedure Code which states:
When the application to the court is made without notice to the adverse party,
and the writ is allowed, the alternative must be first issued; but if the application is upon due notice and the writ is allowed, the peremptory may be issued

Appellate District has contrary rules that are at issue in Bay Development.20 In Bay Development, the court of appeal calendared the case
for oral argument without issuing a writ or an order to show cause in
contravention of rule 24(a) and the Palma decision.
B.

The Implied ContractualIndemnity Issue Under California
Civil Procedure Code Section 877.6

The California Supreme Court first established the concept of partial equitable indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors in the
landmark decision of American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court.2 1
In American Motorcycle, the court reconciled "a common law partial
indemnity doctrine" with the "strong public policy in favor of settlement" exhibited in California Civil Procedure Code section 877.22 In
1980, the Legislature changed the partial indemnity doctrine from
common law to statutory law by codifying the holding of American
Motorcycle.23 Section 877.6 of the California Civil Procedure Code
gives the settling party a "substantive right of discharge from liability."2 4 The section allows a settling party to seek a decree from the
court stating that the settlement is in good faith.25 After a settlein the first instance. With the alternative writ and also with any notice of an
intention to apply for the writ, there must be served on each person against
whom the writ is sought a copy of the petition. The notice of the application,
when given, must be at least ten days. The writ cannot be granted by default.
The case must be heard by the court, whether the adverse party appears or
not.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1088 (West 1980).

20. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1036-37 n.1, 791 P.2d at 305 n.1, 269 Cal. Rptr.
at 735 n.1 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Lucas explained:
[R]eading the two applicable local rules together leaves one to ponder what
purpose is served by a refusal to accept petitions requesting alternative writs.
It appears from its internal operating procedures that the court contemplates
issuing alternative writs and holding argument when it wishes to consider
matters fully on their merits before deciding whether or not to issue a writ.
Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
21. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal Rptr. 182 (1978).
22. Id. at 603-04, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
23. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6, supra note 1. See also Note, Far West Financial
Corp. v. D. & S. Co. and the Abolition of Total Equitable Indemnity: What A Long,
Strange Trip It's Been, 21 PAC. L.J. 147, 162 (1989).
24. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMM. OF CAL. LAW, Torts § 71 (9th ed. 1988).

25. Section 877.6 states in pertinent part:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing
on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or
other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors...
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the
court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any
counteraffidavits filed in response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion,
receive other evidence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims
against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contri-
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ment is judged "in good faith," the nonsettling party is blocked from
seeking redress against the settling party. 26 This result encourages
settlements by allowing a party peace of mind after entering into a

settlement and protects the parties remaining in the action against
unfairness by allowing a court review of the settlement.
1.

2
E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach 7

In E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, the plaintiff
sought "indemnity and equitable contribution" from the City of
Huntington Beach for the city's negligence notwithstanding a general, albeit express, contractual indemnity provision.2 8 In its discussion of that case, the supreme court distinguished two sources of
indemnity. First, an express contractual provision creates an obligation to indemnify a party where the duty is based "upon the occurrence of specified circumstances." 2 9 Second, indemnity may be
founded in "equitable considerations" suggested by contractual language "or by the equities of the particular case." 30 The court went on
bution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence
or comparative fault.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1991).
26. Id. The California Supreme Court laid out the factors to be considered in determining whether a settlement is in good faith in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698 P.2d 159, 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1985). These
factors include:
[A] rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement
proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant
considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of
settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious
conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.
Id.
27. E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 579 P.2d 505, 146
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1978).
28. Id. at 503, 579 P.2d at 508, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 617. In E. L: White there was an
express indemnity provision in the contract that stated White would indemnify the
City "from, any suits, claims, or actions brought by any person or persons for or on
account of any injuries or damages sustained because of or arising out of the work."
Id. at 507, 579 P.2d at 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 619. The court concluded that absent "sufficiently specific" language an express provision "will be construed to provide indemnity
to the indemnitee only if he has been no more than passively negligent." Id. at 507,
579 P.2d at 511, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The contract provision in E. L White did not
meet the test of "sufficiently specific" language. Id.
29. Id. at 506, 579 P.2d at 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
30. Id. at 507, 579 P.2d at 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 619. Notably, the majority opinion
in Bay Development refers to "contractual language not specifically dealing with indemnification" as "implied contractual indemnity." Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at
1029, 791 P.2d at 300, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (emphasis in original).

to state that absent explicit contractual language governing indemnity, a party's right to indemnify emanates from "the independent
doctrine of equitable indemnity." 31 In summary, the court suggested
that implied contractual indemnity is in essence a form of equitable
32
indemnity.
2. The Courts of Appeal's Divided Interpretation of Implied
Contractual Indemnity
Appellate decisions are divided on whether implied contractual indemnity is a bar to further litigation after a good faith settlement is
recognized by the court.33 In County of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court,3 4 the Second Appellate District held that California Civil Procedure Code sections 87735 and 877.636 did not preclude a cause of action for indemnity arising out of express or implied contractual
provisions. 37 Similarly, the Third Appellate District concluded in
Bear Creek Planningv. Title Ins. & Trust Co.38 that implied contractual indemnity was not a form of equitable indemnity and by implication would not bar litigation to recover damages after a good faith
settlement.39 However, in two separate decisions, IRM Corp. v. Carlson 40 and Stratton v. Peat,Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,41 the First Appellate District reached an opposite conclusion, holding that a good
faith settlement precluded a cross-complaint for indemnity on a the42
ory of implied contractual indemnity.
31. E.L. White, 31 Cal. 3d at 508, 579 P.2d at 511, 146 Cal. Rptr at 620.
32. Id. at 508, 579 P.2d at 511-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21.
33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
34. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202 Cal. Rptr.
444 (1984).
35. In pertinent part California Civil Procedure Code section 877 reads:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgement is given in good faith before verdict or judgment
to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution
rights, it shall have the following effect:
(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms
so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount
stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater.
(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other parties.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1991).
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 supra note 25.
37. County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 202 Cal. Rptr at 447, supra note
5.
38. Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227,
1238-39, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 179 (1985).
39. See id.
40. IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986).
41. Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 235 Cal. Rptr.
374 (1987).
42. See IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440
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It was in this atmosphere of differing opinions that the Fourth Appellate District decided that the good faith settlement provision of
California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 blocked an action for
indemnity where a party entered into a good faith settlement. This
led to the California Supreme Court's review of this issue in Bay
Development.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Bay Development, Ltd., a limited partnership, and Bowen Company, the general partner, (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Bay") purchased a condominium development from Home Capital
Corporation ("Home"). 43 Bay subsequently marketed the 251 units
to various buyers. The condominium owners, past and present, filed
a complaint against Bay alleging the partnership misrepresented the
number of parking spaces in the development and sought damages
for the decrease in value. 44 Bay cross-complained against Home and
claimed Home was responsible for the original misrepresentation.
Bay asserted that it was entitled to indemnification from Home on
5
theories of equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity.4
The condominium owners then amended their complaint to include
Home as a defendant.
Home settled with the condominium owners prior to trial. Home
then filed a motion for a determination that the settlement was in
good faith as allowed by section 877.6, and asked for an order of summary judgment on Bay's cross-complaint for indemnity. The trial
court found the settlement to be in good faith and found that Bay
was barred from seeking indemnity from Home under California
Civil Procedure Code section 877.6.46
Bay petitioned the court of appeal for extraordinary writ relief, ultimately contending that "their claim for implied contractual indemnity should . . .be equated with a claim for express contractual
48
indemnity," 47 which is not precluded by a good faith settlement.
(1986); Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 291, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 374, 376-77 (1987), supra note 6.
43. Bay Development, Ltd. and Bowen Company will hereinafter be referred to as
"Bay." Home Capital Corporation will hereinafter be referred to as "Home."
44. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1020, 791 P.2d at 293, 269 Cal. Rptr at 723.
45. Id. at 1035, P.2d at 1021, 791 P.2d at 294, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
46. Id. at 1023, 791 P.2d at 296, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
47. Id. at 1029, 791 P.2d at 299, 269 Cal. Rptr at 729.
48. See C.L. Peck Contractors v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 3d 828, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1984) (finding an express contractual indemnity enforceable notwithstand-

The court of appeal calendared and heard oral argument and denied
the writ, upholding the trial court.49 The California Supreme Court
granted review. 50

IV.
A.

THE COURT'S DECISION

The Majority Opinion Rules of Court 24(a)

ProceduralIssue Under California

The supreme court raised the issue of jurisdiction on its own initiative. 51 The court of appeal issued its written decision in this case on
March 31, 1987 and Bay filed a petition for review in the supreme
court on May 8, 1987. The petition was timely filed if the general
thirty day and ten day time limits of rule 24(a) and rule 28(b) apply.52 However, the supreme court questioned whether the exception
to the general rule applied where the court of appeal did not issue
either an alternative writ or order to show cause, but did schedule
the writ for oral argument. 53 Rule 24(a) states "that the decision becomes final as to that court immediately after filing upon the denial
of a petition for a writ without issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause."54 Further, under Rule 28(b) a party must file a
petition for review by the supreme court within ten days of a final
order.55
The statutory construction suggests three courses of action when a
court of appeal reviews a petition for an extraordinary writ. "[T]he
ing a good faith settlement). The court in C. L. Peck stated, "the law permits people
to voluntarily order their affairs in a manner agreeable to them and equity rarely interferes with a contract knowledgeably executed." Id. at 834, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
49. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1023, 791 P.2d at 295, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
50. IMi
51. Id. at 1024, 791 P.2d at 296, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 726. The court also addressed the
issue of mootness. The parties continued to litigate the underlying complaint during
appeal of the application of the good faith settlement preclusion of § 877.6. The jury
found in favor of Bay before the appeal was heard. The supreme court agreed the issue was not moot because Bay was asking for recovery of attorney's fees associated
with the underlying cause of action. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1026, 791 P.2d at
297-98, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
Section 1021.6 of the California Civil Procedure Code allows an indemnitee to recover attorney's fees. It states in part:
Upon motion, a court... may award attorney's fees to a person who prevails
on a claim for implied indemnity if the court finds (a) that the indemnitee
through the tort of the indemnitor has been required to act in the protection
of the indemnitee's interest by... defending an action by a third person and
... (c) that the trier of fact determined that the indemnitee was without fault
in the principal case ......
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.6 (West Supp. 1991).
52. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1023-24, 791 P.2d at 295-96, 269 Cal. Rptr. at
725-26. See CAL. R. CT. 24(a), supra note 9, and CAL. R. CT. 28(b), supra note 12.
53. Bay Development at 1023-26, 791 P.2d at 295-97, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 725-27.
54. CAL. R. CT. 24(a), supra note 9; Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1023 n.5, 791
P.2d at 295 n.5, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 726 n.5.
55. CAL. R. CT. 28(b), supra note 12.
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court will either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing.. .; or (3) grant a
hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show
cause."56
In this case the California Supreme Court decided that the order
setting the writ for oral argument was tantamount to issuing "an alternative writ or order to show cause." 57 The supreme court reached
this conclusion to prevent "the rule's exception from becoming an
unconscionable trap for the unwary."5 8 However, the court cautioned
the courts of appeal to follow the "statutory procedure" in the
future.59
B.

The ConcurringOpinion

Chief Justice Lucas wrote a concurring opinion, joining in the results but criticizing the majority's treatment of the jurisdiction issue. 60 Justice Lucas reasoned that the plain language of Rule 24(a) is
not the source of the confusion in this case; rather, the contradictory
local rules at the Fourth Appellate District create a conflict with the
California Rules of Court and statutory provisions. 61 Justice Lucas
suggested two reasonable remedies. First, the Legislature could
amend Rule 24 to state that the decision is final thirty days after an
opinion is filed where the court of appeal hears arguments and issues
a written opinion. Second, the rule could be amended to require
62
lower court rules to comply with Rule 24(a).
C. The Majority Opinion - Good Faith Settlement and Implied
ContractualIndemnity Issue Under CaliforniaCode of
Civil Procedure Section 8776
Justice Kennard relied heavily on the principles proffered in E. L.
White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach63 in writing the Bay Development majority opinion. The E. L. White court distinguished be56. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1024, 791 P.2d at 296, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id. at 1025 n.8, 791 P.2d at 297 n.8, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 727 n.8.
60. Id. at 304, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (Lucas, C.J. concurring).
61. Id. at 1035-36, 791 P.2d at 304-05, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 734-35 (Lucas, C.J.
concurring).
62. Id. at 1037 n.2, 719 P.2d at 306 n.2, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 736 n.2 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
63. E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 579 P.2d 505, 146
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1978).

tween two sources of indemnity claims. 64 First, there can be an
indemnity claim based on an express contractual provision; and, second there can be an indemnity claim based on an implicit contractual
provision.65 The Bay Development court took this one step further
by declaring "implied contractual indemnity [is] a form of equitable
indemnity," 66 governed by the comparative rules established in
American Motorcycle, and codified in California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.67 Subsequently, the court held that an implied
contractual indemnity claim, "like other equitable indemnity claims,
may not be pursued by a party who has entered into a good faith
settlement."68
The court explained that this rule governed implied contractual
language but was not a bar to indemnity claims based on an express
indemnity agreement between the parties.6 9 Parties are free to contract regarding indemnity or apportionment. A party cannot circumvent the terms of an agreement by offering a good faith settlement
where such an express agreement exists and the other party has reasonably relied upon it.70 However, based on the decision in E. L.
White, the parties must ensure that the language of the indemnity
71
If
agreement explicitly informs the indemnitor of his commitment.
the language is not specific, the court will deny indemnification
72
where the indemnitee was actively negligent.
64. Id, at 506-07, 579 P.2d at 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
65. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1029, 791 P.2d at 300, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (citing E L. White, 21 Cal. 3d at 506-07, 579 P.2d at 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 619).
66. Bay Development at 1030, 791 P.2d at 300, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
67. Id, at 1031, 791 P.2d at 301, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The court stated that "[w]hen
parties have not entered into an express indemnification agreement specifying that
one party will bear all of the liability for a loss for which both parties may be partially
responsible, the principles of American Motorcycle support an apportionment of the
loss under comparative indemnity principles." Id. at 1029-30 n.10, 791 P.2d at 300 n.10,
269 Cal. Rptr. at 730 n.10.
68. Id at 1031, 791 P.2d at 301, 269 Cal. Rptr at 731. The court disapproved County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984) and
Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1985) to the extent that they were inconsistent with Bay Development. Bay
Development at 1032 n.12, 791 P.2d at 302 n.12, 269 Cal. Rptr at 732 n.12.
69. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1032, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
70. Id,
71. E. L. White, 21 Cal. 3d at 507, 579 P.2d at 511, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Where the
language of the contract is "sufficiently specific," an indemnitee may be held harmless
even from active negligence. But where the language lacks such specificity, then the
indemnitee will be held harmless only for passive negligence. Further, if the language
provides for indemnification only from the acts of the indemnitor and not acts of
others, the passively negligent indemnitee may be barred from indemnification. MdL;
Bay Development at 1033, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr at 732.
72. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1033, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 732. An
indemnitee's degree of negligence impacts enforcement of an express indemnification
provision where the language is not specific. "[Iln the absence of [specific language] a
provision will be construed to provide indemnity to the indemnitee only if he has been
no more than passively negligent." I&.
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The court reasoned that it would be inequitable to give the same
force allowed express contractual indemnity to implied contractual
indemnity.73 An express provision may result in limited indemnification based on the language, however, there is no limiting language in
an implied provision. This could result in greater rights to the indemnitee under implied contractual indemnity. 74 Finally, the majority concluded that the nonsettling party was adequately protected
from a disproportionate risk when another party settles by the good
faith requirement of section 877.6.75
D.

The DissentingOpinion

Justice Eagleson concurred with Chief Justice Lucas' opinion on
the jurisdiction issue, but disagreed with the majority opinion about
the indemnity issue.76 Justice Eagleson proposed that the question
was one of statutory construction. 77 Section 877.6 "applies to contribution and indemnity claims 'based on comparative negligence or
comparativefault.' "78 He considered the language of the statute unambiguous and inapplicable to the indemnity issue in Bay Development.79 Bay's indemnity claim was grounded on an alleged breach of
contract, and Justice Eagleson concluded that section 877.6 is not ap80
plicable to contract issues.
The dissent reasoned that applying section 877.6 to claims arising
under an alleged breach of contract contradicts California Civil Code
section 3300 governing damages as a result of breach of contract.8 1
Under Civil Code section 3300, a party injured by a breach of contract
73. Id. at 1033, 791 P.2d at 303, 269 Cal. Rptr. 733.
74. Id.
75. Id at 1021, 791 P.2d at 294, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 724. Home's settlement in Bay
Development was considered to be in good faith. The court applied the factors delineated in Tech-Bilt, supra note 26. Bay's experts valued the claim at $75,000, and Home's
settlement of $30,000 was considered proportionate. Further, the evidence indicated
that Bay was also responsible for the misrepresentation at the heart of the litigation.
Bay Development at 1021, 791 P.2d at 294, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
76. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1038, 791 P.2d at 307, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 736 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 1039, 791 P.2d at 308, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
78. I& (Eagleson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
80. Id. Justice Eagleson stated that an action for breach of contract could not be
"properly characterized as being a claim based on 'comparative fault.'" Id.
81. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1042, 791 P.2d at 309, 269 Cal. Rptr. at .739. The
majority opinion pointed out that Bay did not seek relief under California Civil Code
§ 3300. Id. at 1033, 791 P.2d at 303, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 733.

"is entitled to all damages proximately caused by the breach."8 2 Justice Eagleson concluded that given the majority's broad application of
section 877.6 to implied contractual indemnity, a breaching party
could avoid the liability under Civil Code section 3300 by entering
into a good faith settlement with an injured party.8 3 Further, the dissent raised the question of the constitutionality of the majority's application of section 877.6 to existing contracts.8 4 The California
Constitution provides that, "[a] bill of attainder ...or law impairing
the obligation of contracts may not be passed."8 5 Justice Eagleson
construed the majority opinion as an impairment of contract, and
should therefore be precluded from application to the existing under86
lying contract in Bay Development.
V.
A.

IMPACT

The ProceduralIssue Under California Rules of Court 24(a)

The majority opinion in Bay Development gave a liberal interpretation to the thirty day exception of Rule 24(a). The majority concluded that a court of appeal order setting a case for oral argument is
the same as issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause, and
does not trigger the immediately final exception of Rule 24(a) even
87
though technically within the language of the exception.
The majority opinion missed an opportunity to encourage the various appellate districts to change their internal operating rules to
comport with the California Rules of Court. For instance, the Fourth
Appellate District has conflicting rules. One rule provides that the
District will only accept petitions for writs that ask "solely" for a peremptory writ.88 A second rule provides that a writ matter will be calendared only after it has become a cause, and the matter does not
become a cause until an alternative writ or order to show cause is issued.8 9 Yet, Bay's writ request was calendared without either an alternative writ or order to show cause. The concurring opinion
suggested that since calendaring the matter indicated the writ matter
had become a cause, then "it would have been futile, if not fatal....
to have filed a request for issuance of an alternative writ or order to
82. Id. at 1043, 791 P.2d at 310, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 740-42 (Eagleson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
83. Id (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1044, 791 P.2d at 310-11, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9).

86. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1044, 791 P.2d at 310-11, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41
(Eagleson, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1024-25, 791 P.2d at 295-97, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 725-27.
88. Id. at 1036, 791 P.2d at 304, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
89. Id.
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show cause." 90 By not deciding that the plain meaning of Rule 24(a)
should be applied, the majority opinion opens the door to further discrepancies within the appellate divisions. This results in confusion
and the potential for inequitable results among divisions. Chief Justice Lucas opined that, "[a]ppellants who seek extraordinary relief in
the Fourth Appellate District thus enter a separate land with independent rules whose singular nature causes the very problem with
which we are here confronted." 9 1 While the majority opinion suggests that, "in the future all Courts of Appeal should follow the contemplated statutory procedure,"92 the courts of appeal do not appear
to be precluded from continuing to create their own "separate land,"
allowing the question of jurisdiction to arise whenever an appellate
district's rules differ from the California Rules of Court.
B.

Implied ContractualIndemnity and Good Faith Settlement
Under California Code of Civil ProcedureSection 8776

Encouraging settlement is the overwhelming motivation behind
section 877.6 which precludes a nonsettling party from pursuing a
claim for indemnity against a settling party. A party who is inclined
to offer a settlement has the assurance that once the court labels the
settlement in good faith he is protected from further litigation on the
issue. In today's congested court system, public policy favors a ruling
that promotes out-of-court settlements.93 On its face, the decision in
Bay Development does just that.
The majority opinion in Bay Development adds a new dimension to
good faith settlement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. While the California Supreme Court has dealt with issues
of good faith settlement in a number of cases, 94 Bay Development
presents the first time the court applied these principles to an injury
arising from an arguable breach of contract. This decision thus supports the policy goal of encouraging out of court settlements by adding a new category of settlement cases protected from further
litigation under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.
90. Id. at 1037, 791 P.2d at 305, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
91. Id. at 1036, 791 P.2d at 305, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1025 n.8, 791 P.2d at 297 n.8, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 727 n.8.
93. See Comment, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 877, 8775 and
87Z6; The Settlement Game in the Ballpark that Tech-Bilt, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 823,
828 (1986).
94. See Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251
Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d. 488, 698
P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).

However, the number of '"minitrials" required to determine
whether a settlement is in good faith will necessarily increase commensurate with the increase in settlements involving implied contractual indemnity.95 While deciding whether a settlement is in good
faith is far less complex than a full fledged trial, the potential impact
cannot be ignored.
In general, parties may voluntarily enter into indemnity agreements that are controlling between them. The majority opinion in
Bay Development muddies the waters when deciding whether the
wording of an explicit contractual indemnity provision meets the test
of "sufficiently specific language." 96 Even when the parties have decided on what they regard as an equitable indemnity scheme, the
courts may decide otherwise. The Bay Development court stated that
"even when parties have entered into an express indemnification
agreement, an indemnitee's culpability may still affect its right to obtain indemnity." 97 This aspect of the court's decision, at the worst,
could result in litigation over the "sufficiency" of the language alone.
At best, some parties will not receive the benefit of their bargain.
The dissent proposed a harsher result from the Bay Development
majority decision. Justice Eagleson concluded that section 877.6 now
precludes recovery for breach of contract where a good faith settlement between the breaching party and an injured party has occured.98 Where there are several parties to a contract and one party's
breach subjects the other party to a lawsuit, the breaching party can
avoid liability for the breach simply by settling with the injured
party.99 Here, the nonbreaching party could ultimately pay damages
when there is little or no fault.x0o The decision has the potential to
95. Note, Far West FinancialCorp. v. D & S Co. and the Abolition of Total Equitable Indemnity: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 21 PAC. L.J. 147, 189-90 (1989).
96. Bay Development, 50 Cal. 3d at 1033, 791 P.2d at 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1043, 791 P.2d at 310, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
99. Justice Eagleson offers the following illustration:
A bolt maker contracts with an aircraft manufacturer to supply bolts. This
contract expressly requires that the bolts be of a certain specification. The
manufacturer, in turn, contracts with an airline company to deliver an aircraft
that meets certain specifications contained in their contract. The bolt maker
breaches its contract by supplying nonconforming bolts. The manufacturer incorporates them into an aircraft. As a result, the plane crashes. The victims

sue the airline, the manufacturer, and the bolt maker. If the bolt maker enters into a good faith settlement with the victims under section 877.6, the majority opinion will preclude the manufacturer from recovering for the bolt

maker's breach of contract.
Id. at 1043, 791 P.2d at 310, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, if the aircraft manufacturer discovered the defective bolts,

before the fatal crash, then the manufacturer could recover damages caused by the
breach of contract even where there is no express contract provision. Id at 1046, 791

P.2d at 312, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
100.

"Faced with even a remotely colorable claim of good faith, many trial courts
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produce "grossly unfair results"O1 where the parties relied on implied contractual indemnity and now find that indemnity gone.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Barring a nonsettling party from seeking indemnity from a settling
party on the basis of implied contractual indemnification is a reasonable way to encourage settlement and reduce traffic in a congested
court system. But the benefits do not come without risks. The Bay
Development decision impacts the nature of contracts. A party's expectations will be frustrated where a party to a contract relies on indemnity based on implied contractual indemnification. Results can
be grossly unfair where a breaching party is able to use a good faith
settlement as a shield against a more substantial liability based on
breach of contract. In the future, when parties to a contract intend
to provide for indemnification, they must be certain to include an explicit indemnification provision in their contract.
LOYE M. BARTON

B. AA otherwise privileged communication made in
connection with a judicial or legislative proceeding need
not have been made in the "interestof justice" in order to
invoke the protection of CaliforniaCivil Code section 47,
subdivision 2: Silberg v. Anderson
With its decision in Silberg v. Anderson,' the California Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the broad immunity from civil lawsuits
will be disposed to view it favorably and approve settlement under section 877.6." Id
at 1045, 791 P.2d at 311, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
101. Id
1. 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1990). Plaintiff brought suit for
breach of contract, negligence, and "intentional tort" against his former wife's attorney
for allegedly seeking an unfair advantage for her client by recommending a psychologist, with whom she had an "undisclosed relationship," to provide evaluations used in
determining a child custody arrangement. The plaintiff claimed that the attorney used
her influence to procure a report which was inaccurate, defamatory and highly biased
against him. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, finding that the
plaintiff had failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the
defendant's statements during litigation were privileged under section 47, subdivision 2
of the California Civil Code. See infra note 2.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all causes of action other than "intentional tort," which the court reversed and remanded to the trial court with an order
sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend. The court of appeals concluded that the
"litigation privilege" does not apply to publications made for reasons other than the
promotion of the "interest of justice."

that has historically protected attorneys, judges, witnesses and litigants for all statements made in connection with litigation. The
court held that the litigation privilege, codified by section 47(2) of the
California Civil Code, 2 is an absolute privilege applicable to all tort
actions, except malicious prosecution, 3 without regard to the participant's "motives, morals, ethics, or intent."4 In so holding, the court
overruled a 17-year-old line of appellate cases5 that had carved out an
exception for statements which, though made in connection with litigation, do not promote the interest of justice.
As a launching point for its discussion, the court identified the policies furthered by section 47(2),6 and emphasized the necessity of an
absolute privilege in order to effectuate those policies. 7 After reiterating the traditional four-pronged formulation of the litigation privilege,8 the court focused its attention on the validity of the "interest of
2. Section 47(2) provides, in pertinent part: "A privileged publication or broadcast
is one made ... in any .. . (2) judicial proceeding ... provided, that an allegation of
averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action for divorce.., made
of or concerning a person by or against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in such
action shall not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to the person making said
allegation or averment within the meaning of this section unless such pleading be verified or affidavit sworn to, and be made without malice, by one having reasonable and
probable cause for believing the truth of such allegation or averment and unless such
allegation or averment be material and relevant to the issues in such action." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 47(2) (West 1982). For an in depth discussion of the development of this
section, see Comment, Absolute Privilege and California Civil Code Section 47(2): A
Need for Consistency, 14 PAC. L.J. 105 (1982); 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts § 214 (1988); 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 504 et. seq.
(9th ed. 1988).
3. See infra note 7.
4. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 220, 786 P.2d at 374, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
5. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 718 (1973); Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr.
321 (1977); Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1981); Barbary
Coast Furniture Co. v. Sjolie, 167 Cal. App. 3d 319, 213 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1985); McKnight
v. Faber, 185 Cal. App. 3d 639, 230 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1986); Fuhrman v. California Satellite
Sys., 179 Cal. App. 3d 408, 231 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1986).
6. The policies identified by the court included ensuring free access to the courts,
encouraging zealous advocacy, promoting truthful testimony, enhancing finality of
judgments and avoiding an unending series of derivative suits. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at
213-14, 786 P.2d at 369-70, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
7. The only exception to the absolute nature of the litigation privilege is its inapplicability to statements made in connection with malicious prosecution suits. See
Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985); Kilgore v.
Younger, 30 Cal. 3d 770, 640 P.2d 793, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1982). The court noted that,
in such cases, "the policy of encouraging free access to the courts... is outweighed by
the policy of affording redress for individual wrongs .... " Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 216,
786 P.2d 371, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (quoting Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 382, 295
P.2d 405, 410 (1956)).
8. The privilege has traditionally been held to apply to all statements (1) made in
connection with either judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
bear a logical relationship to the action. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 212, 786 P.2d at 369, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 642. See also 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts § 214 (1988).
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justice" test, a fifth requirement added by an appellate court in Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.9 This test, the supreme
court held, was both incorrectlyO and unnecessarily 1" devised. While
recognizing the attractiveness of the moral element added by Bradley, the court cautioned that an interest of justice requirement would
potentially defeat the purpose of the litigation privilege by allowing
derivative suits to go forward on the easily averred grounds that the
communication was not made in the interest of justice.1 2 Moreover,
the court noted that the interest of justice test is blatantly inconsistent with numerous cases that have upheld the privilege in instances
of both perjury13 and abuse of process. 14 In fact, because tortious
conduct is, by definition, antithetical to the interest of justice, the test
would necessarily exclude all tortious publications from protection by
section 47(2). Accordingly, the exception would swallow the rule.15
The Silberg decision highlights the tension between the need to ensure free and vigorous legal proceedings without fear of civil liability
and the need to deter unethical or illegal trial tactics. By broadly
construing the parameters of the litigation privilege, the supreme
court has effectively foreclosed the possibility of civil recovery for defamatory statements made in connection with legal proceedings.
9. 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973).
10. The Bradley court mistakenly construed the accepted requirement that the
communication be made to "achieve the objects of litigation" as containing the additional limitation that the communication must also have been made in the "interest of
justice." Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 217, 786 P.2d at 372, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 645. The Bradley
court stated, "[SIpecialemphasis must be laid on the requirement that [the defamatory
statement] be made in furtherance of the litigation and to promote the interest of justice." Bradley, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 723 (emphasis in original).
11. The court emphasized that Bradley and a number of cases which purport to
have followed the "interest of justice" test could have reached the same conclusion on
the basis of the absence of one or more of the four traditional factors without resort to
an "interest of justice" test. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 217, 786 P.2d at 372-73, 266 Cal. Rptr.
at 645-46 (citing McKnight v. Faber, 185 Cal. App. 3d 639, 650, 230 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62
(1986)); Fuhrman v. California Satellite Sys., 179 Cal. App. 3d 408, 231 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1986); Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1981).
12. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 217, 786 P.2d at 372, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
13. Id. at 218, 786 P.2d at 373, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 646. See, e.g., Carden v. Getzoff, 190
Cal. App. 3d 907, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1987); Steiner v. Eikerling, 181 Cal. App. 3d 639,
226 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1986).
14. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 218, 786 P.2d at 373, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 646. See, e.g., Drasin
v. Jacoby & Myers, 150 Cal. App. 3d 481, 197 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1984); Rosenthal v. Irell &
Manella, 135 Cal. App. 3d 121, 185 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1982); Asia Investment v. Borowski,
133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982); Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d
368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978); Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr.
145 (1976).
15. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 218, 786 P.2d at 373, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 646.

Nonetheless, the decision leaves open the avenues of redress offered
through criminal proceedings for perjury and disciplinary proceedings by the state bar. Because these options offer moral rather than
economic victories for injured parties, however, and in spite of the
many beneficial policies which the decision protects, it is likely that
the impact of the Silberg decision will be seen most visibly in the
community at large, where negative notions about the integrity of the
legal profession will be reinforced.
LORI L. SwAFFoRD
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

Voter approval of a ballot measure specifying the
maximum number of low income housing units to be
built, but providing no other details regardingthe
proposed housing project, satisfies the requirements of
article XXXIV of the California Constitution: Davis v.
City of Berkeley.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article XXXIV of the California Constitution requires voter approval before any low rent housing project is developed, constructed,
or acquired by any state public body.' In Davis v. City of Berkeley,2
the court was confronted with the issue of whether this constitutional requirement was satisfied when voters approved a ballot measure specifying the maximum number of low income housing units to
be built, but failing to provide other details about the proposed project. 3 In a six to one decision, the court concluded that this constitu1. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1. Article XXXIV, section 1 provides in relevant
part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is
proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue,
approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for
that purpose, or at any general or special election.
Id. The term "state public body" is defined to include the State, "or any city, city and
county, county, district, authority, agency, or any other subdivision or public body of
this State." Id.
The process of passing laws and amending constitutions through ballot measures is
called "direct democracy." Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735
(1988). For a discussion and analysis of "direct democracy," see id. at 733-76.
2. 51 Cal. 3d 227, 794 P.2d 897, 272 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1990) (en banc). Justice Kennard wrote the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard,
Panelli, Eagleson, and Arabian concurring. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting
opinion.
3. Id. at 230-31, 794 P.2d at 898, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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tional requirement was satisfied.4
This case concerned two ballot measures submitted by the City of
Berkeley to its voters. 5 One measure, submitted in 1977, provided
that any public entity could construct a maximum of 200 low to mod-

erate income housing units in the city, provided that funding was secured through local, state, federal or private sources. 6 The second
measure, submitted in 1981, was identical to the 1977 measure except
that it provided for a maximum of 300 units. 7 Although the ballot
measures failed to provide specific details as to the location, type of
project, or other particulars,8 both measures were approved by the

city's electorate. 9
Two housing projects were developed in Berkeley in 1982 and 1983
pursuant to the authority allegedly provided by the 1977 and 1981
ballot measures.10 In 1984, the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) announced that it would provide
federal funding for eligible public housing authorities to build a maximum of seventy-five low income housing units." The Berkeley
Housing Authority applied for and was granted preliminary funding,
which was used to identify possible sites for the project, develop preliminary plans, and comply with zoning and environmental requirements.' 2 In July, 1985, the Berkeley Housing Authority submitted a
final proposal specifying the project's location and design.' 3 HUD approved the proposal.14
4. Id, at 244, 794 P.2d at 907, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
5. For an analysis and discussion of land use regulation by initiative and the procedural requirements, see Nitikman, Instant Planning- Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 497 (1988).
6. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 231-32, 794 P.2d at 899, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
7. Id. at 232, 794 P.2d at 899, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
8. Id
9. Id at 231, 794 P.2d at 899, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
10. A fourteen unit project, funded by the California Department of Housing and
Community Development, was constructed in 1982, and a sixty-two unit project was
completed in 1983. Id. at 232, 794 P.2d at 899, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
11. Funds were made available for 489 units to be built throughout the region,
limiting each local housing authority to seventy-five units. Id,
12. Id, Federal policy dictates that an application for funding projects in California must be accompanied by a certificate attesting that the requirements of article
XXXIV have been met. In its certificate, the Berkeley Housing Authority reported
that Berkeley's electorate had approved 500 low and moderate income housing units,
and only seventy-six had been developed pursuant to that approval. Id. at 233, 794 P.2d
at 900, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
13. Id14. Id. at 234 n.2, 794 P.2d at 900 n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.2. By the time this
case was reheard by the California Supreme Court, construction of the project had
been completed. However, the court maintained that its discussion was not moot, be-

Five Berkeley residents brought suit, alleging that because the ballot measures did not specifically identify the seventy-five unit project, the requirements of the California Constitution had not been
met. 15 The court disagreed, finding that by the passage of the 1977
and 1981 ballot measures, the project had been approved by the city's
electorate as required by Article XXXIV of the California
Constitution.16
II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The Majority Opinion

In construing a constitutional provision, the court must first look
to the language of the provision to determine its plain meaning.17
Thus, the Davis court looked first to the language of article XXXIV
to determine what information must be placed in a ballot measure
dealing with low income housing projects.' 8
Although article XXXIV provides that voter approval is required
prior to the development, construction, or acquisition of a low rent
housing project,19 the term "project" was not clearly defined.20 The
court found that a "project" encompassed a progression ranging from
planning to completion. 21 Article XXXIV does not specify at which
point along the progression a vote must be taken. However, the court
concluded that a vote was intended to be taken in the early stages,
and thus, the use of nonspecific ballot measures was not inconsistent
cause if the city were found to have acted improperly, there would have been remedies
available to the plaintiffs. Al.
15. Id at 233-34, 794 P.2d at 900, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The city was joined by two
indigent residents of Berkeley who claimed to be potential beneficiaries of the project.
Id at 234, 794 P.2d at 900, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
16. I& at 244, 794 P.2d at 907, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
17. In Re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639
(1985) (en banc). For a discussion on the construction of constitutions, see generally 7
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law §§ 92-100 (9th ed. 1988);
13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw §§ 25-44 (1989).
18. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 234, 794 P.2d at 900-01, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
19. See supra note 1.
20. The constitutional provision does provide:
[f]or the purposes of this article the term "low rent housing project" shall
mean any development composed of urban or rural dwellings, apartments or
other living accommodations for persons of low income, financed in whole or
in part by the Federal Government or a state public body or to which the Federal Government or a state public body extends assistance by supplying all or
part of the labor, by guaranteeing the payment of liens, or otherwise.
CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1. However, this definition is not very helpful in the context of the instant case.
21. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 235, 794 P.2d at 901, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The court maintained that the term "has a variety of meanings, ranging from a 'plan' or 'mental conception, idea, or notion' to a 'government-subsidized block of houses or apartments
available at low rents.'" Id. (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989)).
See also, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1546 (2d ed. 1987) (defining a project as "something that is contemplated, devised, or planned").
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with the language of article XXXIV.22 The court based this decision
on the use of the word "developed" in the constitutional provision,
together with its finding that the term "development" generally in23
cludes planning.
When the language of a constitutional provision is not clear, the
court may use extrinsic aids to determine the voters' intent in adopting that provision. 24 One such extrinsic aid is the provision's historical background. 25 Article XXXIV was adopted in 1950, in response to
Housing Authority of Eureka v. Superior Court, 26 in which Eureka's
electorate sought and was refused the opportunity to vote regarding
the city council's decision to apply for federal funding to develop low
rent housing in the community. 27 Public housing raised two major
concerns: the drain on the community's finances from the construction of low income housing projects, and the projects' aesthetic effect
on the community. 28 The Davis court noted that because Eureka's
electorate desired to vote on a project no more specific than the ballot measures at issue in the present case, there was no indication that
the approval required under article XXXIV was intended to be based
on details more specific than the number of units.29
Additionally, the Davis court examined the ballot arguments made
in support of article XXXIV.30 The provision's proponents argued
that the city's decision to develop low income housing projects was
similar to a city's decision to issue revenue bonds, in that both required a substantial fiscal commitment. 3 ' Moreover, because the issuance of revenue bonds required voter approval, public housing
should also require voter approval.3 2 The court found nothing in the
22.
23.
(1952);
24.

Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 235, 794 P.2d at 901, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
Id. (citing Drake v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 872, 876, 243 P.2d 525, 527
Blodget v. Housing Auth., 111 Cal. App. 2d 45, 51, 243 P.2d 897, 901 (1952)).
13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw §§ 38-44 (1989); 7 B. WITIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW ConstitutionalLaw §§ 96-100 (9th ed. 1988).
25. California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 22 Cal. 3d 171, 177, 583 P.2d 729, 733,
148 Cal. Rptr. 875, 879 (1978) (en banc). See also sources cited supra note 23.
26. 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950). See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
138-39 (1971).
27. HousingAuth., 35 Cal. 2d at 559, 219 P.2d at 462.
28. Patitucci,22 Cal. 3d at 178, 583 P.2d at 733, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
29. Davis v. City of Berkeley, 51 Cal. 3d 227, 237, 794 P.2d 897, 902, 272 Cal. Rptr.
139, 144 (1990).
30. Id. In construing a constitutional provision, the court may consider arguments
presented to the voters regarding the proposed constitutional amendment. 13 CAL.
JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 41 (1989); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
ConstitutionalLaw § 96 (9th ed. 1988).
31. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 237-38, 794 P.2d at 902-03, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
32. Id. See also GENERAL ELECTRIC, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA CON-

ballot pamphlet's arguments to suggest that voter approval of only
the number of proposed units was insufficient to fulfill article
33
XXXIV's purposes.
The court also looked at the derivation of article XXXIV's language to determine what specificity was required in order for voter
approval of a housing project to be sufficient.3 4 The court found that
the language of article XXXIV was based in part on section 8(b) of
the 1950 Housing Authorities Law,3 5 which required every low rent
housing project to be approved by resolution of the city's or county's
governing body.36 At the time article XXXIV was drafted, courts
were regularly approving nonspecific proposals which stated only the
maximum number of low rent units to be built.37 The Davis court
found no indication that the drafters of article XXXIV intended to
require any more specificity than the number of proposed units to be
built.38

Finally, the court noted how article XXXIV had been implemented
over the past forty years. 39 The court found that since article
XXXIV's enactment, local governments have repeatedly used nonspecific ballot measures to obtain the required voter approval. 4o
None of these ballot measures were held to be inadequate.41 In fact,
the validity of these measures has consistently been upheld.42
STITUTION WITH ARGUMENTS TO VOTERS 12-13 (Nov. 7, 1950) (ballot pamphlet), quoted

in Davis v. City of Berkeley, 51 Cal. 3d at 237-38 n.5, 794 P.2d at 903 n.5, 272 Cal. Rptr.
at 145 n.5 [hereinafter Ballot Pamphlet].
33. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 237-38, 794 P.2d at 903, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
34. Id at 238-39, 794 P.2d at 903-04, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
35. Section 8(b) was codified in 1951 with minor changes in section 34313 of the
California Health & Safety Code. Id. at 238 n.6, 794 P.2d at 903 n.6, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
145 n.6.
36. 1d, at 238, 794 P.2d at 903, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
37. See, e.g., Blodget v. Housing Auth., 111 Cal. App. 2d 45, 48, 243 P.2d 897, 899
(1952) (Kern County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing and approving an application by the Housing Authority for preliminary funding to cover the
cost of surveys and planning in connection with 750 low rent housing units); Housing
Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 857-58, 243 P.2d 515, 516 (1952) (city council adopted an ordinance approving the development, construction, and operation of a
low rent housing project consisting of approximately 10,000 dwelling units).
38. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 239, 794 P.2d at 904, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
39. Id. at 239-43, 794 P.2d at 904-07, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 146-49.
40. Id. at 239-40 & n.7, 794 P.2d at 904-05 & n.7, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47 & n.7. The
court listed a dozen such ballot measures, spanning from 1951 through 1984.
41. Id. at 241, 794 P.2d at 905, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The court stated that considerations of maintaining public confidence suggest that well established practices among
local governments should not be deemed unconstitutional. Id.
42. Id. Among those upholding the validity of nonspecific ballot measures were
the following: (1) the California Department of Housing and Community Development, which specifically authorizes the ballot form used by the city of Berkeley in 1977
and 1981, see id. at 241, 794 P.2d at 905, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (citing CAL. DEPT. OF
Hous. & COMMUNITY DEV., LEGAL ISSUES AND BALLOT MEASURES 18-19 (1980 rev.));

(2) the California Attorney General, who specifically authorized a city's voters to give
the city blanket authority to build a specified number of low rent housing units, see 59
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The court concluded by emphasizing that its holding would not diminish voters' ability to affect housing project decisions. 43 Voters
could vote against a particular measure and insist on the submission
of a more detailed proposal. 44 Additionally, they could refuse to vote
for proposals which did not contain time limitations, 45 and could seek
to rescind any previously approved proposal that had not yet been re46
lied upon and that was no longer warranted.
B

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk maintained that the majority's holding was inconsistent with the purpose, language, and history of article XXXIV.47 He
pointed out that a municipality could "stockpile" previously authorized housing units indefinitely, for use in future developments when,
due to changed financial circumstances, voters would not approve a
public housing project. 48 Thus, one of the purposes of article
XXXIV, the voters' ability to assess the fiscal impact of a housing
project, was defeated. Additionally, Justice Mosk argued that the
second purpose of article XXXIV, protection of the community's aesthetic environment, could not be served when the public did not
know the location, size, or other particulars of a proposed housing
project.

49

Moreover, Justice Mosk asserted that the majority's interpretation
Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 211, 212-13 (1976), cited in Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 241, 794 P.2d at 906,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 148; (3) the legislature, which, by adding sections 36000-36005 to the
California Health & Safety Code, anticipated that a municipality would seek and obtain voter approval for a housing project before applying for funding, see Davis, 51 Cal.
3d at 242, 794 P.2d at 906, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 148; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3600036005 (Deering Supp. 1990) (authorizing the commencement of a validation action to
determine whether proper voter authorization for low income housing has been obtained, but limiting the time period in which such an action may be brought); and (4)
the courts, which have upheld the validity of nonspecific ballot measures without questioning their constitutionality, see e.g., Housing Auth. of Monterey County v. Monterey
Senior Citizen Park, 164 Cal. App. 3d 348, 355, 210 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1985) (upholding
ballot measure adopted by voters of the City of Monterey "permitting the Housing Authority to acquire 150 low-rent housing units.., for senior citizens and handicapped
persons of low income."); Housing Auth. v. Peden, 212 Cal. App. 2d 276, 281, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 11, 14 (1963) (upholding ballot measure requesting approval to "develop, construct, and acquire ... a low-rent housing project or projects . . . not to exceed two
hundred and seventy five (275) dwelling units").
43. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 243, 794 P.2d at 907, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 243-44, 794 P.2d at 907, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
46. Id. at 244, 794 P.2d at 907, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
47. Id. at 244, 794 P.2d at 907-08, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 245, 794 P.2d at 908, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).

of the term "project" was incorrect. He maintained that any definition of the term "project" must involve "some isolable undertaking
that has been more or less concretely realized."50 Mosk also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the term "any development," finding that the term suggested a degree of concreteness and
not merely a general plan.51 Justice Mosk concluded that "the ordinary meaning of the language used in article XXXIV contemplates
voter approval of specific housing projects rather than the prospective authority of a locality to broadly formulate public housing
policy."

52

Justice Mosk also criticized the majority's discussion of the historical background of article XXXIV.53 First, he found that since the

provision's proponents were concerned with the financial impact of
housing projects, the ballot arguments supported the plaintiff's position rather than the city's position.5 4 In order to fully evaluate a proposal's financial impact, a voter would need more specific
information regarding the location, type of development, and the
time period in which it was to be constructed. 55
Additionally, Mosk emphasized the proponents' analogy between
revenue bonds and public housing projects.56 Just as bond elections
require the disclosure of specific details regarding the amount of the
bond and its general purpose, ballot measures under article XXXIV
5
should require a degree of specificity.

7

Justice Mosk also challenged the majority's conclusion that because article XXXIV was based on section 8(b) of the Housing Authorities Law, and because it was common practice for cities to adopt
resolutions which specified only the maximum number of housing
units to be developed, the drafters of article XXXIV intended to authorize that practice. He claimed that the cases cited by the majority
failed to demonstrate that these practices were commonplace. 58 Further, even if this was a common practice, there was no evidence that
50. Id. at 246, 794 P.2d at 908-09, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
51. Id, at 246-47, 794 P.2d at 909, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 247, 794 P.2d at 909, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 247-50, 794 P.2d at 909-11, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 151-53 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 247-48, 794 P.2d at 909-10, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). For the arguments set forth by the proponents of
article XXXIV see Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 31.
56. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 31.
57. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 248, 794 P.2d at 909-10, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
58. For example, Justice Mosk emphasized that in Housing Auth. v. City of Los
Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243 P.2d 515 (1952), the city agreed to build the 10,000 housing
units within a specific period of time. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 248-49, 794 P.2d at 910-11,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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the drafters of article XXXIV were aware of it.59
In sum, Justice Mosk concluded that article XXXIV requires more
specific language in ballot measures than that used in the present
case. However, he maintained that such a ruling should be prospective only, so that, while further constitutional violations would be
avoided, projects already approved could proceed. 60
Ill.

CONCLUSION

In Davis v. City of Berkeley, the court was faced with the issue of
whether voter approval of a ballot measure specifying only the maximum number of housing units to be developed satisfied the requirements of article XXXIV of the California Constitution. The court,
relying on the language, purpose, and historical background of the
constitutional provision, found that the requirements of article
XXXIV had been satisfied. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk
maintained that neither the language, purpose, nor historical background of article XXXIV supported the majority's holding.
This ruling is of critical importance to cities throughout California
that are attempting to develop low-income housing projects. It would
be difficult and costly for a municipality to first buy property, develop a preliminary plan, and obtain permits, prior to submitting the
proposal to its voters for authorization. Thus, the court's ruling facilitates the development of low income housing projects.
IRIS WEINMANN

B.

A newsperson, called as a witness in a criminal
proceeding, can be held in contempt for failing to reveal
unpublished information pertinent to the defense if the
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial outweighs the
newsperson's interests in nondisclosure: Delaney v.
Superior Court
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme,
not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know."'
59. Davis, 51 Cal. 3d at 248-49, 794 P.2d at 910-11, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 250, 794 P.2d at 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 153 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

In California, the newsperson's shield law is embodied in the California Constitution2 and is codified at section 1070 of the California
Evidence Code.3 The newsperson's 4 shield law was created to foster
the free flow of information to the public.5 By protecting a nonparty 6
newsperson from being coerced into revealing unpublished, nonconfidential information or the identity of confidential sources, the shield
law protects the autonomy of the press7 and prevents the "drying-up"
of sources who fear revelation of their identity or of information
given on an off-the-record basis.8
In Delaney v. Superior Court,9 the California Supreme Court addressed the scope of the California newsperson's shield law. There
was conflict in the lower courts as to whether the shield law's reference to "unpublished information" included a newsperson's nonconfidential, eyewitness observations.O The opinion in Delaney, written
by Justice Eagleson, resolved the conflict by holding that nonconfidential, eyewitness observations of a newsperson are protected by the
shield law.l" The opinion, however, went on to promulgate a balanc2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1990).
4. For convenience the term "newsperson" is used to refer to all media employ.
ees protected by the shield law.
5. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. For the legislative intent behind
Evidence Code section 1070, see Liggett v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 147071, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990). For quotation and judicial
interpretation of the ballot argument for Proposition 5 which created CAL. CONST. art.
I, section 2(b), see Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 801-03 & n.13, 789 P.2d at 943-44 & n.13, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 762-63 & n.13.
6. Both California Evidence Code section 1070 and article I, section 2(b) of the
California Constitution state that a newsperson "shall not be adjudged in contempt."
The contempt power enables the judiciary to punish those who disobey the court's orders. The contempt power is generally the only effective power a deciding body has
over a nonparty witness. The shield law's grant of immunity from this power gives
nonparty witnesses virtually absolute protection from forced disclosure. The shield
law also protects a party from being held in contempt, however, a party remains subject to a variety of other sanctions, such as fines or an adverse judgment. See Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 274, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155 (1984).
7. See Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 820-21, 789 P.2d 934, 956-57, 268
Cal. Rptr. 753, 775-76 (1990) (Mosk, J., concurring).
8. See Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
612 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789
P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
9. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
10. Compare, New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248
Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988) (holding the shield law protected all information gathered by a
newsperson), aff'd, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990) with Liggett v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (holding the shield law
did not protect information gathered from newsperson's happenstance observations),
overruled, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 286 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1990).
11. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805, 789 P.2d 934, 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 764 (1990).

California Supreme Court Survey

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

ing test12 pursuant to which a newsperson can be held in contempt
for refusing to reveal information when called as a witness in a crimi3
nal proceeding.'
This note begins by providing an historical overview of the California shield law. Next, the factual and procedural history of Delaney v.
Superior Court will be traced from its inception at the municipal
court level to its resolution in the California Supreme Court. Further, this note will analyze the majority and separate concurring
opinions of the supreme court. Finally, this note will examine the
impact that Delaney may have on the free flow of information and
the continued existence of a newsperson's privilege in California.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The CaliforniaNewsperson's Shield Law

In California, there is no common law privilege or immunity allowing a newsperson to refuse to disclose information, even if such
information is confidential.14
In 1935, to protect newspaper employees from being coerced into
revealing their confidential sources, the California legislature enacted its first newsperson's shield law.15 Amendments to the code
section expanded the shield law's protection to other media employees.16 In 1965, the provision was transferred from the code of civil
12. I& at 805-13, 789 P.2d at 945-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764-70. In an effort to balance
the newsperson's interest in nondisclosure with a defendant's right to a fair trial, many
courts have applied some type of balancing test. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
3d 268, 279-83, 690 P.2d 625, 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159-61 (1984) (promulgating an
extensive five part test for balancing both parties' interests in a civil action); Ham.
marley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (creating a four part test for overriding the shield law in a criminal case). But see New York Times Co., 215 Cal. App. 3d
at 679, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (rejecting the use of a balancing test in a civil suit); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 218
(1984) (balancing unnecessary where civil litigants failed to demonstrate an interest
sufficient to create a conflict with the shield law).
13. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
14. Id. at 794-95, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (citations omitted); 6 CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 481, at 488-95
(1964).
15. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 795, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757. See generally,
6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 481, at
483-85 (1964) (historical development of shield law in California).
16. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 795, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757. A 1961
amendment extended the protection to employees of radio and television stations,
press associations, and wire services. Id.

procedure to section 1070 of the California Evidence Code.17 In 1974,
the California Legislature amended section 1070 to include protection
of "any unpublished material" gathered by a newsperson.18
The most recent event in the evolution of the California shield law
occurred in 1980 when California voters approved Proposition 5. As
proposed by the assembly and approved by the voters, Proposition 5
amended the California Constitution to include language virtually
identical to section 1070, thus, giving constitutional proportion to the
newsperson's shield law. This constitutional provision is embodied in
article I, section 2(b).19
B. Judicial Interpretationof the CaliforniaNewsperson's Shield
Law
Initially the shield law protected the identity of only confidential
sources. 20 The 1974 amendment to the statute extended its protec17. Id. Initially, the shield law was codified at section 1881 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure. The 1965 transfer to Evidence Code section 1070 became effective
in 1967. Id. All subsequent references shall be to the California Evidence Code unless
otherwise specified.
18. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1990) (Historical Note). This amendment
was apparently in response to the decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 796, 789 P.2d at 939, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 758. The shield law currently states:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative,
administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas,
for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source
of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication
in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.
(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with
or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so
connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
news or news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.
(c) As used in this section, "unpublished information" includes information
not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought,
whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is
not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of
whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon or related to
such material has been disseminated.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1990).
19. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 796, 789 P.2d at 939, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 758. See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2(b). This constitutional provision will be referred to as article I, section 2(b) for convenience and brevity.
20. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396 & n.3, 153 Cal. Rptr.
608, 612 & n.3 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
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tion to include "any unpublished information," not just source identities. 21 The legislative intent in enacting the 1974 amendment was to
22
protect background information gathered from confidential sources.
By including as protected "any unpublished information," the 1974
amendment engendered confusion as to whether the new provision
protected any confidential, unpublished information, as the legislative intent would suggest, or whether it protected literally any unpublished information, as the plain meaning of the words would seem
to indicate.23 The purpose of judicial statutory interpretation is to
determine the lawmakers' intent.24 The "plain meaning" rule is the
most basic rule for determining such intent.25 However, as the California Supreme Court stated in Lungren v. Deukmejian,26 "the 'plain
meaning' rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether
the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose .... Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative
27
intent apparent in the statute."
Given the conflict between the legislative history and the literal
construction of the shield law, the ad hoc implementation of a particular rule of statutory interpretation has greatly affected the outcome
of court of appeal cases. In the 1990 decision in CBS, Inc. v. Superior
Court,28 the court of appeal immediately rejected a newsperson's
claim of privilege under section 1070 because there was no confidentiality interest in the unpublished information.29 The opposite conclusion was reached by the court of appeal in the 1979 case of
21. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1990) (Historical Note).
22. Liggett v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 1470-71, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166
(1989) (legislative history of the 1974 amendment to section 1070 examined), overruled
on other grounds, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1990).
23. See supra note 10.
24. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798, 789 P.2d at 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759 (citing Brown
v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 724, 771 P.2d 406, 412, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714
(1989)).
25. If the language is clear and unambiguous then the "plain meaning" rule requires that intent be determined from the words utilizing ordinary meaning. In such a
situation there is no need for construction, nor for "resort to indicia of the intent of
the Legislature [in the case of a statute] or of the voters [in the case of a provision
adopted by the voters]." Id. (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755
P.2d 299, 303-04, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988)).
26. 45 Cal. 3d 727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988).
27. Id. at 735, 755 P.2d at 304, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
28. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978), overruled, Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
29. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.

Hammarley v. Superior Court.3o In Hammarley, the court looked to
the plain meaning of the statute and found none of the words to be
meaningless or surplusage. Since it found that the statute was unambiguous, the court held that the shield law protected a newsperson's
unpublished information, even if the information was not from a con31
fidential source.
The incorporation of the shield law into the California Constitution
did not end this interpretation dispute.3 2 For most of the 1980's,
there was substantial agreement among the courts that the shield law
protected all unpublished information regardless of the nature of its
source. 33 However, recent cases evidenced a dispute as to whether
non-confidential unpublished information was protected by the shield
law.34 Here, some courts turned away from the plain meaning rule
and used legislative or voter intent to find the information unprotected. 35 At the time Delaney came before the California Supreme
Court there was great disparity in the decisions of the courts of appeal regarding interpretation of the shield law.36
30. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979),
overruled in part, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 813 n.29, 789 P.2d 934, 951
n.29, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 770 n.29 (1990).
31. Id at 396-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
32. The ballot argument in support of Proposition 5 indicates that the voters intended to enhance the protection of a newsperson's confidential sources by preventing
the disclosure of confidential background information. See Delaney v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 3d 785, 801-03 & n.13, 789 P.2d 934, 943-44 & n.13, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 762-63 &
n.13 (1990). The ballot argument differs substantially from the express language of the
constitutional provision, which says nothing about confidentiality. See CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 2(b). This disparity may be attributable to poor drafting, but the courts would be
acting beyond their powers if they employed such a conclusion to resolve the conflict.
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
33. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803, 789 P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763. See Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 395-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612-13 (1979),
overruled in part, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 688 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1990); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 20-22,
201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 212-14 (1984); Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 248
Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). But see CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 250, 149
Cal. Rptr. 421, 425 (1978), overruled, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789
P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
34. See Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988)
(eyewitness observations of an event in public, nonconfidential context held not covered by shield law's "unpublished information"); New York Times v. Superior Court,
215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988) (nonconfidential, unpublished photographs taken by a nonparty newsperson protected by shield law); Liggett v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 220 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (happenstance observations of
newsperson held not protected by shield law) overruled, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50
Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
35. See Liggett v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989)
(holding that newsperson had no right to refuse to testify about an accident he witnessed while he was reporting on another accident), overruled, Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990); Delaney v. Superior
Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988) (newsperson's eyewitness observation of a nonconfidential event in a public place not covered by shield law).
36. See, e.g., supra note 10. The California Supreme Court in Delaney recognized
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C. Past JudicialApplication of the Shield Law
37
Neither the Supreme Court's invitation in Branzburg v. Hayes,
3
8
nor the legislature's 1974 amendment to the shield law, prevented
California courts from forcing newspersons to disclose their sources
39
and unpublished information.

The voters reacted to this judicial threat to the free flow of information by incorporating the newsperson's shield law into article I,
section 2(b) of the California Constitution. 4 0 It was hoped that by

giving the shield law constitutional status, the courts would recognize
the public's strong interest in preserving the free flow of information
41
by protecting newspersons from judicial coercion.
As a result of the amendment, additional protection was achieved
for newspersons, particularly in civil proceedings.42 The courts of appeal have given effect to the constitutional provision by balancing the
civil litigant's discovery rights against the newsperson's interests in
nondisclosure. Balancing the interests affords the newsperson an ad-

vantage since a civil litigant's discovery rights are statutory and limited,43 while a newsperson's protection under the shield law is
express and constitutional. Thus, the balance of interests will generthis decisional disparity. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 803-04, 789 P.2d at 944-45, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 763-64.
37. 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court held that under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution, newspersons do not have a privilege to
refuse to appear and testify before a grand jury with regard to any pertinent information, even if the newsperson must breach a confidence. Id. at 679-709. However, the
Supreme Court invited state legislatures to enact their own newsperson shield laws.
Id. at 706. See, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 795, 789 P.2d 934, 939, 268
Cal. Rptr. 753, 758 (1990).
38. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399-402, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 608, 614-16 (1979) (although requested information was protected under shield
law, constitutional right of defendant to fair trial outweighed newsperson's interest in
statutory privilege), overruled in part, Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789
P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
40. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 802 n.13, 789 P.2d at 943-44 n.13, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762
n.13 (ballot argument).
41. Id.
42. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201
Cal. Rptr. 207, 218 (1984) (discovery interests of state and civil litigants held not to outweigh constitutional protection given nonparty newsperson by article I, section 2(b));
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984) (holding that newsperson who is a party to a civil action has qualified testimonial privilege,
and balancing the interests in favor of nondisclosure).
43. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 25, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 207, 216 (1984). See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-36 (West 1983) (authorization
for civil discovery); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 900-1034 (limitations on civil discovery).

ally weigh in favor of newspersons in civil suits.44
The balancing test does not favor a newsperson's nondisclosure interests, however, when the party seeking disclosure is a criminal defendant. In fact, the balance of interests is more likely to tip in favor
of disclosure since a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial is equally as compelling as a newsperson's interest in
nondisclosure.45
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Underlying Facts

Roxana Kopetman, a Los Angeles Times reporter, and her photographer, Roberto Santiago Bertero (hereinafter "the reporters") were
accompanying a Long Beach police task force on a routine patrol of
the Long Beach Plaza Mall when the officers encountered Sean Patrick Delaney.46 The officers questioned Delaney and requested some
identification. As Delaney reached for his jacket, ostensibly to retrieve his wallet, the officers allegedly asked Delaney if they could
search the jacket for weapons first. Delaney, however, maintains
that the officers took his jacket and searched it without permission.
The officers' search of the jacket revealed a set of brass knuckles
47
which constituted an illegal, concealed weapon.
The reporters published an article on the task force and the incident with Delaney in the Los Angeles Times. The article did not
mention whether Delaney had consented to the search of his
44. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 28, 201
Cal. Rptr. 207, 218 (1984) (interest of civil litigants held not to outweigh newspersons'
constitutionally protected interest in nondisclosure); New York Times Co. v. Superior
Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988) (nonparty newsperson in civil suit
held to have absolute privilege against compelled disclosure), aff'd, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796
P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d
625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984) (in libel action, party newspersons' qualified privilege to
withhold outweighed plaintiffs' discovery interests).
45. The California Supreme Court noted that "[iun criminal proceedings, both the
interest of the state in law enforcement ...and the interest of the defendant in discovering exonerating evidence outweigh any interest asserted in ordinary civil litigation."
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d- at 807, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (citing Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 278, 690 P.2d 625, 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158 (1984)).
Neither a statute nor a state constitutional provision can deny a criminal defendant his
federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. at 805-06, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr.
at 765. "Such result would violate the supremacy clauses of the federal and state constitutions." Id. at 806, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
46. Delaney and a friend were sitting on a bench in a mall when the police officers
noticed a bag, allegedly similar to that used to hold drugs, protruding from Delaney's
shirt pocket. The officers asked to see the contents of this bag. In response, Delaney
removed the bag from his pocket which revealed a piece of gold and a piece of jewelry.
Id at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
47. Id. At the time of his arrest, Delaney claimed that the brass knuckles were a
key chain. Id.

[Vol. 18: 623, 19911

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

jacket.48

B. ProceduralHistory
Delaney was arrested and charged with unlawful carrying and possession of a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor.49 Delaney filed a motion pursuant to section 1538.5 of the California Penal Code to
suppress evidence of the brass knuckles. 50 Here, Delaney argued
that his suppression motion should be granted because the police
lacked his consent to search the jacket and did not have a reasonable
suspicion that Delaney was armed.51
The reporters were subpoenaed by Delaney to testify at the suppression hearing as to whether he had consented to the search of his
jacket.52 The reporters moved to quash the subpoenas claiming that
what they had observed was protected under the California shield
law as "unpublished information." 53 The motions to quash were denied and the reporters appeared, but they refused to testify as to
whether Delaney consented to the search.M
The municipal court determined that the shield law did not apply
to the reporters' nonconfidential, percipient observations of the public incident and held the reporters in contempt.55 The court further
noted that even if the shield law did apply, its protection would be
overcome by Delaney's right to a fair trial.56
The reporters sought writs of habeas corpus to free them from the
contempt order. The superior court granted the petitions for writs of
habeas corpus holding that the shield law protected the reporters
5
from being forced to reveal the information. 7
Delaney and the state filed a joint petition to vacate the superior
48. Id
49. Md See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a) (West Supp. 1990).
50. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756; Delaney v.
Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 685, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 62 (1988).
51. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 793-94, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756. See Cunha
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 352, 356, 466 P.2d 704, 707, 85 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (1970); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (illegally seized evidence is subject to exclusionary
rule whereby it will not be admitted into evidence).
52. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 794, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756. In this case,
the reporters were the only disinterested witnesses to the incident. Id. at 815-16, 789
P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
53. Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 937, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 937-38, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 794, 789 P.2d at 938, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757.

court decision.58 Justice Robert R. Devich, writing for the court of
appeal, held that the shield law did not protect a newsperson's observation of a public event. 59 Justice Devich reasoned that "[b]ecause in
such a situation the subject matter of the testimony is not dependent
upon anyone's trust being placed in the newsperson, there is no basis
to differentiate the newsperson's observation of the event from that
of any other citizen." 60
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the shield law
was unambiguous and, according to its plain meaning, protected a
newsperson's nonconfidential, eyewitness observations of a public incident. 61 However, the court further held that because: (1) Delaney
showed a reasonable possibility that disclosure would aid his case,
and (2) Delaney's constitutional right to a fair trial outweighed the
reporters' interests, 6

2

the shield law was inapplicable and the report-

ers could be held in contempt for refusing to reveal what they had
observed.63

IV.
A.

THE COURT'S DECISION

Majority Opinion

Justice Eagleson, writing for the court, presented a two part analysis: first, he interpreted the shield law to discover what was protected
by the term "unpublished information," and second, he tried to harmonize the parties' interests through the creation of threshold and
balancing tests. 64
1.

Interpretation of the Shield Law

Justice Eagleson found the language of the shield lawes unambiguous, and interpreted, it according to the "plain meaning" rule.6 6 The
67
majority focused on the language "any unpublished information,"
58. Id.
59. Id.; Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 692, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66
(1988).
60. Delaney, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66. See also L.A. Times, July
20, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 6, col. 1.
61. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 804-05, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
62. Id at 814-16, 789 P.2d at 952-53, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72.
63. Id. at 817, 789 P.2d at 954, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
64. The court's decision was unanimous. Justices Panelli, Kennard and Kremer
concurred with Justice Eagleson's majority opinion. Justices Mosk and Broussard,
each writing separately, concurred with the majority opinion. Chief Justice Lucas concurred as to part I of Justice Broussard's opinion and as to Part III of the majority
opinion.
65. The term "shield law" is used to refer to both California Evidence Code section 1070 and article I, section 2(b) of the California constitution.
66. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text; Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798-800,
789 P.2d at 940-42, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759-61.
67. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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and determined that "any" meant "without limit." Thus, the information protected by the shield law was not limited by a confidential68
ity requirement.
The majority refused to consider the legislative intent behind section 1070. Justice Eagleson justified this refusal by pointing out that
the court was construing only the constitutional provision, article I,
section 2(b).69 In examining article I, section 2(b), Justice Eagleson
noted that under the "plain meaning" rule, it was unnecessary to engage in construction or resort to legislative intent.70 Despite this
finding, the court did examine the ballot argument for Proposition 5
to discover the voters' intent behind article I, section 2(b), but rejected it as being too equivocal to overcome the shield law's clear def71
inition of "any unpublished information."
Firmly adhering to the plain meaning of article I, section 2(b), the
majority concluded that a newsperson's nonconfidential, happenstance observations of a public event fell within the broad scope of
"any unpublished information" and was protected under the shield
law. 72 This determination resolved the conflict that had developed in
the lower courts,73 and allowed the court to disapprove all California
appellate court, decisions that found that the shield law protected
74
only confidential information.
2.

Balancing the Interests

Having determined the scope of the shield law, Justice Eagleson
went on to consider Delaney's federal constitutional rights to due
68. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 798-800, 789 P.2d at 941-42, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61 (citCAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b)).
69. Id. at 800-01, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
70. Id. at 798, 789 P.2d at 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759 (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian,
45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 303-04, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988)). See also supra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
71. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 801-03, 789 P.2d at 943-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63.
72. Id. at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
73. Compare New York Times v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 672, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (1988) (shield law applies to all unpublished information) with Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988); Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979) with Liggett v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989) (shield law only applies to confidential information); Delaney v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 681, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60
(1988); CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
74. 50 Cal. 3d at 804, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764 (disapproving CBS, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978); Liggett v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1461, 260 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989)).
ing

process and a fair trial. At the outset, the court recognized the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, and that fulfillment of the right
depends on full disclosure of "'all relevant and reasonably accessible
information.' "75 The court noted that the "shield law's protection is
overcome in a criminal proceeding on a showing that non-disclosure
would deprive the defendant of his federal constitutional right to a
76
fair trial."
The court explained that once the newsperson has satisfied the requirements of the shield law, 77 the burden shifts to the criminal defendant to satisfy a threshold test.7 8 This threshold test requires a
criminal defendant to show that there is a "reasonablepossibility"
79
that the information sought will materially assist his defense.
Here, the court rejected the reporters' claim that their testimony
must go to the heart of Delaney's case.80 The court found that the
government has a constitutionally imposed duty to assist the criminal
defendant to obtain information likely to help his defense rather
than just that information that would lead to exoneration. 8 ' The
court also found the "reasonable possibility" requirement more workable than the "heart of the case" test.8 2
Justice Eagleson made satisfaction of the defendant's burden a
threshold test because he wanted the court to consider the effect disclosure would have on the newsperson's first amendment rights.83
The majority listed four factors, none conclusive, for consideration:8 4
(1) whether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive,8 5 (2) the interests sought to be protected by the shield law,86 (3)
75. I& at 805-08, 789 P.2d at 946-48, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765-67 (citations omitted).
76. Id at 805, 789 P.2d at 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765 (citations omitted).
77. The shield law has three requirements that the newsperson must satisfy to be
protected: (1) the person claiming protection must be a newsperson, (2) the information to be protected must be unpublished, and (3) the information to be protected must
have been acquired by the newsperson while he was acting within the scope of his employment. CAL. CONST. art I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1990). See
also supra note 18 (text of Section 1070).
78. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 806 n.20, 789 P.2d at 946 n.20, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 765 n.20.
See also Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639
(1988).
79. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
80. Id. at 807, 789 P.2d at 947, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 766. See Mitchell v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 268, 280-82, 690 P.2d 625, 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159-61 (1984) (heart of
the case requirement in civil suit).
81. Id at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
82. Id.
83. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 809 & n.24, 789 P.2d at 949 & n.24, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
768 & n.24.
84. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810-13, 789 P.2d at 949-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-70.
85. The less sensitive or confidential the information, the less effect its disclosure
will have on the newsperson's future ability to gather information. Thus, nonconfidential information is less worthy of protection. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr.
at 768.
86. The majority wants future courts to consider the policy behind the shield law
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the importance of the information to the criminal defendant,87 and
(4) whether there is an alternative source for the unpublished
information.8 8
When the court applied the threshold test it concluded that Delaney far exceeded the required showing.89 The court was equally enthusiastic with the balancing test, finding that Delaney prevailed on
each factor. The court concluded that Delaney's due process interest
in obtaining the nonconfidential, nonsensitive information outweighed the reporters' interest in nondisclosure because disclosure
would not hamper their future ability to gather news. 90
B.

Justice Mosk's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's holding, but found the
four part balancing test conceptually flawed.9' Justice Mosk argued
that the court's duty was to determine whether the shield law's protection would deny a criminal defendant his right to due process. If
such deprivation existed, as shown by satisfaction of the court's
threshold test, Justice Mosk believed the fifth and sixth amendments
required the court to order disclosure. 92

Justice Mosk, however, would add a second part to the threshold
test. He would require that the criminal defendant show that the information cannot be obtained from an alternative source. 93 This requirement protects the integrity of the shield law and satisfies the
defendant's rights. If the information can be obtained elsewhere,
and determine whether it will be undermined by disclosure. Id at 810-11, 789 P.2d at
949-50, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
87. If the defendant is able to exceed the threshold requirement then that excess
is to be weighed in favor of disclosure. Id at 811, 789 P.2d at 950, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
88. In other cases this consideration had been a part of the threshold test. The
majority, however, found that an inflexible alternative source requirement was inappropriate in a criminal case. The court reasoned that when information is nonconfidential or nonsensitive, there is no primary reason why a reporter should not be
compelled to disclose the information even if it is available from another source. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811-12 & n.29, 789 P.2d at 950-51 & n.29, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70 &
n.29 (disapproving of Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1979); Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988)).
89. Not only would the information assist Delaney's defense, it would either seal
his guilt or mandate the dismissal of the charges against him. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at
814-15, 789 P.2d at 952, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
90. Id, at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
91. Id. at 817-18 & n.1, 789 P.2d at 954-55 & n.1, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74 & n.1
(Mosk, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 817-20, 789 P.2d at 954-56, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-75 (Mosk, J., concurring).
93. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 818, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).

then the shield law will not have to be violated to ensure the defendant a fair trial.94
C. Justice Broussard's ConcurringOpinion
While agreeing with the majority that the shield law protected literally any unpublished information, Justice Broussard argued that
the court's sole reliance on the plain meaning rule was inappropriate
and contradicted established interpretation rules.95 Justice Broussard found that the court's conclusion could have, and should have
been reached by examining the legislative history behind section 1070
and article I, section 2(b).96
Justice Broussard analyzed the majority's four part balancing test
and Justice Mosk's reasons for rejecting it and concluded that he
agreed with the majority's approach to the federal constitutional issue.97 Justice Broussard reasoned that federal rights are not absolute.98 When a state has a compelling interest in protecting the free
flow of information, that interest must not be inhibited by a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment interests. Justice Broussard concluded that the test proposed by the majority would protect
important state interests more effectively than the double threshold
test proposed by Justice Mosk.99
V.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS

Analysis of the Majority Opinion
1.

The Interpretation Issue

The majority's determination that the shield law was clear and unambiguous was not a first step in the interpretation process, but
rather a conclusion which resolved the entire issue. Relying on the
"clear definition" of unpublished information, the majority was able
94. Justice Mosk argued that the "alternative-source rule" gives maximum protection to the shield law while at the same time ensuring the due process rights of a criminal defendant. If an alternative source is available there is no reason to threaten the

autonomy of the press by denying the protection of the shield law. Id at 818-21, 789
P.2d at 955-57, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774-76 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk concurred
in the court's judgment because he found "that the alternative source rule is inapplica-

ble when the information sought is the reporter's own observations as a percipient witness of a transitory event." Id. at 821, 789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).

95. Id. at 822-23, 789 P.2d at 958, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring).
96. Id
97. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 823-25, 789 P.2d at 958-59, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78
(Broussard, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 824, 789 P.2d at 959, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 778 (Broussard, J., concurring) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
99. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring).
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to summarily dismiss the ballot argument for Proposition 5100 and
avoid dealing with a legislative history which presented an intent different from the one the court wanted to find.1o1
The court quoted its own language from Lungren v.
02
to support its refusal to look at legislative intent.1 03
Deukmeian,1
The court's reliance on Lungren is curious, if not misleading, because
in that case the court also stated,
[Tihe "plain meaning" rule does not prohibit a court from determining
whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose .... The
meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence
.... Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative
intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.... [E]ach
sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory
scheme. 1 0 4

According to the court's own interpretation rules, the majority's
method of interpreting the shield law was incorrect. The court used
one word to determine the shield law's meaning,105 ignored the fact
that the statute's literal meaning did not comport with the legislative
intent, 0 6 and failed to interpret the shield law in light of its statu100. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 801-03, 789 P.2d at 943-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63. "[A]
possible inference based on the ballot argument is an insufficient basis on which to ignore the unrestricted and unambiguous language of the measure itself." Id. at 803, 789
P.2d at 944, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 763. See id at 802 n.13, 789 P.2d at 943-44 n.13, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 762-63 n.13 (text of ballot argument).
101. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800-01 & n.12, 789 P.2d at 942-43 & n.12, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
761-62 & n.12. "Article I, section 2(b) is plain on its face, and we need not - indeed,
should not - search for external indicia of the voters' intent." Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at
801, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d
727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988)).
102. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988).
103. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800-01, 789 P.2d at 942-43, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62 (citing
Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988)).
104. Lungren, 45 Cal. 3d at 735, 755 P.2d at 304, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (citations
omitted).
105. Instead of focusing on the definition of the word "any" to determine the shield
law's meaning, the court could have analyzed all of the words of the shield law as was
done in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal.
App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
106. The majority should not have ignored the clear legislative history behind section 1070, particularly when the literal meaning of the shield law was contrary to that
history. The majority reasoned in part that section 1070 did not have to be construed
due to the incorporation of its language into article I, section 2(b). This rationale is
confusing since the court had already stated that its discussion of article I, section 2(b)
would apply with equal force to section 1070. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 796-97 n.5, 789
P.2d at 939 n.5, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758 n.5. Concedingly, the court may have just been
interpreting the constitutional provision. However, its conclusions were being applied
to section 1070. More importantly, when the text of a statute has served as the source
of the constitutional provision being interpreted, and the two are virtually identical in

tory scheme.107 Although the court resolved the interpretation argument, its failure to consider the legislative history of section 1070
renders its analysis unconvincing.
2.

The Threshold and Balancing Tests

The majority's threshold test places only a slight burden on the
criminal defendant.108 The lower courts' requirement that the information "possibly lead to exoneration" is a difficult standard to satisfy. Its purpose is to give effect to the shield law, except in the most
compelling situations. 0 9 The majority's desire to afford the criminal
defendant all of his evidentiary rights"lO is understandable, but the
court may have gone too far. A requirement that the defendant show
a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist his
defense encompasses a broad range of evidence. 111 This range is so
broad that it may enable a resourceful defendant to satisfy the
threshold test with regard to any evidence."12
The court's four factor balancing test is problematic in two respects. First, the court determined that the shield law protected all
unpublished information,11 3 yet by finding nonconfidential or nonsensitive information less worthy of protection,114 the court has rendered its interpretation of the shield law meaningless."15
language, the legislative history of the statute should be used as an aid in interpreting
the constitutional provision. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 823, 789 P.2d at 958, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 777 (Broussard, J., concurring).
107. The statutory scheme was meant to protect source confidentiality in order to
encourage the free flow of information. Every amendment to the shield law was
aimed at accomplishing this goal. The 1974 amendment was no exception. It was
adopted to encourage the free flow of information by protecting background information. The incorporation of section 1070 into article I, section 2(b) of the California
Constitution was an effort to show how important it was to achieve these goals. See
supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
108. The majority's threshold test requires only that the criminal defendant "show
a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist his defense." Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
109. See CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421,
426-27 (1978), (criminal defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that
sought evidence will result in his exoneration) overruled, Delaney v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990).
110. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 808, 789 P.2d at 948, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
111. For the court's examples of how evidence may materially assist a defense, see
Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 809 & n.23, 789 P.2d at 948-49 & n.23, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767.68 &
n.23.
112. A defendant will generally seek evidence from only a newsperson that the defendant believes will help his case. To elevate the evidence from helpful, to materially
helpful, the defendant merely has to find an imperfect defense, a lesser included offense, or impeaching purpose which the evidence helps to establish. See Delaney, 50
Cal. 3d at 809, 789 P.2d at 948-49, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
113. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 805, 789 P.2d at 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
114. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
115. See id. at 818, 789 P.2d at 995, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring). The
court did try to soften the impact of its view by noting that nonconfidential informa-
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Nonconfidential information will seldom, if ever, be protected because of the way that the four factors of the balancing test interrelate.116 The second problem with the court's balancing test is that by
making the alternative source rule a flexible factor, the shield law's
protection may be overcome by the compelling interests of a criminal
defendant, although the defendant could have obtained the same in117
formation from another source.
B. Analysis of Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk's treatment of the shield law as a state law privilege' 18 was more realistic than the majority's unyielding view that it
is a mere grant of immunity from contempt.119 Even a non-traditional state law privilege deserves to be recognized as that state's attempt to protect a certain interest, and Justice Mosk gave the shield
law that recognition. Justice Mosk rejected the majority's perversion
of the alternative source rule and restored it to its absolute form as
part of the threshold test.120 Justice Mosk's acceptance of the majortion is entitled to some protection. Id. at 810 n.26, 789 P.2d at 949 n.26, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
768 n.26. However, by ranking types of information, the court has effectively neutralized any advantage the shield law gave to newspersons.
116. Under each prong of the majority's four part balancing test, the balance
weighs toward disclosure of nonconfidential material. Under the first prong,
"[w]hether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive," the disclosure of
nonconfidential information will not have a significant effect on the newsperson's ability to gather news. Under the second prong, "[tlhe interests sought to be protected by
the shield law," disclosure is not likely to thwart any policy behind the shield law.
The third prong, "It]he importance of the information to the criminal defendant,"
serves merely to add more strength to the defendant seeking disclosure. Under the
fourth prong, "[wihether there is an alternative source for the unpublished information," the existence of an alternative source is irrelevant since no confidentiality interest will be harmed by the refusal to apply the shield law to nonconfidential
information. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 810-12, 789 P.2d at 949-51, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 76870 (outlining four factors to be balanced).
117. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811-13 & n.29, 789 P.2d at 950-51 & n.29, 268 Cal. Rptr. at
769-70 & n.29. The court did not consider whether a lack of an alternative source was
required in Delaney's case because he had made such a showing at the trial court level.
Id. at 815-16, 789 P.2d at 953, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 772. See id. at 817-22, 789 P.2d at 954-58,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 773-77 (Mosk, J., concurring) (advocating a rigid alternative source
rule).
118. Id. at 818-20, 789 P.2d at 955-56, 268'Cal. Rptr. at 774-75 (Mosk, J., concurring).
119. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 797 n.6, 789 P.2d at 939-40 n.6, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59
n.6.
120. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 818, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J., concurring). "The legislative establishment of a privilege should make the privilegeholder a disfavored source of information." Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 820, 789 P.2d at 956,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 775 (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting Note, Defendant v. Witness: Mea-

ity's simplified "reasonable possibility"' 2 ' threshold requirement is
the only flaw in his two part threshold test. 122 The potential ease of
passing that test 123 threatens the potency of the shield law as a state
testimonial privilege.
C. Analysis of Justice Broussard's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Broussard cited strong authority to support his view that
the court should have referred to the shield law's legislative history.
However, his agreement with the court's interpretation of the shield
law and his belief that the majority could find support for its conclusions in the legislative history were left unexplained and remain
2
unclear.1 4
Justice Broussard's support for the majority's threshold test and
four factor balancing test125 is somewhat misplaced. While Justice
Broussard made it clear that a defendant's due process rights are not
absolute and can be constitutionally overcome by a state's compelling
interests,126 the cases cited by Justice Broussard never went so far as
to deny a criminal defendant evidence that went to the heart of his
case. 127 Under the majority's test, it is conceivable that evidence going to the heart of a defendant's case can be overcome by a compelling state interest.128 Such a result would be offensive to the notions
of due process. 129
VI.

A.

IMPACT

Effect on the Free Flow of Iqformation

The California Supreme Court interpreted the shield law as protecting all unpublished information, 30 yet the court also determined
that a balancing of interests could require the removal of this protecsuring Confrontationand Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REv. 935, 966 (1978) (italics added)).
121. See supra note 108.
122. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 818, 789 P.2d at 955, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
123. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
124. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 789 P.2d at 958, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (Broussard,
J., concurring).
125. 1I at 823-25, 789 P.2d at 958-59, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78 (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
126. Id. at 824, 789 P.2d at 959, 268 Cal, Rptr. at 778 (Broussard, J., concurring).
127. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
128. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 811, 789 P.2d at 850, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 769 ("heart of
the case" showing weighs heavily in favor of disclosure but is not dispositive).
129. See supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text for other problems with the
majority's test for accommodating the conflicting constitutional rights.
130. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 800, 789 P.2d at 942, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
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tion in order to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.131
Thus, there is no piece of information that a newsperson can gather
with the knowledge that the shield law will prevent its forced disclosure. There is always the risk that a court may order disclosure, even
132
if the newsperson received the information in confidence.
This insecurity places the newsperson in the difficult position of
choosing beforehand what information she would wish to protect.
Thus, a newsperson may refuse to hear sources because she does not
feel she can protect the source or does not think the information is
worth going to jail for in the event she is held in contempt. 13 3 Putting a newsperson in a situation where she feels that she must carefully choose the information she is going to receive because of
possible future court decisions has an obvious negative effect on the
news gathering process and the free flow of information. Unfortunately, this is exactly the effect that the Delaney decision may
produce.
The criminal defendant's ability to compel a newsperson to disclose
information - despite the existence of an alternative source - is a
serious threat to the autonomy of the press.134 A criminal defendant
may decide to use the press as his personal investigative service by
subpoenaing the press to reveal all the information it has on the case,
even though other sources of the information are available. This
would result in time and resources being diverted from the newsgathering process and a potential breach of confidentiality by the
newsgatherer. The free flow of information would again be
impeded. 3 5
B. Existence of the Newsperson's Privilege
The court expressly stated that the shield law does not create a
privilege for newspersons but only provides an immunity from con131. 1& at 809, 789 P.2d at 949, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
132. Id. at 810, 789 P.2d at 949-50, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69.
133. The newsperson's code of ethics requires that a newsperson refuse to disclose
confidential sources or information even if it means going to jail. See generally 6 CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 481-508 (1964).

Now that ordered disclosure is more likely, newspersons may decrease their chances of
having to go to jail by refusing to hear confidential information or by declining to publish confidential information in order to conceal their knowledge.
134. See Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 789 P.2d at 956-57, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 775-76
(Mosk, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 821, 789 P.2d at 957, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J., concurring).

tempt. 3 6 The court disapproved of all cases which suggested that
there was a privilege.' 3 7 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court
has determined that a newsperson's privilege does not exist under
the shield law. This means that the rules developed for privileges,
which give privileges the utmost protection from usurpation, 138 will
no longer be applied to criminal cases involving the shield law. An
immunity from contempt, no matter how absolute, does not require
the scrupulous protection demanded by a privilege. In this way, Delaney has officially emasculated the protections of the newsperson's
shield law. 139
VII.

CONCLUSION

Through its decision in Delaney v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court has not only settled the lower courts' interpretation
conflict, it has officially denied that the shield law gives newspersons
a testimonial privilege in criminal cases.
The shield law's protection extends to all unpublished information,
but a criminal defendant can now overcome that protection by showing that the information might help his defense. The court believes
its four part test will fairly balance a newsperson's first amendment
rights with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial. What the court has failed to realize, because it refused to consider the shield law's legislative history or voter intent, is that the
people of California intended the shield law to protect more than just
the freedom of the press, the people wanted to protect the free flow
of information. However, through a careful use of the judicial rules
of statutory interpretation, the court avoided addressing the legislative history and voter intent behind the shield law. By so doing, the
decision in Delaney appears to ignore the California electorate's intent to create a shield law that would preserve the freedom of the
press by protecting the free flow of information.
JOYCE HETTENBACH

136. Delaney, 50 Cal. 3d at 797 n.6, 789 P.2d at 939-40 n.6, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59
n.6.

137. Id.
138. For an informative analysis of testimonial privileges including alternatives to

the invalidation of a privilege when it threatens constitutional rights, see Hill, Testimonial Privilegeand Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1173 (1980).
139. "It would be a disastrous turn of affairs if the appeal (sic] court ruling were
upheld ....
[I]t would mean reporters would be subject to subpoenas at the whim of
any party that wanted their unpublished information." L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1988, § 1,
at 3, col. 1 (quoting interview with Rex S. Heinke, Attorney for the Los Angeles Times
(Oct. 28, 1988)).
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C.

The Californiashield law provides nonparty reporters
with absolute immunity from contempt in a civil case for
refusing to produce unpublished photos received from a
nonconfidential source. However, a reporter may be
subject to sanctions other than contempt: New York Times
v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

New York Times v. Superior Court' (Sortomme) provided a bittersweet victory for news reporters. The California Supreme Court held
that, in a civil case, the state shield law2 protects nonparty reporters
from being held in contempt for refusing to disclose unpublished information received from a nonconfidential source. 3 However, in
1. 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990). Delaney v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990), includes an extensive history of the shield law. Id. at 794-803, 789 P.2d at 938-44, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 757-63. See
also KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 379-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213-15
(1982) (history of California shield law dating back to 1935); Mitchell v. Superior Court
(Synanon Church), 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984), cert denied,
478 U.S. 1009 (1986) (reporter has "qualified privilege" to withhold disclosure in civil
action); see generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 287-96 (9th ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1990); 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 473-74 (1976 & Supp. 1990); Comment, The
Newsgatherer's Shield - Why Waste Space in the California Constitution? 15 Sw.
U.L. REV. 527 (1985); Comment, Newsman's Shield Law: CaliforniaApproach, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313 (1976).
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (1879, amended 1980). The 1980 amendment to the
constitution reads in pertinent part:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wires service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or
administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas,
for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public.
As used in this subdivision, 'unpublished information' includes information
not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought,
whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is
not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of
whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based on or related to such
material has been disseminated.
Id. The amendment, which repeats the previously existing language of California Evidence Code § 1070, was adopted by voters in 1980. Id.; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West
Supp. 1991).
3. 51 Cal. 3d at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103. While the California
shield law only provides immunity from contempt, others states' shield laws include a
qualified privilege which encompasses protection from all sanctions. See REPORTER'S

some circumstances a nonparty reporter who disobeys a subpoena requiring disclosure of information may still have to answer with monetary sanctions. 4 As to the procedural ramifications of the shield law,
the court concluded that a reporter in a civil case may not seek appellate review of a trial court subpoena ordering disclosure of unpublished information until the reporter has been held in contempt.5
Once a contempt order has been issued, the reporter must make a
showing that the shield law's immunity is applicable.6 Then, only after the trial court rules on the immunity issue, may the reporter seek
7
appellate review.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the present case, two reporters from the Santa Barbara NewsPress sought relief from the trial court's order for an in camera inspection of photos which the reporters had taken of an accident
scene. The plaintiffs wanted the pictures for evidence to bolster their
products liability claim against Volkswagen. In response to a motion
to compel, the trial court ordered an in camera inspection to decide
whether there was a valid claim of privilege. As a result of this inspection, the court found that the photos went "to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim," and, hence, ordered disclosure of the photos.8 Subsequently, the News-Press successfully petitioned the court of appeal
for an extraordinary writ and a stay of the trial court's order.
III.

MAJORITY OPINION

In New York Times, Justice Eagleson, writing for the majority in a
6-1 decision, 9 addressed four key issues regarding the shield law.
First, the majority considered whether a reporter may seek exPRIVILEGE CASES, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, COMMUNICATIONS LAw (1988) (analysis of recent state shield law

decisions).
4. 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105. If a reporter disobeys a
subpoena ordering disclosure of the protected information, the reporter would still be
liable for $500 or other damages pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1992 which reads as follows:

A witness disobeying a subpoena also forfeits to the party aggrieved the sum
of five hundred dollars ($500), and all damages which he may sustain by the
failure of the witness to attend, which forfeiture and damages may be recovered in a civil action.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1992 (West 1990).
5. 51 Cal. 3d at 460, 796 P.2d at 815, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (disapproving CBS, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 (1978)).
6. i& at 459, 796 P.2d at 814, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The reporter must demonstrate that the requirements of the shield law are satisfied. See supra note 2.
7. 51 Cal. 3d at 459, 796 P.2d at 814, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
8. Id. at 457 n.3, 796 P.2d at 813 n.3, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 100 n.3.
9. Justice Mosk concurred and dissented. See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
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traordinary writ relief from an adverse ruling before an order of contempt has been entered. Next, after briefly dealing with whether
"unpublished information" includes information not obtained by a reporter in confidence, Justice Eagleson discussed whether the shield
law provided a privilege or immunity. Last, the court answered the
question of whether the court may impose sanctions other than contempt under the shield laws.
Justice Eagleson allocated the bulk of his opinion to the procedural
issue of whether a newsperson must first be found in contempt
before having the right to seek appellate review. In New York
Times, the appeal had been attempted before an order of contempt
was adjudicated.3o The court held that the shield law applies only after an order of contempt has been entered because it provides immunity from contempt; it is not a privilege.11 The court reasoned that
normally a newsperson claiming immunity under the shield law must
make a showing that all of the law's requirements are satisfied. In
doing so, a factual record is established which allows the reviewing
court to make an informed decision. However, if precontempt relief
were allowed, there would be an insufficient record for the appellate
12
court to review.
Moreover, the court feared that if an order of contempt were not
required, newspersons would be allowed to "avoid the responsibility
of choosing between disclosing information or being held in contempt."'13 Furthermore, to mollify the possible consequences to the
reporter of being held in contempt and jailed, the majority recommended that trial courts stay their judgment of contempt during the
review process. 14 Where the trial court refuses to stay its judgment,
the appellate court should do so. 15 The court also briefly stated that
10. 51 Cal. 3d at 458, 796 P.2d at 813, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
11. Id. at 458-59, 796 P.2d at 813-14, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01.
12. Id at 459, 796 P.2d at 814, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The dissent pointed out that
the majority of the time, an adequate factual record is established during the process
of making motions to compel discovery. Thus, precontempt review should normally be
permitted except in the unusual cases where the record is incomplete. I& at 468, 796
P.2d at 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
13. I& at 459-60, 796 P.2d at 814-15, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02. The dissent voiced
extreme dissatisfaction with the majority's reasoning. If the purpose of the shield law
is to protect reporters from the effects of contempt, then it should not be necessary for
them to first be held in contempt and possibly to suffer the embarrassment and injury
of being arrested while the issue of immunity is argued in the courts. The dissent proposed that precontempt review be allowed. Id. at 468-69, 796 P.2d at 820-21, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 107-08.
14. Id. at 460, 796 P.2d at 815, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
15. Id.

it would follow its precedent in Delaney in holding that the phrase
"unpublished information" as used in the shield law includes nonconfidential information received by the reporter.16
Next, the court contrasted the immunity of the California shield
law with the qualified privilege of shield laws in other states.' 7 The
court noted that the qualified privilege of other states' shield laws
provides a reporter with protection from any type of penalty including contempt and sanctions, while the immunity of the California
shield law only offers protection from contempt.' 8 Furthermore, in
some states where there is a qualified privilege, a balancing test is
used to decide whether the privilege applies.' 9 In contrast, California's absolute immunity involves no balancing test. Instead, the immunity is always applicable unless there is an overriding federal
constitutional issue to be decided.20 The court concluded that because Volkswagen failed to raise a claim of violation of an applicable
state or federal constitutional right, the absolute immunity applied,
and no contempt order could be issued. 21
In the last part of his opinion, Justice Eagleson ruled that the
shield law does not preclude monetary sanctions against an uncooperative reporter who disobeys a civil subpoena by refusing to disclose
the requested information. 22 Volkswagen had invoked section 1992 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in an attempt to procure monetary sanctions from the News-Press for failing to obey a subpoena requiring
disclosure of the photos.23 In rebuttal, the NewS-Press contended
that, as a policy matter, the immunity of the shield law should in16. Id. at 461, 796 P.2d at 815, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (citing Delaney v. Superior
Court (Kopetman), 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805, 789 P.2d 934, 945, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 764 (1990)).
17. Id See also KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385, 186 Cal. Rptr.
211, 216 (holding that the shield law provides immuniity from contempt for refusal to
disclose; it is not a privilege).
18. Id at 459 n.5, 796 P.2d at 814 n.5, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.5.
19. Id. at 461 n.10, 796 P.2d at 103 n.10, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103 n.10.
20. Id. at 461-62, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103. In contrast to the present
case, the Delaney court found that there was an overriding federal constitutional right
to a fair trial. 50 Cal. 3d 785, 805-06, 789 P.2d 934, 946, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 765.
Although there was no occasion for a balancing test in New York Times, the court did
concede that, had the reporters invoked their first amendment right to freedom of the
press, a qualified privilege may have existed, thus necessitating a balancing test analysis which could have been reviewed by an appellate court prior to a contempt order.
Nonetheless, since the reporters did not make such a claim, the court refused to discuss the possibility of a precontempt review, stating that it would be mere dictum. 51
Cal. 3d at 460 n.8, 796 P.2d at 815 n.8, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.8. See Comment, California's "New" Newsmen's Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair
Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1986).
21. 51 Cal. 3d at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Although Volkswagen
did ask the court to create a germane constitutional right which would have allowed
them access to the photos, the court refused to do so. Id.
22. Id at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
23. Id. at 462, 796 P.2d at 816, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 103. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1992 (West 1990).
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clude immunity from all penalties, including sanctions.2 4 However,
the court chose to apply a literal reading of the amendment, providing immunity only from contempt. 25 The court went on to explain
that the actual payment of the sanctions would almost never occur
because the cost of the independent suit necessary to procure such
sanctions would inevitably be greater than the amount of the sanc2
tions themselves. 6
IV.

JUSTICE MOSK'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Mosk concurred in sections B and C of the majority opinion
which held that the shield law provides absolute immunity from contempt, but no protection from monetary sanctions. 27 However, Mosk
was concerned with the majority's ruling that reporters may not obtain precontempt review as to the applicability of the immunity afforded by the shield law.28
Mosk first pointed out that although the shield law specifically
enumerates the kind of relief (i.e. immunity), it says nothing about
the timing of that relief.29 Therefore, based on the policy behind the
shield law, that of protecting reporters from penalties for refusal to
disclose information, precontempt review should be allowed where
30
certain conditions are demonstrated.
In an attempt to provide an avenue for reporters to have access to
the courts of appeal before being found in contempt, Mosk first analogized the present case to a challenge of a criminal statute.3 1 Then,
24. 51 Cal. 3d at 464, 796 P.2d at 817, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
25. Id. at 463, 796 P.2d at 817, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The court commented that
while the News-Press wanted a strict reading of the shield law to include nonconfidential material in the phrase "unpublished information," they wanted a liberal reading to
construe immunity from contempt as including immunity from all sanctions. The
court chose to be consistent in its strict reading of the text. Id at 463 n.13, 796 P.2d at
817 n.13, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104 n.13.
26. Id. at 464, 796 P.2d at 817-18, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05. The court noted that the
aggrieved party seeking sanctions would have difficulty proving any "substantial damages" caused by the news organization's failure to disclose information. Section 1992
provides for only the nominal amount of $500 in addition to actual damages. Id.
27. Id. at 464, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 465, 796 P.2d at 819, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
30. Id at 465, 796 P.2d at 818, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
31. Id. at 466-67, 796 P.2d at 819-20, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07. Mosk referred to two
cases in developing his three-prong test. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), a
person who alleged an intention to engage in first amendment activities proscribed by
statute was allowed to challenge the statute. Moreover, in Babbitt v. Farm Workers,
442 U.S. 289 (1979), the United Farm Workers (UFW) was allowed to challenge a statute prohibiting them from engaging in publicity campaigns.

appealing to the doctrines of standing and ripeness, Mosk developed a
three-prong test to be used to decide whether a reporter may seek
precontempt review in determining the applicability of the shield law
in each case. 32 The three-prong test, acting as an exception to the
general rule opposing precontempt review, stated that the shield law
may be invoked prior to the issuance of a contempt order when:
(1) an important constitutional right is at stake that would benefit from early
adjudication;
, (2) a prosecution or other sanction is 'certainly impending'; and
(3) at the point at which the adjudication occurs, there is either a sufficient
record of how the challenged law would apply to the plaintiff, or a colorable
claim 3 that the law is substantially overboard and therefore invalid on its
3
face.

In applying his three-prong test to the present case, Mosk determined that precontempt review should be permitted.34 First, an important constitutional right is at stake, namely that of a reporter's

right to be free from contempt and ultimately to be free from confinement.3 5 Second, once a reporter decides to disobey a subpoena
which the court has refused to quash, the judge has the power to immediately enter a contempt order. 36 At that point, the sanction of
37
imprisonment is "certainly impending."
Third, Mosk examined the need for an adequate factual record.38
The majority's concern was that before an order of contempt is issued, the reviewing court does not have enough facts to make an adequate analysis of the trial court's decision. 39 However, Mosk pointed
out that during the process of determining the applicability of the
shield law, several motions are litigated, such as motions to compel
discovery and motions to quash the subpoena. 40 It is normal, Mosk
explained, that during the course of arguing these motions, a sufficient factual record is developed.41 Thus, only in those exceptional
cases in which the factual record is not adequate should review be
2
denied.4

The dissent then concluded by mentioning policy considerations of
review and discussing the common occurrence of a case which in32. 51 Cal. 3d at 466-67, 796 P.2d at 819-20, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07.
33. Id. at 467, 796 P.2d at 819-20, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 467-69, 796 P.2d at 820-21, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
35. 51 Cal. 3d at 467-68, 796 P.2d at 820, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Mosk argued that
just as a precontempt writ review is permissible to protect the psychotherapist-patient
privilege from improper discovery, a similar review should be admissible in the present
case where there is the possibility of imprisonment for the reporter. Id.
36. Id. at 468, 796 P.2d at 820-21, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
37. Id. at 467, 796 P.2d at 819-20, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
38. Id. at 468-69, 796 P.2d at 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id
42. Id.
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cludes both a qualified first amendment privilege and a claim of immunity under the California shield law.43 First, Mosk took issue
with the majority's assertion that newspersons should not be allowed
to avoid the responsibility of refusing to disclose information and
thus being adjudged in contempt.44 In balancing the possible imprisonment of reporters with the "minuscule" increased workload of reviewing courts, 45 Mosk argued that the policy behind the shield laws,
that of providing protection to reporters, mandates review in virtu46
ally all cases.
Last, Mosk noted that in most cases, a claim of immunity from the
state shield law is combined with the assertion of a first amendment
privilege of freedom of the press. 47 In such cases, because the federal
analysis involves a qualified privilege which, if successfully asserted,
would preclude a party from even making a discovery request, first
amendment review always occurs before a contempt order is ever issued. Accordingly, in those cases which involve both federal and
state analysis, two separate determinations must be made: 1) a determination of privilege and 2) a determination of immunity. Usually,
the determination of a privilege is decided before a contempt order,
while a determination of immunity is decided after a contempt order.
Instead, Mosk suggested that both of these determinations should be
combined into one precontempt review in an effort to conserve judi48
cial resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reporters and news reporting agencies in California may now engage in news gathering and reporting without being in danger of civil
contempt, even though the information they gather may later be subpoenaed for a civil trial.49 On the other hand, civil plaintiffs who
need information gathered by reporters to prove their case will no
43. Id. at 469, 796 P.2d at 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
44. Id.
45. Mask acknowledged that refusing precontempt review would remove an additional burden on reviewing courts because many times reporters would simply avoid
being held in contempt by succumbing to the discovery request. However, he argued
that this reduced burden on the reviewing courts would be "minuscule at best." Id, at
469, 796 P.2d at 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
46. Id.
47. See Protecting Sources and Defending Libel Actions, 227 PLI/Pat 63, Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series - Libel Litigation (explaining first amendment analysis of federal shield laws).
48. 51 Cal. 3d at 469, 796 P.2d at 821, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
49. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 504 (1979 & Supp. 1990);

longer have access to such information. This restriction extends even
to information which would not impose any harm on the reporter to
release.
Reporters argue that if the court had refrained from giving them
protection under the law, they would constantly be under the threat
of imprisonment for justifiably refusing to participate into a civil action between two private parties. This argument certainly has merit
as reflected in the court's decision. However, the court's ruling does
not prevent reporters from freely yielding information to civil plaintiffs. Hopefully, reporters will not abuse their immunity by refusing
to release information in every situation, especially in those circumstances where a severely injured plaintiff requires the nonconfidential unpublished information in order to receive relief.
BRADLEY R. KIRK

D. Article I, section 28, subdivision 8 of the California
Constitution is not limited by the double base term rule
where enhancements based on priorfelony convictions
are applied, including lessor felony convictions involving
imprisonment: People v. Prather.
In People v. Prather,1 the supreme court held that the defendant's
one-year sentence enhancement, pursuant to section 667.5(b) of the
Penal Code2 (hereinafter section 667.5(b)), was not subject to the
double base term limitation of section 1170.1(g) of the Code3 (herein13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw §§ 250-66 (1989 & Supp. 1990); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW ConstitutionalLaw §§ 231-370 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
1. 50 Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d 1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion, with Justices Panelli, Kennard, and Kaufman concurring. Justice Eagleson concurred in the judgment. Justice Mosk dissented in an opinion in which Justice Broussard concurred.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1990). The text of section
667.5(b) states in pertinent part: "[W]here the new offense is any felony for which a
prison sentence is imposed ... the court shall impose a one-year term for each prior
separate prison term served for any felony ....
See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3367 (1985 & Supp. 1990); 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishments for Crimes §§ 1509-1514 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1990). Section 1170.1(g)
provides:
The term of imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the base term pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
1170 unless the defendant stands convicted of a "violent felony" as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, or a consecutive sentence is being imposed
pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) of this section, or an enhancement is imposed pursuant to Section 667, 677.5, 667.8, 667.85, 12022, 12022.2, 12022.4,
12022.5, 12022.55, 12022.6, 12022.7, 12022.75, or 12022.9, or an enhancement is
being imposed pursuant to Section 11370.2, 11370.4, or 11379.8 of the Health
and Safety Code, or the defendant stands convicted of a felony escape from an
institution in which he or she is lawfully confined.
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after section 1170.1(g)). 4 The court found that the enhancement
arose out of a felony conviction within the meaning of article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution5 (hereinafter
section 28), which could be imposed without regard to general time
limitations.6 The court further stated that the "prior felony convictions" within section 28 included not only felony convictions but also
those felonies which the sentencing court deemed serious enough to
7
impose prison terms.
The court reasoned that although section 1170.1(g) did not likely
contemplate an exclusion for section 667.5(b),8 the constitution itself
barred application of the section insofar as prior felony convictions
were concerned. 9 Because of a lack of conflicting constitutional provisions,1O the court concluded that it was able to give effect to the
See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishmentsfor Crimes § 1474
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
4. The defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to offenses of burglary
and prohibited possession of a concealable firearm pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 459 & 12021 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1990) respectively. The trial court enhanced the
defendant's sentence based on the fact that the firearm possession occurred while the
defendant was released from custody and based on a previous term of imprisonment
for a felony conviction. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022.1(b) & 667.5(b) (Deering 1983 &
Supp. 1990). Base sentence for the offenses imposed was two years, with a total sentence after enhancement of six years and four months.
The defendant appealed the sentence asserting that it was in violation of the double
base term limitation of section 1170.1(g). The court of appeal agreed and modified the
sentence accordingly. The state then sought review of the ruling as it pertained to section 667.5(b) only. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 787 P.2d at 1013-14, 267 Cal. Rptr. at
606-07.
5. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(f). The relevant portion of subdivision (f) states that
"[a]ny prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult
or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding." Id
6. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 440, 787 P.2d at 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
7. Id,
8. Id at 433-34, 787 P.2d at 1015, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 608. In People v. Jackson, 37
Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985), the supreme court held that section
667.5(a), imposing five-year enhancements for prior serious felonies, was excluded
from the double base term limitation of section 1170.1(g). The court reasoned that the
failure to include the five-year enhancements as an exception to the limitation was a
mere "draftsman's oversight." This reasoning was subsequently confirmed when, in
1988, the legislature amended section 1170.1(g) to list as exceptions from its provision,
among others, violent felonies covered in section 667.5(a).
However, the legislature did not include other felonies provided for in section
667.5(b) which was in existence at the time of the amendment. Thus, the court in the
instant case stated that the legislature "may have intended no similar exclusion for
section 667.5(b)." Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 434, 787 P.2d at 1015, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
9. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 437, 787 P.2d at 1017, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
10. In prior rulings, the court dealt with the issue of whether the "without limitation" language allowed for unlimited use of prior felony convictions for purposes of im-

"clear and absolute" meaning of section 28.11 The court found additional support in the legislative history of Proposition 8,12 from which
section 28 was derived.
The court stated that the language of section 28 did not preclude
all limitations on the ability to use prior convictions to enhance
sentences. Although the court failed to conclusively define what limitations were applicable to section 28, it did find that "general caps or
ceilings on overall length of sentence" could not be used to prohibit
enhancement where prior felony convictions were involved.13
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's argument that even if
section 28 was effective in barring limitations on "prior felony convictions," these limitations were still applicable to "prior prison terms"
peachment. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1985) (section 28 does not abrogate trial court's discretion to disallow prior felony conviction to impeach); People v. Collins, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 722 P.2d 173, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1986) (trial court must determine if prior convictions were admitted pursuant to section 28 in violation of the Evidence Code for purposes of impeachment, and if erroneous, was the harm prejudicial). The "without limitation" language was found to be in
conflict with section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution which provides
that the Evidence Code § 352 shall remain unaffected. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29(d). See
generally Letwin, Impeaching Defendants With Their Prior Convictions: Reconsidering the Dangerous Propensitiesof CharacterEvidence after People v. Castro, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 681 (1985). However, the court found no similar conflicting provisions
with regard to enhancement sentences. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 434-35, 787 P.2d at 1016,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
11. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 435, 787 P.2d at 1016, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
12. Proposition 8 was enacted by referendum on June 8, 1982. Dubbed the "Victims' Bill of Rights," Proposition 8 created "broad reforms in the procedural treatment
of accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons." CAL.
CONST. art I, § 28(a).
In support of its position, the court cited to information contained in Proposition 8's
Ballot Pamphlet which stated that, under the law as it then existed, there were limitations as to the possible enhancement of sentence terms. The Pamphlet continued that
under the proposed measure, "any priorfelony conviction could be used without limitation in calculatinglonger prison terms." Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 436, 787 P.2d at 1017,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (citing Analysis by the Legis. Analyst, Ballot Pamp., Proposed
Stats. & Amends. to Cal. Const. Primary Election (1982)) (emphasis added by court).
The majority looked to this wording as an expression of the voters' intent to apply
prior felony enhancements without limitation.
To the contrary, the dissent believed that this language provided no guidance whatsoever in the interpretation of the intent of the voters. The dissent stated that the
analysis did "little more than paraphrase article I, section 28(f) .. .[a]nd it d[id] absolutely nothing more than quote (without quotation marks) the phrase whose meaning
must here be determined." Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 444, 787 P.2d at 1022-23, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 615-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of interpretation of Proposition 8, see generally Note, Proposition8
and the California Supreme Court: InterpretationRun Riot?, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 540
(1987).
13. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 437-39, 787 P.2d at 1017-19, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 610-12. The
dissent, on the other hand, felt that the legislature could impose general caps on the
length of sentences and that the only limitations that the voters intended to bar by use
of the phrase "without limitation" were judicially created limitations. Id. at 445, 787
P.2d at 1023, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
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included in section 667.5(b).14 The court reasoned that constitutional
language necessarily employed general terminology which should be
broadly interpreted. Section 667.5(b) should therefore be interpreted
to include the subset of prior felony convictions requiring actual imprisonment. Thus, section 28 bars limitations on prior felony convictions inclusive of those for which imprisonment was required.1 5
In reaching this decision, the California Supreme Court adopted
the opinion of many lower state courts. 16 In doing so, it has continued to chip away at the double base term rule of section 1170.1(g),
finding yet another implied exception. It is not clear whether the
legislature will again follow suit and amend the statute to add validity to the court's decision.
SUE ELLEN DIEB

IV.

CRIMINAL LAW
In child molestation cases, a young victim's testimony
that is unspecific with regard to the time, place, or other
particularsof the alleged sexual assault is suzfficient to
support a conviction from both an evidentiary and
constitutionalstandpoint: People v. Jones.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of child sexual abuse has grown over the past several
years. Approximately 22,000 cases of child sexual abuse were reported in 1988.1 Of these, a large number are "resident child molester" cases, in which a child is subject to prolonged abuse by a
molester who resides with or has recurring access to the child.2
Often, the child, because of age or frequency of assaults is unable to
distinguish one incident from another in terms of time, place, or
14. Id. at 439, 787 P.2d at 1019, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The defendant based this argument on the reasoning of the court in People v. Rodriquez, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1487,
1494, 253 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311 (1988) wherein the court distinguished the terms "conviction" and "prison term" as different legal terms of art.
15. Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 440, 787 P.2d at 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
16. See generally People v. Doane, 200 Cal. App. 3d 852, 246 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1988);
People v. Poole, 168 Cal. App. 3d 516, 214 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1985); People v. Hall, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 624, 214 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1985).
1. People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 34, 39-40, 792 P.2d 643, 645, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613
(1990) (citing CAL. DEPT. JUSTICE, CHILD ABUSE CENTRAL INDEX, CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATION REPORTS, (1988)), modified, 51 Cal. 3d 294 (1990).
2. 1989 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 1402, sec. 1(a) (West). See inrfra note 90.

other particulars.3 When a child witness is unable to give specific details about the sexual assault, an issue arises as to whether the child's
testimony is sufficient to convict a defendant, and if so, whether the
defendant's due process rights are violated. It is this issue that faced
the California Supreme Court in People v. Jones.4 The court held
that such generic testimony5 was sufficient to sustain a conviction,
from both an evidentiary and constitutional standpoint. 6
The defendant in Jones was convicted by a jury of twelve counts of
lewd and lascivious conduct under California Penal Code section
288.7 Six of those counts related to acts against his adopted son,
Sammy.8 The court of appeal reversed four of the counts relating to
Sammy, finding that the boy's failure to specify dates or other distinguishing characteristics of the individual acts prevented the jury
from differentiating between the acts. 9
Upon review, the California Supreme Court confronted two competing interests. On one hand, the public has a strong interest in convicting child molesters. However, disallowing generic testimony to
support a conviction would virtually immunize a resident child molester from prosecution, since a child subject to continued sexual assaults over a prolonged period of time will usually be unable to give
specific details regarding the acts. This public policy interest must be
balanced against the accused's due process rights. The court found
the public policy interest to prevail, concluding that generic testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and that such testimony
does not deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights.O
3. 1989 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 1402, sec. 1(a) (West). Recognizing the unique
problems associated with resident child molester cases, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 288.5, which establishes a new crime of continuing sexual
abuse of a child under circumstances where there have been repeated acts of molestation over a period of time, and where the perpetrator either resides with or has recurring access to the child. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5 (West Supp. 1990).

4. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion, with which Justices Panelli,
Eagleson, Kennard, and Arabian concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion,
with which Justice Broussard concurred.
5. The term "generic testimony" refers to a child's testimony that does not distinguish one incident of molestation from another in terms of time, place, or other particulars. See People v. Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d 831, 845, 253 Cal. Rptr. 894, 901 (1988)
("For example, the victim testifies the defendant had sexual intercourse with her
every other day in her bedroom ... or did the same thing over and over").
6. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 60, 792 P.2d at 659, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
7. For a discussion of lewd conduct with children, see generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 771-819 (1981); 2 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAw §§ 786-92 (2d ed. 1988).
8. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 43, 792 P.2d at 647, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The six counts
involved the following time periods: Count 18 - September 1, 1983 to October 31, 1983;
Count 19 - November 1, 1983 to December 31, 1983; Count 20 - January 1, 1984 to February 29, 1984; Count 22 - May 1, 1984 to June 30, 1984; Count 23 - July 1, 1984 to August 30, 1984; Count 28 - May 1, 1985 to June 30, 1985. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id, at 60, 792 P.2d at 659, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
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I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The California Courts of Appeal disagree as to the proper effect of
generic testimony in cases of child molestation. Two cases decided by
the California Supreme Court in 1901 have greatly shaped the treatment of this subject." People v. Castro'2 was a rape case in which
the defendant was charged with committing an act of sexual intercourse on a specific date with a girl who had not yet attained the age
of consent.' 3 Although the information charged only one offense, it
contained evidence of four separate acts of sexual intercourse committed by the defendant with the victim. None of these acts were
proven to have occurred on the date specified in the information. After the jury convicted the defendant, the superior court granted a
motion for a new trial.
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the defendant was not called upon to defend himself against all of these respective acts of intercourse, extending over a period of several months.
The information only charged one act, and upon that allegation the
case must stand or fall."i4 The court further held that the State
should have been required to choose the specific act upon which it relied to prove the charges against the defendant,' 5 and that the trial
court should have instructed the jury to focus on the one specific act
6
that the State had to prove.'
People v. Williams'7 also involved a defendant charged with committing sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent.' 8
As in Castro, the State had alleged only one offense in the indictment, but the victim testified that acts of sexual intercourse had occurred almost daily for a period of about four months. The court
reversed the conviction, concluding that
[e]ach of these acts was a separate offense, and the defendant could not be
tried for either, and separately for each of them. The jury were not even told
that they must all agree that some specifically described act had been performed. A verdict of guilty could have been rendered under such an instruction, although no two jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or at
11.
165, 65
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See People v. Castro, 133 Cal. 11, 65 P. 13 (1901); People v. Williams, 133 Cal.
P. 323 (1901).
133 Cal. 11, 65 P. 13 (1901).
Id.
Id at 13, 65 P. at 14.
Id.
Id
133 Cal. 165, 65 P. 323 (1901).
Id.

19
all, of the truth of the charge, as to any one of these separate offenses.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant was denied an opportunity to present a defense because of the State's failure to inform
20
him as to which particular offense he was being tried.
After Castro and Williams, the courts developed an "either/or"
21
rule to resolve the due process concerns raised in those early cases.
This rule applies where one single criminal act is charged in the
pleadings, but evidence of more than one illegal act is introduced. In
such a case, "either the prosecution must select the specific act relied
upon to prove the charge or the jury must be instructed in the words
of CALJIC No. 17.0122 or 4.71.5,23 or their equivalent, that it must
unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant com24
mitted the same specific criminal act."
The "either/or" rule effectively cures the due process concerns
enumerated in Castro and Williams in cases where one specific act is
charged and evidence of other distinct acts are introduced. However,
an election or unanimity instruction does not meet these due process
concerns where the testimony establishes numerous indistinguishable
acts of molestation.25 Where the acts are not distinguishable from
one another, the prosecution cannot "select the specific act relied
19. 1d& at 168, 65 P. at 324.
20. Id. at 168-69, 65 P. at 324-25.
21. The due process concerns were notice, opportunity to present a defense, and
jury unanimity. People v. Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d 831, 844, 253 Cal. Rptr. 894, 900
(1988).
22. CALJIC No. 17.01 provides:
[in Count The defendant is accused of having committed the crime of -1. The prosecution has introduced evidence tending to prove that there is
more than one [act] [or] [omission] upon which a conviction [on Count -]
may be based. Defendant may be found guilty if the proof shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that [he] [she] committed any one or more of such [acts] [or]
all
[omissions]. However, in order to return a verdict of guilty [to Count -],
jurors must agree that [he] [she] committed the same [act] [or] [omission] [or]
[acts] [or] [omissions]. It is not necessary that the particular [act] [or] [omission] agreed upon be stated in your verdict.
CALJIC 17.01 (5th ed. 1988).
23. CALJIC No. 4.71.5 provides:
of] the information of having commitDefendant is accused in [Count[s] ted the crime of -,
a violation of Section of the Penal Code, on or
and about a period of time between In order to find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a specific act [or acts] constituting that crime within the period alleged.
And, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree
upon the commission of the same specific act [or acts] constituting the crime
within the period alleged.
It is not necessary that the particular act or acts committed so agreed upon
be stated in the verdict.
CALJIC 4.71.5 (5th ed. 1988).
24. People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 853, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174, 183 (1985) (emphasis in original). See Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 844, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 900; People v.
Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1988).
25. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

upon to prove the charge," 26 and the jury cannot "unanimously agree
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the same
specific criminal act." 27 Thus, generic testimony presents a unique
problem that is not adequately resolved through application of the
"either/or" rule.
Two lines of cases have arisen in California with regard to the
treatment of generic testimony. Some courts have concluded that the
defendant's due process rights are violated when his conviction rests
on a child's unspecific testimony. 28 In People v. Van Hoek,29 for example, the defendant was accused of molesting his minor daughter
for approximately ten years.3 0 The victim testified that these acts occurred from the time she was three years old until she was thirteen,
but she could not give specific dates or tie the acts to a holiday, birthday, or other significant event. The court reversed the conviction,
finding that the accused's defense was severely hampered by the lack
of specificity because he could not present an alibi defense without
knowing when the act charged was alleged to have occurred. 31 Additionally, since there were no specific details to attack, he could not
undermine her credibility. 3 2 Moreover, the court concluded that the
jury could not unanimously agree that the same specific criminal act
had occurred, because no specific act was charged.33 Many similar
cases also attack unspecific testimony on evidentiary grounds, finding
generic testimony to be insufficient evidence to support a
34
conviction.
26. Id,(quoting Williams, 133 Cal. at 168-69, 65 P. at 324).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 846, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (holding that
"[wihere evidence of several acts is presented, any one of which could constitute the
crime or crimes charged, due process requires that a distinguishing characteristic be
presented of one or more of the acts"); People v. Atkins, 203 Cal. App. 3d 15, 19-23, 249
Cal. Rptr. 863, 865-68 (1988) (finding that in cases where the child's unspecific testimony is virtually uncorroborated, a "defendant's rights to due process are seriously violated"); Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (holding that in cases
based on generic testimony "the defendant's rights to due process are seriously
violated").
29. 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1988).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 817-18, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., People v. Luna, 204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 737-49, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878, 884-91
(1988) (reversing a defendant's conviction for three counts of sexually molesting his
minor stepdaughter, finding the child's generic testimony to be insufficient to support
the conviction as to those counts); Atkins, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 19-23, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
865-68 (finding insufficient evidence to support two counts of child molestation against

Other courts disagree with the Van Hoek line of reasoning that generic testimony violates a defendant's due process rights, instead
finding that criminal defendants today have procedural protections
available to them that were not present when Castro and Williams
were decided.35 Additionally, these cases recognize that defendants
in resident child molestation cases are less likely to rely on alibi or
misidentification defenses, with the real issue being credibility. 36
This line of cases also rejects the argument that a child victim's failure to distinguish between various acts renders the evidence insufficient to support a conviction.3 7
Recognizing this split of authority in the lower courts, and recognizing the societal concern with convicting resident child molesters,
the California Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in
3
People v. Jones. 8
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mark E. Jones, a public schoolteacher living in Mira Mesa, California was charged with twenty-eight counts of sexually molesting his
two adopted sons and two neighborhood boys. He was convicted by a
jury of twelve counts of lewd conduct, and was sentenced to prison
for fifteen years.3 9 This appeal addressed the six counts relating to
Jones' adopted son, Sammy.
Sammy was able to recall being molested in a similar manner (oral
copulation by the defendant) at five different locations (in the room
he shared with his brother; in Sammy's own bedroom; in the shower
or bathroom; and on camping trips). However, he was not able to recall specific dates upon which the molestations occurred, nor could
the defendant because of the prosecutor's failure to provide a specific offense). But see
Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 847-54, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 902-07 (following the precedents
set in Luna and Atkins, but maintaining that those cases were incorrectly decided with
respect to their conclusions regarding the sufficiency of generic testimony).
35. See, e.g., People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 341-42, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135, 155
(1988); People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 868-73, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 194-98 (Sims, J.,
concurring).
36. See People v. Obremski, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1346, 1353, 255 Cal. Rptr. 715, 719-20
(1989); People v. Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d 48, 54-55, 259 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182-83 (1989);
People v. Moreno, 211 Cal. App. 3d 776, 787-88, 259 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807-08 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (holding that
"[c]ourts should not require that a child victim of sexual abuse be able to testify about
the time of the offense with more precision than the victims of other types of crimes");
Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (maintaining that "[b]ecause the
distinguishing characteristic is not a statutory element of the crime and because this
court cannot create an element, failure to provide evidence of a distinguishing characteristic does not render the evidence insufficient as to defendant's commission of each
of the elements of the crime").
38. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 47, 792 P.2d at 650, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
39. Id. at 40, 792 P.2d at 645-46, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
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he remember other specific details.40 Sammy testified that the molestations began approximately one month after he came to live with
the defendant in August 1983, and that the molestations continued
once or twice each month until June 1985.41 He testified that there
were some breaks when the molestations ceased for more than one
month, and believed that one such "break" occurred during March
and April of 1984.42
The court of appeal found sufficient testimony to uphold count 18,
in light of Sammy's testimony that he was molested approximately
one month after moving in with the defendant.43 Similarly, count 28
was also upheld based on Sammy's testimony that he was molested
on a camping trip over the Memorial Day weekend.44 However, the
court found insufficient evidence to support the other four counts,
and therefore reversed those counts.45
IV.

THE COURT'S OPINION

The defendant in Jones raised two issues on appeal. First, he argued that because Sammy could not testify with sufficient specificity
to allow the jury to distinguish the various incidents, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. 46 Additionally, Jones argued that the unspecific testimony prevented him from adequately
preparing and presenting a defense, prevented the jury from reaching a unanimous verdict,47 and therefore violated his due process
rights. The court addressed each of these issues in turn.
A.

Insufficiency of the Evidence48

The court agreed with the line of cases finding generic testimony
substantial from an evidentiary standpoint.49 In its analysis, the
court began by pointing out that "even generic testimony (e.g., an act
of intercourse 'once a month for three years') outlines a series of specific, albeit undifferentiated, incidents each of which amounts to a
separate offense, and each of which could support a separate criminal
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

1I at 41-42, 792 P.2d at 646-47, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43, 792 P.2d at 647-48, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
Id. at 43, 792 P.2d at 647-48, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
Id.
Id. at 43, 792 P.2d at 647, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
Id. at 44, 792 P.2d at 647-48, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
See generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 805-811 (1981).
Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 53, 792 P.2d at 654, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 622.

sanction." 50 Thus, the court began to question how much proof is

needed to support a conviction based on such generic testimony. 51
On appeal, the court was required to review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution.5 2 If the court concluded that
a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. 53 In reviewing the record, the court emphasized that children
are considered to be just as competent as adults to testify.54 Therefore, in determining whether the generic testimony was sufficient,
the court focused on factors other than the age of the testifying
victim. 55

The court concluded that while particular details regarding the
time, place, or other circumstances of an alleged assault might enhance the child witness' credibility, these details are not elements of
child molestation offenses and are therefore not necessary to sustain
a conviction. 56 The victim is only required to describe three things:
the kind of act or acts committed, in order to assure that some unlawful conduct has occurred and to differentiate between the various
types of proscribed conduct;s z the number of acts committed, to support the counts alleged in the information or indictment;5 8 and the
general time period in which these acts occurred, in order to assure
that the acts were committed within the applicable limitation
period.5 9
Under the foregoing analysis, Sammy's testimony was sufficient to
support a conviction against Jones on all six counts alleged.60 Sammy
50.
51.
52.
(1985);

Id. (emphasis in original).
IdPeople v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 695, 704 P.2d 719, 735, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 668
People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578, 606 P.2d 738, 750-51, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431,

443-44 (1985).

53. People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 303, 721 P.2d 110, 122, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 240
(1986); Treino, 39 Cal. 3d at 695, 704 P.2d at 735, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 668; Johnson, 26 Cal.
3d at 576-78, 606 P.2d at 750-51, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 443-44.
54. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 54, 792 P.2d at 655, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 623. For an example of

the modern view of the competence of children to testify, see CAL. PENAL CODE

§

1127f (West 1988), which provides for a jury instruction stating that a child's testimony should not be discounted or distrusted simply on the basis of age. See also Fote,
Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their Capabilities,Special
Problems & Proposalsfor Reform, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157, 157-60 (1986) (citing empirical studies showing that traditional assumptions concerning the unreliability of
child witnesses are unfounded). For a discussion of the examination of a child who is
the prosecuting witness in a case involving lewd conduct with children, see 17 CAL.
JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 790 (1981).
55. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 792 P.2d at 655, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
56. Id.
57. Id. The types of proscribed conduct include lewd conduct, sodomy, oral copulation, and intercourse. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 55, 792 P.2d at 656, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
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testified as to the type of act (oral copulation), the number of acts
(once or twice a month over a two year period), and the general time
period in which the acts occurred, which was within the applicable
limitation period (between August 1983 and June 1985). Therefore,
although Sammy could not give additional specific details regarding
the time, place or circumstances of the assaults, his testimony was
sufficient from an evidentiary standpoint to support Jones'
conviction.
B.

Due Process Concerns

In many child molestation cases, two due process rights are implicated: (1) the right to prepare and present a defense, and (2) the right
to a unanimous jury verdict. 61 The court discussed each of these
rights in turn.
1.

The Right to Defend

The right to defend encompasses two distinct rights: the right to
notice of the charges alleged and the right to present a defense to
those charges. 62 Neither of these rights is violated by virtue of the
63
prosecution's introduction of generic testimony.
In arguing that the prosecution of child molestation charges based
on generic testimony does not result in a denial of the defendant's
due process right to fair notice of the charges against him, the Jones
court relied on Justice Sims' concurring opinion in Gordon. In that
opinion, Justice Sims explained that "modern procedures in criminal
cases have eroded if not eliminated Williams' concerns about fair notice in the indictment process." 64
At the time Castro and Williams were decided, many of the procedural protections modernly afforded criminal defendants were not
available. 65 Present day defendants receive notice of the charges
against them not only from the information or indictment, but also
from evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing, through demurrers to the complaint and pretrial discovery procedures. 66
61. MdLat 55-56, 792 P.2d at 656, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
62. Md at 56, 792 P.2d at 656, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
63. Id.
64. People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 868, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174, 194 (1985)
(Sims, J., concurring).
65. Id at 868-70, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
66. Id. See also Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 56-57, 792 P.2d at 657, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625;
People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 342, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135, 155 (1983); People v. Luna,

Furthermore, the child's failure to recall specific dates, locations,
or other particulars of the assault do not inevitably preclude a defense. 67 In cases involving resident child molesters, neither alibi nor
wrongful identification is likely to be a reasonable defense.6 8 The
true issue in these cases is credibility.69 The victim testifies as to a
series of sexual assaults, and the defendant denies that any wrongful
70
conduct occurred.
Additionally, the court recognized that the defendant, despite the
lack of specificity of the young victim's testimony, has other defense
techniques available. 71 The defendant may take the stand and deny
any wrongdoing, allowing the jury to determine his credibility. The
defense can cross-examine the child to expose weaknesses in the
child's testimony, and can introduce evidence of past fabrications by
the child to undermine his or her credibility. Additionally, the defendant can offer expert testimony refuting the physical evidence or
establishing that the defendant's personality profile is inconsistent
with the behavior alleged.
Based on the foregoing, the Jones court concluded that generic testimony does not deprive a defendant of his due process right to de72
fend himself against the charges alleged.
2.

Right to Unanimous Jury

The Jones court also rejected the defendant's contention that generic testimony necessarily prevents the jury from reaching a unanimous verdict.73 In cases where testimony regarding repeated,
identical offenses is presented, "although the jury may not be able to
readily distinguish between the various acts, it is certainly capable of
unanimously agreeing that they took place in the number and manner described." 74 The unanimity instruction serves to focus the jury's
attention on each act related by the victim and charged by the People. 75 Thus, "if the victim testified that an act of oral copulation oc204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 748, 250 Cal. Rptr. 878, 890 (1983) (holding that "[s]o long as the

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing supports the number of offenses
charged against a defendant and covers the time frame or time frames charged in the
information, a defendant has all the notice the Constitution requires").
67. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 792 P.2d at 657-58, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
68. Id See also People v. Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d 48, 54-56, 259 Cal. Rptr. 178, 18283 (1989); People v. Moreno, 211 Cal. App. 3d 776, 787-99, 259 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807-08
(1989).
69. Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 54-56, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83; Moreno, 211 Cal. App.
3d at 787-88, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 807-08.
70. See, e.g., Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 54-56, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
71. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 792 P.2d at 657-58, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
72. Id. at 58, 792 P.2d at 658, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 58-59, 792 P.2d at 658, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
75. Id. at 59, 792 P.2d at 658, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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curred once each month for the first three months of 1990, and the
People charge three counts of molestation, the jury's unanimous conclusion that these three acts took place would satisfy the constitutional requirement of unanimity."76
In the present case, the jury was given an unqualified unanimity
instruction. 77 Sammy testified that the molestations occurred once or
twice a month, beginning about one month after he moved in with
the defendant in August of 1983, and continued until June of 1985.78
He also testified that there may have been some breaks when no molestations occurred for more than a month, including March and
April of 1984. This testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to
unanimously conclude that at least one act of molestation occurred
during each time period alleged in the information, and that no act of
79
molestation occurred during March and April of 1984.
The Jones court went on to hold that
when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular
acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed
all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which,
in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific
acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant
committed all the acts described by the victim.8 0

The court presumed that because credibility is the main issue in
these cases, it is likely that if the jury believed the child's entire testimony as to one act of molestation, it believed the child's entire testimony and agreed that the defendant committed all the acts to which
the victim testified. If the jury agreed that the defendant committed
all the acts testified to, it necessarily agreed that he committed the
single act or acts charged81
Thus, the court concluded that jury unanimity is attainable in cases
76. Id.
77. The jury was given CALJIC 4.71.5, which states in pertinent part: "In order to
find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a specific act constituting the crime within the period
alleged.
And, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously agree upon the
commission of the same specific act constituting the crime within the person alleged."
CALJIC 4.71.5 (5th ed.) (West 1988). See supra note 16.
78. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 41, 792 P.2d at 646, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
79. Id. at 60, 792 P.2d at 659, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
80. Id. at 59, 792 P.2d at 659, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
81. See People v. Moreno, 211 Cal. App. 3d 776, 790, 259 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809 (1989)
(maintaining that "if the jury considered [the victim's] testimony credible, as apparently it did, there would be no reason for it to conclude appellant had molested her
only once, while she was in kindergarten, when she asserted it happened more than
one time").

where testimony is unspecific regarding the time, place, or other circumstances of the alleged assaults.8 2 In sum, the court found that
such generic testimony does not violate a defendant's due process
83
rights.
V.

JUSTICE MOSK's DISSENT

Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's conclusion, finding that
the majority did not adequately address the due process concerns
raised in the case. Justice Mosk asserted that he would require a
greater degree of specificity with regard to the time, place, or other
circumstances of an alleged assault, so as to differentiate each criminal act before allowing a conviction under Penal Code section 288.84
He emphasized that Penal Code section 288.5 is available to prosecute
resident child molestation cases, where the child is unable to recall
specific details.8 5
Mosk's strongest point of disagreement was with the majority's discussion of the right to a unanimous verdict. Mosk contended that the
jury unanimity requirement does not exist only "to preclude the possibility that jurors presented with multiple acts in support of a single
criminal charge might actually disagree,"8 6 rather, unanimity is required to remind the jurors of the necessity that their decision be
free from doubt.87 In order to determine whether the defendant is
guilty, the jury must decide what the defendant did.88 Allowing the
jurors to rely on generic testimony would mean that "they would
only need to agree that the defendant committed some lewd or lascivious act, somewhere, at some time."8 9 Mosk maintained that the acts
must be distinguishable to allow unanimity. "[I]ndistinguishable acts
cannot serve as the tangible core around which twelve minds dedicated to finding specific-act guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can form
agreement."9o
Furthermore, Justice Mosk contended that the modified unanimity
instruction proposed by the majority would not solve the problems of
generic testimony. 9 1 However, he argued that even if such a modified
82. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 58-59, 792 P.2d at 658-59, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
83. Id. at 57, 792 P.2d at 657, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
84. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 660, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 628 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 64-65, 792 P.2d at 662, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 630 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
87. Mosk maintains that the unanimity requirement is needed "to impress on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts at issue." Id. at 65, 792 P.2d at 662, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 630 (quoting United States v. Gipson,
553 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977)) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
91. Mosk asserts that "[t]he subjective certitude that jurors lack in deciding
whether defendant committed a single act does not magically appear when jurors are
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instruction were to be accepted as a means of removing the problems
associated with generic testimony, such an instruction was not given
in this case, and therefore the conviction could not be upheld.92
The solution to this due process problem, according to Mosk, is to
disallow a conviction under Penal Code section 288 when the prosecution's case is based on generic testimony. Instead, the prosecution
may rely on section 288.5 which exists specifically to deal with these
types of cases. 93 Under section 288.5, the jury need only unanimously
agree that the defendant engaged in a criminal course of conduct in
order to convict him.94 Mosk maintained that section 288.5 contains
procedural safeguards to protect the defendant's rights.95 For example, under this section, a defendant can be charged with only one
count per victim. 96 He is protected from "overzealous prosecutors,
who may be tempted to compile a multitude of convictions based on
potentially exaggerated estimates of the frequency of the criminal
97
conduct by victims concededly unable to recall specifics."
In addition to disagreeing with the majority's conclusion regarding
the unanimous jury requirement, Mosk also disagreed with the majority's discussion regarding the defendant's right to prepare a defense. Mosk concluded that a defendant faced with generic testimony
is unable to present an effective credibility defense, since he cannot
cross-examine the witness regarding specific details of the alleged
considering the totality of his acts." Id. at 65-66, 792 P.2d at 663, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 631
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 65-66, 792 P.2d at 663, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Additionally, Mosk notes that since the jury acquitted the defendant on 5 counts, they obviously did not agree that he committed all the acts with which he was charged.
93. Chief Justice Lucas acknowledged the existence of Penal Code section 788.5
and asserted that its enactment did not render moot the Court's discussion, because "if
the constitutional impediments discerned by Van Hoek, et. al., are valid, this statute
may face similar due process challenges." Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 50, 792 P.2d at 652, 270
Cal. Rptr. at 620.
94. The "continuous course of conduct" crime is an exception to the "either/or"
rule. See Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 63, 792 P.2d at 661-62, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 854-55, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85. This exception
arises when the criminal acts are so closely related in time that they constitute one
offense, or when the criminal activity is continuous, committed against one victim, and
described in terms of cumulative injury to the victim. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 792
P.2d at 661-62, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
95. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 61, 792 P.2d at 660, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 628 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
96. However, the penalties are more severe. A defendant convicted under section
288.5 may be subject to a six, twelve, or sixteen year sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 288.5 (West Supp. 1990).
97. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 67, 792 P.2d at 664, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

assault. 98
Finally, Mosk criticized the majority's conclusion that generic testimony is sufficient from an evidentiary standpoint to sustain a conviction. Mosk argued that generic testimony is insufficient as a matter
of law, because it does not allow a jury to reach a unanimous verdict
regarding specific acts.99 Thus, Mosk maintained that he would affirm the court of appeal's judgment reversing the conviction on
counts 19, 20, 22, and 23.100

VI. IMPACT
The decision in People v. Jones settles a conflict that has existed in
California courts regarding the role of generic testimony in child molestation cases. In concluding that a child's unspecific testimony relating to the details of sexual abuse is sufficient both from an
evidentiary and constitutional standpoint, the court removes significant obstacles from the path of prosecutors attempting to convict resident child molesters. 0 1 Since the prosecution of resident child
molesters generally involves generic testimony, the number of convictions obtained under Penal Code section 288 is likely to increase.
However, while resolving some conflicts, this decision raises some
new questions. The respective roles to be played by Penal Code sections 288 and 288.5 in prosecuting child molestation cases are unclear.
Although Penal Code section 288.5 was enacted to deal with the
problems involved in convicting resident child molesters under section 288,102 these problems are greatly diminished after Jones. A
98. Id. at 68, 792 P.2d at 664.65, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 632-33. Accord. Van Hoek, 200
Cal. App. 3d at 817-18, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
99. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 70, 792 P.2d at 666, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
100. Id. at 71, 792 P.2d at 666-67, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
101. See L.A. Times, June 29, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
102. Section 1 of chapter 1402 of Stats. 1989 provides the Legislature's reasons for
enacting section 288.5:
Section 1. (a) The legislature finds and declares that because of the court's
decision in People v. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, there is an immediate
need for additional statutory protection for the most vulnerable among our
children, those of tender years, some of whom are being subjected to continuing sexual abuse by those commonly referred to as 'resident child molesters.'
These molesters reside with, or have recurring access to, a child and repeatedly molest the child over a prolonged period of time but the child, because of
age or the frequency of the molestations, or both, often is unable to distinguish one incident from another in terms of time, place, or other particulars,
and as a consequence prosecutors are unable to provide the specificity of
charges necessary to overcome the constitutional due process problems raised
in the Van Hoek case within the framework of existing statutory law. As a
consequence, some of our most vulnerable children continue to be a risk and
some of our worst offenders continue to go unpunished.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to provide additional protection for children subjected to continuing sexual abuse and certain
punishment for persons referred to as 'resident child molesters' by establish-
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young victim's inability to recall specific details about the alleged molestations will not render the evidence insufficient to convict the accused. Additionally, a defendant faced with such generic testimony
will no longer be able to successfully assert that a violation of his due
process rights has occurred.
Because section 288.5 limits the number of counts against a defendant to one per victim, x0 3 a prosecutor may have an incentive to bring
charges under section 288, under which multiple counts may be
charged against a defendant. Thus, although section 288.5 provides
for a jail sentence of up to sixteen years, it is possible for a defendant
to obtain a harsher sentence under section 288 if the jury convicts
him of multiple counts. 0 4 Regardless of the statute used, however, it
is clear that this decision facilitates the prosecution and conviction of
resident child molesters.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In People v. Jones, the court was faced with the issue of whether a
child's generic testimony regarding alleged acts of sexual abuse is sufficient to uphold a conviction against the accused under Penal Code
section 288, and, if so, whether the use of such testimony that is unspecific with regard to the time, place, or other circumstances of the
alleged acts of molestation violates the defendant's constitutional
rights. The court concluded that such testimony is sufficient from an
ing a new crime of continuing sexual abuse of a child under circumstances
where there have been repeated acts of molestation over a period of time, and
the perpetrator either resides with or has recurring access to the child. It is
the further intent of the Legislature that the penalty for this crime shall be
greater than the maximum penalty under existing law for any single felony
sex offense.
1989 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 1402, sec. 1 (West).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(c) (West Supp. 1990).
104. Justice Mosk noted that:
[blecause the number of charges on which a defendant is convicted will
strongly influence the length of his sentence, the majority's approach creates
a serious risk of arbitrary and disproportionate sentencing ....
The majority's only response to this dilemma is to admonish prosecutors,
parenthetically, to 'exercise discretion in limiting the number of separate
counts charged.' The exhortation neither provides prosecutors with any
guidelines as to what a reasonable exercise of discretion would be, nor establishes any standard for abuse of discretion that would be reviewable by an appellate court. While most prosecutors will doubtless exercise restraint, the
few who do not, for whatever mixture of self-seeking and misguidedly altruistic motives, will be undeterred by the majority's admonition.
Jones, 51 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 792 P.2d at 666, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).

evidentiary standpoint to uphold a conviction, and that the use of
such testimony does not violate a defendant's due process rights.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's conclusions and argued that in cases where a child is unable to
recall specific details regarding the alleged sexual assaults, the defendant should be charged under Penal Code section 288.5, a statute
specifically enacted to deal with ongoing and indistinguishable abusive conduct.
The court's ruling in Jones settles a conflict that has existed in the
California courts, and makes it easier for prosecutors to convict resident child molesters. The decision thus upholds the state's strong interest in fully prosecuting and convicting child molesters.
IRIS WEINMANN

V.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A criminal defendant may obtain discovery of
information in police possession regardingan
unidentified informantfor purposes of challenging the
veracity of statements made in an affidavit supportinga
search warrantonly upon a preliminaryshowing of
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of material
statements made by the informant People v.
Luttenberger.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 5-2 decision emerging from a legal battle that pitted the confidential informant's right to anonymity against the defendant's right
to challenge the search warrant leading to his arrest, the California
Supreme Court limited the criminal defendant's access to information in the hands of law enforcement officials regarding the reliability of confidential informants. 2 Pursuant to the court's ruling, an
accused must now make a preliminary showing of evidence sufficient
to cast "reasonable doubt" upon the reliability of the informant in or3
der to gain an in camera review and discovery of police records.
Discovery of such information is often helpful to criminal defendants who, under federal law, must make a substantial showing of inaccuracy within an affidavit before being granted a hearing where
1. 50 Cal. 3d 1, 784 P.2d 633, 265 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1990). Chief Justice Lucas'
opinion for the court was joined by Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and Kennard. Justice
Kaufman concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion was
joined by Justice Broussard.
2. Id. at 20-24, 784 P.2d at 645-48, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702-05.

3. Id. at 21-22, 784 P.2d at 646, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
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they can challenge a facially valid search warrant. 4 Not suprisingly,
criminal defendants often encounter difficulty in meeting this burden
when the search warrant affidavit is based on information supplied
by a confidential informant. 5 Defendants in California have attempted to remedy that problem by requesting discovery of police
records. By comparing the affidavit to the police files, the defendant
hopes to find sufficient inaccuracies to meet the substantial showing
required for a traversal hearing.
Prior to the Luttenberger decision, the propriety of granting these
motions for discovery had become a source of great controversy and
confusion among the various courts of appeal. 6 With its decision in
Luttenberger, the court substantially modified a 1985 court of appeal
decision that had given criminal defendants wide latitude to procure
information in police records provided that the contents were
prescreened and edited by the court to protect the informant's identity.7 By establishing the reasonable doubt requirements, the court
hoped to limit "fishing expeditions" by defense attorneys which the
1985 decision had allegedly fostered. 8 While acknowledging the dilemma faced by defendants when warrants are based on information
obtained from confidential sources, the court nonetheless agreed that
the 1985 ruling was "inappropriately broad" and should be curtailed.9
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Theodor v. Superior Court

In Theodor v. Superior Court,O the California Supreme Court upheld the statutory right of a criminal defendant to challenge a
facially valid search warrant by challenging the veracity of the affidavit supporting the warrant.'" However, the court placed upon the defendant the burden of making a preliminary showing, requiring some
4. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
5. See People v. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 318, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1985).
See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text (discussing Rivas). See also Comment,
The Rivas Motion: The Creative Defense Attorney's Attempt to Circumvent Franks v.
Delaware and the Informer's Privilege Rule, 20 PAC. L.J. 1207 (1989) (advocating reversal of Rivas).
6. See infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
7. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 319-22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 481-83.
8. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 20-21, 784 P.2d at 645, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
9. Id. at 7, 784 P.2d at 636, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
10. 8 Cal. 2d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
11. Id. at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243.

degree of specificity, material innacuracies within the affidavit.12 If
the challenged assertion in the affidavit was the result of negligence,
the inaccuracy was to be corrected and the affidavit reinstated if sufficient probable cause remained.i 3 On the other hand, in cases subsequent to Theodor, the California Supreme Court held that, where an
assertion was made in bad faith, the rationale of Theodor mandated
that the warrant be quashed and the evidence obtained pursuant to
the warrant be suppressed.i4
Thus, by 1980, the law regarding challenges to facially valid search
warrant affidavits was firmly established in California. Meanwhile,
the federal courts were grappling with the same issue, but formulating a significantly different standard.
B. Franks v. Delaware
The United States Supreme Court did not squarely confront the
question of a defendant's right to challenge the truth of statements
made by law enforcement officials in affidavits used to support
6
search warrants until 1978,15 in the case of Franks v. Delaware.'
The Franks Court recognized that the answer to that question was
necessarily a function of several competing interests.' 7 After weighing those interests, the Court concluded that a total ban on challenges to search warrants was not a tenable solution,18 and that a
criminal defendant must have a limited right to challenge the validity of a search warrant. Thus, the Supreme Court held that a defend12. See 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2439 (2d ed. 1989).
13. Theodor, 8 Cal. 2d at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
14. See People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 390, 618 P.2d 213, 221-22, 168 Cal. Rptr.
667, 676 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 74-75,
583 P.2d 130, 133, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1978). See also 20 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw
§ 2526 (1985 & Supp. 1990); 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,

Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2439 (1989).
15. The issue of a defendant's right to traverse a facially valid search warrant affidavit was tangentially addressed by the Supreme Court in a case predating Franks,but
the Court merely presumed, without deciding, that such a right existed. See
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964). See also Note, Franks v. Delaware, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 67, 72 (1979).
16. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). For an in depth analysis of the Franks decision, see Note,
Franks v. Delaware: A Proposed Interpretationand Application, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 601.
See also Note, supra note 15.
17. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164. The Court noted that allowing challenges to facially
valid search warrants and excluding otherwise relevant evidence would exact a cost on
society by preventing some criminal convictions and overburdening the criminal
docket with postsearch evidentiary hearings. However, the Court also recognized that
these factors must be weighed against the possibility that, by precluding such hearings,
searches based on false allegations by police officers would be allowed to go unchallenged. Id. at 167-68.
18. "[A] flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude the probable-cause requirement of all real meaning." Id. at 168.
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ant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the veracity of an
affidavit only after making a "substantial preliminary showing" that
(1) a false statement was knowingly or recklessly included in the affidavit, and (2) that the alleged misstatement was material to the finding of probable cause. 19
In contrast to Theodor, the Court also held that the fourth amendment imposes no sanctions for negligent misstatements contained in
affidavits and requires mere deletion of those inaccuracies which are
falsely or recklessly caused.
C.

20

Proposition8

Faced with an obvious conflict between both the procedures and
remedies afforded a criminal defendant under the California search
and seizure statute 2 1 and those granted by the fourth amendment af-

ter Franks,the California Supreme Court chose to rely solely on California law in

holding that intentional or reckless misstatements
require automatic invalidation of the warrant. 2 2 However, this practice of autonomy came to a sudden halt in June of 1982 when the California electorate passed Proposition 8, an initiative measure which
23
added article I, section 28 to the California Constitution.
Under subdivision (d) of this enactment, California state courts are
required to apply federal standards in determining whether relevant
evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid search warrant must be

excluded.24 Less clear, and a source of conflict among the courts of
19. Id, at 155-56.
20. Id. at 171.
21. "A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence
any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of
the following grounds: ...(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable
because... (iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; [or] ...
(v) there was any other violation of federal or state constitutional standards." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
22. See People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1490-91, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860
(1988) (citing People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 383 n.2, 618 P.2d 213, 217 n.2, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 667, 671 n.2 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)).
23. Proposition 8, The Victim's Bill of Rights § 1, 1982 Cal. Stat. A-186, A-187 (enacting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28).
24. Section 28(d), entitled "Right to Truth-in-Evidence," states in pertinent part:
"Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See also Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1491, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
860. Because section 28(d) forbids the exclusion of evidence except when mandated by
the federal constitution, "even if affiants run afoul of Kurland, Cook, and Theodor,
there is no remedy for mere negligence, and the remedy for perjury or reckless indif-

appeal, is whether section 28(d) requires California state courts to
adopt the federal threshold for granting the defendant a traversal
hearing and subsequently compelling discovery. 25 Prior to Luttenberger, three California courts of appeal had considered this issue
in the context of motions for discovery of police records containing
infomation about confidential informants but were unable to reach a
concensus.
D.

The California Courts of Appeal
1. People v. Rivas

In People v. Rivas,26 the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District stated that "under both the state and federal standards, a defendant's opportunity to secure a hearing rests in large part upon his
ability to discover whether the affidavit contains inaccuracies, in order that he may make a sufficient preliminary showing of same." 27
Accordingly, the court was sympathetic to the plight of defendants
who must challenge the accuracy of affidavits which are based upon
information obtained from confidential informants. However, the
court also recognized the importance of protecting the identity of
those informants. 28 Reconciling these competing interests, the Rivas
court held that a defendant is entitled to the discovery of information
relevant to the accuracy of an affidavit, provided that the documents
are prescreened in camera to protect the identity of the confidential
29
informant.
Significantly, the Rivas court did not require the defendant to
make a preliminary showing under Franks before being granted an
in camera hearing.30 In fact, the defendant apparently made no
ference is to correct the misinformation and retest the warrant-the warrant is no
longer peremptorily quashed." Id.
25. For a general discussion of Proposition 8 and its effect on traversal hearings,
see 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Exclusion of Illegally Ob-

tained Evidence § 2442 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
26. 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985).
27. Id. at 320, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
28. The Rivas court stated that "[c]ourts have long approved the government's
contention that informants are necessary and would not remain an available source of
assistance to law enforcement if not provided anonymity." Id. at 321, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
482.
29. Id. at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483. Several other courts support the use of the in
camera hearing procedure to protect the identity of confidential informants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049
(1976) ("in camera procedure provides an equally-acceptable accomodation of the competing interests of the Government and the accused . . . [where] the question is
whether a law enforcement officer has lied."); Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d at 394-95 nn.11-12,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79 nn.11-12.
30. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 321-22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83. Rivas failed to specify any preliminary standard of its own or another court's creation. Instead, it stated
simply that in camera hearings should not be granted "as a matter of routine," but
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showing whatsoever of inconsistencies in the affidavit but simply asserted the necessity of discovery in order to exercise his right to challenge the affidavit.31 Nonetheless, the Rivas court found the
preliminary showing made by the defendant sufficient to merit discovery of police records. 32 Thus, Rivas appears to hold that a mere
conclusory challenge to the veracity of the affidavit constitutes a sufficient preliminary showing. Notably, the court failed to discuss section 28(d) and its impact, if any, on the court's analysis.
2. People v. Crabb
Confronted with the same issue, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
flatly rejected the Rivas decision in People v. Crabb.33 The court
noted that section 28(d) mandates the application of federal law in all
challenges to the admissibility of evidence.34 Because a defendant
seeks discovery in order to challenge the warrant and eventually exclude all evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant, the Crabb court
reasoned that section 28(d) requires the application of federal law in
discovery motions as well as motions to suppress.3 5
Therefore, the court concluded that the Rivas decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Franks v. Delaware.36
Moreover, the Crabb court stated that the standard announced by Rivas constituted "unfettered police record discovery." 37 Thus, the
that "it should not take much to prompt the suppression hearing judge to order such a
hearing" if the defendant "'has fairly put in issue'" the existence or reliability of the
informant. I& at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (quoting 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 3.3 at 585-86 (1978)).
31. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 14, 784 P.2d at 641, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 698 (Lucas,
C.J, commenting on Rivas).
32. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
33. 191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1987). In Crabb, the defendant was
convicted of possession of illegal drugs after a search of his home, conducted pursuant
to a search warrant, uncovered evidence of his guilt. The defendant sought discovery
of police records concerning the confidential informant whose statements supported
the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant claimed that
the denial of his motion was improper because it precluded him from assembling the
necessary evidence of inaccuracies within the affidavit as required by Franks. Id. at
392-93, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
34. Id. at 393, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
35. Id. at 395-96, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
36. The court characterized the defendant's discovery motion as "a random search
for evidence that the affiant might have misstated or omitted facts which might then
have cast doubt upon the affiant's veracity." Id at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 388. Thus, the
court concluded that the motion constituted the type of "fishing expedition" that
Franks was designed to preclude. Id. at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
37. Id. at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387.

court held that a defendant is not entitled to a suppression hearing
absent a preliminary showing required by Franks.3 8
3.

People v. Broome

Finally, the Third District Court of Appeal, in People v. Broome,
addressed the issue, and, in turn, rejected Crabb.39 The Broome court
drew a distinction between an evidentiary hearing to controvert the
veracity of statements in an affidavit and the defendant's right to discovery. 40 Section 28(d), it explained, requires California courts to follow federal law only in the direct context of excluding relevant
evidence.41 Thus, the court found "absolutely no basis . . . [for concluding that] the Franks standard of a 'preliminary substantial showing' must be grafted on the California law of discovery." 42
It was against this analytical background that the California
Supreme Court decided People v. Luttenberger.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's home was issued pursuant to the affidavit of a police officer whose source was a
confidential informant.43 The affidavit stated that previous information given by the informant had proven reliable; however, it did not
contain any additional facts pertaining to the informant's background
or reliability.44 A search conducted pursuant to the warrant uncovered methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphanalia, cash, and a
loaded handgun in the defendant's home. Consequently, the defend45
ant was arrested and charged with possession of illegal drugs.
Prior to his preliminary hearing, the defendant moved for discovery of information in police possession which he sought to support a
"sub-facial" challenge of the warrant by disputing the accuracy of
statements contained within the affidavit.4 The defendant did not
38. Id. at 396, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
39. People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1495, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854, 863 (1988).
In Broome, the district attorney refused to comply with an order to turn over a drug
sample allegedly purchased from the defendant during a "controlled buy," contending
that the court order was allowing discovery of evidence without the required showing
by the defendant under Franks. Id. at 1485-88, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57. The trial court
dismissed the charges on the basis of the prosecutor's failure to comply with the order.
Id. at 1486-87, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 857.

40.
41.
42.
43.
(1990).
44.
45.

Id, at 1491-92, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
Id.
Id. at 1491, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
People v. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 784 P.2d 633, 636, 265 Cal. Rptr. 690, 693
Id.
Id.

46. Id. at 7-8, 784 P.2d at 636, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 693. The defendant's request sought

in camera review and discovery of any existing information pertaining to the inform-
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47
request disclosure of the informant's identity at that time.
The magistrate denied the motion, and an information was filed.48
9
The defendant then made a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges.4
The superior court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the magistrate erred in failing to conduct an in camera
review of the requested information as required by People v. Rivas.5°
The court of appeal affirmed.
The California Supreme Court granted review in order to determine whether the in camera screening procedure authorized by Rivas is consistent with section 28(d), and if so, what preliminary
showing is required in order to justify such in camera review and discovery of information in police records concerning confidential

informants.51
IV.

A.

THE COURT'S DECISION

The Majority Opinion

The majority prefaced their discussion of the right to discovery of
information concerning confidential informants with a comprehensive survey of legal authority pertaining to that issue.5 2 Then, in
resolving the growing fissure between the courts of appeal, the majority rejected the contention that section 28(d) requires state courts
to apply the Franks "substantial preliminary showing" standard in
conjunction with discovery. 53 The court stressed that section 28(d)
controls only the admissibility of evidence in criminal hearings 54 and
ant's past involvement with illegal drugs, police reports concerning the informant, pay
vouchers issued or promises made to the defendant by the police in compensation for
his services. Id.
47. Id. at 8, 784 P.2d at 636, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 693. Although the defendant's written motion sought disclosure of the informant's identity, the defendant modified that
request at the hearing on the motion, stating that he was not requesting such disclosure pending the outcome of the discovery motion. Upon denial of the motion, the defendant filed a second motion which included a request for disclosure of the
informant's identity. This motion was likewise denied. Id at 8 n.2, 784 P.2d at 636 n.2,
265 Cal. Rptr. at 693 n.2.
48. Luttenberger,50 Cal. 3d at 8, 784 P.2d at 637, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
49. 1d
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6, 784 P.2d at 635, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
52. Id. at 9-16, 784 P.2d at 637-42, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 694-99.
53. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 16-17, 784 P.2d at 642-43, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text
54. Id. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988); In
re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886-88, 694 P.2d 744, 752-53, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-40
(1985).

does not find application to discovery procedures.55 A defendant's
right to discovery, the court held, emanates from the fundamental
principle that an accused is entitled to a "'fair trial and an intelligent
defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible
information.' "56
While the court adamantly professed state autonomy in regard to
matters of discovery, it nonetheless sought guidance from the Franks
decision in evaluating the appropriateness of the Rivas standard for
discovery. The court noted that the purpose of the Franks requirement of a substantial preliminary showing was to avoid misuse of the
evidentiary hearing as a tool for discovery.57 However, the majority
also stressed that the Franks court was not faced with the dilemma
that exists when an affidavit relies upon information given by a confidential source.58 In such cases, the majority theorized, the Franks
court would not have intended its substantial showing threshold to
bar challenges to warrant affidavits.5 9
Moreover, the court stated that preliminary discovery may, in fact,
55. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 16-17, 784 P.2d at 642-43, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
See Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1491-92, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. "Proposition 8... did
not adopt the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States Code, or the federal common law. Consequently, [California] criminal courts did not become federalized by its enactment." IL at 1492, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
56. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 17, 784 P.2d at 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (quoting
Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 84, 776 P.2d 222, 228, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520,
526 (1989)). The court stated that granting criminal defendants reasonable access to
information bearing on the validity of a search warrant is consistent with the holding
of Santa Cruz. I& See also Holman v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 480, 485-86, 629 P.2d
14, 17, 174 Cal. Rptr. 506, 509 (1981) (holding that defendants are entitled to "reasonable, limited" discovery prior to preliminary hearing upon a showing that such discovery is "reasonably necessary" and will not cause undue delay).
57. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 17, 784 P.2d at 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See
Franks,438 U.S. at 170 (preliminary showing "should suffice to prevent the misuse of a
veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction"). But see Broome, 201 Cal.
App. 3d at 1493, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (holding that the discovery prohibited by Franks
was general in nature as opposed to discovery aimed at gathering facts for a traversal
hearing).
58. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 11, 18, 784 P.2d at 638, 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700.
The Court in Franks was faced with an affidavit containing information from two
named informants whom the defendant had been able to contact. Franks, 438 U.S. at
157. Thus, the facts of Franks did not require and the Court did not decide the issue of
how a defendant could meet the required substantial preliminary showing when confronted with an affidavit based on information derived from an unidentified source.
Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 18, 784 P.2d at 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
59. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 18, 784 P.2d at 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 700. On the
federal level, several courts applying Franks have acknowledged the difficulty of amassing sufficient information to make a substantial preliminary showing in situations involving confidential informants. See, e.g., People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 506 N.E.2d
1269 (1987) (the Franks requirement must not be applied in such a manner as to preclude all possibility of a traversal hearing). See also Comment, supra note 5, at n.147
and accompanying text (citing cases which highlight the problems associated with confidential informants and call for a lower standard of preliminary showing in such
instances).
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have the effect of reducing the number of Franks veracity hearings
because many defendants will find little or no helpful information in
police records and will forgo making a Franks motion. 60 Given these
factors, the majority concluded that the in camera review and discovery procedures sanctioned by Rivas do not conflict with, but rather
complement, the stated purpose of Franks.61 Thus, the court held
that neither section 28(d) nor Franks requires criminal defendants to
make a substantial preliminary showing in order to obtain discovery
of information relevant to the traversal of a warrant.62 However, the
majority qualified this pronouncement, stating that the appropriate
threshold must be higher than the general allegations made by
63
Luttenberger.
The majority endorsed the use of in camera screening as proposed
by Rivas, noting that the devise accommodates the conflicting interests of the state and the defendant while safeguarding the informant's identity. 64 However, the court found fault with the Rivas
decision to the extent that it allowed an in camera discovery hearing
65
to go forward on the basis of a conclusory assertion of necessity.
This liberal approach, the majority stated, would constitute an "unjustifiable burden on our trial courts and an unwarranted invasion of
police files."66 Citing several supreme court cases as authority, the
majority concluded that an appropriate standard would require that a
discovery motion be "sustained by plausible justification" 6 7 and requested "with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a 'fishing expedition.' "68 Moreover, the court
stressed that under Franks, a warrant affidavit is presumed truth60. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 18, 784 P.2d at 643, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
61. Id,
62. 1& at 18-19, 784 P.2d at 644, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
63. 1&
64. The majority noted that the in camera procedure has been employed by numerous courts and administrative bodies in a variety of contexts. Id at 19, 784 P.2d at
644, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(d) (West 1966) (mandating
in camera review at prosecutor's request in order to determine whether an informant's identity should be disclosed because he is a material witness on the issue of guilt);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 915(b) (West 1966) (approving in camera proceeding to determine
whether information is privileged); see generally People v. Brown, 207 Cal. App. 3d
1541, 256 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1989) (denying open evidentiary hearing based upon results of
in camera examination of confidential informants).
65. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 20, 784 P.2d at 645, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
66. 1&
67. Id (citing Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 167, 410 P.2d 838, 843, 49
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1966)).
68. Id. at 20-21, 784 P.2d at 645, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702.

ful.69 Thus, a defendant should not be entitled to an in camera review of documents absent a showing that the warrant affidavit is in
70
some way inaccurate.
In light of these criteria, but with an understanding of the difficulty of proving inaccuracies in an affidavit that relies on information
from a confidential informant, the majority felt the need for a preliminary showing requirement that is "somewhat less demanding
than the 'substantial showing of material falsity' required by
Franks," and yet more demanding than the general allegation of necessity required by Rivas.71 Therefore, the majority fashioned a
three-pronged approach to obtaining discovery. Under this approach,
a criminal defendant may obtain discovery of information in police
possession regarding a confidential informant for purposes of challenging the accuracy of an affidavit supporting a search warrant only:
(1) upon a showing that there is reasonable doubt as to the veracity
of the statements made by the affiant; 72 (2) after specifying, if possible, the information sought, his basis for believing such information
exists, and his reasons for requesting access to that information; 73
and (3) after raising a substantial possibility that the allegedly untrue
statements were material to the finding of probable cause. 74
Once this preliminary showing is made, the trial court must satisfy
itself that the allegations of material misrepresentation are supported
by the information to be discovered. If such a determination is made,
the court shall delete all references to the informant's identity and
69. Luttenberger,50 Cal. 3d at 21, 784 P.2d at 645, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702. See Franks
v. Delaware: A Proposed Interpretation and Application, supra note 16, at nn.86-95
and accompanying text.
70. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 21, 784 P.2d at 645, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
71. Id. at 21-22, 784 P.2d at 646-47, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
72. Id. at 22, 784 P.2d at 646, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 703. The court noted that the newly
formulated standard of reasonable doubt was similar to the requirements of other jurisdictions faced with analagous issues. Id. (citing People v. Poindexter, 90 Mich. App.
599, 282 N.W.2d 411, 416 (1979) (allowing in camera examination of informant after defendant has "raised a legitimate question" regarding the veracity of the affidavit and
the court concludes there is "some doubt" as to the affiant's reliability)); United States
v. Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.R.I. 1981) (authorizing in camera review upon a minimal showing of inconsistency on the face of the affidavit which substantiates the defendant's assertion of falsehood).
73. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 22, 784 P.2d at 646-47, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04. The
majority reiterated that conclusory statements averring the necessity of discovery will
not entitle the defendant to an in, camera hearing, even in circumstances involving
confidential informants. Id. The majority contemplated that, in such cases, a defendant could still meet his burden by either contradicting statements in the affidavit or
pointing to inconsistencies on the face of the affidavit. Id.
74. Id. at 23, 784 P.2d at 647, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 704. Following the adoption of section 28(d), materiality is judged by the federal standard as set forth in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), which evaluates the existence of good cause for a search in terms
of the totality of the circumstances. Id. See also People v. Gesner, 202 Cal. App. 3d
581, 590, 248 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328-29 (1988).
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7
order the disclosure of the documents to the defendant. 5
Having set forth a new standard for obtaining in camera review,
the court applied the test for the first time, holding that in this case,
the defendant had not met that standard.76

B.

The ConcurringOpinion

In his concurrence, Justice Kaufman advocated the reasonable
doubt standard formulated by the majority, emphasizing that this
higher threshold requirement facilitates the policy of discovery while
offering protection to the confidential informant. 77 Justice Kaufman
stated that, because the need for discovery is far less compelling
when sought for purposes of attacking an affidavit than for use in
preparing a substantive defense, a requirement of a preliminary
78
showing of reasonable doubt is therefore appropriate.
While approving of the reasonable doubt standard itself, Justice
Kaufman wrote separately to call attention to a problem associated
with the application of that test in circumstances where the only
statement in the affidavit concerning the confidential informant consists of a mere conclusion without further facts. Justice Kaufman
agreed with the dissent that, under such circumstances, it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to successfully
raise reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the conclusory statement. 79 However, Justice Kaufman stressed that the proper remedy
for this problem lies not in requiring less of the defendant who seeks
discovery, as the dissent advocates, but rather in requiring more factual detail to be included in affidavits concerning the reliability of
confidential informants.80 Thus, in the defendant's case, Justice
Kaufman indicated that he would have found the affidavit insufficient on its face to establish the reliability of the informant had the
defendant filed a motion challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit
75. Luttenberger,50 Cal. 3d at 24, 784 P.2d at 647, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
76. The court found that the defendant's motion "was based entirely on conclusory assertions, unsupported by affidavits, and he failed to raise any doubt regarding the truthfulness of the warrant affidavit." Id. at 24-25, 784 P.2d at 648, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 705. Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.
77. Id. at 25, 784 P.2d at 648, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 25, 784 P.2d at 648-49, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 25, 784 P.2d at 649, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
80. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 25-26, 784 P.2d at 649, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Kaufman, J., concurring).

in this regard.S1
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk, joined in dissent by Justice Broussard, prefaced his
criticisms of the majority opinion with an acknowledgment of two areas of common ground. First, he supported the majority's conclusion
that matters of criminal discovery are outside the scope of section
28(d) and thus are not confined by the parameters of federal protection.82 Moreover, Justice Mosk agreed that, even if section 28(d) does
apply to discovery, the liberal standard set forth in People v. Rivas
does not conflict with the threshold test formulated by the United
83
States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware.
However, Justice Mosk parted company with the majority at this
juncture, finding fault with their modification of Rivas. He stated
that the heightened requirement of reasonable doubt is out of line
with previous holdings of the court.84 He further stated that the new
preliminary standard places an "unrealistic" burden on defendants
85
and is the product of "ill defined" rationale.
In defense of this position, Justice Mosk reviewed several recent
supreme court decisions which indicate that the liberal rule announced by Rivas is entirely appropriate for purposes of discovery.
Quoting from Pitchess v. Superior Court,86 Justice Mosk emphasized
that discovery has been allowed upon a showing of "general allegations which establish some cause for discovery."87 Additionally, Justice Mosk drew attention to the case of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, in which the court held that discovery of police records was
proper upon allegations set forth in an affidavit of information and
belief. 88
At the heart of Justice Mosk's dissent was his concern that the reasonable doubt standard imposes an unreasonable burden on criminal
defendants, often placing them in a "Catch-22" predicament. Justice
Mosk expressed this concern in the words of United States v. Brian,
stating, "when an affidavit relies for its assertion of probable cause
81. I& at 26, 784 P.2d at 649, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Kaufman, J., concurring). In
Luttenberger, the "[d]efendant did not contend the affidavit was facially insufficient to
establish probable cause for issuing a search warrant." I& at 8, 784 P.2d at 636, 265
Cal. Rptr. at 693.
82. Id. at 26, 784 P.2d at 649, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
83. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
84. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
85. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 26 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

86. 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
87. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d at 27, 784 P.2d at 650, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 707 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pitchess, 11 Cal. 3d at 537, 522 P.2d at 309, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 901).
88. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Cruz, 49 Cal. 3d at 89, 776 P.2d at 231,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 529).
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upon facts attributable to confidential informants, defendants have
no way to obtain the very information they need to assert their entitlement to a Franks hearing." 89 Moreover, Justice Mosk argued that
this basic problem is further complicated by the possibility of
fabrication by police to make the informant's statement consistent
with the corroborating information. 90 In such situations, he claimed,
a defendant would be unable to raise a reasonable doubt concerning
the veracity of the affidavit by pointing to inconsistencies on the face
of the warrant.
Finally, Justice Mosk analyzed each of the items put forth by the
majority as justifications for the adoption of the heightened requirement of a preliminary showing of reasonable doubt. He dismissed
the majority's concern for maintaining the court's discretion to preserve the confidentiality of the informant's identity, stating that the
Rivas pre-screening procedure already serves that function.9 1 Justice
Mosk also noted the maxim advanced by the majority - that a warrant, under Franks, is presumed to be truthful. In response, Justice
Mosk stated that while a warrant may be presumed truthful, it
should not be granted immunity from challenge by denying discovery. 92 Justice Mosk also attacked the reasonable doubt standard on
grounds of judicial inefficiency, charging that the new standard "substitute[s] a less expensive procedure - the grant of discovery upon a
minimal showing, with a more costly procedure - a hearing to determine whether reasonable doubt and materiality standards had been
satisfied."93 Lastly, Justice Mosk labeled the majority's concern over
"fishing expeditions," unwarranted. 94 Justice Mosk stated that, so
89. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Brian, 507 F. Supp. at 765).
90. Id. at 28, 784 P.2d at 650, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 707 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The pervasive nature of police perjury has been the subject of several commentaries. See, e.g.,
Herman, Warrantsfor Arrest or Search: Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 721 (1975); Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counse.
Spinelli-HarrisSearch Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 405; Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What if It's
False?,19 UCLA L. REV. 96 (1971). See also Franks v. Delaware:A Proposed Interpretation and Application, supra note 16, at nn.96-112 and accompanying text.
91. Luttenberger,50 Cal. 3d at 28, 784 P.2d at 651, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 28-29, 784 P.2d at 651, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
Franks v. Delaware: A Proposed Interpretationand Application, supra note 16, at 62223 (noting that "the Franks opinion confirms that the mere fact that a search was
made incident to a warrant does not preclude review of the veracity of warrant
affiants").
93. Luttenberger,50 Cal. 3d at 29, 784 P.2d at 651, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
94. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). "

long as the requests for discovery are somewhat specific and narrow
in scope, the Rivas standard provides adequate protection against
95
overly broad discovery.
In conclusion, Justice Mosk called for the rejection of the proposed
reasonable doubt standard and, in its place, the adoption of a standard based on either "general allegations" or "information and
belief."96
V.

IMPACT

The Luttenberger decision is a clear triumph for prosecutors, as the
foreseeable impact of the case will be a substantial reduction in the
number of defendants who will be able to obtain discovery of information contained in police records which they could ultimately use to
meet the substantial preliminary showing required for an exclusionary hearing pursuant to Franks.
By establishing a requirement of reasonable doubt as a prerequisite
to in camera review and discovery, the majority professes to have
created a sanctuary of middle ground between the negligible preliminary showing embraced by Rivas and the substantial preliminary
showing delineated by Franks. 97 Admittedly, a showing of reasonable doubt is logically a compromise between the two standards.
However, for all practical purposes, a defendant confronted with a
conclusory statement in an affidavit based on information derived
from a confidential informant can no more reach a standard of reasonable doubt than he can make a substantial showing. 98 Perhaps
the realization of this truism will prompt the introduction of more
stringent requirements for the amount of information to be included
in affidavits.9 9
The Luttenberger decision naturally impacts confidential informants as well as defendants. When viewed from the perspective of
the confidential informant, the decision represents a qualified victory. Luttenberger adopts the in camera procedures of Rivas, allowing discovery of information concerning confidential informants
only after the requested documents are prescreened by the court and
1°
purged of all references to the identity of the informant. 0 While
95. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 29, 784 P.2d at 651-52, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 21, 784 P.2d at 646, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
98. This is especially true in situations such as the Luttenberger case where the
affidavit read in its entirety: "Within the past ten days, I met with an informant who
has, in the recent past, given me information about drug dealers which later proved to
be reliable." Id at 25, 784 P.2d at 649, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
Given such conclusory language, there is little chance that a defendant could point to

inaccuracies on the face of the affidavit, as contemplated by the majority. Id,
99. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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confidential informants argue that such measures are largely ineffective due to judicial time constraints and inadvertant disclosures of information pertinent to the informant's identity,O1 the Luttenberger
decision should nonetheless provide some additional degree of comfort. Due to its imposition of a reasonable doubt standard, fewer defendants will gain access to such information.
The Luttenberger decision is unlikely to satisfy critics of Rivas who
charged that the prehearing discovery authorized by Rivas imposed a
02
substantial burden on an already overburdened judicial system.
These critics argue that motions for discovery purusant to Rivas
often result in continuances, thereby adding to the congestion of the
courts.' 03 Moreover, it is feared that such motions for discovery will
likely become routine, adding, in effect, a whole new layer to the judicial process in all cases involving search warrants based on information from confidential informants 0 4
Luttenberger, like Rivas, embraces the use of the in camera hearing. Granted, Luttenberger's imposition of a preliminary showing of
reasonable doubt will surely prevent most unmeritorious, and arguably some meritorious, claims from reaching the in camera review.
However, even in those instances, Luttenberger merely substitutes a
reasonable doubt hearing in the place of the in camera review. Furthermore, where the defendant meets the burden of demonstrating
reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the affidavit, an in camera review will follow. Thus, the Luttenberger decision potentially adds a
procedural layer of its own in cases involving confidential informants.
With its decision in Luttenberger, the California Supreme Court
has altered the status quo for criminal defendants, confidential informants, and the judicial system. Whatever the additional consequences of Luttenberger may be, it seems clear that the practical
effect of the decision will be to bring the California courts of appeal
in line with one another.
101. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1231 (noting that informants and defendants
frequently move in the same social circleshence, details remaining in documents
purged of the informant's name may nonetheless lead a defendant to the identity of
the informant). Id
102. Id at 1232.
103. Id,
104. Id (citing Grano, supra note 90 at 407) (stating that criminal defense counsel's
only available option to exclude evidence may be a Rivas motion).

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Luttenberger court was faced with the task of balancing the
defendant's right to be secure in his home against the confidential informant's right to anonymity. While not perfect, the reasonable
doubt standard is the court's attempt to provide judicial equality between the two. Naturally, when dealing with two diametrically opposed interests, a concession to one cannot be granted without cost to
the other.
LORI SWAFFORD
VI.

DEATH PENALTY LAW
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Between January and June of 1990, the California Supreme Court
decided ten death penalty cases.'

During this period, the Lucas court

continued its policy of reversing only upon an actual finding of prejudicial error.2

Out of the ten cases decided, the court reversed the

death penalty in only one case and vacated another with the possibility of reinstatement.

3

1. This survey covers the death penalty cases decided between February 8, 1990
and June 14, 1990. The following cases, listed alphabetically by the defendant's name,
form the basis for this survey: People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 399, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d
640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990); People v. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1098, 790 P.2d 1327, 269
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990); People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834
(1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 790 P.2d 676, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1990); People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826, 789 P.2d 983, 268 Cal. Rptr. 802, cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
591 (1990); People v. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d 954, 790 P.2d 1289, 269 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 713 (1991); People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 791 P.2d 965, 270
Cal. Rptr. 286 (1990); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr.
309, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 226 (1990); People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 789 P.2d 887,
268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 768 (1991). For ease of reference, subsequent histories are hereinafter omitted.
2. See California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 451 (1989); California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1165 (1989); CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law,
17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 537 (1990); CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey - Death Penalty
Law, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1095 (1990) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law L II, III & IV
respectively].
3. The death penalty was reversed in Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d at 1117, 790 P.2d at
1338, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 541, and vacated with the possibility of reinstatement in Lewis,
50 Cal. 3d at 292, 786 P.2d at 910, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
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Significant in this survey period is the continuing decrease in the
number of cases decided.4 Statistics show a current backlog of 180
death penalty cases. 5 Although the court must dispose of about forty
cases annually to stay even, the output of the court dropped from
fifty-five cases decided from May 1988 to May 1989, to nineteen cases
decided between May 1989 and May 1990.6 Chief Justice Malcolm
Lucas claims that the court is not overwhelmed with death penalty
cases. 7 However, observers remain unconvinced.8
This survey will address the issues causing reversal of death penalties, and will highlight recent clarifications in death penalty law and
trial court errors. Because death penalty law appears to be more settled in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent affirmance
of California's death penalty statute, several of the decisions turned
on fundamental issues.9
II.
A.

GUILT PHASE

Miranda

In six of the ten cases decided, the supreme court confronted fifth
amendmentO challenges based on alleged Miranda" violations.12 In
4. See Death Penalty Law IV, supra note 2, at 1095-96 (discussing the court's reduced output of death penalty cases).
5. The Exodus of California'sHigh Court, NAT'L. L. J., May 14, 1990, at 29.
6. Id. These statistics are from the Santa Clara University School of Law.
7. lI
8. The observers include Stephen R. Barnett and Preble Stolz of the University
of California at Berkeley School of Law, and John Poulos at the University of California at Davis School of Law. Id.
9. The United States Supreme Court decision in Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct.
1190 (1990), aff g People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988),
has been heralded as the final constitutional obstacle for the California death penalty
statute. See Death Penalty IV, supra note 2, at 1107 (discussing Boyde).
10. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the fifth amendment requires the interrogating officer to inform the person in custody prior to interrogation
that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says will be used against him in
court; that he has the right to consult with a lawyer; and that if he is indigent, he has
the right to an appointed lawyer). See generally 5 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2679 (2d ed. 1989).
12. See People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990);
People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990); People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d
826, 789 P.2d 983, 268 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 790 P.2d
676, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1990); People v. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1058, 790 P.2d 1327, 269
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990).

analyzing the claims, the court continued its policy of distinguishing
crimes that occurred prior to the enactment of Proposition 8.13 Proposition 8,14 entitled the "Truth-in-evidence" provision, was enacted in
1984 to curtail the exclusion of relevant evidence based upon independent state grounds.15 Thus, in determining whether an accused
has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, the prosecution no longer
has the burden of proving the voluntariness of an admission or confession beyond a reasonable doubt.16 Instead, the accused is protected only by the United States Constitution, which requires the
lesser standard of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence.17 However, crimes that occurred prior to the effective date of Proposition 8
are governed by the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.18
Under the appropriate standard, the court found in four cases that
the defendants had waived their rights to counsel and to silence.19 In
People v. Thompson, People v. Mattson, and People v. Marshall, the
waiver issue arose pursuant to alleged Edwards2o errors.21 Following
the analysis of Oregon v. Bradshaw,22 the court found that the de13. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 170, 785 P.2d at 877, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 329; Lewis, 50
Cal. 3d at 274-76, 786 P.2d at 898-99, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41; Douglas,50 Cal. 3d at 499,
788 P.2d at 654, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 140; Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d at 924 n.1, 790 P.2d at 683
n.1, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 276 n.1.
14. Proposition 8 as enacted provides that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See generally 1 B. WITIUN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 8-9 (3d ed. 1986).

15. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 71, 775 P.2d 1042, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273,
278 (1989). See also In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 639 (1985).
16. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 71, 775 P.2d at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
17. Id.
18. People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 394, 749 P.2d 279, 288, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851
(1988).
19. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 159-66, 785 P.2d at 874-77, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 326-29;
Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d at 274-76, 786 P.2d at 898-99, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41; Mattson, Cal. 3d
at 862, 789 P.2d at 1008, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 827; Marshall,50 Cal. 3d at 925-26, 790 P.2d at
684, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
Although the United States Supreme Court may limit its inquiry into whether
there was a valid waiver of the defendant's Miranda-basedright to counsel, the California Supreme Court considers whether the defendant waived both his right to counsel and his right to silence. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 862 n.20, 789 P.2d at 1008 n.20, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 827 n.20. See generally People v. Boyer, 48 Cal. 3d 247, 273 n.14, 768 P.2d
610, 623 n.14, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 109 n.14 (1989).
20. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, the United States
Supreme Court held that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, he "is not
subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchange or conversations with
the police." Id. at 481-85.
21. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 162-64, 785 P.2d at 871-74, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 323-26;
Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 858-62, 789 P.2d at 1005-08, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 824-27; Marshall,50
Cal. 3d at 926, 790 P.2d at 684, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
22. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). The plurality opinion in Bradshaw acknowledged that
some inquiries by an accused, "such as a request for a drink of water or a request to
use a telephone," are routine statements that do not indicate a desire to open up a general conversation. Such statements generally do not constitute an "initiation" of a con-
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fendants had initiated conversations, and had thus waived their Mi3

randa rights.2

The court also suggested in Mattson that the reasoning of Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Bradshaw is now the standard for determining whether an accused has initiated a conversation. 24 The
crucial question in Justice Powell's concurrence was whether based
upon the "totality of the circumstances," the accused made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and right to silence. 25 In applying both the two-step standard of the plurality and
Justice Powell's totality of the circumstances test, the California high
26
court found a valid waiver in all four cases.
Another Miranda issue that the court addressed was the propriety
of relitigation on retrial of a motion to suppress admissions and confessions under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code.27 Section 1538.5 was
enacted to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 28 This statute has been expanded to exclude confessions
versation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards. Id. at 1045. Hence,
the analysis must determine: 1) whether the accused initiated the conversation; and 2)
whether a valid waiver of the accused's rights to silence and counsel has occurred. Id.
at 1044.
23. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 162-64, 785 P.2d at 871-72, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24;
Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 858-62, 789 P.2d at 1004-08, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 824-27; Marshall, 50
Cal. 3d at 926, 790 P.2d at 684, 260 Cal. Rptr at 277.
24. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 861 n.19, 789 P.2d at 1007 n.19, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 826 n.19
(citing Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1182 (1990) (Supreme Court ruled that "if
all circumstances in a particular case show that the police have engaged in a course of
conduct which would render the waiver involuntary, the burden [of establishing voluntariness] will not be satisfied.")).
25. Bradshaw, 162 U.S. at 1047-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990);
People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990); People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d
826, 789 P.2d 983, 268 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 790 P.2d
676, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1990); People v. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1058, 790 P.2d 1327, 269
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990).
27. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 848-53, 789 P.2d at 998-1001, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 817-20.
Penal Code section 1538.5 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on either of the following grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1990). See generally 4 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW §§ 2253-2268, 2461 (2d ed. 1989).
28. People v. Superior Court (Smith), 70 Cal. 2d 123, 128, 449 P.2d 230, 234, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 298 (1969).

that result from unlawful searches or seizures. 29
In the first trial of Mattson,30 the trial court had allowed the defendant to litigate both the admissibility of his statement and the
suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an alleged illegal
search under a section 1538.5 motion.31 The trial court denied the defendant's motion. The supreme court overturned the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion and found that his Mirandarights had
been violated due to illegally obtained statements, and therefore reversed the judgment.3 2
On retrial, the supreme court permitted relitigation of the Miranda issues. 33 It concluded that section 1538.5 was not a proper motion for the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment claims,3 4 and that
the law-of-the-case doctrine was inapplicable to the determination of
questions of fact on the basis of new or different evidence in a new
trial following reversal.3 5 The court reasoned that section 1538.5 applies only to fourth amendment violations, and the defendant asserted fifth and sixth amendment violations.36 Hence, the court
implied that the defendant must make both a section 1538.5 motion
to exclude the physical evidence, and an Evidence Code section 402
motion to exclude the confession.3 7
Three justices disagreed with the majority opinion's application of
section 1538.5 to the alleged Miranda violation.3 8 Instead, they con29. People v. Superior Court (Zolnay), 15 Cal. 3d 729, 735, 542 P.2d 1390, 1393-94,
125 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801-02 (1975).
30. 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 887, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1984).
31. Id. at 91, 688 P.2d at 890-91, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
32. I&
33. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 850-53, 789 P.2d at 999-1001, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 818-20.
34. Id.
35. Id. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that when the supreme court, in deciding an appeal, "states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to
throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal ... [and] in any subsequent suit for the same cause of action." Tally v. Ganahl,
151 Cal. 418, 421, 90 P. 1049, 1050 (1907). The doctrine does not apply to issues of fact.
People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 842, 533 P.2d 211, 216, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 88 (1975).
36. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 850-53, 789 P.2d at 999-1001, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 818-20.
37. CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 1990). Section 402 provides in relevant part: "(a)
When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence
shall be determined as provided in this article. (b) [T]he court shall hear and determine the question of admissibility of a confession or admission of the defendant ....

Id,
38. Justice Kennard's concurring opinion stated that the majority's analysis was
squarely inconsistent with the holding in People v. Zolnay. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 88182, 789 P.2d at 1021-22, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 840-42 (Kennard, J., concurring). Because the
Zolnay court had acknowledged the propriety of the combined motion, Justice Kennard accused the majority of mischaracterizing the nature of the defendant's motion to
require both a section 1538.5 motion to exclude the physical evidence and an Evidence
Code section 402 motion to suppress the confessions. Id Thus, she concluded that the
majority skirted the most important issue: whether the prosecution may relitigate the
motion on retrial based on the presentation of new evidence. Id at 882, 789 P.2d at
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cluded that the defendant's motion under section 1538.5 was proper.3 9
Notwithstanding the result in Mattson, the court in Holloway continued to resolve the Miranda claims even though the case was reversed due to jury misconduct. 40 Justice Mosk critically noted in a

concurring opinion that the court's findings would not be binding on
41

retrial because of the holding in Mattson.

During the guilt phase, the court also addressed issues concerning
the lack of territorial jurisdiction,42 and the admission of posthypnotic testimony.
B.

43

Special Circumstance Issues

In general, if a defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and
one or more of the statutory special circumstances is charged and
found to be true at the guilt phase of the trial, the penalty shall be
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." The
use of a jury is strictly limited to cases in which one or more of the

statutorily enumerated special circumstances is alleged and proven
during the guilt phase.45
1022, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard goes on to conclude, however, that relitigation would be permissible. Id at 884-85, 789 P.2d at 102324, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justices Mosk and Broussard both would reverse the judgment because: 1) the defendant's section 1538.5 motion was proper; 2) the prosecution did not introduce new
facts; and 3) the policy of section 1538.5 is to require full and final litigation, and thus
the prosecution is bound by the judgment of the reviewing court. Id. at 885-88, 789
P.2d at 1024-26, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 843-45 (Mosk, J., dissenting & Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
39. Id
40. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1098, 1112-17, 790 P.2d 1327, 1335-38, 269 Cal. Rptr. 530,
538-41.
41. 1& at 1117, 790 P.2d at 1338, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
42. People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 493-94, 788 P.2d 640, 650-51, 268 Cal. Rptr.
126, 136-37 (1990). The court did not lack territorial jurisdiction although the crime
occurred outside of the county, because the defendant had met the victims within the
boundaries of the county. Moreover, the trial court's denial of a motion for change of
venue on account of the publicity was correct based on the county's large size and the
time period that had lapsed. Id at 495-96, 788 P.2d at 651-52, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
43. People v. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d 954, 982-86, 790 P.2d 1289, 1302-04, 269 Cal. Rptr.
492, 505-08 (1990). The court found it was error to admit posthypnotic testimony under
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); however, the
error was deemed harmless because the court found that it was not "reasonably possible" that exclusion of this testimony would have caused a more favorable outcome for
the defendant. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d at 986, 790 P.2d at 1035, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). For a general discussion, see Death Penalty Law III, supra note 2, at 543.
45. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 48-49, 609 P.2d 468, 496-97, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 29-30

During the guilt phase of each of the ten death penalty trials, the
court affirmed the findings of special circumstances. The special cir7
cumstances included: robbery/murder, 46 multiple murder/murder,4
arson/murder,48 sodomy/murder,49 lewd and lascivious conduct on a
child under the age of fourteen/murder,50 and rape/murder.S1
In People v. Clark,5 2 the court addressed as first impression the issue of whether gasoline constitutes an "explosive" within the meaning of section 190.2(a)(6) of the Penal Code. 53 The defendant in
Clark carried gasoline in two five-gallon buckets into the victims'
(1980). See 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1569 (2d. ed.
1989).
46. People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 277-78, 786 P.2d 892, 900-01, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834,
842-43 (1990); People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 701, 789 P.2d 887, 904, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706,
723. The robbery special circumstance attaches to the underlying first degree murder
when "the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, or
attempted commission of a robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West 1988).
47. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d at 1001-02, 790 P.2d at 1315-16, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 519. "The
prosecution erred in charging twelve multiple-murder special circumstances on the basis of four homicides;" however, the jury was not influenced by the number, and thus
the verdict was unaffected. I& See also People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826, 875, 789 P.2d
983, 1017, 268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 836 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 486, 788 P.2d
640, 646, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 132 (1990). The multiple murder special circumstance attaches when the defendant has either: 1) been "previously convicted of murder in the
first or second degree," or 2) in the current proceeding has been convicted of more
than one offense of first or second degree murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2)-(3)
(West 1988).
48. People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 609, 789 P.2d 127, 144, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 416
(1990). The arson special circumstance attaches to the underlying first degree murder
when "the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of [or] attempted commission of ... arson in violation of
[Penal Code Sections 451 & 452]." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(viii) (West 1988).
49. People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1175-77, 791 P.2d 965, 975-76, 270 Cal. Rptr.
286, 296-97 (1990); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 170-73, 785 P.2d 857, 877-78, 266
Cal. Rptr. 309, 329-30 (1990). The sodomy special circumstance attaches to the underlying first degree murder when "the murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, [or] attempted commission of,
• . . sodomy in violation of [Penal Code] Section 986." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17)(iv) (West 1988).
50. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 170-73, 785 P.2d at 877-78, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30.
Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 838-39, 789 P.2d at 991, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 811. This special circumstance attaches to the first degree murder when "the murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, [or] attempted
commission of, ... the performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a
child under the age of fourteen in violation of [Penal Code] Section 288." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(v) (West 1988).
51. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 838-39, 789 P.2d at 991-92, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The
rape/murder special circumstance attaches when "the murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit ... rape in violation of Section
261." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(iii) (West 1988).
52. 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990).
53. Section 190.2(a)(6) provides in relevant part: "The murder was committed by
means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered .... CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(6) (West 1988).
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home. As the vapor rising from the gasoline mixed with the air, the
defendant ignited the mixture with lighted highway flares. This created an explosion causing burn injuries that led to the death of one of
the victims. 54
The trial court determined that the gasoline fell within the parameters of the delivery-of-explosive special circumstance. 55 The
supreme court disagreed and concluded that gasoline vapor was not
an "explosive" for purposes of the section 190.2(a)(6).56 The court
based its reasoning on the legislative history of the definition of "explosive" as it was defined in Health and Safety Code section 1200057
and applied to Penal Code section 189.58 Since the legislature used
the definition of the Health and Safety Code section 12000 in Penal
Code section 189, the court presumed that the same definition would
apply for purposes of section 190.2(a)(6). 59
Furthermore, the Legislative Analyst's statement made prior to
the modification of section 190.2(a)(6) in 1978 provided that the revised measure would include in the list of special circumstances
"'murder involving concealed explosives or explosives that are
mailed or delivered.' "60 Thus, the court concluded that the legislative intent of section 190.2(a)(6) did not include gasoline. 6 1 Moreover,
the court concluded that the defendant's "delivery" of the gas vapors
was not within the context of section 190.2(6).62
Still, the court found the defendant guilty of first degree murder
54. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d at 594, 789 P.2d at 134, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
55. I&
56. 1& at 602, 789 P.2d at 139, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
57. Section 12000 of the Health and Safety Code provides in relevant part:
'[E]xplosives' shall mean any substance, or combination of substances, the primary or common purpose of which is detonation or rapid combustion and
which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat,
or... when combined with others, [is used] to form a substance capable of a
relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12000 (West 1988).
58. Section 189 provides in relevant part: "'[E]xplosive' shall mean any explosive
as defined in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety Code." CAL.PENAL CODE § 189
(West 1988).
59. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d at 602, 789 P.2d at 139-40, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
60. Id. at 602-03, 789 P.2d at 140, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (quoting BALLOT PAMP. GEN.
ELECTION 32 (Nov. 7, 1978)).
61. Id.
62. 1& at 608, 789 P.2d at 144, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 416. "The gasoline vapor was not
'delivered.' It arose by an independent physical process after the gasoline was thrown
into the home. And the vapor alone was not explosive until it combined with air in
the required proportion. Manifestly, defendant did not deliver the air that was already
present in the victim's home." Id at 605, 789 P.2d at 141, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 413.

with the special circumstance of arson.6 3 This conclusion was dependent upon a derivative finding that the defendant entertained an independent felonious intent separate from the intent to set the fire.
The defense counsel argued that the objective in committing the arson was to drive the victim out of the house and then the murder was
to follow. Thus, the arson was incidental to the murder and the trial
court was required to give the Green instruction.6 4 The supreme
court rejected the argument and stated that the relation between the
murder and the defendant's intent to burn the home "would not invoke the Green rule since the defendant had independent, albeit concurrent, goals."65 However, based on the prosecutor's contentions
and the jury's agreement that such an intent was possible, the court
found that the failure to instruct pursuant to Green was error,
although harmless. 66 The court stated that the defendant's "belated
realization that the [victim's] bedroom was occupied, and his resolution to proceed with his plan" did not negate the possibility of an independent purpose causing the death of the victim in the commission
67
of the arson.
C.

Voir Dire

The Witherspoon-Witt error was the most common allegation during the death penalty voir dire proceedings. 68 This error occurs when
a member is excluded from the jury panel in a death penalty case because of his general objections to the death penalty, or his conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. 69 A prospective juror
may be excluded when his views on the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 70 Accordingly, a
juror may be dismissed when "the trial judge is left with the definite
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and
7
impartially apply the law." '
63. Id. at 609, 789 P.2d at 144, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 416.

64. The Green instruction is required when the evidence indicates that the defendant intended to commit the murder and only incidentally committed one of the specified felonies while doing so. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61-62, 609 P.2d 468, 50506, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38-39 (1980).
65. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 789 P.2d at 144, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
66. Id. at 609, 789 P.2d at 144, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
67. Id.
68. People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 926-27, 790 P.2d 676, 684-85, 269 Cal. Rptr.
269, 277-78 (1990); People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826, 844-47, 789 P.2d 983, 995-97, 268
Cal. Rptr. 802, 814-16 (1990); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 596-98, 789 P.2d 127, 13536, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 407-08; People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 289-91, 786 P.2d 892, 90809, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 850-51 (1990); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 157-59, 785
P.2d 857, 868-69, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 320-21 (1990).
69. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
70. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
71. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985). This is also applicable in deter-
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In People v. Mattson,72 the defendant alleged that the trial court
erred in restricting his efforts to "rehabilitate" (by further examination) prospective jurors whose responses led the court to excuse them
for cause. Although the defendant did not directly allege Witherspoon-Witt error, he claimed that the trial court unreasonably denied
his sixth amendment rights by disallowing further examination after
the excused jurors expressed their reservations. The supreme court
disagreed and concluded that although counsel has the right to a
"reasonable opportunity to examne the prospective jurors," the ultimate duty "to select a fair and impartial jury is ... imposed on the
court." 73 Therefore, "when a juror has clearly expressed an inability
to vote for the death penalty... the court has discretion to limit further voir dire."

74

Throughout the remaining cases, the court consistently applied this
analysis. In People v. Clark, 75 during sequestered voir dire, the court
refused the defendant's request to ask the prospective jurors whether
evidence of serious burn injuries suffered by the surviving victims
would automatically cause them to vote for the death penalty. 7 6 The
court explained that the Witherspoon-Witt voir dire seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors in the abstract as to
whether they "would vote against the death penalty without regard
to the evidence produced at trial." 7 7 Hence, the power of the judge to
control the voir dire proceedings included the power to control the
8
manner in which they would be conducted.7
mining the propriety of an excuse for cause under article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution. See People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142, 1165, 259 P.2d 730, 743, 774 Cal.
Rptr. 701, 714 (1989).
72. 50 Cal. 3d 826, 789 P.2d 983, 268 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1990).
73. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d at 845, 789 P.2d at 996, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 815. See CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 223(a) (West Supp. 1990) ("It shall be the duty of the trial court to examine the prospective jurors to select a fair and impartial jury .... [The trial court
shall permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the people
and for the defendant, such examination to be conducted orally and directly by counsel"). See also CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 223(c) (West Supp. 1990) ("[Tihe court shall
have discretion and control with respect to the form and subject matter and duration
of voir dire examination").
74. Id. at 846, 789 P.2d at 997, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 816. Additionally, the court denied
the defendant's request for funds in order to hire an expert to conduct the voir dire
proceedings. Id. at 847, 789 P.2d at 998, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
75. 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990).
76. I& at 596-97, 789 P.2d at 135-36, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
77. Id& (citing People v. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d 207, 250, 763 P.2d 906, 931, 253 Cal. Rptr.
55, 78 (1988)).
78. Id. at 597, 789 P.2d at 136, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 408. See also People v. Lewis, 50
Cal. 3d 262, 289-90, 786 P.2d 892, 908-09, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 850-51 (wherein the court

The court addressed other jury issues in People v. Thompson.79
The defendant in Thompson first alleged that exclusion of the public
from voir dire proceedings was a violation of his constitutional right
to a public trial.8 0 Because the contention focused on the defendant's
right and not that of the media or the public,81 the court found that
the defendant had waived his right by failing to assert it in a timely
fashion.8 2 Additionally, the court rejected the defendant's claim that
the "exclusion of persons who would automatically vote against the
death penalty denied him a representative jury."8 3 Finally, the court
approved the trial court's hardship exemptions on certain jurors
84
based upon the trial's lengthy duration.
D.

Jury Misconduct

85
In People v. Marshall,
during penalty deliberations, a juror "informed the jury that he had a background in law enforcement, and
that lack of evidence did not mean that the defendant had no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at
age eighteen. '8 6 Because of these declarations, the court concluded
that the juror had introduced into the jury room both extraneous and
erroneous law, which, whether erroneous or not, constituted misconduct.8 7 The court then addressed whether or not the presumption of

rejected the defendant's contention that limiting voir dire to the four standard Witherspoon questions was ineffective assistance of counsel).
79. 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309.
80. Id. at 156-57, 785 P.2d at 867-68, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20. A defendant has both
a constitutional and statutory right to a public trial. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. PENAL CODE § 686(1) (West 1988).
81. The sequestered voir dire has its origins in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d
1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). There, the court concluded that the deathqualification portion of voir dire should be done in sequestration in order to avoid publicity that could cause jurors to anticipate guilt. Id, at 80-81, 616 P.2d at 1354-55, 28 Cal.
Rptr. at 181-82. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held that there is a presumption that jury voir dire is to be conducted in open court, and this presumption
"may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). The effect of this case
has not been resolved in California. See People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 316 n.4, 690
P.2d 669, 677 n.4, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 204 n.4 (1984). See also 5 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2850 (2d ed. 1989).

82. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 157, 785 P.2d at 867-68, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
83. Id. at 157, 785 P.2d at 868, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 320. See People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d
329, 353, 673 P.2d 680, 695, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 818 (1983) ("[Plersons who would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase ... are not a cognizable group, the
exclusion of which makes a jury unrepresentative and unconstitutional").
84. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 158, 785 P.2d at 869, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
85. 50 Cal. 3d 907, 790 P.2d 676, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1990).
86. Id. at 949, 790 P.2d at 699, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
87. Id. at 949-50, 790 P.2d at 699, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The information was erroneous under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), which includes criminal activity of
juveniles. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West 1988). See irtfra note 108 (text of section
190.3).
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prejudice raised by the misconduct had been rebutted. 88
In its analysis, the court introduced a set of criteria based primarily
on the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice that
must be met in order to overcome the presumption.8 9 This standard,
approved by the court, states that a judgment adverse to the defendant must be reversed "whenever . . . the court finds a substantial
likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case
itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury."90 Using an objective "substantial likelihood"
standard, the court adopted a two-step procedure. 91 The first step required the court to examine the extrajudicial material. Next, the
court had to judge whether such material was inherently likely to
have influenced the jury.92 The court deemed "[s]uch prejudice analysis" as less tolerant than the "harmless-error analysis" for ordinary
error at trial.93
Following these guidelines, the court found that the presumption
of prejudice was rebutted. 94 The court reasoned that the jury instructions informed the jurors that there was no evidence that the
defendant had a criminal background, and therefore it was a mitigating factor. Also, the trial court clarified the instruction stating that
both the prosecution and the defense could have brought in aggravating or mitigating circumstances if such evidence existed.95 Thus,
based on the clarity of the instructions and the absence of further aggravating circumstances, the supreme court concluded that the jury
would have understood the words of the instructions as they were
written, and therefore the misconduct was nonprejudicial.96
In People v. Holloway,97 the court found otherwise. In Holloway,
88. When misconduct has been shown on the part of a juror, prejudice is presumed; the state must then rebut the presumption or lose the verdict. See, e.g., In re
Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 396-402, 708 P.2d 1260, 1266, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1985).
See generally 6 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 3069 (2d ed.
1989).
89. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d at 950-51, 790 P.2d at 700, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 293. (citing 2
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 951, 790 P.2d at 700, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
92. Id. (citing 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.7 commentary at 8.58 (2d
ed. 1980)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 952, 790 P.2d at 701, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
96. Id.
97. 50 Cal. 3d 1098, 790 P.2d 1327, 269 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990).

despite the trial court's efforts to caution the jurors against reading
newspaper articles or listening to other media reports about the case,
the court discovered shortly after the jury had returned its verdicts
in the guilt phase that one of the jurors had read a newspaper article
the second day of trial. The article stated that the defendant was on
parole from prison after having served time for assaulting a woman
with a hammer. The juror did not expose his information until after
the verdict forms had been signed by all jurors. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial and then considered a motion for a new trial.98 In its discussion, the trial court focused on the
minimal impact of the juror's communication to the rest of the jury.
Also, the trial court stated that it had found no cases or statutes
prohibiting the inadvertent reading of a newspaper. Hence, the trial
court found neither misconduct nor prejudice to the defendant and
refused the motion for a new trial.99
The supreme court reluctantly disagreed0oo The court noted the
clarity of the law declaring that it is misconduct for a juror to read
newspaper accounts of a case on which he is sitting.lOl Such juror
misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice that can only be rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually occurred.102 Following the
guidelines set forth in Marshall,103 the court found that the content
of the article was extremely prejudicial because it revealed information about the defendant's prior criminal conduct that the court had
ruled inadmissible. 104 Moreover, the court struck down the prosecutor's argument that the failure of the juror to disclose the offending
information precluded the contamination of the eleven remaining jurors. 0 5 Criticizing the contention as missing the point, the court explained that the fact that one juror went through the entire guilt
phase with outside knowledge of inadmissible evidence, exacerbated
by his failure to disclose this information, was sufficient to require
reversal.106 Accordingly, the court held that the conviction could not
stand "if even a single juror had been improperly influenced."107
98. 1& at 1107, 790 P.2d at 1331, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
99. Id. at 1107-08, 790 P.2d at 1331-32, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
100. Id. at 1106, 790 P.2d at 1330, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
101. Id at 1108, 790 P.2d at 1332, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (citing People v. Lambright,
61 Cal. 2d 482, 393 P.2d 409, 39 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1964); People v. Wong Loung, 159 Cal.
520, 114 P. 829 (1911); People v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 37 P. 207 (1894); People v. McCoy,
71 Cal. 395, 12 P. 272 (1886)).
102. Id (emphasis added).
103. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
104. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d at 1110, 790 P.2d at 1333, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
105. Id. at 1111, 790 P.2d at 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
106. Id. On the other hand, the court implied that had the information been less
prejudicial and had the misconduct been revealed earlier, corrective steps could have
been taken to avoid a reversal. Id at 1111-12, 790 P.2d at 1334, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
107. Id. at 1112, 790 P.2d at 1335, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 538 (quoting People v. Pierce, 24
Cal. 3d 199, 595 P.2d 91, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1979)).
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III.

PENALTY PHASE ISSUES

In determining whether to impose the death penalty or a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon the defendant, the jury must consider certain aggravating and mitigating
factors.1 08 The prosecutor is limited to the factors listed in section
190.3 of the penal code, unless evidence is offered in the form of a
rebuttal. 0 9 The following portion of this survey will highlight the
factors utilized most frequently in the supreme court's decisions.
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). Section 190.3 provides in relevant part:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which
the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation
for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not [the] defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or
the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence ....
the trier of fact
shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of
death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of
fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life
without the possibility of parole.
I& See generally 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1597 (2d ed.
1989).
109. See, e.g., People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 773-74, 700 P.2d 782, 791, 215 Cal. Rptr.
1, 9 (1985) ("Since the jury must decide the question of penalty on the basis of the specific factors listed in the statute, the quoted language must refer to evidence relevant
to those factors").

A.

Factor (b) and Factor (c) of Penal Code section 190.3

In general, factor (b) allows the trier of fact to consider prior criminal conduct involving the use or attempted use of force or violence.11 0 Factor (c) allows the consideration of the presence or
absence of any prior felony conviction."' In People v. Boyd, the
court clarified the distinction between factors (b) and (c) by permitting the jury to consider under factor (b) any violent criminal activity
whether or not it led to conviction, and under factor (c) any prior felony conviction whether or not it was violent."l 2 Thus, offenses which
qualify under both factors (b) and (c) may properly be considered
3
under both or either."X
11 4
The court continued this distinction in People v. Ramirez.

There, the prosecutor introduced evidence of the defendant's prior
felony conviction for possessing a concealed weapon under factors (b)
and (c). The defendant argued that because his conduct did not involve the use, or attempted use, of force or violence, or the threat of
violence, his conduct did not fall under factor (b). The court rejected
the argument, stating that possession of a concealed weapon while in
jail involved an implied threat to use force or violence, declaring that
it is a "classic instrument of violence... normally used only for criminal purposes." 115 Therefore, the evidence was properly admitted
under both factors.116
Another issue related to evidence introduced under factors (b) and
(c) arises when the evidence is not probative of either factor and thus
is irrelevant to aggravation. 117 In People v. Douglas,1s the prosecutor introduced evidence of alleged prior criminal conduct involving
110. Section 190.3 provides in pertinent part: "In determining the penalty, the trier
of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant: ... (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or
violence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3.
111. Penal Code section 190.3 provides in pertinent part: "In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant: ...
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1988).
112. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 773-76, 700 P.2d 782, 791-93, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-11 (1985).
See also Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d at 525, 788 P.2d at 673, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
113. People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 764-65, 750 P.2d 741, 771-72, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867,
895-97 (1988).
114. 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1186, 791 P.2d 965, 983, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 304 (1990).
115. Id. at 1186-87, 791 P.2d at 983, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (quoting People v. Grubb,
63 Cal. 2d 614, 620, 408 P.2d 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965); People v. Wasley, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 383, 386, 53 Cal. Rptr. 877, 879 (1966)).
116. Id. See also Miller, 50 Cal. 3d at 1009, 790 P.2d at 1321, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 524
(where the court rejected the defendant's argument that the jury misunderstood factors (b) and (c) as applying to the crimes for which he was being tried).
117. See People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 773-76, 700 P.2d 762, 791-93, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1,
9-11 (1985).
118. 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990).
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violence or force under factor (b).119 The defendant argued that he
had not been criminally charged for the conduct, that the conduct did
not involve violence, and therefore was not probative of any specifically listed factor. The court rejected the defendant's contentions by
finding that criminal acts need not be charged to merit the jury's consideration, and that the conduct in question involved an implied
i
threat of force or violence; the evidence thus fell within factor (b). 20
The court has also addressed the question of whether the elimination of factor (b) from the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances read to the jury constitutes prejudicial error. In People v.
Turner,'2 ' the trial court eliminated factor (b) from the jury instructions and set forth only the defendant's other felony convictions
under factor (c). The defendant claimed that this was prejudicial error in that it prevented the jury from realizing that the lack of other
crimes under factor (b) constituted a mitigating factor. The supreme
court disagreed on two grounds. First, the defense counsel, not counsel for the prosecution, submitted the instruction form, so any error
was invited.122 Second, the decision had the desired result, because
the defendant's prior robbery conviction was within the meaning of
factor (b), and had it been included in the instruction, the prosecutor
23
would have used it as an aggravating factor.1
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether double jeopardy
applies when a prior offense is used as an aggravating circumstance
under factor (b) when the defendant withdraws a plea of nolo contendre and enters a plea of not guilty under section 1203.4 of the Penal code.124 In People v. Douglas, 25 the court determined that the
119. The prosecutor claimed that the defendant had twice forced young women to
pose for photographs depicting nudity and sexual acts.
120. Douglas,50 Cal. 3d at 526, 788 P.2d at 673, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 159. See also Clark,
50 Cal. 3d at 624, 789 P.2d at 154-55, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27 (where the court found a
possible Boyd error because the prosecution introduced evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct which did not involve violence; however, consideration of the
claim was precluded by the defendant's failure to object).
121. 50 Cal. 3d 668, 789 P.2d 887, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990).
122. Id at 712-13, 789 P.2d at 911-12, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31. A tactical decision on
the part of counsel prevents a contention on appeal that any resulting error is grounds
for reversal. People v. Avalos, 37 Cal. 3d 216, 228-29, 689 P.2d 121, 129, 207 Cal. Rptr.
549, 557 (1984).
123. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 713, 789 P.2d at 912, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
124. Section 1203.4 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation
for the entire period of probation.., or in any other case in which a court, in
its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defendant should
be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall . . . be

defendant's plea bargain was not an acquittal under section 190.3.126
Based on the absence of an acquittal, the court concluded that nothing in section 1203.4 prohibits the jury from considering the facts of
127
the crime that gave rise to the offense.
B. Factor (k)of Penal Code Section 190.3
Section 190.3(k) lists as the final factor for the jury to consider
"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."'128 In order to ensure the statute's constitutionality under the United States Supreme
Court decisions of Lockett v. Ohio 129 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,130 the
trial court must also instruct the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."131 This expanded factor (k) instruction is now embodied in section 8.85 of the California Jury Instructions.132 In cases predating the current instruction, the court
must determine whether failure to give the expanded instruction was
prejudicial in light of the evidence, arguments, and instructions as a
33
whole.1
The defendants asserted factor (k) error in only two cases during
the period of this survey. In People v. Douglas,34 the jury was properly given the expanded factor (k) instruction similar to the one prescribed in Easley.35 Additionally, the trial court read to the jury a
"sympathy instruction" that allowed the jury to consider "pity, sympermitted by the court to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo
contendere and enter a plea of not guilty ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1988).

125.
126.
127.
128.

50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990).
Id. at 528-29, 788 P.2d at 674-75, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
Id. at 529, 788 P.2d at 675, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988). See generally 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw § 1608 (2d ed. 1989).
129. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
130. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
131. People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 878, 671 P.2d 813, 825, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 321
(1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
132. Id. See CALJIC No. 8.85 (k) (5th ed. 1988).
133. See, e.g., People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 777, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275, 239 Cal. Rptr.
82, 107 (1987). In upholding the constitutional adequacy of factor (k), the court must
"analyz[e] the record in each case to determine whether the jury instructions, taken as
a whole, and read in conjunction with the prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the
case." Id.
134. 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990).
135. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d at 534-35, 788 P.2d at 679, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The jury
was instructed to consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of
the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other factor proffered by the defendant as a factor in mitigation of the penalty, including his character." Id at 50 Cal. 3d at 534, 788 P.2d at 679, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
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pathy and mercy for the defendant in deciding the appropriate penalty."136 The defendant claimed that the prosecution's argument
misled the jury into believing that it was not permitted to assign mitigating weight to the defendant's character. The court rejected the
argument on the grounds that the expanded factor (k) instruction in
conjunction with the "sympathy" instruction was sufficient to avoid
the possibility of misleading a reasonable juror in his duty to consider
37
the defendant's character and background as mitigating evidence.
The second factor (k) error was asserted in the context of an alleged Boyd error.' 38 In People v. Ramirez,1 39 the defense introduced
mitigating evidence based on the defendant's background and character through the testimony of the defendant's mother. During crossexamination, the prosecution questioned the mother about the defendant's criminal conduct while a juvenile. On appeal, the defendant
contended that the evidence of his earlier non-violent criminal activity elicited during cross-examination was inadmissible under any statutory factor to be considered in aggravation. 40 The prosecution
responded that once the defense introduced evidence of the defendant's background and character for consideration by the jury as factor (k) mitigating evidence, the prosecutor was permitted to rebut
this evidence in order to develop an accurate picture of the defendant's background and character.
In addressing the issue, the court first noted the propriety of a
prosecutorial rebuttal when the defense presents evidence in mitigation under factor (k) as evidence tending to disprove any disputed
fact relevant to the action.'41 The court went on to state, however,
that "the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and ... relate directly to
a particular incident or character trait" that the defendant had offered as mitigation.142 Because much of the evidence solicited by the
prosecution was not responsive to evidence presented by the defense,
136. 1d&at 535, 788 P.2d at. 679, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
137. I&
138. Boyd error occurs when the trier of fact considers factors in aggravation that
are not specifically enumerated in section 190.3, People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 775,
700 P.2d 782, 791-92, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-11. See supra note 108 and accompanying text
(describing section 190.3). See generally Death Penalty III, supra note 2, at 553-56.
139. 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 791 P.2d 965, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1990).
140. Id at 1191-92, 791 P.2d at 987, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 308. The defense specifically
argued that the evidence was "inadmissible under factor (b) or any other factor" because the evidence elicited was of non-violent conduct. I& at 1191, 791 P.2d at 987, 270
Cal. Rptr. at 308.
141. Id. at 1192, 791 P.2d at 987, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
142. Id at 1193, 791 P.2d at 987, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (emphasis added).

the court concluded that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to question the defendant's mother regarding the criminal incidents.143 However, since the incidents were relatively innocuous in
comparison to properly admitted evidence, the court concluded that
the error was harmless and did not require reversal. 144
C. Victim and Family Impact Evidence

In five cases the court affirmed the admissibility of victim photographs and prosecutorial statements concerning the victims' emotions
at the time of the crimes and the impact of the victims' deaths on relatives. 14 5 With respect to the admission of photographs depicting the
death of the victim, the court in People v. Thompson146 rejected the
defendant's contention that the photographs were erroneously admitted solely to create an adverse emotional impact on the jury.147 The
court reasoned that the photographs tended to show the defendant's
intent to kill the victim with malice - a factor which the jury could
consider in aggravation.148 The court also determined that the photographs were relevant to show the extreme callousness and cruelty
with which the victim was killed.149 Finally, the court stated that,
although the trial court did not expressly weigh undue prejudice
against the probative value before admitting the photographs, 150 the
"overwhelming probative value on the question of penalty" was
manifest. 151
On the issues concerning victim and family impact statements, the
court referred to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Booth
v. Maryland152 and South Carolinav. Gathers.153 In Booth and Gath143. Id. at 1193, 791 P.2d at 988, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
144. Id. at 1193-94, 791 P.2d at 988, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
145. People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990); People
v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990); People v. Louis, 50
Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907,
790 P.2d 676, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1990); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d
857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990).
146. 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309.
147. Id. at 181, 785 P.2d at 884, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
148. Id. at 182, 785 P.2d at 884-85, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
149. Id. at 182, 785 P.2d at 885, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 337. One photograph depicted a
rope wrapped around the victim's neck, and others showed where the rope cut into the
victim's neck. Id. at 181, 785 P.2d at 884, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
150. Generally, in admitting photographs depicting the death of the victim, the record must affirmatively show the actual weighing of undue prejudice against probative
value by the trial judge. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 24-25, 609 P.2d 468, 481-82,
164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14 (1980).
151. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 183, 785 P.2d at 885, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 337. The court
also pointed out the fact that the trial judge had excluded one photograph from admission, thus implying that the trial court did in fact weigh undue prejudice against probative value. Id.
152. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
153. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
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ers, the Supreme Court determined that it was generally violative of
a criminal defendant's rights under the eighth amendment' 5 4 in a
capital case to present argument concerning such matters as the "victims' personal characteristics ....
the emotional impact of the crime
on the victims' family, and the family members' opinions about the
crine."155
Applying these rules, the California Supreme Court found either
that the holdings in Booth and Gathers were not violated, or that the
error in admitting such statements was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. In People v. Lewis, 5 6 the court found that the statements
were more "fleeting and restrained" than those criticized in Booth
and Gathers.157 It further determined that even if the comments constituted error under Booth and Gathers, the error was not per se reversible.158 Instead, the standard to apply is whether the comments
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.159 The court thus concluded that the impropriety was nonprejudicial based on the relative
154. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
155. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-11; see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-07. See also Death
Penalty I, supra note 2, at 473-74 and accompanying sources cited.
156. 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990). Although the supreme
court considered this issue in the context of a motion for modification of the verdict
under section 190.4(e), the consideration of the victim impact statements are treated in
this portion of the survey. For a discussion of section 190.4(e), see infra notes 190-209
and accompanying text.
157. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d at 284, 786 P.2d at 905, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 847. In Booth, the
prosecution's statements concerned: 1) the emotional impact on the family; 2) the personal character of the victim; and 3) the family's opinions and characterizations of the
defendant. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502. In Gathers, there were extensive references during
closing argument to the victim's religious articles that had been strewn about during
the attack, which had no relevance to the circumstances of the crime. Gathers, 490
U.S. at 808. In Lewis, the prosecutor stated:
[Trhe impact is more than just the death of Milton Estell. The impact is more
than that because that death affects the people who were close to Milton Estell, the concerned neighbors, the family, and more. . . . [The defendant]
robbed him of the chance to see his kids grow up, go to school, get married.
To ever hold his grandkids, if there were any ....
[Y]ou have to think about
the impact of the defendant's actions upon these children. These children
never again will have an opportunity to sit on their father's knee, to talk to
the father, to ask those questions of a father that only a father can answer.
That is part of the impact of the defendant's actions.
Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d at 294, 786 P.2d at 911-12, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54.
158. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 786 P.2d at 905, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (citing Rose v.
Clark 478 U.S. 570, 576 (1986) (errors of federal constitutional magnitude generally are
subject to a harmless-error analysis under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard test
of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))).
159. Id. at 285, 786 P.2d at 905, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 847.

brevity of the material in the context of the entire argument, and the
insignificance of the statements in light of the lack of any mitigating
evidence.160 Two justices disagreed with the majority's decision in
Lewis, concluding the statements were strikingly prejudicial.'61 They
believed that the comments were relatively extensive, emotional and
emphatic, "[causing] at least a reasonable possibility that they contributed to the outcome, i.e., the difference between life and
death."162
In People v. C7ark,16 3 the prosecution's evidence in aggravation included a graphic description by the attending physician of the burn
victims' injuries from the fire set by the defendant. The evidence
also included a description of the impact on the victim's surviving
spouse, who would require extensive rehabilitation due to the injuries sustained in the fire, and brief testimony by the victim's father
about the effect of the defendant's acts on the victim's family. In
considering the propriety of the admitted statements, the court determined that Booth and Gathers indicated that any evidence of the impact of the defendant's criminal conduct on persons other than the
victim could be relevant if it was directly related to the circumstances of the specific crime.164 Because the victim impact evidence
was almost exclusively related to the injuries causing the victim's
death and to the injuries suffered by the victim's spouse, the court
concluded that the conduct was relevant to the penalty decision.165
The court thus found beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was
harmless.166
D.

Jury Instructions - Brown Error

The final paragraph of section 190.3 provides that "the trier of fact
shall.., impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum160. Id. at 285, 786 P.2d at 905, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48. See also Marshall,50 Cal. 3d

at 928-29, 790 P.2d at 685-86, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79 (court found comments regarding
impact of the victim's death on the family were nonprejudicial based on the "relatively
brief and unemphatic" context in which the statements were made and the insignificance "within the penalty phase as a whole").
161.

Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Broussard, concurred in the guilt phase and

death eligibility judgments but dissented from the majority's conclusion regarding the
victim impact statements. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d at 292-93, 786 P.2d at 911-12, 266 Cal. Rptr.
at 853-54 (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting).
162. Id. at 296, 786 P.2d at 913, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 855 (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting). See supra note 158 (description of the prosecutor's comments).

163.
164.
165.
166.

50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990).
Id, at 629, 789 P.2d at 158, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
Id.
Id
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stances."' 16 7 This statutory requirement was given to the jury in the
cases analyzed in this survey under the unmodified version of section
68
8.842.2 of the California Jury Instructions.1
In People v. Brown,169 the supreme court recognized the possibility
that a juror may apply a "mere mechanical counting of factors on
each side of the imaginary 'scale'."' 170 Specifically, the court was concerned that a juror might understand the language to require him to
vote for the death penalty if he mathematically finds that aggravating circumstances outnumber the mitigating circumstances, even if
he determines that death is not an appropriate punishment.171
Therefore, in order to ensure that a defendant is protected by the
eighth amendment, Brown requires that the jury make a moral assessment of the facts as they relate to the appropriateness of the
death penalty.172 Rather than applying an arithmetic formula, the
167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 108 (list of
the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
168. CALJIC 8.84.2. This instruction provided in relevant part:
It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, shall be imposed on [each] defendant .... After having heard all of the evidence, and
after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed.
If you conclude that the aggravatingcircumstancesoutweigh the mitigating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
CAJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 4th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Currently, CAIJIC 8.88 provides the so-called Brown instruction. This instruction states in pertinent part:
After having heard all of the evidence.... you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances upon which you have been instructed.
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a
mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the
arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of
the various factors you are permitted to consider.... [Y]ou determine under
the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be
persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison
with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.
CALJIC No. 8.88 (West 5th ed. & Supp. 1990).
169. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985).
170. Id. at 541, 726 P.2d at 532, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
171. Id.
172. Id.

jury must apply a balancing test that weighs as a whole the aggravating and mitigating factors, and decide whether the death penalty is
173
proper based on the results.
The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the California Supreme Court's analysis of the eighth amendment protections in
Penry v. Lynaugh.174 Essentially, the instruction must inform the
jury that it may consider and give treatment to any mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's background and circumstances of
the crime regardless of the statutory language.175 Hence, the jury
must understand that it is free to give a "reasoned moral response" to
the evidence in determining whether death is the appropriate
76
punishment.1
Brown error was alleged in each of the death penalty cases, and the
supreme court rejected all of the claims. In determining whether the
jury instruction adequately informed the jurors of the scope of mitigating evidence, the court applied the standard set forth in Boyde v.
California.177 Under Boyde, the proper inquiry is "whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the instruction in a
way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant
78
evidence."
In People v. Clark, 1 79 the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to
section 8.84.2 of the California Jury Instructions, 8 0 which declared
that jurors "shall" impose a sentence of death if they concluded that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The supreme court concluded that a juror might reasonably
have understood the instruction to limit the jury's function to a
mechanical computation of factors. This would have compelled a
death penalty if the number of factors in aggravation was greater
than those in mitigation.' 8 ' However, the court ultimately determined that the jury had not been misled, based on the instructions as
a whole and the arguments of counsel.' 8 2 The error thus was not
173. Id
174. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 934, 790 P.2d
676, 689, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 282 (1990).
175. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952. In Penry, the jury instructions asked only three
questions: "1) Did Penry [the defendant] act deliberately when he murdered Pamela
Carpenter [the victim]? 2) Is there a probability that he will be dangerous in the future? 3) Did he act unreasonably in response to provocation?" Id. at 2947.
176. Id. at 2948.
177. 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990). See, e.g., Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d at 933 n.5, 790 P.2d at 688
n.5, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 281 n.5.
178. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1193. See also Death Penalty IV, supra note 2, at 1107.
179. 50 Cal. 3d 583, 789 P.2d 127, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990).
180. See supra note 169 (text of CALJIC 8.84.2).
181. 50 Cal. 3d at 632, 789 P.2d at 160, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
182. Id. The trial court had further instructed the jurors: "You are the sole judges
of the respective weight to be given the evidence in aggravation and mitigation
presented to you during this trial."
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8 3

prejudicial.I

in the remaining cases, Brown error allegations were not so compelling. Although the jury may have received the instruction "shall,"
it also received additional instructions with respect to the normative
nature of the weighing process. 8 4 For example, in People v. Douglas,185 the defense counsel's clarification to the jury that it was to
"weigh the factors, not count them" in addition to the prosecutor's
explanation of the weighing process were sufficient guidance for the
jury.1 86 Similarly, in People v. Thompson,187 the court concluded that
the further instruction not to count the factors, but rather to weigh
their respective combination in aggravation against mitigation, favored the defendant more than any other death penalty case based
on 1978 law seen by the court. 88
E. Motion for Modification of the Verdict
In every capital case resulting in a death sentence, section 190.4(e)
of the Penal Code requires the trial judge to assume that the defendant has sought a modification of the verdict.'8 9 The judge must independently determine if the death penalty was warranted by the
evidence, in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered under section 190.3.190 The judge then must set forth the reasons for his ruling in the clerk's minutes. 19 1 This decision is
automatically reviewed on appeal.19 2
In People v. Lewis,193 the trial court considered matters from a probation report that had not been presented to the jury. The supreme
court on appeal concluded that references to the probation report
183. Id,
184. 50 Cal. 3d 468, 533, 788 P.2d 640, 678, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 164 (1990) (court noted
that the jury was also instructed that any mitigation factor "could, standing alone, be
sufficient to justify a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.").
185. 50 Cal. 3d 468, 788 P.2d 640, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990).

186. Id.
187. 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990).
188. Id at 184-85, 785 P.2d at 886, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988). See generally 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, §
190. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e).

1618 (2d ed. 1989).
See supra note 108 (list of the factors contained

in section 190.3). See also People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 793, 726 P.2d 113, 154,
230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 708 (1986) ("[S]ection 190.4, subdivision (e) ...requires that the trial
judge make an independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty
upon the defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and the applicable law").
191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e).
192. Id.
193. 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990).

were improper in ruling on the application for modification of the
verdict, because under section 190.4(e), the judge's independent determination must be based solely on evidence heard by the jury.194
Moreover, the defendant's report contained prejudicial information
regarding his past criminal conduct, including a homicide which
would not otherwise have been known. The supreme court therefore
concluded that the trial judge's actions caused prejudice to the defendant, requiring the court to vacate the judgment of death and remand the case for proper consideration under section 190.4(e).195
Conversely, the court declined to find prejudice when the trial
court referred to the defendant's probation report in People v.
C7ark.196 Unlike the defendant in Lewis,197 the aspects of the report
to which the judge referred were ones favorable to the defendant's
position.1 98 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
denial for verdict modification.199
Another issue the supreme court has addressed under section
190.4(e) concerns the adequacy of evaluating the factors contained in
the California Rules of Court, division III, Sentencing Rules for the
Superior Courts (hereinafter Sentencing Rules), rather than those in
section 190.3.200 In People v. Turner,20 1 the trial judge evaluated the
circumstances of the crime in terms derived from the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances found in the Sentencing Rules, rather
than those listed in section 190.3 as required by section 190.4(e). 20 2
194. Id at 287, 786 P.2d at 907, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (citing People v. Williams, 45
Cal. 3d 1268, 1329, 756 P.2d 221, 257, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 870 (1988)).
195. Id. at 292, 786 P.2d at 910, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
196. 50 Cal. 3d 583, 635, 789 P.2d 127, 162, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 434 (1990).
197. Supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis).
198. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d at 635, 789 P.2d at 162, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 434. The trial judge
noted that the defendant had promptly confessed and had no prior criminal record.
Also, the judge noted that the defendant "felt a certain justification for his conduct."
Id
199. Id. See also People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 539, 788 P.2d 640, 682-83, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 126, 168-69 (1990) (supreme court failed to find prejudice as a result of the trial
court's references to the defendant's probation report, because the trial court did not
indicate that it relied on the record for its determination under section 190.4(e)).
200. CAL. RuLEs OF COURT, Rules 401-490 (West 1990). These provisions provide
the sentencing rules for the California Superior Courts.
201. 50 Cal. 3d 668, 789 P.2d 887, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990).
202. See supra note 108 (list of the factors contained in section 190.3). The rules the
trial court noted were located in Rule 421(a) which provides in pertinent part: Circumstances in aggravation include:
(a)(1) The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty . . . (a)(2) The defendant . . . used a weapon
...
(3) The victim was particularly vulnerable. (4) The crime involved multiple victims. (5) The defendant .. . occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants . . . . (8) The planning, sophistication or
professionalism . . . or other facts indicat[ing] premeditation ....
(10) The
crime involved... a taking ...of great monetary value .... (12) The defendant took a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.
CAL. RULES .OF COURT, Rule 421 (West 1990). The trial judge also referred to Rule
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The defendant contended that the judge's reference to the Sentencing Rules constituted improper consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of People v. Boyd.203 The supreme court
disagreed. 20 4 First, the court pointed to the fact that the judge indicated his understanding that section 190.3 contained the pertinent
sentencing factors. 205 Secondly, the relevant factors utilized in the
Sentencing Rules were almost rephrasings of those set forth in section 190.3.2 06 Finally, the court declared that no Boyd error occurred,
because section 190.3(a) permits the sentencer to weigh any constitutionally permissible aspect of the offense in addition to the aspects
which the law deems specifically pertinent to the penalty determination. 20 7 Accordingly, the particular provisions of the Sentencing
Rules evaluated by the trial judge were an adequate "normative
framework" under which to consider the defendant's section 190.4(e)
20 8
application.
F.

ProportionalityReview

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court rejected the contention
that the eighth amendment requires the sentencing court to conduct
an intercase comparative proportionality review. 2o9 Nevertheless, in
five cases the defendants claimed a constitutional right to a determination of whether the imposition of the death penalty in their cases
was disproportionate to the penalties imposed in other similar offenses. The California Supreme Court summarily disposed of all five
2 10
claims.
421(b)(3) (prior prison record as aggravating circumstance), Rule 423(b)(1) (absence of
significant prior criminal record as mitigating circumstance), Rule 423(a)(1) (being a
passive actor as a mitigating circumstance), Rule 423(a)(7) (mistaken belief in right to
commit crime as mitigating circumstance), and Rule 423(b)(3) (the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing at an early stage of the criminal process). Turner, 50
Cal. 3d at 715-16, 789 P.2d at 914, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 733. See CAL. RULES OF COURT,
Rules 421-423 (West 1990).
203. See supra note 138 (discussion of Boyd error).
204. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 716, 789 P.2d at 914, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id. at 715-16, 789 P.2d at 914-15, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 733-34.
208. Id. See also People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826, 879-80, 789 P.2d 983, 1019-20, 268
Cal. Rptr. 802, 838-40 (1990) (while the judge considered the circumstances "under a
normative framework for the imposition of determinate sentences, the factors considered were relevant to capital sentencing").
209. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-54 (1984).
210. People v. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d 954, 1010, 790 P.2d 1289, 1321, 269 Cal. Rptr. 492,
524 (1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907, 938, 790 P.2d 676, 692, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269,
285 (1990); People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 285-86, 786 P.2d 892, 906, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834,

However, the state court continued to conduct an intracaseproportionality review. 21i This review determines whether the punishment
is proportionate to the defendant's individual culpability. 2' 2 In People v. Thompson,213 the defendant claimed that his sentence was disproportionate to his individual culpability on the grounds that he was
a pedophile. The court responded that despite his disease, the jury
found the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 21 4 Moreover, the court declared that society is not required to endure the acts of a pedophile and that the defendant had
the alternative of seeking treatment in a psychiatric facility. 2i5
In the remaining cases, the court failed to find intracase disproportional sentences based primarily on the weight of the evidence and
the defendant's culpability.216

IV.

CONCLUSION

As the Lucas court's application of the death penalty statute continues to settle, the asserted errors are considered a matter of routine. This is partly because a majority of the cases were tried prior to
848 (1990); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 185, 785 P.2d 857, 887, 266 Cal. Rptr.
309, 339 (1990); People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 718, 789 P.2d 887, 916, 268 Cal. Rptr.
706, 735 (1990).
211. It appears that the trial court is not required to conduct an intracase proportionality review. See People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 1043, 782 P.2d 627, 662, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 386, 421 (1989) ("trial courts have discretion to determine intracaseproportionality - i.e., to determine whether the sentence imposed is proportionate to the individual culpability of the defendant, irrespective of the punishment imposed on others").
Yet, the supreme court acknowledged the necessity for intracase review on appeal. See
Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 718, 789 P.2d at 916, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 735 ("However, the Eighth
Amendment . .. and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution preclude the
imposition of punishment that is not proportionate to the defendant's individual
culpability").
212. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 482-90, 668 P.2d 697, 722-27, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390,
415-20 (1983). The supreme court found that a punishment for first degree murder was
disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability based on his being a minor.
Id See also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226
(1972) (punishment may violate the California Constitution "if, although not cruel or
unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity").
213. 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990).
214. Id, at 186, 785 P.2d at 887, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
215. Id, at 186-87, 785 P.2d at 888, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh,
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2956 (1989)).
216. People v. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d 954, 1010-11, 790 P.2d 1289, 1321-22, 269 Cal. Rptr.
492, 524-25 (1990) ("Defendant was found to have personally committed four
murders.... Nothing in the prior decisions of this court, or of the federal courts, suggests that his punishment, as the actual killer, is constitutionally disproportionate to
the offense .... "); People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 286, 786 P.2d 892, 906, 266 Cal. Rptr.
834, 848 (1990) ("We do not find the death penalty disproportionate to [the] defendant's
culpability."); People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 717, 789 P.2d 887, 916, 268 Cal. Rptr.
706, 735 (1990) ("[W]e cannot conclude that the death penalty is disproportionate to
[the] defendant's .. culpability.").
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the modifications of the CALJIC pattern jury instructions. The court
will continue to consider retroactively these issues under the harmless error analysis and will only reverse upon a finding that the error
prejudicially affected the ultimate outcome of the trial.
Most noteworthy is that none of the cases reviewed were reversed
due to the misapplication of the death penalty statute. Although the
trial courts may not have utilized the precise statutory procedures,
the supreme court found that the substitute procedures and language
in the jury instructions provided the defendants with adequate constitutional protections. This flexibility implies that given the
deplorable nature of the underlying crimes, the court will permit deviations from the statutory requirements so long as the trial is fair in
its totality.
Therefore, due to the more established posture of the death penalty statute, the fundamental issues appeared to predominate. These
issues generally were outside the context of the death penalty statute
and focused on unique circumstances of a particular case in all phases
of the trial. Thus, in future death penalty cases, the court will most
likely continue to emphasize the gravity of the crimes involved with
respect to a defendant's individual constitutional rights rather than
the ambiguities elicited from the trial court's application of the death
penalty statute.
CORI LYNN MACDONNEIL

VII.

FAMILY LAW
A transmutationof property between husband and wife
under California Civil Code section 5110.730, subdivision
(a), must be evidenced by an express declaration
containing language that explicitly acknowledges the
spouses' intent to change the "ownership or control" of
the property: Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Just six years ago a husband or wife in California could transmute
community property into separate property or vice versa with an oral
declaration of his or her desire to change the property classification.1
1. Before 1985, a married person could change the character of his or her separate property or share of community property by an oral agreement or conduct that
implied a transmutation. Reppy, Debt Collectionfrom MarriedCalifornians:Problems
Caused by Transmutations,Single-Spouse Management,and Invalid Marriage,18 SAN

Not even a hand shake was necessary. Then, effective January 1,
1985, the California Legislature enacted California Civil Code section
5110.730 requiring that a transmutation of real or personal property
between spouses be evidenced by an express written declaration. 2 In
August 1990, the California Supreme Court decided, in Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald,3 that a writing must explicitly proclaim an intent to change the character or ownership of the property in order
for the writing to be valid and effective under section 5110.730, subdi4
vision (a).
In Estate of MacDonald, both Mr. and Mrs. MacDonald had children from a previous marriage.5 When Mrs. MacDonald learned she
had terminal cancer, she and Mr. MacDonald divided their community property into separate property to facilitate Mrs. MacDonald's
desire to leave the bulk of her estate to her own children and to
avoid conflict after her death. All such real and personal property
was successfully divided with the exception of Mr. MacDonald's
three IRA accounts which were not included in the accounting and
reclassification of property.6 The IRA accounts were solely in Mr.
DIEGO L. REV. 143, 157 (1981) [hereinafter Reppy]. See also 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 125 (9th ed. 1990) (a change in property classification "did not require a writing"); 33 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 508 (1977) (no
formality required to transmute property). According to Professor William A. Reppy,
Jr., California gave "great freedom to alter the nature of the proprietary interests in
assets owned or even yet to be acquired." Reppy at 168.
2. The Civil Code states in part:
(a) A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in
writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in property is adversely affected.
(b) A transmutation of real property is not effective as to third parties without notice thereof unless recorded.
(c) This section does not apply to a gift between the spouses ... that is not
substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730 (West 1990). The California Legislature adopted the suggestions of the 1983 Law Revision Commission and required that transmutations between
spouses be in writing. 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 126 (9th ed. 1990).

3. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153, modified, 51 Cal. 3d 452A
(1990).
4. Id. at 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153. Justice Panelli wrote the majority
opinion of the court and Justice Mosk wrote an opinion concurring with the majority
conclusion. The modification made textual changes in Justice Arabian's dissenting
opinion and did not impact the substantive nature of the decision.
5. Margery and Robert MacDonald were married in 1973 and Margery died on
June 17, 1985. Mrs. MacDonald had four children by a previous marriage.
6. The funds in the IRA accounts originated from Mr. MacDonald's pension plan
which originally designated a revocable living trust as beneficiary with Mr. MacDonald's children receiving the majority of the corpus. The pension plan was created on
January 1, 1977, and generated $266,577.90 on March 21, 1985. The IRA accounts were
funded with the money from the pension plan and were opened solely in Mr. MacDonald's name. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
155. The dissenting opinion points out that while the pension plan funds were accumulated during marriage, the pension funds were actually a result of Mr. MacDonald's 35
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MacDonald's name and designated a revocable living trust as the beneficiary. Mrs. MacDonald signed a consent paragraph acknowledging
7
her understanding of the beneficiary designation.
The MacDonald's acquired the IRA accounts during marriage and
the IRA funds were presumptively community property.8 However,
spouses may transmute community property into separate property 9
by an express written declaration.10 Mr. MacDonald claimed that the
signed consent form should be construed as such a written declaration. After Mrs. MacDonald's death, the estate executrix filed a petition to establish a community property interest in the IRA funds,
asserting the consent paragraph was insufficient to effect a transmutation.'" The classification of the IRA accounts as community or separate property became the focus of the MacDonald case and provided
the California Supreme Court the opportunity to construe section
12
5110.730 subdivision (a).
II.

TREATMENT

California Civil Code section 5110.730 subdivision (a) states that

"[a] transmutation ... is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by
the spouse whose interest . . . is adversely affected."13 In Estate of
years in business, and the majority of that time was prior to his marriage to Margery
MacDonald. Id. at 281 n.3, 794 P.2d at 924 n,3, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67 n.3 (Arabian, J.,
dissenting). The majority emphasized that the funds came into existence during the
marriage. Id. at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
7. The IRA agreements each contained a signature line for a spouse not designated as the sole primary beneficiary that is evidence of the spouse's agreement to the
designation. In this case the consent agreements contained the following wording: "If
participant's spouse is not designated as the sole primary beneficiary, spouse must sign
consent. Consent of Spouse: Being the participant's spouse, I hereby consent to the
above designation." Id. at 265 n.2, 794 P.2d at 913 n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2. Mrs.
MacDonald signed the consent paragraph.
8. "[A]ll real property situated in this state and all personal property wherever
situated acquired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this
state .... is community property .... CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983).
9. Subject to sections 5110.720 to 5110.740, inclusive, married persons may by
agreement or transfer, with or without consideration, do any of the following:
(a) Transmute community property to separate property of either spouse.
(b) Transmute separate property of either spouse to community property.
(c) Transmute separate property of one spouse to separate property of the
other spouse.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110.710 (West 1990).
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730 (a), supra note 2.
11. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 265-66, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
12. Id. at 266, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730 (a) (West 1990).

MacDonald, the California Supreme Court held that a writing must
contain language that "expressly states that a change in the characterization or ownership of the property is being made," in order to
satisfy the "express declaration" requirement of section 5110.730 subdivision (a). 14 The party's intent is not determinative if the words
fail to effectuate an express declaration.' 5 The court concluded that
the standard bank form executed by Mrs. MacDonald was insufficient to be a valid transmutation as required by section 5110.730 sub16
division (a).
The MacDonald majority relied on the Legislature's intent to define the term "express declaration."1 7 The California Law Revision
Commission' 8 had several goals in mind when issuing the report that
was eventually codified as California Civil Code section 5110.730.
California court decisions are replete with examples of questionable
transmutations.19 To avoid loosely defined transmutations, the Commission attempted to insure better that the parties actually intended
a transmutation by imposing formal requirements. 20 The Commission hoped to reduce dissolution litigation by abandoning the "easy
transmutation" rule that invited a party "to transform a passing comment into an 'agreement' or even to commit perjury by manufacturing an oral or implied transmutation." 2 1 The MacDonald majority
reasoned that the language of the Commission report indicated that
14. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 264, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
15. 1d. at 267, 794 P.2d at 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
16. The majority in Estate of MacDonald concluded that there was no evidence
that Mrs. MacDonald intended a transmutation nor that she knew of her community
property interest in the pension plan that was the source of Mr. MacDonald's IRA
funds. Id. at 267 n.4, 794 P.2d at 914 n.4, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156 n.4.
17. Referring to California Civil Code section 5110.730(a), the majority found the
term "express declaration" to be ambiguous and unclear which caused them to explore
the legislative history and intent. Id. at 268, 794 P.2d at 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
18. Recommendation Relating to MaritalProperty Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 205 (1984) [hereinafter "the Commission" or "the Commission Report"].
19. For example, in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal. 2d 788, 108
P.2d 405 (1940), the court found that the husband gave up rights to the wife's earnings
by his conduct. The wife put her earnings in a bank account in her own name and the
husband deposited sums in the same account from time to time. However, when the
husband made withdrawals from the account, he did so with the intent to pay back the
borrowed amount. The court deemed this a transmutation of the husband's community property interest in the wife's earnings from community property to the wife's
separate property. In another more recent case, the court found that the husband
made a gift of his community property interest in a motor home because he did not
object to the wife putting title in her name alone. In Re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d
808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). The Commission Report, supra note 17 at
210-12, cites the result of'Lucas as one of the factors motivating a change in the statute
requiring a written transmutation.
20. The Commission Report, supra note 17 at 214. See also supra note 18.
21. The Commission Report, supra note 17 at 214. Professor Reppy stated that
"this state of the law invites litigation and tends to encourage perjury." Reppy, supra
note 1, at 168.
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the Legislature did not mean that "any signed writing" would create
22
a transmutation.
The California Supreme Court objected to classifying the MacDonald IRA beneficiary consent form as a sufficient writing. The form
did not indicate that Mrs. MacDonald was aware she was changing
the character of the IRA funds from community property to separate
property, nor that she was relinquishing her rights to the funds.23 In
order to satisfy the "express declaration" test, the court explained
that the writing must state the adversely affected party is "effecting
a change in the character or ownership" of the property. 24 However,
the writing need not include the term "transmutation" nor refer to
community or separate property.25 The MacDonald court would
have found the beneficiary consent form a sufficient writing if it had
contained another sentence: "I give to the account holder any interest
26
I have in the funds deposited in this account."
In addition, where the writing is insufficient to create a transmutation, the court will not allow extrinsic evidence to prove intent to effect a transmutation. 27 The majority suggested that this would defeat
the purpose of the Legislature and would still allow an ill motived
28
spouse or heir to create a transmutation where none was intended.
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority's conclusion that the
writing in this case was insufficient.

However, Justice Mosk dis-

agreed with the majority's construction of section 5110.730, subdivision (a). Justice Mosk found the language of the statute requiring
"definite content, ' '29 to be clear and disapproved of interpreting the
30
statute as one requiring proof of a transmutation.
Justice Arabian disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 5110.730, subdivision (a). Justice Arabian contended that Mrs.
22, Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 269, 794 P.2d at 916, 272 Cal. Rptr. at .158
(emphasis in original). The court discussed the sufficiency of a writing in general in
Estate of Blair, 199 Cal. App. 3d 161, 167-68, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627, 630-31 (1988). In Estate
of Blair, the court found that a statement in the wife's Petition for Legal Separation
listing a house as community property, and the husband's deposition declaration stating a belief that the property was community property were not sufficient to constitute
a written transmutation. Id
23. See supra note 6.
24. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id. at 269, 794 P.2d at 916, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
29. Id at 274, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (Mosk, J., concurring).
30. Id.

McDonald was sophisticated in the financial affairs of the marriage,
was aware of Mr. MacDonald's pension plan that eventually became
the disputed IRA accounts, and by her actions and conduct intended
to waive any rights to the funds in the IRA accounts.3 ' Justice Arabian interpreted the Legislative intent, as found in the Commission
Report, as a desire to require a writing like the statute of frauds.3 2
Further, Justice Arabian would allow extrinsic evidence to show
meaning or intent.3 3 He asserted that the Legislature's goal was to
overrule those cases that allowed oral transmutations or transmutations based on conduct, and the Legislature meant to "create a simple
34
writing requirement."
III.

CONCLUSION

Estate of MacDonald mandates that any transmutation requires a
clear and express writing in order to insure the transmutation will be
effective if challenged. After Estate of MacDonald, many of the
forms and writings used by businesses, banks and estate planners to
transmute property will not be sufficient to insure that the intent of
the parties is realized. To protect their clients and employees, attorneys, accountants, and personnel departments will have to modify a
mountain of forms if the party's intent was to effectuate a
transmutation.
On the other hand, the history of transmutations in California suggests that the intent of the parties was often broadly interpreted. For
instance, the court of appeals found that real estate purchased with
community funds could be transmuted to separate property by inferring a gift where one spouse disclaimed an interest in the property.3 5
The Estate of MacDonald ruling will make it more certain that the
spouse who is giving up rights in community property or changing
the nature of separate property does so with full knowledge of the
31. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 794 P.2d at 924, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 166

(Arabian, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 277-78, 794 P.2d at 922, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (citing the Commission Report, supra note 17 at 213-15).

33. Id. at 280, 794 P.2d at 923, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 278, 794 P.2d at 922, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., dissenting).

35. In Re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979). In
this case, the wife bought and sold property that was titled in her name alone. Since
the transactions occurred before 1975, and the property was titled in the wife's name
alone, the property was presumed to be her separate property. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5110 (West 1983). The husband was unable to rebut the presumption even though he
testified that he intended no gift and, in fact, was unaware of the transactions. The
court ruled the husband intended to make a gift by "abandoning" his wife to practice
real estate. Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 560. The decision was
bolstered by the fact that the husband signed two grant deeds and made no inquiry

into the income tax consequences of the real estate transactions.
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36
consequences of his or her actions.
It is clear that the majority ruling in Estate of MacDonald will
have far reaching consequences. 37 Questionable consent forms will
have to be amended if the consent form was also intended to act as a
transmutation. Estate planners will have to obtain express declarations from clients if transmuted property enters into the estate plan.
38
Further, transmutations before 1985 may also come into question.
California Civil Code section 5110.730 is applied prospectively. With
the California Supreme Court's clear expression of distrust for oral
transmutations or transmutations implied from conduct, it is likely
that a spouse or heir who wished to rely on such a form of transmutation that occurred before January 1, 1985, will need to present convincing proof.
In Estate of MacDonald, the dissent believed that Mrs. MacDonald's intent to give up her share of the IRA funds was an express declaration, and her intent was denied by the majority's holding. This
result, if correct, is all the more unfortunate because it negates the
wishes of a person who can no longer defend her intentions. On the
other hand, Mrs. MacDonald's possible misfortune will help to protect those spouses who are not sophisticated in the mechanisms of
the community property system by insuring, at a minimum, that the
spouse who is adversely affected by a transmutation has an opportunity to learn of the consequences.

LOYE

M.

BARTON

36. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
37. The Estate of MacDonald case found its way into a weekly update on family
law. Transmutation of Property Requires Express Writing, The Nat'l Law. J., Sept.
10, 1990, at 40. The impact of the case was also discussed at the Sixteenth Annual
U.S.C. Probate and Trust Conference on October 26, 1990. A summary of the Estate of
MacDonald can be found in Summary of Recent Developments at 37.
38. Cal. Civ. Code § 5110.730(e) states: "This section does not apply to or affect a
transmutation of property made before January 1, 1985, and the law that would otherwise be applicable to such a transmutation shall continue to apply." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5 11 0 .7 3 0 (e) (West 1990).

VIII.

EMPLOYMENT LAW
The cost of providing unemployment insurance coverage
on behalf of local government employees is not subject to
subvention under the California Constitution,article
XIII B, or parallelstatutes. However, local governments
may tax and spend as required to effect the legislation:
City of Sacramento v. State.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The supreme court unanimously found that costs charged to governments under the 1978 state unemployment insurance legislation,
chapter 2 of the Statutes of 1978 ("chapter 2/78"), were not constitutionally required to be reimbursed by the state because the legislation was not a "new program or higher level of service" within the
meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.'
This standard for subvention 2 of funds was explained in the recent
decision of County of Los Angeles v. State.3 However, in City of Sacramento v. State,4 the supreme court determined, with one justice
dissenting,5 that because the unemployment insurance legislation was
a federally mandated program within the meaning of the constitutional article, the local governments were not limited in their ability
to appropriate funds through taxation to meet the costs of the program, even if the standards for subvention were not met.6
II.

FACTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") mandates that unemployment taxes be levied upon employers nationwide based on
gross wages paid to employees.7 In states where there is a federally
certified unemployment insurance program,s however, employers
1. City of Sacramento v. State, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 785 P.2d 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139
(1990). The majority opinion was authored by Justice Eagleson, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard, Panelli and Kennard concurring. A separate opinion was submitted by Justice Kaufman, who concurred that the costs charged were not
subject to subvention by the state. Id. at 77, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154
(Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Subvention is "the provision of assistance or financial support" such as "a subsidy from a government."

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1177 (9th

ed. 1988). In this case, "subvention" refers to reimbursement sought from the state by
local and county governments.
3. 43 Cal. 3d 46, 729 P.2d 202, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1987).
4. 50 Cal. 3d 51, 785 P.2d 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1990).
5. City of Sacramento at 77, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
6. Id. at 57, 785 P.2d at 524, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
7. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-11 (West 1989 & Supp.
1990).
8. Id. § 3301. The Secretary of Labor is responsible for certifying state programs
that meet the enumerated requirements of the Act. Id § 3304(a).
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may credit their state contributions almost fully against the federally
imposed tax.9 States with certified programs also qualify to receive
federal administrative funds.10 Every state, including California, has
now adopted a federally certified program.'1
In 1976, Congress enacted Public Law 94-566 which required that
coverage for employees of public agencies be a part of the unemployment insurance program of the state in order to maintain certified
status. 12 To comply with Public Law 94-566, California passed chapter 2/78.13 Chapter 2/78 mandated that the state, as well as local governments, include unemployment insurance coverage on behalf of
their employees as of January 1, 1978.14
The City of Sacramento ("City") and the County of Los Angeles
("County") sought state subvention for costs incurred as a result of
the requirements of chapter 2/78 for the years 1978 and 1979, based
originally on applicable Revenue and Taxation Code sections.' 5 The
State Board of Control ("Board"), with whom the claims were filed,
denied them, holding that chapter 2/78 was not a reimbursable state
mandate. 16 In 1979, while an appeal on the claims was pending in the
Sacramento Superior Court, article XIII B of the California Constitu9. Id. §§ 3302-03. Employers may currently obtain credit for up to 90% of the fed.
erally imposed tax. Id § 3302(c)(1).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). Payment is made to states with
certified programs in an amount which the Secretary of Labor, taking several objective
and quantifiable factors into account, has deemed "necessary for the proper and efficient administration of such law." Id. § 502(a) (explaining that such factors include the
population of the state and the estimated cost of administering the law).
11. City of Sacramento,50 Cal. 3d at 58, 785 P.2d at 524, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The
court noted that a state which fails to meet the requirements of a federally certified
program has two unfathomable choices: the state could either eliminate its existing unemployment tax so that employers would not be double taxed, or it could do nothing,
and thereby subject resident businesses to both federal and state unemployment tax.
Id. at 74, 785 P.2d at 535, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 152. Adoption of the latter opinion would
force businesses to either leave the state or lose significant competitive advantages. Id
12. Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 115(a), 90 Stat. 2607, 2670 (1976) (amending FUTA's certification requirements).
13. Act of Jan. 1, 1978, ch. 2, §§ 12, 24, 31, 36.5, 58-61, 1978 Cal. Stat. 12-14, 16, 18,
24-27; CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 135(a), 605, 634.5 (West 1986).
14. Id.
15. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 2201-7.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990) (Sections 2207
and 2207.5 were repealed in 1989). The Revenue and Taxation Code embodies what
was California's original state reimbursement statute requiring subvention by the state
for "any new state-mandated program or any increased level of service of an existing
mandated program." Property Tax Relief Act of 1972, ch. 1406, § 14.7, 1972 Cal. Stat.
2961, 2962. The statute was subsequently amended, but the subvention requirement remained the same. See City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 57, 785 P.2d at 524, 266 Cal.
Rptr. at 141.
16. 50 Cal. 3d at 59, 785 P.2d at 525, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 142.

tion was enacted. The City's and County's petitions were then
amended to include the Article as a basis for relief.17
Article XIII B was adopted by the electorate as an amendment to
the state constitution.' 8 The Article limits the ability of state and local governments to appropriate and spend funds, but excludes from
this limit any "[a]ppropriations required to comply with mandates of
the courts or the federal government which, without discretion, require an expenditure for additional services or which unavoidably
make the provision of existing services more costly."'19 Additionally,
the Article requires the state to reimburse the local government
"[w]henever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government." 20
The superior court overruled the Board and the court of appeal affirmed ("Sacramento P').21 The court of appeal concluded that, contrary to the Board's ruling, chapter 2/78 involved state mandated
costs which were reimbursable under article XIII B.22 The supreme
court denied review and the case was remanded to the Board for determination of amounts due.2 3
Despite the ruling of the court of appeal and the subsequent guidelines for reimbursement developed by the Board, the Legislature
failed to introduce bills to either reimburse costs already paid by the
local governments or to fund future costs. Thus, in reliance on the
ruling in Sacramento I, the City initially paid its quarterly billings
under protest and then began to return the bills unpaid when no action was taken. 24 The instant class action suit was subsequently filed
in Sacramento Superior Court on behalf of all local governments in
the state, seeking, among other things, "injunctive and declaratory
relief barring enforcement of chapter 2/78 in the absence of state
subvention . . .[and] .. .a writ of mandate directing that past, current, and future subvention funds be... disbursed."25
In the interim, the Legislature appropriated funds for fiscal years
1984-85 and also approved limited funds for 1986.26 The trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims from these legislatively funded peri17. Id. at n.2.
18. CAL. CONST.art. XIII B. See generally 9 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Taxation § 123 (9th ed. 1989).
19. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 9(b) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 6.
21. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 59, 785 P.2d at 525, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
22. City of Sacramento v. State, 156 Cal. App. 3d 182, 199, 203 Cal. Rptr. 258, 268
(1984). The supreme court expressly disapproved of this portion of the opinion in
County of Los Angeles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 58 n.10, 729 P.2d 202, 209 n.10, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 44 n.10 (1987).
23. 50 Cal. 3d at 60, 785 P.2d at 525, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
24. Id. at 60, 785 P.2d at 526, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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ods, certified the suit as a class action, and granted a motion for sum27

mary adjudication.
While the case was pending, the supreme court
decided County of Los Angeles, holding that article XIII B and parallel statutes did not call for subvention where general increases in

workers compensation benefits were imposed on local agencies by the
state. The court reasoned that these were not unique local require-

ments, but requirements that applied generally to the public. 28
Based on this holding, the defendants in City of Sacramento moved
29
for summary judgment which the trial court granted.

The court of appeal reversed, finding that the defendants were collaterally estopped by the ruling in Sacramento I and that chapter 2/
78 did in fact impose a unique requirement on local governments
within the meaning of County of Los Angeles.3 0 The California
Supreme Court granted review.

III.
A.

MAJORITY OPINION

Jurisdiction
The supreme court first addressed jurisdictional concerns. Specifi-

cally, the court focused on whether the plaintiffs had appropriately
exhausted all of their remedies. 3 1 The State contended that although
27. Id.
28. County of Los Angeles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 56, 729 P.2d 202, 208, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 43 (1987).
29. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 61, 785 P.2d at 526, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
30. Id.
31. Id. Reimbursement procedures in effect during the applicable period have
since been repealed and are now codified, but essentially remain the same. Id. at 62
n.5, 785 P.2d at 527 n.5, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 144 n.5; see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 17500-630
(West Supp. 1991) (which sets forth the procedures for implementation of article XIII
B). As one commentator has observed, the California reimbursement process is "long
and complex." Comment, Unfunded Mandates: A Continuing Source of Intergovernmental Discord, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 591, 599 (1990) [hereinafter Unfunded Mandates]. First, the local government or agency must file a test claim with the
Commissioner on State Mandates [hereinafter CSM]. The claim must state that costs
imposed on the agency are eligible for reimbursement by the state. The CSM then
makes findings as to the merits, eligibility of agencies, and total statewide costs. Upon
approval of a claim, the CSM submits a "local government claims bill" to the Legislature. At this point, the Legislature has the option of denying the claims bill or reducing the amount. The Governor must also approve the claim and has the same options
available as the Legislature. Finally, the bill is received by the State Controller, who
in turn informs the local agencies how to obtain the reimbursement. .c at 599-600
(citing CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON STATE MANDATES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO THE
MANDATE PROCESS 1 (Dec. 1987)). Should the Legislature deny the bill, enforcement

of the state mandate may be enjoined by a claimant in an action for declaratory relief.
Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 44 Cal. 3d 830, 833, 750 P.2d 318, 321, 244 Cal.

the plaintiffs had exhausted all administrative remedies applicable to
subvention of costs, the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the procedures
applicable to resolution of tax cases.32 The State asserted that the
California Constitution prohibited claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against tax collection.3 3 Thus, in order to pursue the
claim, the plaintiffs must first pay their unemployment taxes and
then seek a refund under the procedures established in the Unemployment Insurance Code. 34 To the extent that plaintiffs had sought
a refund, the State claimed that they did not follow proper
3
procedures. 5
The court found, however, that the plaintiffs were not attempting
to challenge the validity of the unemployment insurance law or the
resulting tax, but were asserting that the related costs required state
subvention.36 The court stated that the fact that the costs may include "taxes" was merely incidental. 37 Further, the claim for a refund involved subvention issues and not disputes over taxes
contemplated in the Unemployment Insurance Code.38 Thus, plaintiffs were entitled to bring suit to retrieve past unreimbursed expenses as well as to declare present unfunded mandates
unenforceable. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to re39
solve "whether chapter 2/78 constitute[d] a reimbursable mandate."
B.

CollateralEstoppel and Res Judicata

The court next discussed the doctrines of collateral estoppel and
res judicata to determine whether the issues presented were precluded by the decision in Sacramento L The plaintiffs claimed that
both doctrines applied, and the court of appeal agreed that the State
was collaterally estopped from litigating the characterization of chapter 2/78 as a state mandate. 40
1.

Collateral Estoppel

The plaintiffs asserted that Sacramento I finally decided that chapRptr. 677, 679 (1988) (school districts providing special education sought declaratory
relief).
32. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 62, 785 P.2d at 527, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1176-81, 1241(a) (West 1986)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 63, 785 P.2d at 527, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The plaintiffs had pursued all
of the appropriate avenues relating to the issue of subvention. The Board approved
their claims bill but the Legislature rejected it. Thus, the appropriate procedure was
to bring an action for declaratory relief. The court therefore found it difficult to countenance the State's claim that the City was seeking resolution of a tax issue. Id.
37. Id. at 63, 785 P.2d at 527, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
38. Id. at 63-64, 785 P.2d at 528, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
39. Id. at 63, 785 P.2d at 528, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
40. Id. at 64, 785 P.2d at 528, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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ter 2/78 was a state mandated cost, and thus collateral estoppel
barred the State from relitigating the issue. The court explained
that, as here, where the issue involves a question of law rather than a
question of fact, collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation "if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation
not be foreclosed."41 According to the supreme court, even if collateral estoppel was suggested by the circumstances, the public interest
exception required that relitigation be allowed or else the consequences of any error in the judgment of Sacramento I would be pervasive, exceeding the consequences of litigation between mere private
parties. 42 On one hand, if Sacramento I was incorrectly decided and
not reviewable, taxpayers would suffer because the state would have
a continuing obligation to fund chapter 2/78 costs. Alternatively, California employers may suffer great financial losses if the state does
not collect the funds necessary to enforce chapter 2/78, resulting in a
43
violation of federal law.
2.

Res Judicata

The plaintiffs also argued that all claims involving the instant parties were decided in Sacramento I; thus res judicata prohibited further review. The court stated that although it would be precluded by
res judicata from upsetting "individual claims or causes of action...
which have been finally adjudicated," the issues in the instant case
were "not limited to the validity of any such finally adjudicated
claims" but involved subvention "in general."44
41. Id.
42. The court noted that collateral estoppel would bar the relitigation of this pure
question of law:
The state was the losing party in Sacramento I, and also the only entity legally
affected by that decision. Thus, strict application of collateral estoppel would
foreclose any reexamination of the holding of that case. The state would remain bound, and no other person would have occasion to challenge the
precedent.
Id, (emphasis in original).
43. Id, at 64-65, 785 P.2d at 529, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
44. Id. at 65, 785 P.2d at 529, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (emphasis in original). According to the court, the test claim procedure culminating in Sacramento I was merely a
procedure to address the question of law as to whether enacted state legislation
amounted to a reimbursable state mandate. As res judicata only precludes upsetting of
individual claims, it would only bar relitigation of the test claims actually adjudicated
and not "all claims by all local agencies for all years." Id. at 65 n.10, 785 P.2d at 529
n.10, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 146 n.10 (emphasis in original).

C. "New Program" or "IncreasedService?"
In reaching the merits of the case, the supreme court held that
chapter 2/78 did not impose any reimbursable costs on local governments under article XIII B. 4 5 Its decision was controlled by the holding of County of Los Angeles.46 In County of Los Angeles, the court
reasoned that the key phrases in article XIII B, "new program" and
"higher level of service," were meant to convey their ordinary meaning - "programs that carry out the governmental function of providing services to the public, or laws which, to implement a state policy,
impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply
generally to all residents and entities in the state." 47 County of Los
Angeles held that the costs associated with a general increase in
workers' compensation benefits did not qualify as a reimbursable
state mandate under the standards of article XIII B.48 Local agencies
were merely being put on par with their private employer
49
counterparts.
The court in City of Sacramento then analogized the workers' compensation benefits in County of Los Angeles to the unemployment
compensation coverage in the instant case. The court found that the
new provision requiring unemployment compensation coverage for
public employees likewise did not amount to a new or increased service to the public or to a uniquely imposed state policy because
"[e]xtension of this requirement to local governments . . . merely
makes the local agencies 'indistinguishable in this respect from private employers.' "50
The court discounted each of the plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish
County of Los Angeles. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the expressed purpose behind article XIII B was to prevent new costs, such
as the one in the instant case, from being forced onto local agencies
45. Id. at 66, 785 P.2d at 530, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
46. Id.
47. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 3d at 56, 729 P.2d at 208, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 43
(emphasis added). In County of Los Angeles, the court rejected the appellant/city's
definition of "higher level of service." Id. Appellants in that case contended that the
appropriate definition -was included within the Revenue and Taxation Code, Section
2164.3 (part of the Property Tax Relief Act of 1972) which had been repealed prior to
County of Los Angeles. The definition therein stated that " 'fijncreased level of service'
means any requirement mandated by state law or executive regulation . . . which
makes necessary expanded or additional costs to a county, city and county, city, or special district." CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 2164.3, repealed by ch. 358, § 2, 1973 Cal. Stat.
779 (West 1991). The court held that the Legislature intended a change in the definition by deleting its presence from the superceding statute, section 2207 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code. 43 Cal. 3d at 55, 729 P.2d at 206, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
48. Id.
49. 43 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 729 P.2d at 208, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
50. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 67, 785 P.2d at 530-31, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48
(quoting County of Los Angeles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 58, 729 P.2d 202, 209, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 44 (1987)).
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without subvention from the state.51 The court found this argument
unmeritorious because the language of the Article does not support
the contention that any new law of general application which inci52
dentally affects local governments necessitates reimbursement.
The court next rejected the contention that chapter 2/78 imposed a
3

unique requirement within the meaning of County of Los Angeles.5
The City urged the court to find the unemployment insurance to be a
unique cost, as in Lucia Mar Unified School Districtv. Honig.54 Lu-

cia Mar involved legislation requiring local school districts to fund
the education of their handicapped students. The court in Lucia Mar
found that this requirement qualified as a new program for local government because the state "shifted" the cost of a public service that
had traditionally been funded by the state to local school districts.55
In City of Sacramento the court distinguished Lucia Mar, finding
that in the instant case the issue was "whether costs unrelated to the

provision of public services are nonetheless reimbursable costs of gov-

ernment, because they are imposed on local governments 'unique[ly],'
and not merely as an incident of compliance with general laws."56
The court noted that the previous exemption enjoyed by the state

and local governments was merely eliminated by chapter 2/78, and
51. Id. at 67, 785 P.2d at 531, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The plaintiffs referred to the
ballot materials available when the voters approved article XIII B. The pamphlet
stated that "this measure... [w]ill not allow the state government to force programs
on local governments without the state paying for them." County of Los Angeles, 43
Cal. 3d at 56, 729 P.2d at 208, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (citing Ballot Pamphlet, Proposed
Amend. to Cal. Const., Spec. Statewide Elec., p. 18 (Nov. 6, 1979)). According to the
court in County of Los Angeles, the voters were concerned with preventing the state
from passing costs along to local agencies which should be provided to the public by
the state. Id, However, the concern was not related to costs applicable to all state residents in general. "Laws of general applicability are not passed by the Legislature to
'force' programs on localities." Id. at 56-57, 729 P.2d at 207-08, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.
52. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 67-68, 785 P.2d at 531, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
53. Id, at 68, 785 P.2d at 531, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
54. Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 44 Cal. 3d 830, 750 P.2d 318, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 677 (1988).
55. Id. at 835-36, 750 P.2d at 321-22, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81. In Lucia Mar, the
court stated that there was no issue as to whether the education of the children was a
program within the meaning of article XIII B because "the education of handicapped
children is clearly a governmental function providing a service to the public." Id at
835, 750 P.2d at 322, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 680. Further, the shifting of these costs to the
school districts would impose costs on the local agency that are not borne by the general public. In the case of unemployment insurance costs, both private employers
statewide and state and local governments are required to incur the same costs after
enactment of chapter 2/78.
56. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 68, 785 P.2d at 531, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (emphasis in original).

the government was made subject to costs which have always been
borne by other employers.57 Thus, the requirement was new to the
local governments but not unique.
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the costs imposed were not "incidental" within the meaning of County of Los Angeles. According to the plaintiffs, the cost of the unemployment
insurance coverage charged to local governments was too high to be
considered incidental and therefore required subvention. However,
the court responded that, by employing the term "incidental," the
court in County of Los Angeles did not mean to refer to insignificant
amounts.5 8 To the contrary, expenses imposed primarily on the private sector and incidentally on the public sector may be quite
9
substantial.5
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' request to overrule
County of Los Angeles.60 The plaintiffs argued that the "program"
and "service" limitation of County of Los Angeles conflicted with the
language of article XIII B that enumerates an all-inclusive list of
nonreimbursable state mandates. Further, plaintiffs asserted that
the limitation was incongruous with the intent and purpose of the
Article because it allowed the state to "force" upon the local governments costs not intended by the voters to be nonreimbursable state
6
mandates. 1
The court rejected the contention that the Article purported to
limit nonreimbursable mandates to those specifically listed. According to the court, the listed exceptions were merely meant to encompass those programs which would not be reimbursable regardless of
whether they met the "new program" or "increased level of service"
language of the Article.62
Additionally, the court stated that the standards set forth in
County of Los Angeles did not conflict with those of the Article.
Rather than allowing states to "force" programs on local governments, the standards require subvention "whenever the state freely
57. Id
58. Id. at 69, 785 P.2d at 532, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 69, 785 P.2d at 532, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 149. Article XIII B reads, in pertinent part, that the Legislature may, but need not, provide subvention of funds for the
following mandates:
(a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected;
(b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a
crime; or
(c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975 or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January
1, 1975.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6.
62. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 69-70, 785 P.2d at 532, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
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chooses to impose on local agencies any peculiarly 'governmental'
costs which they were not previously required to absorb."63 As such,

the standards do not create a risk that local agencies will bear the
cost of state mandated programs in contravention of article XIII B.64
D.

FederalMandate
Finally, the supreme court initiated a reexamination of the "fed-

eral mandate" holding in Sacramento L In Sacramento I, the court
of appeal held that chapter 2/78 did not qualify as a federal man-

date,65 thus the outcome of the case rested on whether chapter 2/78
was a reimbursable state mandate. Because the federal versus state
classification has fiscal ramifications beyond the issue of subvention, 66 the supreme court rejected the finding that chapter 2/78 was a
67
state mandate.
Under article XIII B, federally mandated appropriations are imposed "without discretion" and "unavoidably" increase the costs of

providing services currently offered.68 The plaintiffs contended that
unless Public Law 94-566 legally dictated coverage of public employees, then the language of article XIII B would not be satisfied. The
State countered that the issue was more appropriately couched in
69
terms of "realistic 'discretion' to refuse."

The court rejected the plaintiffs' restrictive view of legal compulsion, listing several factors to be considered on a case by case basis in
determining whether a program was mandatory or optional upon a
state. Among the relevant inquires are
the nature and purpose of the federal program; whether its design suggests an
intent to coerce; when the state and/or local participation began; the penalties,
if any, assessed for withdrawal or refusal to participate or comply; and any
other legal and practical consequences of nonparticipation, noncompliance, or
63. Id. at 70, 785 P.2d at 532, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
64. Id,
65. City of Sacramento v. State, 156 Cal. App. 3d 182, 194, 203 Cal. Rptr. 258, 265
(1984). The court of appeal held that financial and political coercion, no matter how
great, were not the equivalent of a statutory mandate. Id. at 196, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
Justice Kaufman found the same in his dissent. 50 Cal. 3d at 80, 785 P.2d at 540, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. 50 Cal. 3d at 70, 785 P.2d at 533, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Under the Revenue and
Taxation Code, a local government is not limited in its ability to tax in order to meet
the costs of federal mandates. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2271 (West 1989 & Supp.
1990). Additionally, article XIII B section 9 exempts federal mandates from the constitutional spending limit. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 9.
67. 50 Cal. 3d at 71, 785 P.2d at 533, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
68. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 9(b).
69. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 71, 785 P.2d at 533, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 150.

withdrawal.

70

Here, the court looked to the prevailing legal environment at the
time article XIII B was enacted 71 and the Legislature's subsequent
adoption of amendments to the statutory definition of federally mandated costs.72 These groups agreed with the more liberal construction. The court concluded that Public Law 94-566 and resulting
chapter 2/78 effected a federal mandate as defined by article XIII
B.73 Thus, state and local governments were not limited in their ability to tax and spend to comply with chapter 2/78.74
IV.

THE CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT

Justice Kaufman concurred in the judgment of the court that
under the reasoning of County of Los Angeles, chapter 2/78 was not a
"new program or higher level of service." 75 Nevertheless, Justice
Kaufman dissented from the majority in both its view of chapter 2/78
as a federal mandate and in its decision to raise the issue
altogether.76
According to the dissent, the majority exceeded the bounds of judicial restraint in deciding the constitutional issue. "A court will not
decide a constitutional question unless such construction is absolutely
necessary." 77 Here, neither of the parties actively sought determination of nor vigorously argued the issue. 78 Further, the outcome of
70. Id. at 76, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
71. Id. at 72-73, 785 P.2d at 534-35, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52. During the latter part
of the 1970's, the time period in which article XIII B was enacted, the concept of federalism was popular, leaving doubt as to Congress' otherwise plenary power to impose its
will on state and local governments. As a result, the federal government was much
more inclined to utilize incentives than statutory directives. Thus, to conclude that the
drafters of the article intended the "federal mandate" requirement to mean actual
statutory compulsion would have rendered the amendment meaningless given the prevailing attitude at the time of its adoption. Id at 73, 785 P.2d at 535, 266 Cal. Rptr. at
152.
72. Id. at 75, 785 P.2d at 536, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 153. Subsequent to the adoption of
article XIII B, the Revenue and Taxation Code was amended. Among the changes was
an amendment to the definition of "costs mandated by the federal government." Id
The amended code defines federal mandates as "costs resulting from enactment of a
state law or regulation where failure to enact such law or regulation to meet specific
federal program or service requirements would result in substantialmonetary penalties or loss offunds to public or private persons in the State." Id (citing CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 2206 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990))(emphasis supplied by court).
73. Id. at 76, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
74. 50 Cal. 3d at 76, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
75. Id. at 77, 785 P.2d at 537, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
76. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. Id. at 77, 785 P.2d at 538, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534, 73 P. 424, 425 (1903)).
78. Id. at 77, 785 P.2d at 538, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting). Indeed, the court itself requested additional briefing. As the majority
even noted, it was odd that the plaintiffs chose to argue that chapter 2/78 was not a
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this issue was not necessary as a ground for the court's ultimate holding, and the only reason for revisiting the issue was its "important
implications," a justification that Justice Kaufman felt to be wholly
indefensible.79
Presented in an appropriate case, Justice Kaufman would have
found that the chapter 2/78 costs imposed were clearly state mandated.80 He believed the usual and ordinary meaning should be accorded to the term, "mandate," therefore requiring "obligations
compelled by force of law" instead of coercive use of economic or
political inducements.81
Justice Kaufman proceeded to attack the majority's test for discerning those enactments which were mandatory and those which
were optional. Because the inquiry proposed by the majority involved burdensome fact finding and unpredictable outcomes, Justice
Kaufman concluded that the holding was bound "to generate more
difficulties than it resolves."82
V.

CONCLUSION

Tension between the state and local governments resulting from
unfunded mandates is a problem that has touched every state.8 3 As
each state considers how best to resolve the problem, California must
reexamine its chosen solution. As one commentator has noted,
although the state constitution now dictates subvention by the state
for state mandates, the effectiveness of this constitutional amendment has been limited by the complicated reimbursement proceedings and by holdings of the court which have "essentially gutted the
84
mandate provision."
federal mandate because a finding that the statute constituted a federally imposed
mandate would lift the local agency's taxing and spending limits. The presumed reason for such a stance was that the classifications are mutually exclusive, and thus classification as a federal mandate would eliminate the possibility of state subvention. Id.
at 71 n.17, 785 P.2d at 533 n.17, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 150 n.17. However, the majority did
not preclude the possibility of a mandate that was both federally and state mandated
for the purposes of subvention. Id. at 71 n.16, 785 P.2d at 533 n.16, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 150
n.16.
79. City of Sacramento, 50 Cal. 3d at 78, 785 P.2d at 538, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 155
(Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 79, 785 P.2d at 539, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
82. Id. at 81, 785 P.2d at 540, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
83. See Unfunded Mandates, supra note 31, at 592.
84. Id. at 600. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. State, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1478, 225 Cal.

The ruling in City of Sacramento continues the precedent set by
the supreme court and followed by lower state courts in narrowly interpreting the constitutional language of article XIII B insofar as it
defines "new program" and "higher level of service." It can be expected that only a small number of state mandates will continue to
be reimbursed by the state.85 However, the factual inquiry set forth
by the majority in determining whether a program is federally mandated may open more possibilities as to classification as a federal
mandate, thus lifting the limits of taxing and spending to meet the
costs of programs thrust upon local agencies.
SUE ELLEN DIEB
Ix.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A projectfor the increase 6r initiation of passenger
services on a rail line is exempt from regulation in the
California Environmental Quality Act requiringan
environmental impact report where the rail line has
already been constructed along the rail right-of-way and
the rail operatorhas not obtained a certificate of
abandonment. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)' enables public
agencies to oversee projects that may have a significant effect on the
environment. Within the CEQA, however, there is a list of projects
that the legislature has designated as exempt from such environmental review. 2 In Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities
Commission,3 the California Supreme Court considered the application of one such exemption to a railroad company that planned to institute passenger service on a rail line that had not operated for two
Rptr. 101 (1987) (holding that an increase in pension payments to retired employees
does not require reimbursement by the state under article XIII B); Contra Costa
County v. State, 177 Cal. App. 3d 62, 222 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1986) (holding that requirement that condemnor in eminent domain action pay for business goodwill not a state
mandate); 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 700 (1980) (deciding that requirement for municipal
county districts to increase number of judges does not result in reimbursable costs).
85. See Unfunded Mandates,supra note 31, at 599. The comment cites to a General Accounting Office Report finding that over a 10 year period, out of 4100 state
mandates, only 124 were funded at the time of passage. Id. at n.47 (citing GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LEGISLATIVE MANDATES:

STATE EXPERIENCES OFFER INSIGHT

FOR FEDERAL ACTION 3 (Sept. 1988)).
1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 and Supp. 1991).

2. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(b) (West 1986).
3. 50 Cal. 3d 370, 787 P.2d 976, 267 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1990) (abrogated by the California Legislature's changes to Public Resources Code Section 21080.04).
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and one half years. The particular exemption applies only to rail
rights-of-way if considered already in use. Thus, the Supreme Court
had to consider the legislative intent behind the language "rail rightsof-way already in use" and whether, under the facts of Napa Valley
Wine Train, Inc., the rail right-of-way was "already in use."
In a concise opinion written by Justice Panelli,4 the majority held
that a rail right-of-way is in use where the rail line has been constructed on the right-of-way, and the operator of the rail line has not
intentionally abandoned the right-of-way.5 Because the rail line in
question had already been constructed and no certificate of abandonment had been issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission
6
(ICC), the court concluded that the exemption applied.
This article begins by examining CEQA and other relevant statutes. Next, the article summarizes the factual and procedural history
of Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc.. Additionally, this article analyzes

the majority and dissenting opinions, and ultimately concludes with a
discussion of the case's impact on CEQA and the environment.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Application of CEQA

In 1970, the California Legislature enacted CEQA.7 The legislative
intent behind CEQA was to ensure
that all agencies of the state government which regulate activities of private
individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the
quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian. 8

The Act declares a state policy requiring all government agencies to,
among other things, do the following: (1) develop standards and pro4. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Eagleson and Kennard concurred with Justice Panelli's majority opinion. Justices Mosk and Kaufman filed separate dissenting
opinions with Justice Broussard concurring as to each. Justice Kaufman was retired
sitting under assignment by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
5. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 380, 787 P.2d at 981, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 574.
6. Id. at 383, 787 P.2d at 983-84, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
7. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 and Supp. 1991). See generally
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property §§ 58-66 (9th ed. 1987) (providing an overview of CEQA); Comment, Substantive Enforcement of the California
Environmental Quality Act, 69 CAL. L. REV. 112 (1981) (considering possible means of
enforcing CEQA). The California Legislature also mandated the promulgation of administrative regulations for the implementation of CEQA. CAL. CODE REAS. tit. 14,
§§ 15000-15387 (1983) [formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE] [hereinafter CEQA Guidelines].
8. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 1986).

cedures to protect the environment; (2) consider qualitative, economic, and technical factors affecting the environment; (3) consider
the long and short term benefits and costs that the proposed project
would cause to the environment; and (4) consider alternatives to proposed actions affecting the environment. 9
To enable the agencies to accomplish these four requirements,
CEQA requires that an environmental impact report be prepared for
all projects10 that may have a significant effect on the environment."
The legislature hoped that by requiring an impact report, government agencies and the general public would be informed of the proposed project's environmental impact, and that concerned citizens
would be comforted knowing that the ecological implications of a
project had been analyzed and taken into consideration.12
CEQA, as originally enacted, clearly applied to public projects, but
application to private projects was unclear. The California Supreme
Court, in Friends of Mammoth v. City of Los Angeles,'3 examined the
legislative history of CEQA and determined that the legislature intended the Act to include private projects having a significant effect
on the environment and at least a minimal link to a government
agency. 14 In 1972, the legislature recognized ambiguity in the language of CEQA and amended the Act to clarify the inclusion of private projects under its provisions.15
9. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE

§ 21001(f)-(g)

(West 1986).

10. A "project" is defined as any of the following:
(a) Activities directly undertaken by any public agency.
(b) Activities undertaken by a person which are supported in whole or in part
through contracts, grants, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or
more public agencies.
(c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1986). See generally, Comment, Probable Future
Projects: Their Role in Environmental Assessment under the California Environmental Quality Act, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 727 (1981) (examining the projects to which
CEQA applies).
11. "Significant effect on the environment means a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068 (West
1986).
12. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 86, 529 P.2d 66, 78, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 46 (1974).
13. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
14. Id. at 262-63, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
15. Section 21151 was amended to require the preparation of an impact report
whenever a public agency approves a private project that may have a significant effect
on the environment. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1986). The legislature also
added section 21065, defining "project," to clarify that CEQA extends to private
projects with which a public agency has some minimal link. The "minimal line" is satisfied by an agency's direct proprietary interest in the project or by the agency permitting, regulating, or funding the private activity. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West
1986). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App.
3d 959, 966-67, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176-77 (1976) (acknowledging the broad definition of
"project"); See also No Oil, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d at 82 n.13, 529 P.2d at 75 n.13, 118 Cal. Rptr.
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Though CEQA's main policy concern is the maintenance of environmental quality, the legislature has recognized the existence of
other state policy interests that outweigh the environmental concern.16 The legislature expressly set forth these alternative policy interests in a list of project categories that are exempt from CEQA
requirements. 17
In 1978, the legislature included in this list an exemption for "project[s] for the institution or increase of passenger or commuter service on rail lines already in use, including the modernization of
existing stations and parking facilities."' 8 In 1982, this section was
amended to read, "a project for the institution or increase of passenger or commuter services on rail or highway rights-of-way already in
use, including modernization of existing stations and parking facilities." 19 The change from "rail line"2 0 to "rail right-of-way" 21 created
ambiguity. It was unclear whether this change was meant to be substantive or merely procedural. The California Supreme Court had to
confront and resolve this ambiguity in Napa Valley Wine Train,
Inc..22 The courts resolution, however, was immediately and expressly abrogated by the California legislature in Public Resources
Code Section 21080.04.
III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. involves the Rocktram-Krug line, a
at 43 n.13 (pointing out that Public Resources Code section 21151 codifies the holding
in Mammoth).
16. See Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 50 Cal. 3d 370,
376, 787 P.2d 976, 978-79, 267 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571-72 (1990).
17. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21080(b) (West 1986). The list of exemptions now includes rail lines such as the track at issue in Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc.. CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21080.04. See Comment, The Application of Emergency Exemptions under
CEQA: Loopholes in Need of Amendment?, 15 PAC. L. J. 1089 (1984) (criticizing the exemptions to CEQA).
18. 1978 Cal. Stat. 791 (emphasis added) (re-enacted by 1979 Cal. Stat. 2171 and
formerly codified as § 21085.5).
19. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(b)(11) (West 1986) (emphasis added).
20. A rail line is a line of track or rails providing a runway for wheels. WEBSTER'S
NEW CoLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 972-73 (9th ed. 1983).
21. A right-of-way is a property right, which is described as a servitude that "may
be granted and held, though not attached to land." CAL. CIV. CODE § 802 (West 1982).
In the same bill that amended the passenger service exemption, the legislature added
to the Civil Code's section on servitudes a definition of the legal attributes of rail
rights-of-way. CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.7(a) (West Supp. 1991).
22. The passenger service exemption was a matter of first impression, leaving the
court with only the legislative intent and normal interpretation procedures to determine its amended meaning.

railroad line that runs through California's Napa Valley.23 This line
was built over one hundred years ago to carry passengers to Calistoga, and for most of that time the line has belonged to the Southern
Pacific Transportation Company (Southern Pacific). Southern Pacific ceased transporting passengers around 1940, and began transporting only freight. 24 In late 1984, Southern Pacific ceased
transporting freight and applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for permission to abandon the line.2 5
The ICC conducted an abandonment investigation to determine if
present and future public convenience and necessity would permit
the abandonment, if rural and community development would be seriously impacted, and if the quality of the human environment or energy conservation would be significantly affected. 26 Several petitions
arguing against abandonment were filed,27 but the ICC rejected them
all, concluding that abandonment would not negatively impact the
area. 28 The ICC, however, conditioned issuance of the abandonment
certificate on Southern Pacific keeping the right-of-way underlying
the track intact for a period of 180 days. Furthermore, a certificate
would only be issued if "no offer for continued rail operation [was]
received [by Southern Pacific] during the 180 day period." 29
Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. (Wine Train) offered to buy the
Rocktram-Krug line from Southern Pacific within the 180 day period,
intending to continue rail service. Southern Pacific agreed to the
sale. The ICC approved the transfer and dismissed Southern Pacific's
application for abandonment.3 0
23. The Rocktram-Krug line runs 21 miles through the heart of California's wine
country, past many wineries, and through the cities of Napa, St. Helena, and
Yountville.
24. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 374, 787 P.2d at 977, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 570.
25. Southern Pacific originally filed the application to abandon on November 16,
1984, but it was dismissed for failure to comply with notice requirements. The application was properly refiled on April 18, 1985. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co., Doc. No.
AB-12 (Sub-No. 79) (I.C.C. Oct. 9, 1985) (abandonment hearing) (LEXIS, Trans library,
ICC file). See generally Woodruff v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 949 (D. Conn. 1941)
(discussing the ICC's authority to grant abandonments); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Railroads
§§ 189-193 (1972).
26. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., Doc. No. AB-12 (Sub-No. 79) (I.C.C. Oct. 9, 1985)
(abandonment hearing) (LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file). See generally 65 AM. JUR. 2D
Railroads §§ 185-87 (1972) (discussing abandonment).
27. The cities of Napa and St. Helena, the town of Yountville, the County of Napa,
and the Napa Valley Vinters Association filed petitions against abandonment. The
town of Yountville argued that the line should not be abandoned because "the potential for passenger services merits preservation." Southern Pac. Transp. Co., Doc. No.
AB-12 (Sub-No. 79) (I.C.C Oct. 9, 1985) (abandonment hearing) (LEXIS, Trans library,
ICC file).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Under 49 U.S.C. section 10905(e) "[i]f the carrier and a person offering to
purchase a line enter into an agreement which will provide continued rail service, the
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Upon acquisition of the line, Wine Train proceeded to refurbish it
for the commencement of freight and passenger service. 31 Wine
Train planned to use the line primarily for passenger service by offering tourists the option of taking the train to see the Napa Valley
and visit its many wineries. 3 2 Wine Train also planned to continue

freight service as a means of generating additional revenue. 33 The
passenger service plan provoked objections by Napa Valley residents
who feared a tourist invasion.
The objectors filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) claiming the proposed passenger service was subject to
the PUC's regulatory jurisdiction, and therefore, that Wine Train was
subject to CEQA provisions. 34 Wine Train had already filed a peti-

tion with the ICC, requesting that the commission declare Wine
Train subject to ICC jurisdiction and the proposed passenger service
exempt from CEQA under the passenger service exemption. 35
The ICC issued a declaratory order finding as follows: (1) that
Wine Train was an interstate carrier; 3 6 (2) Wine Train needed no adCommission shall approve the transaction and dismiss the application for abandonment." 49 U.S.C. § 10905(e) (1982) (emphasis added). Application of this section
means that the line was never abandoned by Southern Pacific's license. Napa Valley
Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 50 Cal. 3d 370, 374, 787 P.2d 976, 977, 267
Cal. Rptr. 569, 570 (1990). The decision authorizing Wine Train's acquisition of the line
was served December 5, 1985 and contained an environmental finding that the acquisition would "not significantly affect either the quality of the human environment or energy conservation." Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 720, 724-25 (1988)
(petition for declaratory order). It is important to note that once parties agree on the
financial terms of the transfer, the nondiscretionary nature of section 10905 prevents
the commission from denying the transfer on environmental grounds. Id. at 717.
31. Between 1985 and 1987, Southern Pacific neglected the line and let it fall into
disrepair. Wine Train was able to reinstitute freight service on January 10, 1988. Napa
Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 375, 787 P.2d at 977, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
32. Id at 387, 787 P.2d at 986, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
33. Because the transfer occurred under section 10905, Wine Train was required to
continue rail service for at least two years. 49 U.S.C. § 10905(f)(4) (1982); Napa Valley
Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 374-75 n.5, 787 P.2d at 977 n.5, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 570 n.5.
34. City of St. Helena v. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 28 Cal. P.U.C.2d 2 (1988).
35. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 720 (1988) (declaratory order).
36. Wine Train planned to instigate freight service in conjunction with Southern
Pacific and to instigate passenger service in conjunction with the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), Greyhound Lines, Inc. and others. Because jointly
offered freight service is an interstate operation, the freight service connects the passenger service to the national rail system, making it not purely a local line. This connection results in federal pre-emption of the state's ability to regulate the proposed
passenger service, and makes Wine Train an interstate carrier under the jurisdiction of
the ICC and subject to its economic regulation. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 4
I.C.C.2d 720, 732-33 n.5 (1988) (declaratory order). See also 53 CAL. JUR. 3D Public
Utilities § 43 (1979) (explaining division of jurisdiction between ICC and PUC).

ditional authority to institute passenger service because it was the
successor in interest to Southern Pacific's license to operate the
Rocktram-Krug line;37 and (3) the PUC did not have jurisdiction over
Wine Train because the Staggers Rail Act of 198038 requires ICC cer-

tification of the PUC in order to retain any jurisdiction to impose
economic regulation over intrastate transportation provided by interstate carriers which California had failed to request. 39 The PUC,
however, held that the Staggers Act only applies to economic regulation of freight service, not passenger service, and that, therefore, the
proposed passenger operations would be subject to economic regulation by the PUC.40 Furthermore, the PUC held that its jurisdiction

over Wine Train made the proposed passenger service a "project"
subject to the requirements of CEQA, and that Wine Train was not
exempt from environmental review because the line was not "already
in use," as required for application of the passenger service exemption.41 The contradictory holdings of the ICC and the California
PUC prompted the California Supreme Court to issue a writ of re37. The ICC's decision authorizing the transfer of the Rocktram-Krug line from
Southern Pacific to Wine Train did not limit the type of service that Wine Train could
provide, and, in fact, the decision anticipated Wine Train's instigation of passenger service. Though Southern Pacific had only freight service, it could have added passenger
service at any time without obtaining any regulatory approval. Thus, Wine Train, as
Southern Pacific's successor in interest, needed no additional grant of authority from
either the PUC or the ICC, to instigate the passenger service. Napa Valley Wine
Train, Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 720, 731-32 (1988) (declaratory order). The CEQA requires state
agencies to take account of environmental considerations in their decision making process, but because the PUC has no role in licensing Wine Train's instigation of passenger service, the PUC cannot "condition the commencement of such operations on the
prior completion of an environmental impact report under CEQA." Napa Valley Wine
Train, Inc., Fin. Doc. No. 31156 (I.C.C. Jan. 9, 1989) (Petition for declaratory order)
(LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file).
38. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1981) (codified
in various sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the Staggers Act]. See also
Birkholz, The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Deregulations and Reregulation:A Railroad
Perspective, 17 FORUM 850 (1982) (a brief look at the effects of the Staggers Act).
39. The Staggers Act provides that a state authority can only exercise jurisdiction
over intrastate rail transportation by an interstate rail carrier covered by the Act, if
the state is certified by the ICC. 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1) & (2) (1982). "All rail transportation in an uncertified state is "deemed" interstate and is subject to the [ICC's]
economic regulation, not that of the state." Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d
720, 734 (1988) (declaratory order) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4)(B)). California has
not been certified under the Staggers Act; therefore, it cannot impose any economic
regulation over Wine Train, such as conditioning funds on compliance with CEQA.
This means that the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction to impose economic regulation over
Wine Train's proposed passenger and freight service, limiting California authorities to
enforcing railroad compliance with local safety, zoning, land use and other non-economic regulation within its powers. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 720, 734
(1988) (declaratory order); Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., Fin. Doc. No. 31156 (I.C.C.
Jan. 9, 1989) (petition for declaratory order) (LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file).
40. City of St. Helena v. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 28 Cal. P.U.C.2d 352, 362-63
(1988).
41. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 50 Cal. 3d 370, 388,
787 P.2d 976, 987, 267 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580 (1990) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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view to resolve the conflict.42
IV.
A.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT

The Majority's Opinion

Justice Panelli, writing for the majority, addressed whether
CEQA's passenger-service exemption applied to Wine Train's activities. He phrased the court's task as having to "determine what it
means for a right-of-way to be 'already in use.' "43

The legislature's decision to change the exemption's language from
"rail line" to "rail rights-of-way" was viewed by the majority as an

intentional broadening of the exemption. 44 Justice Panelli noted that
a rail line is merely the tracks on which a train runs,45 and, thus, the
old language could have been interpreted as requiring actual rail traffic for the rail line to be considered "in use."4 6 The current language
of the statute uses the term "rail rights-of-way," which the court
viewed as distinctly broader in meaning than "rail line" because a

right-of-way is a property interest: the easement on which the rail
line is built.47 The majority concluded that the term "rail rights-ofway" should be read in its technical, real property sense because, in
the same bill, the legislature added a section to the servitude chapter
8
of the Civil Code defining the legal attributes of a rail right-of-way.4

42. The clash between the ICC and the PUC largely derives from the ICC's reliance on Mendocino Coast, and its broad interpretation of the Staggers Act. Mendocino
held the Staggers Act's pre-emption provision applied not only state economic regulation of freight services, but to state economic regulation of passenger services as well.
Mendocino Coast Ry., Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 71 (1987). The recent federal court decision in
Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, overturned the Mendocino holding. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 879 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The ICC has requested the court
of appeals to remand the Illinois Commerce case to the ICC for reopening and further
consideration of the ICC declaratory order in Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc.. Napa
Valley Wine Train, Inc., Fin. Doc. No. 31156 (I.C.C. Oct. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file). The reconsideration is currently still pending. Napa Valley Wine
Train, Inc., Fin. Doc. No. 31156 (I.C.C. Mar. 29, 1990) (LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file).
43. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 50 Cal. 3d 370, 377,
787 P.2d 976, 979, 267 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1990).
44. Id. at 378, 787 P.2d at 980, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 380 n.15, 787 P.2d at 981 n.15, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.15. Under the old
language, the Rocktram-Krug line would not be considered "already in use," because
Southern Pacific had ceased running traffic on the line.
47. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 801 & 802 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (defining a right-ofway as an easement and a servitude).
48. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 801.7(a) (West Supp. 1990). The court summarized its
opinion by saying, "if the legislature had wanted the application of the exemption to
turn on traffic statistics rather than on the status of rail 'rights-of-way,' there would

Justice Panelli, then went on to consider when a rail right-of-way
is in use, and what constitutes abandonment of that use. He noted
that a railroad company is considered, to have made use of its rightof-way when it constructs the rail line. 49 The court reasoned that the
existence of a rail line shows a dedication of the land for the purpose
of rail transportation and while "a railroad's tearing up of its tracks
may raise a question of fact about the destruction of its right-of-way,
a decrease in traffic or a change in passenger to freight service does
not."50 Justice Panelli emphasized that rail rights-of-way could not
51
be lost simply because rail traffic had temporarily lapsed.
The majority concluded that "real property law preserves a rail
right-of-way from destruction so long as it has been put into use by
the construction of a rail line, and so long as the operator has not intentionally abandoned it."52 Application of this test to Wine Train
revealed that even though Southern Pacific had ceased rail service
and had let the track fall into disrepair, the track still existed and,
thus, the rail right-of-way, which had been put into use by the construction of the track a century before, was still in use at the time
3
Wine Train acquired the Rocktram-Krug line.5
The PUC argued that the legislature's use of the term "rail rightsof-way" was not meant to be substantive. Justice Panelli dismissed
this argument stating that the PUC did not "purport to find any support for their argument in the language or legislative history of the
statute."5 4 The majority viewed the PUC's argument as nothing
more than a challenge of the legislature's wisdom which the majority
have been no need to amend the language of the exemption to refer to such easements
or to define them in the same bill." Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 379,
787 P.2d at 980, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
49. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 379-80, 787 P.2d at 980-81, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 573-74.
50. Id. (citing Tamalpais Land and Water Co. v. Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co., 73
Cal. App. 2d 917, 927, 167 P.2d 825, 830 (1946)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The majority noted that the Rocktram-Krug line had not been intentionally
abandoned as a matter of law because of the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction to authorize
abandonments, and the fact that no certificate of abandonment has been issued. Id. at
380 n.15, 787 P.2d at 981 n.15, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.15; See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See also 65 AM. JUR. 2D Railroads §§ 82-83 (1972) (analysis of abandonment); 53 CAL. JUR. 3D Railroads § 62 (1979) (same); 74 C.J.S. Railroads §§ 67, 117, 392
(1951) (same); Comment, Railroad Line Abandonment and Opportunity Cost, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 979 (1981) (allowable evidence in railway line abandonment proceedings under the ICC). Because the PUC misinterpreted the passenger-service exemption, the court held that the PUC had not "regularly pursued its authority," thus,
the PUC's decision was annulled. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 383-84,
787 P.2d at 983-84, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
54. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 381, 787 P.2d at 982, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 575.
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had already refused to challenge. 55
The PUC also argued that the amendment should not be treated as
substantive because that would produce a result inconsistent with
CEQA goals. Rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that

while the legislature enacted CEQA to protect the environment, the
legislature also purposefully exempted the increase or institution of
passenger service from environmental review under CEQA.56 The
majority supported its view with an examination of the exemption's
legislative history which showed that the legislature weighed the
benefits of environmental review against the benefit of increased pas57
senger service and clearly chose to forego environmental review.
The court's conclusion that CEQA's passenger-service exemption
applied to Wine Train's activities enabled the court to avoid the jurisdiction issue. Determining which commission had jurisdiction over
Wine Train's activities would make no difference with respect to application of CEQA requirements because the exemption freed Wine
Train's activities from environmental review, regardless of which
commission had jurisdiction. 58
While the court's conclusion is a correct literal interpretation of
the exemption, a lingering question is whether the court should have
treated the language of the exemption so literally in resolving this
case.

The temptation to lean more towards legislative intent is especially
strong in this case because Wine Train's operations could have an extremely significant environmental impact on a very important region
9
of California.5
The question that the majority had to answer was simple: should
the legislature's wisdom in amending the passenger-service exemp55. In this regard the majority expressly pointed out that
[t]his court does not sit in review of the Legislature's wisdom in balancing
these policies against the goal of environmental protection because, no matter
how important its original purpose, CEQA remains a legislative act, subject to
legislative limitation and legislative amendment.
Id at 376, 787 P.2d at 978-79, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
56. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The existence of an exemption
naturally means a certain amount of disharmony. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50
Cal. 3d at 381, 787 P.2d at 982, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
57. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 381-82, 787 P.2d at 982-83, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 575-76.
58. Though the ICC is reconsidering its jurisdictional decision, such reconsideration will not subject Wine Train to CEQA, because the passenger service exemption
applies. Id. at 373-74 n.2, 787 P.2d at 976-77 n.2, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 569-70 n.2.
59. Id at 392, 787 P.2d at 989-90, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).

tion to refer to rail rights-of-way be challenged? Justice Panelli answered no. The effect of that answer is to limit environmental
review of a railroad company's increase or institution of passenger
service on a rail line unless that line is being newly built or is an
abandoned line being reactivated. Thus, no matter how seriously the
environment will be affected by an increase or institution of passenger service on a line already in use, the project will be exempted
from CEQA review. Such disregard for the environment is clearly
contrary to the legislative purpose behind CEQA,60 but it is exactly
the result contemplated by the legislature when it enacted the pas61
senger-service exemption.
B. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mosk
In his dissent, Justice Mosk expressed "incredulity" at the majority's opinion and his utmost agreement with Justice Kaufman's dissent. Protecting the broad objectives of CEQA was foremost in
Justice Mosk's opinion. He reminded the court of its holding in
Friends of Mammoth; CEQA must "be interpreted in such manner as
to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within
the reasonable scope of the statutory language." 62 For Justice Mosk,
this meant interpreting the legislature's amendment of the passenger-service exemption as purely technical with no substantive change
intended.
Further, Justice Mosk would have given much greater deference to
the PUC's decision. Accordingly, Justice Mosk stated that if the
PUC's "findings [were] supported by any evidence, they may not be
set aside."63
C. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kaufman64
Justice Kaufman framed the issue in this case as whether the PUC
regularly pursued its authority in ordering Wine Train to comply
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

61. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. If Wine Train's proposed passenger
service was not likely to have a significant effect on the environment, then the exemption would not have been needed because only projects that potentially have a significant impact on the environment are subject to CEQA. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 21082.2(a) (West 1986). See also Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 381, 787
P.2d at 982, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
62. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 384, 787 P.2d at 984, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 577 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8
Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972) (majority opinion
written by Justice Mosk)).
63. Id. at 385, 787 P.2d at 984, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (citing Yucaipa Water Co. No. 1
v. Public Utility Comm'n, 54 Cal. 2d 823, 828, 357 P.2d 295, 297, 9 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241
(1960)).
64. Justice Marcus M. Kaufman is a retired Associate Justice of the supreme court
sitting under assignment by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
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with the requirements of CEQA.65 To resolve this issue Justice
Kaufman first addressed what the passenger-service exemption
meant by "in use."
Through an examination of several cases, 6 6 Justice Kaufman contended that the test for abandonment of a rail right-of-way was nonuse coupled with an intent to abandon. 67 Because nonuse was a part
of the test for abandonment, Justice Kaufman believed that the majority had confused the concept of nonuse with abandonment, and
that the two were actually clearly separate concepts, with nonuse,
not abandonment, being the test set forth in the exemption. 68 Justice
Kaufman concluded that, because nonuse meant not operating
trains,69 for a right-of-way to be "in use," trains had to actually be
70
running on the line.
For the rail line to have been "already in use," Justice Kaufman
agreed with the majority arguing that the point in time wherein the
rail line must be "already in use" is when the responsible agency
must determine whether to require CEQA compliance.71 To resolve
the question of when an agency had to make such a determination,
the dissent first had to resolve the question of whether Wine Train's
72
operations constituted a project subject to CEQA review.
Justice Kaufman believed the proposed passenger service constituted such a project because the PUC had control over certain safety
65. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 385, 787 P.2d at 985, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 578 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
66. The cases Justice Kaufman examined were Home R.E. Co. v. Los Angeles Pac.
Co., 163 Cal. 710, 126 P. 972 (1912), and Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean
Shore R.R. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 421, 23 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1962). See Napa Valley Wine
Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 390, 787 P.2d at 988, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 581 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
67. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 390, 787 P.2d at 988, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 581 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See, e.g., People v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 692,
700-01, 158 P. 177, 180 (1916).
68. The crux of Justice Kaufman's position is that "if nonuse plus the removal of
tracks may constitute an abandonment of a railroad right-of-way, then nonuse cannot
be the equivalent of the removal of tracks, and the opposite must be true as well; the
existence of tracks on a railroad right-of-way does not, ipso facto, mean that it is in
use." Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 390, 787 P.2d at 988, 267 Cal. Rptr. at
581 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
69. This definition derives from Justice Kaufman's presumption that when the
cases he quoted referred to the term "use" they were referring to the use of the rightof-way and that "use" meant there had to be actual operation of the rail line. Id. at
391, 787 P.2d at 988-89, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 389, 787 P.2d at 987, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 391-92, 787 P.2d at 989, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
72. Id. See also supra notes 10 & 15.

aspects of Wine Train's operations 73 and Wine Train had requested
financial assistance from the PUC for maintenance of cross warning
devices. 7 4 Based on these facts, Justice Kaufman argued that the
PUC was authorized to compel CEQA compliance, 75 and that the
time for requiring such compliance would be at the point early
enough in the proposed project's development to enable the PUC to
influence future development,76 but late enough to ensure a mean77
ingful review.

Having resolved all the preliminary questions, Justice Kaufman finally addressed the key question of whether the Rocktram-Krug line
had been already in use? The PUC determined that it was not, because Southern Pacific had ceased operating the line and had let it
fall into a state of disrepair and disuse that lasted for nearly three
years. 78 Justice Kaufman concluded the passenger-service exemption
did not apply in this case because, as he had defined the test, Southern Pacific's failure to maintain or operate the Rocktram-Krug line
and Wine Train's inability to operate the line until 1988, meant that
the right-of-way was not "already in use" when Wine Train requested
financial assistance from the PUC in 1987. 79 Based on the foregoing,
Justice Kaufman felt the record fully supported the PUC's decision
because the PUC regularly pursued its authority.8 0
Justice Kaufman admitted that if the passenger-service exemption
applied to this case, Wine Train's operation would be exempt from
73. Id. at 396-98, 787 P.2d at 992-93, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 585-86 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See supra notes 15 & 39. See also CAL. PUB.. UTIL. CODE §§ 1202, 768 & 7607
(West 1975) (defining safety measures over which the PUC has exclusive plenary
power); Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 398, 406-07, 77 Cal. Rptr. 262,
267 (1969) (showing the power which the PUC has over local railroad safety measures).
74. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 394-95, 787 P.2d 991-92, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 584-85 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Wine Train requested that the PUC reimburse
it for funds it spent altering and maintaining cross warning devices. This request was
made under a PUC rule which allows reimbursement for such expenses and which exempts from CEQA compliance installation of new signals or signs. CEQA Guidelines
§ 15300.4. This exemption, however, is not applicable applying when the activity could
have a significant impact on the environment due to unusual circumstances. CEQA
Guidelines § 15300.2.
75. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 398, 787 P.2d at 993-94, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 586-87 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
76. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 810, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388
(1973) (early review is necessary because it acts as an "alarm bell" for the public and
the responsible public agency).
77. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 398-400, 787 P.2d at 994-95, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 587-88 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See CEQA Guidelines § 15004(b); See
also Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of University of California, 47 Cal.
3d 376, 395, 764 P.2d 278, 284, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 432 (1988).
78. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 400, 787 P.2d at 995, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 589 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
79. Id. See also supra notes 31, 72 and accompanying text.
80. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 401, 787 P.2d at 996, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 589 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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environmental review under CEQA. Consequently, the PUC's authority over various safety features of Wine Train's operations become irrelevant, and the PUC could not require CEQA compliance. 8 '
Justice Kaufman's examination of case law resulted in a definitional mistake. The cases cited in the dissent8 2 referred to abandonment as consisting of nonuse plus an intent to abandon; Justice
Kaufman immediately focused on the word "nonuse" without fully
considering what the cases were referring to. The cases were referring to nonuse of the rail line rather than the nonuse of the right-ofway.
The cases cited by Justice Kaufman never defined what it meant
for a rail right-of-way to be in use. The cases only proposed that a
rail line could not be abandoned8 3 unless there was nonuse (of the
rail line) and an intent to abandon.
Justice Kaufman, however, raises the point that an intent to abandon does not necessarily have to come from an ICC certificate of
abandonment. Such intent can be shown by the removal of tracks or
84
the selling of parts of the right-of-way.
Justice Kaufman also found that the PUC has jurisdiction over
Wine Train's activities because the PUC has power over certain
safety aspects of the operations and Wine Train requested reimbursement of funds from the PUC.85 Justice Kaufman would let these two
facts, relating to only minor parts of Wine Train's activities, bootstrap
the entire operation into CEQA's environmental regulation.
If part of a project may have a significant effect on the environment, such bootstrapping should be allowed. So long as no exemption applies to the project, the entire project should be subject to
environmental review because there is no reason not to give full
force to the policies of the CEQA.86 This view also prevents the fractionalization of a project, which is consistent with the CEQA's
81. Id. at 396 n.15, 787 P.2d at 981 n.15, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.15 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
82. See supra note 67 and case cited therein.
83. The majority defined nonuse as abandonment or nonconstruction, thus, these
cases could be read as supporting the majority's position - that the line was in use
because it was constructed and had not been abandoned. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
84. See Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 390, 787 P.2d at 988, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 581 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
85. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
86. As Justice Kaufman pointed out in his dissent, Wine Train's activities would
be subject to CEQA requirements if the exemption did not apply, and where no exemption applies, the full force of CEQA should be used to accomplish its goals. Napa

"whole of an action" policy.8 7
V.

IMPACT

The majority's conclusion that the construction of a rail line puts a
rail right-of-way in use and that it remains in use so long as the operator does not intentionally abandon it, makes the passenger-service
exemption extremely broad. Consequently, the impact on the environment of any increase or institution of passenger service on a constructed rail line, including increased rail traffic, increased use of
cross warning devices, increased whistle blasts and increased parking
and station facilities, will be exempt from review and challenge.
The most significant impact of the majority opinion will be on the
definition of a railroad's abandonment. The court did not fully explore what was required for a rail line to be intentionally abandoned
by its operator. However, the court did say that "[t]here was no
abandonment in this case as a matter of law because the ICC never
issued a certificate of abandonment."88 This could be taken to mean
that, for application of the passenger-service exemption, intentional
abandonment could only exist if the ICC had issued a certificate of
abandonment. Such strict construction of an intentional abandon89
ment makes the passenger-service exemption even broader.
The holding results from giving further deference to the legislative
intent behind the exemption while ignoring the intent behind CEQA.
Maintaining this policy balance is what the dissent urged the court to
do, but the majority decided to leave it to the legislature. 90 If the
passenger-service exemption is widely used by railroad companies,
the majority's decision could result in great harm to the environment. Specifically the decision in this case may result in transforming the Napa Valley into an amusement park. 91
Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 393, 787 P.2d at 990, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
87. See CEQA Guidelines § 15378. Allowing fractionalization would result in the
production of warped and misleading reports that fail to accurately reflect the real impact being felt by the environment. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13
Cal. 3d 263, 283-84, 529 P.2d 1017, 1031, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 263 (1975).
88. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 380 n.15, 787 P.2d at 981 n.15, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.15.
89. A railroad company could cease using a track without ever applying for an
abandonment certificate and then, several years later, it could refurbish the decaying
line and institute passenger service without ever having to submit an environmental
impact report on the effect of such restoration and institution.
90. See supra note 55. This result has been deemed unfortunate but legally
proper. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., Fin. Doc. No. 31156 (I.C.C. Jan. 9, 1989) (declaratory order) (Phillips, Comm'r, concurring) (LEXIS, Trans library, ICC file). The only
hope that remains after this decision is that the legislature will enable the courts to
avoid this result in future cases.
91. See Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 50 Cal. 3d at 375, 787 P.2d at 977, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 571.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Through its decision in Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public
Utilities'Comm'n, the California Supreme Court has broadly defined
the passenger-service exemption of CEQA. As so construed, the exemption now makes the institution or increase of passenger service
on any rail line that has already been constructed, exempt from environmental review.
Passenger service operations on a rail line will remain exempt so
long as the right-of-way is not intentionally abandoned by the line
operator. Under the court's opinion, this means the passenger-service
exemption could have an even broader application if, as the court
seems to imply, intentional abandonment can only occur when the
ICC issues a certificate of abandonment.
Even though the jurisdiction question was never resolved by the
majority, if the PUC or the ICC is deemed to have jurisdiction, both
the majority and the dissent agree that application of the passengerservice exemption in this case means that Wine Train's institution of
passenger service cannot be subjected to environmental review under
CEQA.
JOYCE HETTENBACH

x.

HEALTH LAW
Acute care hospitals with clinicalpsychologists on staff
may give those psychologists primary responsibilityfor
the admission,diagnosis, treatment and discharge of
mental patients: California Association of Psychology
Providers v. Rank
I.

INTRODUCTION

After a decade of tension, the California Supreme Court has finally
resolved the controversy concerning the determination of who has
"primary responsibility" over mental patients in America's hospitals.
Hailed as a "victory for patient's rights,"' the court, in CaliforniaAssociation of Psychology Providers v. Rank,2 held that psychologists
and psychiatrists may stand on equal footing in admitting and treat1. CaliforniaSupreme Court Decision is Victory for Patients'Rights says American Psychological Association. PR Newswire (June 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Omni file).
2. 51 Cal. 3d 1, 793 P.2d 2, 270 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1990).

ing mental patients in inpatient facilities.3
Prescribing the majority view, in a 4-3 decision, Justice Broussard
stated the court's ruling, which nullified departmental regulations of
the Department of Health Services (hereinafter DHS) giving psychiatrists the exclusive responsibility for the admission, diagnosis and
4
treatment of hospital mental patients.
In defending its decision, the court relied primarily on the "plain
meaning" of two California statutes. Business and Professional Code
section 2903 defines the practice of psychology as including the "diagnosis, prevention, treatment and amelioration of psychological
problems."5 Moreover, section 1316.5 of the Health and Safety Code
states that in hospitals, psychologists may perform all medical serv6
ices within the scope of their licensure, without discrimination. Simply put, because psychologists have the right to act within their
licensure without discrimination, and because the practice of psychology includes diagnostic treatment, psychologists may not be precluded from assuming primary responsibility for the diagnosis and
treatment of mental patients in acute care hospitals.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1978, organized hospital staffs primarily consisted of physicians, dentists, and podiatrists. 7 Psychologists were often given little,
if any, substantial input as to the procedures or policies of the hospital and received few privileges.8 Moreover, in many cases, mere access to health care facilities was refused to qualified clinical
psychologists.9 This resulted in hospitalized mental patients being
precluded from receiving care from their personal psychologists. In
an effort to remedy this situation, the California legislature, in 1978,
enacted section 1316.5 of the Health and Safety Code.10 Its purpose
was to provide licensed psychologists with uninhibited access to, and
utilization of, health care facilities, complete with the privileges and
responsibilities of a staff member."1
Although the new legislation solved many problems, the relation3. Id. at 21, 793 P.2d at 14, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
4. Id. at 21-22, 793 P.2d at 14, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 1990). See generally 36 CAL.
HealingArts and Institutions § 10 (1977 & Supp. 1990).

JUR. 3D

6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990).

7. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70703(b) (1990) (formerly CAL. ADMIN. CODE). The
regulation states: "The medical staff shall be composed of physicians and, where dental
or podiatric services are provided, dentists or podiatrists." See generally 36 CAL. JUR.
3d Healing Arts and Institutions §§ 1-197 (1977 & Supp. 1990).
8. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 30, 793 P.2d at 19, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
9. Id.
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990).

11. 1978 Cal. Stat. 285-86.
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ship between psychiatrists and psychologists was still significantly
strained. Psychiatrists were trained as medical doctors and could
therefore perform surgery, prescribe drugs, and administer shock
treatment. 12 Psychologists, on the other hand, were not trained medical doctors and therefore were legally prohibited from performing
such services. 13 The controversy specifically focused on the allocation of power pursuant to the admission, diagnosis and treatment of
mental patients. Psychologists claimed to be as qualified as their
medically trained counterparts to admit mental patients and to maintain primary responsibility over their care and treatment.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In an attempt to clarify further the meaning and implementation
of section 1316.5, the DHS enacted regulations, within its statutory
authority, precluding hospitals from allowing psychologists to take
the leading role in the initial admission and diagnosis of mental patients. 14 This was an attempt to assign primary responsibility to the
medically trained psychiatrists. Upon admission, and after the psychiatrist made an initial diagnosis, the patient would be assigned to
the proper health care worker for treatment, be it a physician or psychologist. However, the psychiatrist would maintain ultimate control
over the treatment plan. Looming in the shadows of section 1316.5
was the fear that psychologists were simply not qualified to handle
the initial determination and treatment of a patient's medical
condition.
The California Association of Psychology Providers (hereinafter
CAPP) brought an action against the DHS asking the court to declare the departmental regulations invalid as violative of statutory
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2038 (West 1990).
13. Compare CAL. Bus. & PRO..CODE §§ 2903, 2038 (West 1990).
14. CAL. CODE REGs, tit. 22, §§ 70577(d)(1), 71203(a)(1)(A) (1990) (formerly CAL.
ADMIN. CODE). The regulations both read as follows: "A psychiatrist shall be responsible for the diagnostic formulation for each patient and the development and implementation of the individual patient's treatment plan." It is significant to note that only
acute psychiatric hospitals (§ 71203(a)(1)(A)) and general acute care hospitals with
psychiatric departments (§ 70577(d)(1)) are affected by the regulations and the court's
decision. Thus, general acute care hospitals without psychiatric departments are not
governed by the regulations. Psychologists practicing at such hospitals do so merely as
consultants, and thus, their ability to admit and treat patients is not addressed by the
court's decision. HANSON, BRIDGETT, MARCUS,'VLAHOS OF RUDY, CaliforniaSupreme
Court Confirms Decision ConcerningClinical Psychologists'Rightsin PsychiatricHospitals, in UPDATE, A REPORT ON RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS (September 24, 1990)
(newsletter from the firm's San Francisco office to clients) [hereinafter UPDATE].

law.'5 In granting CAPP's motion for summary judgment, the trial

court ruled that the challenged regulations were invalid.16 However,
this ruling was overturned when the court of appeals held that statutory law did not necessitate a repeal of the departmental regulations. 17 The California Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari to the court of appeals to consider the case. 18
IV.

A.

THE COURT'S DECISION

The Majority Opinion

After deciding preliminary procedural issues, the court proceeded
to address the viability of the regulations.19 The court's analysis consisted primarily of four sections: (1) the scope of review; (2) the
"plain meaning" of 1316.5; (3) the legislative intent behind the statute; and (4) the statute's anti-discrimination provision.
The court first considered the scope of review. 20 It is undisputed
that the accepted standard of review for a regulation enacted by an
administrative agency dictates that a court may only strike down the
regulation when it is "arbitrary or capricious."2 1 However, the ma15. California Ass'n of Psychology Providers v. Rank, No. C 502929 (Super. Ct.
Apr. 11, 1986).
16. Id.
17. California Ass'n of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1207, 247
Cal. Rptr. 641 (1988).
18. California Ass'n of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 758 P.2d 623, 250 Cal. Rptr.
295 (1988).
19. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 9-10, 793 P.2d at 5-6, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800. The court
addressed three procedural questions: appealability, standing to appeal and mootness.
Originally, the plaintiffs brought seven causes of action. Because the trial court only
granted summary judgment on the seventh cause of action, there was a question as to
whether there was a final judgment. However, because the seventh cause of action, a
declaratory judgment action to render the regulations void, was determinative of the
case, the court held that there was a final judgment. Id at 9, 793 P.2d at 5, 270 Cal.
Rptr. at 799.
The court also determined that the California Hospital Association had standing as it
was directly affected by the invalidation of the regulations because it was a member
hospital of the DHS and subject to the Departments' regulation. I& at 10, 793 P.2d at
6, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 800. However, there was a question of standing pursuant to two
other appellants, the California Medical Association and the California Psychiatric Association. Nevertheless, the court held that they were sufficiently affected since the
ruling narrowed the scope of responsibilities of all physicians, particularly psychiatrists. Id.
Lastly, the court considered mootness because the DHS amended the regulations
and removed the requirement that psychiatrists have primary responsibility for patients after the trial court's ruling which invalidated the regulations. Id. However, because the DHS only amended the regulations pursuant to a court order, the court held
that the issue was not moot. Id. This was most likely due to the fact that if the
Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the appellants, the DHS would change the
regulations back. Id. at 9-10, 793 P.2d at 5-6, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800.
20. Id. at 11, 793 P.2d at 6-7, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
21. Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 377 P.2d 83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1962) (noting that
the court did not substitute its own judgment for that of the regulating body). The
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jority argued that where a regulation threatens to alter, amend or
impair the scope of a statute, the regulation can be invalidated simply
22
if it "transgresses statutory power."
Next, the court considered the "plain meaning" of the statute. Section 1316.5 states that in hospitals which appoint psychologists to
their staff, the psychologists may perform all medical services within
the scope of their licensure.23 The statute goes on to say that where
a health service can legally be performed by both a psychiatrist and a
psychologist, the service may be performed by either, without discrimination.2 4 Additionally, in clarifying the "scope of licensure" for
a psychologist, the court looked to the Business and Professional
Code section 2903, which defines the practice of psychology as including the "diagnosis, prevention, treatment and amelioration of psychological problems."25 The court reasoned that because psychologists
have the right to act within their licensure, and since the practice of
psychology includes diagnostic treatment, psychologists may not be
precluded from diagnosing and treating mental patients in acute care
hospitals.26 However, the challenged regulation specifically referred
to the exclusive authority of a psychiatrist in admitting mental patients, while the statute was silent as to that authority. Thus, in a
footnote, the court expanded the meaning of the statute by ruling
dissent points out that the regulations were not challenged as being arbitrary or capricious. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 23, 793 P.2d at 15, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
22. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 11-12, 793 P.2d at 6-7, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01. But see infra
notes 58 and 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's criticism on this
point. In the duration of its argument, the majority does not give the departmental
regulations any deference or weight. Generally, the burden is on the complaining
party to prove that the regulations are unreasonable. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians and
Surgeons § 54 (1987). Yet, the court seems to take the stance that the regulations must
prove themselves before being acceptable. It could be argued that the only statutory
authority which the regulations "transgress" is that which the majority implies from
section 1316.5. See Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 13 n.7, 793 P.2d at 8 n.7, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 802 n.7.
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990). It is important to note
that the court's holding does not require hospitals to allow psychologists on their medical staffs. Moreover, hospitals who do appoint psychologists to their staff have the
power to determine the terms and conditions governing such appointments. See Letter
from Ellingsen, Christensen & Van Hall to Clients and Friends (July 2, 1990) (regarding the California Supreme Court's decision in CAPP v. Rank).
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990). In its conclusion, the majority states that hospitals may adopt non-discriminatory rules governing their psychologists, scope of authority. However, the court gives no direction as to what a nondiscriminatory rule would entail. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 21, 793 P.2d at 13-14, 270 Cal.
Rptr. at 807-808.
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 13, 793 P.2d at 8, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 802. See also CAL. Bus.
PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 1990).

that "the psychologist's statutory authority to carry the responsibility
of diagnosis and treatment implies the authority to admit patients
27
for these purposes."
Because of the deficiency of case law on this issue, the court turned
to an examination of the legislative history of section 1316.5. The
court first analyzed several previous bills which were rejected by the
legislature - Senate Bill numbers 259, 1443 and 181, and Assembly
Bill number 3592.28 Next, the declaration of findings and purpose
that accompanied the statute were discussed. 29 Then, the court
looked at an opinion by the Legislative Counsel and an opinion of the
Attorney General.30
When Senate Bill number 259 was originally introduced, it contained a subdivision which specifically gave primary responsibility for
a patient's care to the psychologist who admitted the patient.3 1 However, this subdivision was deleted before the bill was passed.3 2 Likewise, when an amendment to Senate Bill number 1443 was
contemplated, giving psychologists exclusive authority over patients,
the proposed language was deleted before the bill was passed.33 Finally, the 1983 Legislature defeated Senate Bill number 18134 which
attempted to implement language giving psychologists primary responsibility for diagnosing and treating patients.3 5 The implication of
these proposals was that the legislature clearly communicated three
times that it did not approve of apportioning such authority to
psychologists.
To rebut this line of argument, the court turned to Assembly Bill
number 3592 and to the declaration of findings and purpose in conjunction with section 1316.5.36 The court first evaluated the legisla27. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 13 n.7, 793 P.2d at 8 n.7, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 802 n.7 (emphasis
added). It should be noted that the authority to admit patients is not mentioned in
either the statute or the legislative committee notes after the statute. In effect, the
court has added to the statute.
28. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 14-15, 793 P.2d at 9, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The senate bills
included language similar to that contained in the more recent court ordered regulations. Thus, because all three of the senate bills were defeated in the legislature, the
dissent argued that this was evidence of legislative intent to deny imparting this additional power on the psychologists. Id. at 29, 793 P.2d at 19, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Similarly, the majority argued that because the legislature
rejected the assembly bill, which contained language similar to the old DHS regulations, the legislative intent was to confer upon the psychologists the authority to admit
and diagnose mental inpatients. Id. at 15, 793 P.2d at 9, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
29. Id. at 16, 793 P.2d at 10-11, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
30. Id. at 17, 793 P.2d at 11, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
31. Cal. S. 259, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. § 2 (1978).
32. Cal. S. 259, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978) (as amended Jan. 19, 1978).
33. Cal. S. 1443, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. § 1 (1980) (as amended May 7, 1980); 1980 Cal.
Stat. 2178.
34. 5 CAL. ASSEMBLY DAILY J. p. 9356-57 (Sept. 14, 1983).
35. Cal. S. 181, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1984).
36. The court never rebutted the dissent's argument that in deleting these provi-
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tive action pursuant to Assembly Bill number 3592 which stated that
"a psychiatrist shall be responsible for the diagnostic formulation and
the development and implementation of the treatment plan."3 7 In
arguing that the wording of this bill was almost identical to the wording of the DHS regulation, the court reasoned that because the bill
was rejected by the legislature, the DHS regulations must also be re38
jected as being contrary to legislative intent.
In order to clarify its position, the court next turned to the declaration of the legislature's findings and purpose which accompanied the
statute. The court pointed out that in enacting this statute, the legislature specifically stated its purpose to provide "greater availability of
licensed psychologists within health facilities," and to allow patients
to continue to receive care from their own psychologist after being
admitted to a hospital.3 9 Thus, the court focused on the language in
the declaration stating that by giving psychologists greater access to
hospitals, the legislature intended to change "present law."40 Since
no germane laws existed at the time, the court posited that the legislature, in referring to "present law," must have been alluding to the
41
DHS regulations.
Lastly, the court sought approval from the opinions of the Attorney General and Legislative Counsel to give weight to its position.
After section 1316.5 was enacted in 1978, the Attorney General responded to the statute in an unpublished opinion. 42 Moreover, the
Legislative Counsel also reacted in a written opinion. 43 Both opinions state that under section 1316.5, a psychologist may exercise primary responsibility for the admission, referral and treatment of
sions in Bills 259, 1443, and 181, the legislature intended to prevent psychologists from
having primary responsibility for patients. See Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 30, 793 P.2d at 19,
270 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
37. Cal. A. 3592, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1986).
38. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 15, 793 P.2d at 9, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The dissent, however, pointed out that the legislature never actually defeated this bill: "That bill, however, was never addressed by the Legislature or even by a legislative committee." Id
at 29, 793 P.2d at 19, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Kennard, J., dissenting). According to the
Assembly Final History of the California legislature, this bill was dismissed from the
Committee on Health "without further action." See [1985-86 Reg. Sess.] 2 CAL. ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY 2273.
39. 1978 Cal. Stat. 286.
40. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 16, 793 P.2d at 10, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Letter from California Attorney General to Sen. Paul B. Carpenter (Mar. 15, 1979) (regarding opinion of California Legislative Counsel, No. 16615)).
43. Id (quoting opinion of California Legislative Counsel, No. 16615 (Jan. 4, 1979)
(regarding psychologists' use of health facilities)).

patients in acute care hospitals.44 The court argued that if either of
these opinions misconstrued the law, the legislature could have clarified their intent when they amended section 1316.5 in 1980.45 The
majority inferred that by not taking such measures, the legislature
was, in effect, communicating that they agreed with the opinions. 46
As to the legal authority of the Attorney General and Legislative
Counsel opinions, the court argued that while they are-not binding,
47
they are persuasive.
The court next argued that in order to ascertain the true meaning
44. It is quite interesting that the court does not refer to another attorney general
opinion reflecting a different demeanor toward the issue that was published qfker the
letter to Senator Carpenter. On September 29, 1983, John Van De Kamp responded to
a question posed by Senator Carpenter. The question pertained to sections 1288 and
1242 of the Business and Professions Code which provided that clinical laboratories
may provide medical testing services for licensed practitioners of the healing arts. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1288, 1242 (West 1990). Carpenter asked whether psychologists fall within the category of practitioners under the statute. The answer of the
attorney general was a resounding "no." Although psychologists were judged to be licentiates of the "healing arts," because of their legal impotence to puncture the skin,
they were not permitted to perform or authorize skin tests. In responding to this question, Van De Kamp included a poignant analysis of section 2903. He stated,
By its terms psychologists therefore are licensed to render psychological services involving the application of psychological principles, methods and procedures including administering and interpreting mental tests. Not surprisingly,
the key word in the statutory description of their practice is "psychological."
That of course is defined as of or pertaining to "psychology," which in turn is
defined as "the science of the mind or of mental phenomena and activities";
"a method of obtaining knowledge about mental processes." (WEBSTERS
THIRD NEW INTERNAT. DiCr. (1971 ed. at 1833)... Accordingly, we do not believe the Legislature ever intended the practice of licensed psychology to include the diagnosis and treatment of either (1) physical or organic disorders
by means of physical or nonphysical instrumentalities; or (2) mental disorders
by investigations and analyses of the body's organic as opposed to mental
processes. Those endeavors, which would construe the practice of medicine,
would have to be performed by licensed physicians and surgeons."
66 Op. Att'y. Gen 308-09 (1983) (emphasis in original).
45. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 17, 793 P.2d at 10, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
46. Id. at 17, 793 P.2d at 10, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 805. To support its contention of legislative acquiescence, the court cites two cases, Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 195 Cal.
App. 2d 420, 15 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1961) (emphasizing the deference to be given to attorney general opinions) and Ventura v. City of San Jose, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 216 (1984) (noting that the legislature would have acted affirmatively on the
opinion if it was not accurate). However, in both of these cases, the opinions of the
attorney general, which were presumed to be known to the legislature, were both published. The majority takes some liberty in analogizing these two cases to the present
case because, here, the attorney general opinion was not published. An unpublished
opinion has a lower probability of being seen by the legislature. In the case of unpublished opinions, a better rule would be a presumption that the legislature has not seen
the opinion. This presumption would then have to be overcome by the party invoking
the authority of the attorney general opinion. Nonetheless, as the dissent points out,
the rule of legislative inaction is a "slim reed upon which to lean" particularly where it
is applied to non-binding authority. See Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 32, 793 P.2d at 21, 270 Cal.
Rptr. at 815 (quoting Quinn v. State of California, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 175, 539 P.2d 761, 769,
124 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975)).
47. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 17, 793 P.2d at 11, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The court, however, neither offered evidence to show that the legislature was aware of either opinion,
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of a statute, one must look to the statute as a whole, and in determin8
ing legislative intent, the entire statute must be examined.4
Although the first line of section 1316.5 clearly gives hospitals the
prerogative to admit psychologists to hospital staffs, the statute goes
on to give psychologists the right to perform duties within the scope
of their licensure and to not be discriminated against regarding services that can be legally performed by both psychologists and psychiatrists.49 The court propounded that the statutory language
prohibiting discrimination between psychiatrists and psychologists in
areas where both are equally qualified undermines any kind of hospital hierarchy where psychiatrists have authority over psychologists in
the admission and diagnosis of patients. 50
Justice Broussard concluded his opinion with an analysis of the
opinion of the court of appeals. Broussard rejected the argument of
the lower court that a physician must first "[rule] out a medical basis
for the patient's mental disorder" before transferring control over
the patient to a psychologist.51 Appellants argued that because hospitalized patients usually have more severe disorders than would normally be treated by a psychologist on an outpatient basis, a medical
doctor should initially be required to screen the patient for any medical problems. 52 However, the court called attention to the fact that
in defining the scope of licensure of a psychologist, section 2903 does
not delineate between inpatient or outpatient care.53 Moreover, because section 1316.5 gives individual hospitals the right to determine
the extent to which they will allow psychologists to exercise authority, the court should not abrogate the hospital's power by legislating
nor law which mandates the presumption that legislatures are aware of attorney general opinions or legislative opinions.
48. Id. at 18, 793 P.2d at 11, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 805. See also Weber v. County of
Santa Barbara, 15 Cal. 2d 82, 86, 98 P.2d 492, 494 (1940); Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 Cal. 3d 458, 478, 595 P.2d 592, 604, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1979).
49. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 18, 793 P.2d at 12, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 806. However, the psychologist's authority does not include the diagnosis and treatment of organic medical
conditions. Thus, a psychologist may be "discriminated against" in these areas, just as
a family doctor may be "discriminated against" when it comes to performing brain surgery. In these areas there really is no discrimination at all. It is merely a question of
qualifications and training.
50. Id.
51. Id at 19, 793 P.2d at 12, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
52. Id. Appellant's argument was in response to appellee's claim that psychologists regularly diagnose patients in their offices. Therefore, they are often called to
recognize organic medical disorders and refer patients to medical doctors. See infra
note 60 and accompanying text.
53. Id.

any such restrictions.5 4
The court then addressed the lower court's ruling that before a
psychologist is assigned a patient, a physician must first rule out any
medical problem. Here, the court identified the difficulty in distinguishing between "organic" and "psychological" sicknesses, and declared that because the distinction is blurred, there is no reason to
elevate one profession over another in apportioning power, particu55
larly in the face of an "anti-discrimination" clause.
In conclusion, the court held that the legislature chose to prohibit
discrimination against psychologists, and vested hospitals with the
authority to determine regulations on hospital practice.56 Section
1316.5 has given hospitals the freedom to determine the degree of authority to be given to psychologists. Consequently, the DHS regulations prohibiting a psychologist from exercising primary
responsibility over the admission, diagnosis, treatment and discharge
of patients at an inpatient hospital are invalid.57
B.

The Dissent

In her dissent, Justice Kennard chastised the majority for
"grant[ing] by litigation what could not be achieved by legislation."s
She argued that the majority dodged appropriate standards of judicial
review, flouted the authoritative DHS regulations, and performed juridical gymnastics in analyzing the legislative history. 59 Kennard
concluded that by enacting the regulations, the DHS was well within
60
the bounds of its authority.
Pursuant to the scope of review, Kennard agreed with the majority
that in order for the regulations to be invalid they must "transgress
statutory power."6 ' However, she claimed that the majority did not
give the required deference and weight to the DHS's interpretation
of section 1316.5.62
54. Id.
55. Id. at 20, 793 P.2d at 12-13, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07.
56. Id. at 21, 793 P.2d at 13, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 22, 793 P.2d at 14, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 33, 793 P.2d at 21, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
61. Id. at 22, 793 P.2d at 14, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
62. Id. at 23, 793 P.2d at 15, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 809. The majority cited several cases
giving authority to this proposition. See Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d
697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n,
43 Cal. 3d 1379, 743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987); Hittle v. Santa Barbara County
Employees Retirement Ass'n, 39 Cal. 3d 374, 703 P.2d 73, 216 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1985). The
majority's reliance on Morris v. Williams is persuasive. In Morris, the court held that
"[a]dministrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its
scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such
regulations." Morris, 67 Cal. 2d at 748, 433 P.2d at 707, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (emphasis
added). Here, the regulations go beyond the scope of the statute by prohibiting hospi-
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In beginning its statutory analysis, the dissent briefly pointed out
that nowhere in the statute is there any express language giving psychologists primary responsibility for the admission, diagnosis or treat63
ment of mental patients.
Next, in response to the majority's contention that the definition of
"scope of licensure" under section 2903 includes diagnosis of mental
patients, Kennard argued that the section was intended to apply only
to outpatient offices, not to inpatient hospitals. 64 Moreover, section
2903 specifically states that the scope of licensure only includes the
diagnosis of "psychological" problems, and consequently does not include the diagnosis of medical problems which can only be legally
treated by a medical doctor. 65 Simply put, because a psychiatrist's
training is more comprehensive than that of a psychologist, including
organic medicine and psychology, it is only logical to have psychiatrists make the initial determination as to whether a patient needs
medical or psychological treatment, or both.66 After the initial diagnosis, the patient can then be effectively assigned to the appropriate
health care professional.
To demonstrate the legal distinctions between psychiatrists and
psychologists, the dissent referred to the State Medical Practices Act
which states that only doctors, including psychiatrists, may legally di-

agnose physical and mental disorders. 67 Psychiatrists, unlike psychologists, may legally perform surgery, prescribe drugs, and
administer electroconvulsive therapy. 68 In contrast, a psychologist is
allowed only to diagnose and treat mental and emotional disorders,
and psychological problems. 69 Further, because section 1316.5 says

nothing about the authority of psychologists to admit patients into
tals from giving primary responsibility to psychologists. In so restricting the hospitals,
the regulations inhibit hospitals in a way not contemplated by the statute. In that
sense, they enlarge the statute. It also could be argued that because the aim of the
statute is to give hospitals broad discretion in their utilization of psychologists, the regulations impair the scope of the statute by taking the power away from the hospitals.
63. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 24, 793 P.2d at 15, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
64. 1i The majority responded to this contention by asserting that in their definition of "scope of licensure," the statutes made no distinction between inpatient and
outpatient facilities. In their private outpatient offices, psychologists must daily diagnose mental patients and refer them to physicians when appropriate. The majority
would argue that hospitals are no different. If a physician is needed, the psychologist
can always refer the patient to one. Id. at 12-13, 793 P.2d at 8, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
65. Id. at 24, 793 P.2d at 15, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
66. Id. at 25, 793 P.2d at 16, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
67. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900-18 (West 1990).
68. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2038, 2903, & 2904 (West 1990).
69. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 1990).

hospitals or the power of psychologists to have primary responsibility
over patients, the appropriate governing department, the DHS,
70
should have the final say, not the courts.
The dissent next responded to the majority's interpretation of the
"anti-discrimination" clause of section 1316.5. This clause states that
regarding services which a psychiatrist and a psychologist are both
authorized to perform, the service may be discharged by either, without discrimination. 71 However, the statute does not even address the
72
issue of who will have "primary responsibility" over the patient.
Discussing the assertion of section 1316.5 that psychologists must be
given membership on hospital staffs, Kennard contended that the
section goes no further than merely allowing health facilities to permit psychologists to be on hospital staffs and to have a voice in the
policy-making procedure. 73 Moreover, because the anti-discrimination rule does not apply to the exercise of primary responsibility over
patients or to the admission of patients, the statute is consistent with
7
the DHS regulations. 4
Next, the dissent addressed the legislative history of section 1316.5.
Senate Bill No. 259, introduced by Senator Carpenter in 1978, provided that a psychologist may not be precluded from exercising primary responsibility over a patient admitted to a hospital upon
referral of a licensed psychologist. 75 This provision, however, was deleted before the bill, containing the current section 1316.5, was
passed. 76 Moreover, in 1980, Senator Carpenter introduced Senate
Bill No. 1443 which would have given psychologists primary responsibility for the admission and diagnosis of mental patients in acute care
facilities. 77 Once again, this provision was deleted before the bill was
passed. 78 Kennard argued that the deletion of these provisions was
evidence that the Legislature did not intend such an interpretation of
section 1316.5.79
70. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 33, 793 P.2d at 21, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990).

72. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 24, 793 P.2d at 15, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 809. In addition, the
statute does not mention anything pertaining to the admission or diagnosis of a patient.
It merely discusses treatment. Furthermore, as the clause only applies to treatments
which can legally be performed by a psychiatrist or a psychologist, it does not address
the diagnosis or treatment of medical problems which can legally be administered only
by a medical doctor. Evidently, the majority infers all of this from the statute. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 1316.5 (West 1990).

73. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 27, 793 P.2d at 18, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
74. Id,
75. Cal. S. 259, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. § 2 (1978).
76. Cal. S. 259 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978) (as amended Jan. 19, 1978).
77. Cal. S. 1443, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. § 1 (1980).
78. Cal. S. 1443, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. (1980) (as amended May 7, 1980).
79. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 29, 793 P.2d at 18, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 812. To support this
proposition, the dissent cited United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 8182 (1982). It is significant that the majority never attempts to refute this argument.
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April of 1983 brought yet another attempt by Senator Carpenter to
get his interpretation of section 1316.5 enacted into law. Senate Bill
No. 181, amended in April of 1983, proposed that 1316.5 be amended
to give psychologists diagnostic responsibilities and authority over
their own patients or patients referred to them.8 0 On September 14,
1983, the assembly rejected this bill.81
To explain its position further, the dissent recounted the historical
background of section 1316.5. When the section was enacted, psychologists were greatly restricted in their participation in, and access to,
hospitals.82 This was a problem for hospitalized patients who wanted
83
to continue to receive care from their personal psychologists.
Therefore, section 1316.5 was an attempt to give psychologists free access to hospitals and to afford them positions on hospital staffs.84
The dissent expressed dismay at the majority's use of the opinions
of the Attorney General and Legislative Counsel. To begin, Kennard
reiterated that the opinions of an attorney general or a legislative
counsel are not binding.8 5 Furthermore, not only were the opinions
to which the majority referred never published, they were written in
1979, four years before the court even considered amending section
1316.5.86 The dissent also pointed out that the majority proffered no
evidence to show that the opinions of the Attorney General or the
Legislative Counsel were known to the legislature, and the court set
8
forth no rule of law stating that such knowledge must be presumed. 7
The dissent concluded this portion of its opinion by pointing out that
while the majority heavily relied on unpublished unauthoritative
opinions of the Attorney General and the Legislative Counsel, they
gave very little deference to the published regulations of the DHS
which legally should be given great weight.8 8
80. Cal. S. 181, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1984) (as amended Apr. 13, 1983).
81. 5 CAL. ASSEMEMBLY DAILY J. 9356-57 (Sept. 14, 1983). This was the third attempt to pass through the legislature giving psychologists primary authority over patients. Incidentally, nine months after this third attempt failed, the plaintiffs filed the
present lawsuit. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 29, 793 P.2d at 19, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
82. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 30, 793 P.2d at 19, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See also supra note
7 and accompanying text.
83. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 31, 793 P.2d at 20, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
84. Id, However, the statute does not go so far as to determine the authority of
psychologists pursuant to the admission or diagnosis of patients. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1316.5 (West 1990).
85. Rank, 51 Cal. 3d at 31, 793 P.2d at 20, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
86. Id. However, earlier in its argument, the dissent implied that only the attorney general opinion was unpublished. Id. at 31, 793 P.2d at 20, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
87. Id. at 32, 793 P.2d at 20, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
88. Id. at 33, 793 P.2d at 21, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 815.

In conclusion, the dissent claimed that by ignoring the DHS's interpretation of the statute and by obscuring the plain message of the
legislative history, the majority "succumbed to the temptation to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature and the [DHS]."89
V.

IMPACT

Surprisingly, the immediate impact of CAPP v. Rank in the medical community will be nominal. It is true that by striking down the
DHS regulations, the court substantially altered the roles of psychologists and psychiatrists in hospitals. However, in 1986, the trial court
ruled in favor of the psychologists, and pursuant to the resulting
court order, the DHS amended the disputed regulations to reflect increased authority for psychologists. These amended regulations have
been in effect for over four years, thus, the court's ruling will not affect the legality of these new regulations. Moreover, the DHS regulations that were struck down only applied to free standing
psychiatrists' hospitals and general acute care hospitals with psychiatric departments, which constitute only 20% of all California
hospitals.90
Additionally, although it was not given substantial consideration by
the court's opinion, the role of psychotropic drugs seems to be a major factor in the controversy. Evidently, 90-98% of all mental patients
admitted to hospitals received drugs. 9 1 Thus, in virtually every case,
psychiatrists will be required to examine the patient in order to prescribe the drugs.
This high proportion of drug prescriptions for mental patients
presents two problems. Financially, patients will be required to pay
two doctors instead of one; one doctor to prescribe the drugs and another doctor to administer treatment. Moreover, this could present
legal problems for hospitals and staff psychologists with regard to
possible malpractice exposure.
Where at one time only one doctor could both diagnose and treat
mental patients and prescribe drugs, now two health professionals
may be required: one for the mental diagnosis and one to prescribe
the drugs. Where there are two doctors, there are two salaries and
two bills to be paid, resulting in higher costs to the patient. Moreover, as to liability, under the old regulations, psychologists were
never allowed to admit, diagnose or maintain primary responsibility
89. Id.
90. Telephone interview with Pat Keith, Department of Health Services (Nov. 13,
1990). Telephone interview with Bonnie Darwin, California Hospital Association (Nov.
12, 1990).
91. Telephone interview with Collette Hughes, Protection and Advocacy, San
Francisco (November 14, 1990).
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over patients with possible organic medical conditions. In contrast,
hospitals now have broad discretion over the admission of psychologists to hospital staffs, as well as the duties assigned to the psychologists. However, with broad discretion comes broad possibilities that
psychologists will negligently prescribe or fail to prescribe an appropriate treatment. Hospitals and staff psychologists could open themselves up to malpractice suits for negligence by failing to properly
diagnose and treat a mental patient's adverse organic medical
condition.92
One commentator has suggested that hospitals could give the added
authority to the psychologists and still avoid liability by implementing a set of guidelines designed to educate and train psychologists in
the area of organic medical conditions. Possible policies could be (1)
to require psychologists to demonstrate the ability to recognize medical conditions compelling the intervention of a psychiatrist; (2) to set
guidelines which mandate the circumstances in which a psychologist
must request a psychiatrist for consultation; and (3) to provide regular evaluations of each psychologist to ensure their continued conformity to hospital practices governing admission and treatment of
93
mental patients.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In CAPP v. Rank, the California Supreme Court ruled that acute
care hospitals may not be compelled to require a psychiatrist to maintain primary responsibility for the admission, diagnosis and treatment of mental patients. After a grueling struggle in the courts and
the legislature between psychiatrists and psychologists, the court's
decision represents a victory for clinical psychologists who now have
the opportunity to stand on equal footing with their psychiatric
counterparts.
As a result of CAPP, hospitals, not the courts or the DHS, will
make the decision as to the amount of responsibility given to psychologists in acute care facilities. Although hospitals are not required to
allow psychologists on staff, once they choose to do so, section 1316.5
causes certain rights to flow to psychologists. These include the right
to hold membership and serve on committees, the right to carry pro92. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 222-25 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions §§ 136-96 (1977

& Supp. 1990).
93. See

UPDATE,

supra note 14, at 2.

fessional responsibilities within the scope of their licensure, and the
right to perform services offered by the facility, which the psychologists are legally permitted to perform, without discrimination. Moreover, the court held that psychologists may also admit, diagnose and
treat mental patients on an equal basis with psychiatrists.
In reaching their decision, the court struck down two regulations
enacted by the Department of Health Services in 1978 and amended
in 1980 which mandated that in acute care hospitals psychiatrists
must exercise primary authority over the admission, diagnosis and
treatment of mental patients.
The psychiatrists argue that because psychologists have no organic
medical training, they should not be the ones to initially diagnose or
direct the treatment of patients who may have an organic medical
problem. After all, patients could suffer extreme consequences if a
psychologist gave an incorrect medical diagnosis.
On the other hand, psychologists argue that if they are not given
primary responsibility for patients, then patients will be deprived
from the care of their personal psychologist when they enter the hospital. Moreover, the overbearing psychiatrists might commandeer
the treatment plan and may even force mental patients to take harmful drugs against their own personal psychologists' judgment.
As a result of CAPP, hospitals can now allow psychologists to be
the "captain of the ship." Whether they actually will do that is yet to
be seen. On the other hand, perhaps hospitals will shed the authoritarian model altogether and try the team approach where each
health care professional performs his or her job efficiently, competently, and equally.
In the future there will most certainly be a continuing battle in the
legislature for control of mental patient facilities, resulting in increased litigation and still more court decisions. Unfortunately, if
psychiatrists and psychologists in our society who are supposed to be
experts in human relations and conflict management cannot overcome the lure of money and power and arrive at some amiable compromise themselves, what does that say for the rest of us?
BRADLEY R. KIRK
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XI.

INSURANCE LAW
A.

A stipulation of an insured's liability signed by the
insured, insurerand third party claimant, and entered
as a judgment, constitutes a final judicial determination
requisitefor a third party claimant to sue an insurerfor
unfair practices under Section 790.03(h) of the

California Insurance Code. California State Automobile
Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior Court.
In California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior Court,1 the California Supreme Court 2 held that a
stipulation of an insured's liability which is signed by the insurer and
later entered as a judgment, constitutes a final judicial determination
requisite to bring an unfair practice claim against the insurer pursuant to section 790.03(h) of the California Insurance Code. 3 In reach1. 50 Cal. 3d 658, 788 P.2d 1156, 268 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1990). Third-party claimant
brought a personal injury action against the insured as a result of a March 1983 automobile versus automobile accident, in which the insured allegedly drove down a oneway street while intoxicated and struck claimant. In May 1987, the insured, his insurer and the third-party claimant stipulated to the following: the insured admitted liability, the insured agreed to pay claimant $175,000 in damages, and the claimant
reserved her rights against the insurer. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with this signed stipulation. Thereafter, the claimant brought suit against the insurer alleging that the insurer had committed unfair practices in violation of Insurance
Code section 790.03(h) in the course of settling the personal injury suit. The insurer,
petitioner in the case at bar, moved for judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner argued
that a stipulated judgment does not satisfy the judicial determination of an insured's
liability mandated by Moradi-Shalal Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d
58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988), as a requisite to pursuing a Section 790.03(h) claim. The
trial court denied the motion. The Prerequisite court of appeal issued a peremptory
writ of mandate to petitioner, and directed the trial court, to vacate its order and enter
a new order granting petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court reversed. California State Auto InterIns. Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 662, 788 P.2d at 1157-58, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
2. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Lucas with Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Eagleson, Kennard and Klein concurring. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring opinion.
3. In Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that a private party may pursue
an unfair practice claim against an insurance company pursuant to section 790.03(h) of
the California Insurance Code. In 1988, the California Supreme Court prospectively
overruled its decision in Royal Globe, and held that Insurance Code section 790.03(h)
does not confer a statutory cause of action upon private parties to sue insurance companies for unfair practices. Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 116. Respondent, a third-party claimant, brought a section 790.03(h) unfair
practice suit against petitioner, an insurer, before the Moradi-Shalaldecision was final
and thus her claim was not barred by the Moradi-Shalaldecision.
Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) prohibits sixteen unfair and deceptive
acts or practices. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1991).

ing this conclusion, the court reiterated its holding in Moradi-Shalal
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company4 that "a conclusive judicial
determination of the insured's liability"5 is a condition precedent to a
section 790.03(h) unfair practice cause of action.
In Moradi-Shalal,the California Supreme Court decided that a settlement was an "insufficient conclusion of the underlying action"6 for
purposes of pending Royal Globe third-party section 790.03(h) suits. 7
Thus, the issue before the court in CaliforniaState Automobile Association was whether a settlement which is incorporated into a stipulated judgment is likewise insufficient.8 Ultimately, the court found
that it was not. 9
In California State Automobile Association, the court explained
that an enforceable claim against an insurance company does not

arise until liability of its insured is established.10 In a settlement, liability of an insured is not established. Thus, a post-settlement thirdparty claimant would need to establish the liability of the insured
within the section 790.03(h) action itself in order to obligate the insurer. 1

Further, the incentive of settlement would dissipate since

the insurer and third party would be required to litigate the issue of
liability despite the settlement.12 Post-settlement protection of insurers serves as an incentive to settle.1s The court found that it was
these considerations which prompted the court in Moradi-Shalal to
4. See supra note 3.
5. Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (defining
Royal Globe's requirement of a "conclusion" of the action for surviving Royal Globe
cause of actions).
6. Id. at 306, 758 P.2d at 69-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. See id. at 304, 758 P.2d at
69-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27, for a review of post-Moradi remedies. See also Note,
Loosing the Fox Amongst the Chickens: The CaliforniaSupreme Court Overrules Royal
Globe in Moradi Shalal v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Company, 22 LoY. L. REV. 1267
(1989); California Practicum, The Overruling of Royal Globe: A "Royal Bonanza" for
Insurance Companies, But What Happens Now?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989);
Note, Compromising Position: Moradi-Shalalv. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
- Insured's Liability as a Bad Suit Requisite, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 707 (1988).
7. Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. See
generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 94 (1990); 39 CAL.
JUR. 3D Insurance Companies § 40 (1977 & Supp. 1990); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance
Contracts and Coverage §§ 410-413, 426-31, 498 (1977 & Supp. 1990).
8. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d
658, 661-62, 788 P.2d 1156, 1156-57, 268 Cal. Rptr. 284, 284-85 (1990).
9. Id. at 665, 788 P.2d at 1160, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
10. Id. at 663, 788 P.2d at 1158, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (citing Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal.
3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128). "Under an insurance contract, the insurer's obligation is to indemnify the insured to the extent of the insured's liability to
the third party." Id
11. Id. at 663, 788 P.2d at 1158, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (citing Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal.
3d at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 73-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131-33).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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find settlement an insufficient conclusion.14
However, the court found a stipulated judgment to be distinguishable from a settlement. 15 First, a stipulated judgment is indeed a
judgment in that it requires a judicial act and utilizes judicial discretion. 16 Second, a stipulated judgment is given collateral estoppel effect if the parties manifest this intention. 17 On this latter point, the
court found that the insured, insurer and third-party claimant intended the stipulated judgment to have collateral estoppel effect as to
the issue of the insured's liability.18 Finally, the serious practical and
policy problems delineated by the court in Moradi-Shalal in its consideration of the finality of a settlement agreement are not
implicated.19

Specifically, the issue of liability would not have to be litigated
within the section 790.03(h) suit due to the collateral estoppel effect
given to the stipulation of insured liability. 20 Furthermore, the advantage of settlement would be sustained since the parties would not
be forced to relitigate a settled issue. 21 Accordingly, the court re14. CaliforniaState Auto. Inter-Ins. Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 663, 788 P.2d at 1158, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 286.
15. Id, at 663-65, 788 P.2d at 1158-60, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 286-88. "In a stipulated judgment, or consent decree, litigants voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assentng to specified terms, which the court agrees to enforce as a judgment." Id. at 663, 788 P.2d at
1158, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 286. See Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 325 (1988).
16. CaliforniaState Auto Inter-Ins.Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 663-64, 788 P.2d at 1158-59,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87. "If parties to pending litigation stipulate ... for settlement of
the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the
terms of the settlement." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 1987) (emphasis added).
17. In a footnote, the court explained that the states are split as to whether a stipulated judgment should be given collateral estoppel effect. California State Auto Inter-Ins. Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 664-65 n.2, 788 P.2d at 1159 n.2, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 287 n.2.
Furthermore, the case law in California is split on this issue. Id. See, e.g., Gates v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 301, 223 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1986) (stipulated judgment given
collateral estoppel effect). But see, e.g., Travelers Indemnity Co. v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 330 F.2d 250, 262 (9th Cir. 1964) (stipulated judgment not given collateral estoppel effect). The court declined to rule on the issue. Instead, the court ruled
that where the parties have evidenced an intent to be collaterally bound, that intent
will be upheld. California State Auto Inter-Ins.Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 664-65 n.2, 788 P.2d
at 1159 n.2, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 287 n.2.
18. Id. at 664-65 & n.2, 788 P.2d at 1159 & n.2, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 287 & n.2.
19. Id. at 665, 788 P.2d at 1160, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (citing Moradi-Shalal,46 Cal.
3d at 311, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131). See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
20. CaliforniaState Auto Inter-Ins. Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 665, 788 P.2d at 1160, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 288. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
21. CaliforniaState Auto Inter-Ins. Ass'n, 50 Cal. 3d at 665, 788 P.2d at 1160, 268
Cal. Rptr. at 288.

versed the court of appeal and held that a stipulation of an insured's
liability which is signed by the insurer and entered as a judgment
will be treated as a final judgment for purposes of pre-Moradi-Shalal
section 790.03(h) unfair practice lawsuits. 22
ERIN E. NUGENT
B. Proposition 103's mandatory renewal provision does not
apply to nonrenewal notices sent by insurers who have
complied with statutory withdrawal application
requirements: Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gillespie.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Travelers Indemnity Company v. Gillespie' confronted the California Supreme Court with the issue of whether insurers who had applied for withdrawal and submitted their certificates of authority for
cancellation could issue notices of nonrenewal to California policyholders contrary to Proposition 103's mandatory renewal provision. 2
In deciding that they could, the supreme court held the mandatory
renewal provision inapplicable to insurers engaged in statutory withdrawal from the California insurance market. 3
The mandatory renewal provision, adopted as part of the Proposition 103 insurance initiative 4 and embodied in section 1861.03(c) of
the California Insurance Code, provides that a notice of nonrenewal
or cancellation will be effective only if based on certain specified
grounds.5 Typically, an insurer who wishes to withdraw from the
California insurance market will attempt to "run-off"6 as many of its
existing automobile policies as possible in order to avoid reinsuring
such policies.7 The mandatory renewal provision assured California
22. Id.
1. 50 Cal. 3d 82, 785 P.2d 500, 266 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1990) (en banc).
2. Id. at 85, 785 P.2d at 501, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
3. Id. at 103, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
4. CAL. GEN. ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposition 103 (Nov. 8, 1988) (ballot
included five different initiatives). See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) (California
initiative process); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-34 (1977 & Supp.
1990); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw §§ 120-125 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); Comment, New Limits on the CaliforniaInitiative: An Analysis and Critique, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1045 (1986).
5. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(c) (West Supp. 1991). The statute provides: "[A] notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy for automobile insurance shall be effective only if it is based on one or more of the following reasons: (A) nonpayment of
premium; (B) fraud or material misrepresentation affecting the policy or insured; (C) a
substantial increase in the hazard insured against." Id.
6. The term "run-off" refers to the "orderly termination of existing policies over
a period of time by cancellation and/or nonrenewal." Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d
at 88 n.8, 785 P.2d at 503 n.8, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 120 n.8.
7. Id. at 108, 785 P.2d at 517, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Section 1071.5 of the California Insurance Code imposes a reinsurance and assumption ob-
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insureds that no "run-offs" would occur before initiation of the withdrawal process.8
The majority in Travelers, however, was unwilling to grant that
protection during the pendency of a withdrawal application. The
court reasoned that insurers had the right to discontinue California
business and that "nonrenewal of existing automobile policies is a
logical and integral part of the orderly winding up of a withdrawing

insurer's affairs."9
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

California Withdrawal Provisions

Sections 1070 through 1076 of the California Insurance Code govern the process of insurer withdrawal from the California insurance
market. 10 Section 1070 sets forth the requirements of a withdrawal
application: (1) payment of fees, (2) surrender of certificate of authority to commissioner, (3) executed application to withdraw, and
(4) affidavit submitting authority for such execution.'
Before an insurer will be allowed to withdraw, liabilities to California residents must be discharged pursuant to the terms of Insurance
Code section 1071.5 (the "discharge/reinsurance provision"). 12 "In
the case of its policies insuring residents of this State it shall cause
ligation upon insurers who wish to withdraw. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying
text for an explanation and the text of section 1071.5.
8. Before enactment of Proposition 103's mandatory renewal provision, an insurer could run-off its business by cancellation or nonrenewals at any time and for any
reason. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 109, 785 P.2d at 518, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 103, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
10. The withdrawal statutes, enacted in 1935, remain essentially unchanged. CAL.
INS. CODE § 1070 (West 1972) (citing Stats. 1935, c. 145, p. 557 & historical note). See
generally 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Companies § 152 (1977 & Supp. 1990) (withdrawal
of insurers from state).
11. "Any insurer, upon payment of the fees and costs therefor and surrender to
the commissioner of its certificate of authority, may apply to withdraw from this State.
Such application shall be in writing, duly executed, accompanied by evidence of due
authority for such execution, and properly acknowledged." CAL. INS. CODE § 1070
(West 1972).
12. Every insurer which withdraws as an insurer, or is required to withdraw
as an insurer, from this State shall, prior to such withdrawal, discharge its liabilities to residents of this State. In the case of its policies insuring residents of
this State it shall cause the primary liabilities under such policies to be reinsured and assumed by another admitted insurer. In the case of such policies
as are subject to cancellation by the insurer, it may cancel such policies pursuant to the terms thereof in lieu of such reinsurance and assumption.
CAL. INS. CODE

§ 1071.5 (West 1972).

the primary liabilities under such policies to be reinsured and assumed by another admitted insurer."1s In lieu of reinsurance and assumption, an insurer may cancel those policies subject to
cancellation.14
Thereafter, the Insurance Commissioner will examine the books
and records of an insurer who has applied to withdraw to ensure
compliance with section 1071.5.15 If the insurer does comply, the
commissioner "shall" cancel the insurer's certificate of authority and
grant the insurer's application to withdraw.16 Significantly, the California ballot initiative, Proposition 103,17 did not alter the withdrawal
provisions.18

B.

Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian

In Cafarm Insurance Company v. Deukmejian,19 the California
Supreme Court assumed original jurisidiction and issued an alternative writ in order to promptly consider various challenges made to
the validity of Proposition 103.20 The supreme court unanimously
held most of Proposition 103's provisions facially constitutional. 21
Those provisions deemed unconstitutional 22 did not defeat Proposi13. Id.
14. 1&
15. CAL. INS. CODE § 1072 (West 1972). Section 1072 provides in pertinent part:
The commissioner shall make, or cause to be made by the insurance authority
of the State where the insurer is organized, an examination of the books and
records of the insurer. If, upon such examination, he finds that the insurer
has no outstanding liabilities to residents of this State and no policies in favor
of the residents of this State uncanceled or the primary liabilities under which
have not been reinsured and assumed by another admitted insurer, as required by Section 1071.5, he shall cancel the insurer's certificates of authority,
if unexpired, and he shall permit the insurer to withdraw.
Id.
16. Id.
17. CAL. GEN. ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET, Proposition 103 (Nov. 8, 1988). See
generally California Supreme Court Survey, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 561 (1990) (background of the Proposition 103 insurance rate reduction and control initiative).
18. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 93, 785 P.2d at 507, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
19. 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989). For complete coverage
of the Calfarm decision, see CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
561 (1990).
20. CaLfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 812, 771 P.2d at 1249, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 163. See
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982); Hardie v.
Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1976).
21. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 842, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
22. The Calfarm court held that the insolvency standard embodied in Insurance
Code section 1861.01(b) violated the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 821, 771 P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (referring to CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1990)). The court further held that
section 1861.10's consumer advocacy provision violated the California Constitution. Id.
at 832, 771 P.2d at 1263, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (referring to CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10
(West Supp. 1990)). The court refrained from deciding the constitutionality of section
12202.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which imposed increased tax rates upon

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tion 103 because the court found them severable from the rest of the
23
initiative.
Most importantly, the Calfarm court held that the mandatory renewal provision was applicable to all policies in force on Proposition
103's effective date. 24 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered both the language and purpose of the mandatory renewal provision. The court explained that the language of the mandatory
renewal provision did not limit its applicability to post-Proposition
25
103 policies, whereas other provisions did state such a limitation.
Furthermore, the policy behind the mandatory renewal provision, assuring Californians continued coverage and preventing a mass of responsive nonrenewals, mandated this retrospective application.26
The court further held that the retrospective application of the
mandatory renewal provision to existing policies did not unconstitutionally impair the obligations of contract. 27 The court reasoned that
the mandatory renewal provision's moderate restrictions on nonrenewal were more than justified by strong policy interests including
the assurance of insurance affordability and availability to
28
Californians.
insurers, as no such taxes had yet been collected. Id. at 815, 771 P.2d at 1251-52, 258
Cal. Rptr. at 166.
23. Id. at 842, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184. There are three criteria for
severability; "the invalid provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable." I&i at 821-22, 771 P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170. See Santa Barbara
School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 605, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1975);
People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 226 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1986).
24. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 827, 771 P.2d at 1260, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 174. See
supra note 5 (text of mandatory renewal provision). "Before enactment of Proposition
103 insurers had an unfettered right to refuse to renew policies." Calfarm Ins. Co., 48
Cal. 3d at 826, 771 P.2d at 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173. See Greene v. Safeco Ins. Co., 140
Cal. App. 3d 535, 538, 189 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1983) (insurance company under no obligation to renew policy).
25. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 827, 771 P.2d at 1260, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 831, 771 P.2d at 1263, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 10;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9. See also 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 6 (1977 & Supp.
1990); 16A C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw §§ 283, 356, 362 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
28. Calfarn Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 831, 771 P.2d at 1262-63, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
The court also found that public safety can warrant state interference with existing
contract rights pursuant to the state's police powers. Id. at 828-30, 771 P.2d at 1260-62,
258 Cal. Rptr. at 174-76. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.' 176 (1983); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); Hinckley v. Bechtel Corp., 41 Cal. App.
3d 206, 116 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1974).

III.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

FactualBackground

Five related insurance companies (the "applicants") jointly applied
to withdraw from the California insurance market on November 7,
1988.29 Californians were to vote on the infamous Proposition 103 the
very next day.3o This joint application was sent to the Department of
Insurance (the "Department") and contained each insurer's certifi31
cate of authority, applications to withdraw, and statutory filing fees.
In accordance with the discharge/reinsurance provision, 32 each application provided that The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois
would assume the primary liabilities of their California policies with
the exception of automobile policies.33 Correspondingly, the applicants gave oral notice to the Department that it was their intention
to not renew their automobile policies. 34
The cover letter accompanying the withdrawal applications specified that the applications were contingent upon passage of Proposition 103. 35 On November 8, 1988, California voters approved
Proposition 103.36 Proposition 103 contained a mandatory renewal
provision which delineated the circumstances in which an insurer can
cancel or refuse to renew a policy. 37 The applicants began to issue
notices of nonrenewal to their automobile insurance policyholders on
November 9, 1988.38 The basis for these nonrenewals was not among
the grounds specified in Proposition 103's mandatory renewal
39
provision.
On November 17, 1988, the applicants sent the Department a proposed plan for their withdrawal.40 Twelve days later, the Department formally acknowledged the withdrawal applications but found
29. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gillespie, 50 Cal. 3d 82, 87, 785 P.2d 500, 502-03, 266
Cal. Rptr. 117, 119-20 (1990). The insurance companies included The Travelers Indemnity Company, The Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, The Travelers Indemnity
Company of America, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island, and the
Phoenix Insurance Company. Id.
30. Id. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
31. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 87, 785 P.2d at 502-03, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 11920.
32. See supra note 12.
33. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 87, 785 P.2d at 503, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
34. Id
35. 1&
36. Id.
37. Id. at 88, 785 P.2d at 503, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (citing CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1861.03(c) (West Supp. 1990)). See supra note 5 for text of code.
38. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 88, 785 P.2d at 503, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
39. Id.
40. Id. Pursuant to this plan, the applicants would eliminate most of their California insurance business over a period of time by cancellation and nonrenewal and
would reinsure their group disability policies. To this end, the applicants requested the
Insurance Commissioner to waive the discharge/reinsurance provision as applied to ex-

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

fault with the proposed plan.41 On December 12, 1988, the applicants
proposed two alternative plans and requested that the Department
2
approve one of them.4

Instead of approving a plan, on December 23, 1988, the Department
notified the applicants of noncompliance with the mandatory renewal
provision of Insurance Code section 1858.1.43 The nonrenewal notices
issued by the applicants after Proposition 103's effective date formed
the basis of this alleged violation. The applicants responded to the
notices the same day and agreed to a public hearing."
The public hearing was conducted on January 4, 1989. 45 The hear7
6
ing officer was the Department's chief counsel.4 At the hearing,4
the applicants argued that the notices of nonrenewal did not violate
the mandatory renewal provision, 48 while the Department contended
precisely the opposite.
After a review of the entire record, which included the hearing officer's unpublished decision, the Commissioner concluded that the
mandatory renewal provision applied to all policies active on Proposition 103's effective date. 49 Furthermore, an insurer's actions to withdraw from the California insurance market did not alter this result,
although the mandatory renewal provision would not apply in inisting automobile policies. This request was denied. Id. at 88-89, 785 P.2d at 503-04, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
41. Id. at 88-89, 785 P.2d at 503-04, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
42. Id at 89, 785 P.2d at 504, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island rescinded its application to withdraw. Id. Purportedly, neither
of the two newly proposed plans necessitated a waiver of the discharge/reinsurance
provision. Id.
(citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1858.1 (West 1972) (notice to correct
43. Id.
noncompliance)).
44. Id. at 90, 785 P.2d at 504, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 90, 785 P.2d at 505, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
47. The Department argued that the scope of the hearing inquiry should be confined to the fact that the applicants issued notices of nonrenewal after the effective
date of Proposition 103 which were in violation of its mandatory renewal provison.
The Department's attempt to exclude evidence pertaining to the applicants withdrawal
efforts was rejected by the hearing officer. Id.
48. Id. at 91, 785 P.2d at 505, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 122. Petitioners argued that:
(1) the mandatory renewal provision applied only to policies issued or renewed on or after the effective date of Proposition 103, and (2) the mandatory
renewal provision did not apply to insurers who had submitted applications to
withdraw from the California insurance market and tendered their certificates of authority for cancellation.
Id.
49. Id. at 91, 785 P.2d at 505, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 122.

stances where withdrawal was formally effective.5o
The applicants petitioned the Supreme Court of California for a
writ of mandate in order to obtain a review of the Commissioner's
decision.51 The petition presented, and the supreme court addressed,
three issues:
(1) whether the mandatory renewal provision applies to all policies in force on
November 9, 1988; (2) whether the mandatory renewal provision applies to insurers who have submitted applications to withdraw as insurers in California
and have tendered their certificates of authority for cancellation; and (3)
whether 2the Commissioner is required to disclose the hearing officer's
5
decision.

IV.

A.

CASE ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion

In an opinion written by Justice Kaufman, the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the mandatory renewal provision applied to all
policies in force on Proposition 103's effective date. 53 The court also
held that the mandatory renewal provision does not apply to nonrenewal notices sent by insurers engaged in statutory withdrawal and
that the Commissioner did not have to disclose the hearing officer's
54
decision.
1.

The mandatory renewal provision applies to all policies in
force on the effective date of Proposition 103.

In Calfarm Insurance Company v. Deukmejian,55 the California
Supreme Court held that Proposition 103's mandatory renewal provision constitutionally applied to all policies in force on its effective
date. 56 Petitioners conceded this, and the court summarily noted that
57
the first issue had been resolved.
50. Id. Accordingly, the Commissioner ordered the insurers to renew their automobile policies and to rescind the previously issued notices of nonrenewal that did not
comply with the mandatory renewal provision. Id, at 91, 785 P.2d at 505, 266 Cal. Rptr.
at 123.
51. Id. at 91, 785 P.2d at 506, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1858.6
(West 1972); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
52. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 785 P.2d at 506, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
The Commissioner argued, and the court agreed, that whether petitioners were presently entitled to withdraw was not at issue. However, the withdrawal steps undertaken by petitioners were relevant in determining the validity of the nonrenewals
issued by petitioners. Id. at 92, 785 P.2d at 506, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
53. Id. at 92, 785 P.2d at 506, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
54. Id. at 103, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
55. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
56. Id. at 826-31, 771 P.2d at 1259-63, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173-77.
57. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 92, 785 P.2d at 506, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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2.

The mandatory renewal provision does not apply to insurers
who have complied with statutory withdrawal
application requirements, including insurers
who surrender their certificates of
authority.

The court considered the legislative history and statutory language
of the withdrawal statutes and Proposition 103, as well as pertinent
case law, in concluding that the mandatory renewal provision did not
apply to "withdrawing" insurers.5 8 Significantly, the mandatory renewal provision of Proposition 103 does not purport to alter the efficacy of the withdrawal statutes. 59
The court found that the language and rationale in Calfarm confirmed that the mandatory renewal provision does not apply to insurers who employ the statutory withdrawal mechanism. 60 In Calfarm,
the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 103's
mandatory renewal provision.61 In so holding, the Calfarm court relied on the fact that Proposition 103 did not prevent an insurer from
withdrawing, but, instead, recognized that disconcerted insurers had
the option to withdraw. 62 The only means by which an insurer can
discontinue active policies is by cancellation 'or expiration. 63 Since an
insurer would be unable to discontinue its California business if required to comply with the mandatory renewal provision, Ca~farm implied that a withdrawing insurer would not be bound by this
provision. 64
According to the court, the language of Proposition 103 supports
the conclusion that the mandatory renewal provision does not apply
to a withdrawing insurer.65 In so finding, the court pointed to section
1861.11 of the California Insurance Code, added by Proposition 103.66
58. Id. at 92-98, 785 P.2d at 506-10, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123-27.
59. Id. at 93, 785 P.2d at 507, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
60. Id at 93-94, 785 P.2d at 507, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
61. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Dukemejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 826-31, 771 P.2d 1247, 1259-63,
258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 173-77 (1989). See also supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
62. Id at 831, 771 P.2d at 1262-63, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
63. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 93-94, 785 P.2d at 507, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 12324.
64. Id. at 94, 785 P.2d at 507-08, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
65. Id. at 94, 785 P.2d at 507-08, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
66. Id. (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.11 (West 1990)). The court interpreted section 1861.11 to provide:
In the event that the commissioner finds that (a) insurers have substantially
withdrawn from any insurance market covered by this article, including insurance described by Section 660 [automobile insurance], and (b) a market assist-

This section authorizes the establishment of a joint underwriting authority in instances where an insurer has substantially withdrawn
from the California insurance market. 6 7 The court reasoned that this
section necessarily contemplated a lapse of coverage. 68 Such lapse
would not occur if withdrawing insurers were forced to comply with
the mandatory renewal provision. 69 Thus, Proposition 103 itself recognized that the mandatory renewal provision would not apply to a
70
withdrawing insurer.
The Commissioner claimed that insurers who complied with the
mandatory renewal provision would be able to terminate California
business by utilizing the reinsurance/assumption provision of the
withdrawal statutes. 71 The court found that this argument was premised on a misconception of the purpose and effects of a reinsurance
72
and assumption agreement.
The court explained that a reinsurance and assumption agreement,
whereby a reinsurer assumes the policy obligations of an insurer, results in joint liability of reinsurer and insurer. 73 Furthermore, the
purpose of requiring withdrawing insurers to reinsure their policies
was not to aid insurers by providing them with a release from liability, but rather to protect Californians. 74 Thus, the reinsurance/assumption provision was not intended to, and does not, enable an
insurer to terminate his California insurance business. 7s
The court went on to reject another plausible argument on the
ance plan would not be sufficient to make insurance available, the
commissioner shall establish a joint underwriting authority in the manner set
forth by Section 11891, without the prior creation of a market assistance plan.
Id. at 94 n.12, 785 P.2d at 507 n.12, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124 n.12.
67. Id. at 94, 785 P.2d at 507-08, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25 (citing CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1861.11 (West Supp. 1990)).
68. Travelers Indem Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 94, 785 P.2d at 507-08, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
69. Id. at 94, 785 P.2d at 508, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 95, 785 P.2d at 508, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The requirement of reinsurance
and assumption embodied in section 1071.5 of the California Insurance Code is generally referred to as the discharge/reinsurance provision. See supra note 12 (text of discharge/reinsurance provision).
72. Id. at 95-98, 785 P.2d at 508-10, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125-27.
73. Id. at 95-96, 785 P.2d at 508, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26 (citing Sawyer v. Sunset
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 492, 496, 499, 66 P.2d 641, 644 (1937)); Baer v. Associated
Life Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 117, 123, 248 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239 (1988) (direct liability of
reinsurer to insureds). A reinsurance and assumption agreement is distinguishable
from a pure reinsurance agreement. "A reinsurance contract is one by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against loss or liability by reason of such
original insurance" and the original insured, thus, has no interest in it. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 95, 785 P.2d at 508, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (citing CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 620 & 623 (West 1972), respectively). See also Ascherman v. General Reinsurance
Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 307, 311-12, 228 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1986) (insured has no interest or
rights in reinsurance agreement).
74. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 97, 785 P.2d at 509, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
75. Id. at 95-96, 785 P.2d at 508-09, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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Commissioner's side: the insurer and reinsurer's joint obligation includes compliance with the mandatory renewal provision, but this obligation ceases to bind the insurer when withdrawal becomes final,
although it continues to bind the reinsurer. 76 The court rejected this
argument on several grounds. First, because Section 660(e) of the
California Insurance Code does not allow a reinsurer to "renew" a
policy, it would therefore be unreasonable to impose a renewal obligation upon reinsurers. 77 Second, since insurers could issue effective
cancellations after their withdrawal was finalized, there would be no
need to reinsure their automobile policies.78 Third, the enactment of
Proposition 103's joint underwriting provision reflects legislative recognition that Californians whose insurers withdrew would face a
laspe in coverage. The court, therefore, found the Commissioner's argument inconsistent with this judicial interpretation of the joint un79
derwriting provision.
In Part V of its opinion, the court refused to distinguish between
an insurer whose withdrawal application has been approved and certificate of authority cancelled, and an insurer who has fulfilled the
statutory withdrawal requirements but is awaiting Commissioner approval.80 According to the court, such a distinction is necessarily premised on the theory that before cancellation of an insurer's
certificate of authority, the insurer must be an "admitted insurer"
bound by California statutory law, including the mandatory renewal
provision.8 1 After an insurer's certificate is cancelled, an insurer becomes a "nonadmitted insurer" who can no longer service California
82
policies.
The court discredited such a theory on several grounds. Foremost,
the court noted that such an interpretation effectively eliminates the
possibility of an insurer withdrawing from the California market.
76. Id. at 96, 785 P.2d at 509, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
77. Id, at 97, 785 P.2d at 509-10, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27 (citing CAL. INS. CODE
§ 660(e) (West 1972)). Section 660(e) of the California Insurance Code provides: "Renewal" or "to renew" means to continue coverage with either the insurer which issued
/the policy or an affiliated insurer ...for an additional policy period upon expiration of
the current policy period." CAL. INS. CODE § 660(e) (West Supp. 1991).
78. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 97, 785 P.2d at 510, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
79. Id. at 97-98, 785 P.2d at 510, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 127. See supra note 64 for text of
section 1861.11's joint underwriting provision.
80. Id at 98-102, 785 P.2d at 510-13, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 127-30. California Insurance
Code section 1070 delineates the requirements of a withdrawal application. See supra
note 11 for the text of section 1070.
81. Id. at 98, 785 P.2d at 511, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
82. Id.

This would result in an anomalous situation where the mandatory renewal provision would preclude an admitted insurer from making a
"run-off"83 of his automobile policies. Once that insurer is "nonadmitted," it would be unable to legally service the policies that it was
forced to retain.8 4 Second, the court explained that there are instances in which a nonadmitted insurer may service California policies.8 5 Third, the court objected to the decisive use of "admitted" and
"nonadmitted" in determining the applicability of the mandatory renewal provision. To this end, the court explained that not all of the
86
Insurance Code provisions apply to all admitted insurers.
The court concluded that in order to ascertain whether a particular
statute is applicable to an insurer, one must examine and "harmonize" the entire rubric of insurance law in order to discover the most
reasonable interpretation.8 7 The court reasoned that Proposition 103
did not overtly or impliedly alter the longstanding withdrawal statutes.88 However, Proposition 103 would drastically affect the withdrawal statutes if its mandatory renewal provision was deemed
applicable to insurers engaged in the process of withdrawal.89 Enforcing the mandatory renewal provision upon withdrawing insurers
would result in a greater amount of outstanding liability.9 0 Such liability would be more difficult to reinsure and would substantially increase the burden upon the Commissioner. 9 1 Furthermore, the court
found renewing automobile policies fundamentally inconsistent with
withdrawal. The court concluded that the most reasonable interpretation of the mandatory renewal provision was that it was not intended to apply, and did not apply, to withdrawing insurers. 92
The court went on to distinguish an insurer who had fulfilled the
83. See supra note 6.
84. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 99, 785 P.2d at 511, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
85. 1& (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1070.5 (West 1972)).
86. Id. at 99 n.17, 785 P.2d at 511 n.17, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 128 n.17. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 700(b) (West Supp. 1991) (applicable to nonadmitted insurers); CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 250-87, 331, 352 (West & Supp. 1991) (applicable to both admitted and nonadmitted
insurers); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1100.1, 1150, 1210, 1211.5 (Deering 1991) (applicable to
some admitted insurers but not others).
87. 1I at 99-100, 785 P.2d at 511, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (citing Bowland v. Municipal
Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 489, 556 P.2d 1081, 1085, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1976)); see also
Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equal., 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 676
(1959).
88. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 100, 785 P.2d at 512, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
89. Id. at 100, 785 P.2d at 512, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
90. Id. "The liabilities it would be required to reinsure would be not merely those
remaining after termination of its automobile policies, but all its automobile policies in
force and each future policy resulting from compelled renewal during the pendency of
its withdrawal application." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 100-01, 785 P.2d at 512, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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statutory requisites for withdrawal from other admitted insurers.
The withdrawing insurer, unlike other admitted insurers, may not
write new business in California. 94 Furthermore, the surrender of its
certificate of authority effects this change in status and evidences a
committment to the orderly winding down of business. 95 The court
accordingly held that the mandatory renewal provision does not apply to insurers who withdraw, or who are withdrawing (i.e., those
who have complied with the statutory requirements for
withdrawal).96

3.

The Commissioner was not required to reveal the hearing
officer's decision.

Petitioners argued that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" compel the Commissioner to disclose the hearing officer's decision. 97 The court rejected this contention on two grounds.
First, since there is no legal authority for compelling disclosure of
a section 1858.1 proceeding, 98 the case was decided on stipulated facts
and documentary evidence. 9 9 Thus, the hearing officer did not make
any factual determinations, such as credibility of witnesses, that arguably would be accorded "great weight" upon review. 100 In fact, the
hearing officer's decision ceased to have any legal relevance once it
was rejected by the Commissioner.O1
Second, although it is customary to disclose the hearing officer's
decision in order to give parties an opportunity to comment before
the agency renders its decision, this purpose is not served after the
agency has rendered its decision, as in the instant case. 102 Accordingly, the court held that the petitioners were not presently entitled
to disclosure of the hearing officer's decision since there was no rec93. Id. at 101, 785 P.2d at 512-13, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30. See supra note 11 (text
of section 1070 which outlines the statutory withdrawal requirements).
94. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 101, 785 P.2d at 513, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
95. Id. at 101, 785 P.2d at 512-13, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30. Here, the court drew an
analogy to a voluntary proceeding for winding up a corporation. Id. (citing CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 1900, 1901, 1903 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991)).
96. Id. at 101, 785 P.2d at 513, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
97. Id. at 102, 785 P.2d at 513, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
98. Id. at 102-03, 785 P.2d at 513-14, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
99. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 102, 785 P.2d at 513, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
100. Id. at 102-03, 785 P.2d at 513, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31 (quoting Garza v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 3 Cal. 3d 312, 318-19, 475 P.2d 451, 456, 90 Cal. Rptr. 355, 360
(1970)).
101. Id. at 103, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
102. Id.

ognized authority to compel such a result, and there was no longer a
useful purpose for such information.03
4.

Conclusion

In summary, the California Supreme Court held that the
mandatory renewal provision does not apply to insurers who have
completed the statutory requisites for withdrawal, including surrender of the certificate of authority. 0 4 The court further held that the
petitioners had no present right to compel disclosure of the hearing
officer's decision because it would serve no purpose in this case. 0 5
The supreme court ordered a writ of mandate directing the Commissioner to set aside her decision and issue another decision consistent
with the court's opinion in this case.' 06
B.

Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard concurred in the majority's conclusion that the
mandatory renewal provision did not apply to insurers whose applications to withdraw had been approved by the Commissioner. 107 She
agreed that, in the interests of certainty in the law and upholding
Proposition 103's validity, it was appropriate for the court to rule on
this issue even though it was not the factual scenario which con08
fronted the court.
Justice Kennard, however, dissented to the majority's opinion that
the mandatory renewal provision did not apply to insurers whose
withdrawal applications had not yet been approved.109 On this issue,
Justice Kennard agreed with Justice Broussard's dissenting
opinion."l 0
C

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Broussard was joined by Justice Mosk in his appraisal that
insurers who have merely applied for withdrawal are subject to the
mandatory renewal provision."' Justice Broussard noted that
whether insurers whose withdrawal applications have been approved
103. Id. at 103, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 103-04, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
107. Id. at 104, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
108. Id. at 104, 785 P.2d at 514, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Sokol v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 257, 418 P.2d 265, 271,
53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 679 (1966)).
109. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Id (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
111. Id. at 114-15, 785 P.2d at 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (Broussard, J., dissenting)
(advocating support of Commissioner's ruling).

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

are subject to the mandatory renewal provision was not an issue
before the court. 1 2 Accordingly, he found that the issue should not
1 3
have been addressed and resolved by the majority. '
Justice Broussard argued that the purpose of Proposition 103 and
the import of Calfarm support the conclusion that the mere act of applying for withdrawal should not entitle an insurer to issue
nonrenewals. 114 He noted that the express purpose of Proposition
103 was to provide Californians with insurance that was "fair, available, and affordable."'115 This express purpose and the post-Proposition 103 danger of mass nonrenewals were cited by the court in
Calfarm in upholding the retrospective application of the mandatory
renewal provision.1l 6 Justice Broussard remarked that allowing insurers to issue notices of nonrenewal before they have permission to
withdraw adversely impacts the "availability" of insurance and facilitates mass

exodus.11

7

Justice Broussard found the majority's decision to have a number
of "pernicious effects."11s An applicant insurer that has issued nonrenewal notices can be denied withdrawal or may decide to retract
her application.11 9 Under the majority view, many insureds will thus
face a temporary lapse in coverage.120 Similarly, he determined that
the majority permits insurers that submit conditionalwithdrawal applications to immediately issue nonrenewals.121 Justice Broussard
emphasized that all the problems of attempting to rectify a large
112. Id. at 105, 785 P.2d at 515, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (Broussard, J., dissenting). The
Commissioner had not yet approved The Travelers' application to withdraw. See supra
text accompanying notes 38-42.
113. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 105, 785 P.2d at 515, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 132
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 106, 785 P.2d at 516, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
115. 1d (Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.
3d 805, 813, 771 P.2d 1247, 1250, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (1989)).
116. Id, (Broussard, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 106-08, 785 P.2d at 516, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 106-07, 785 P.2d at 516, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 107, 785 P.2d at 516, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard criticized Travelers whose withdrawal application expressly reserved
the right to withdraw in the event that Proposition 103 did not pass or was subsequently declared invalid. Id. Travelers issued its notices of nonrenewal immediately
after Proposition 103 was adopted and did not wait to see if its second condition was
fulfilled. Id See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
In addition, Justice Broussard questioned whether a conditional application satisfied
section 1070's application requirements. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 107 n.4, 785
P.2d at 516 n.4, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.4 (Broussard, J., dissenting).

scale refusal to renew may be avoided by simply requiring insurers
who submit withdrawal applications to comply with the mandatory
renewal provision.122 Furthermore, Justice Broussard noted that the
Commissioner had not yet fixed rates under Proposition 103.123
When she does so, Justice Broussard commented that the majority's
decision will enable insurers to withdraw from the state with great
ease. These "pernicious effect[s]" further diminish Proposition 103's
intended assurance of coverage. 124
Justice Broussard's interpretation of the language and purpose Of
the withdrawal statutes led him to conclude that Commissioner approval of a withdrawal application was the required, legally significant act. 125 Justice Broussard viewed the use of the word
"withdrawal" in the withdrawal statutes as signifying the period of
time after which the Commissioner had cancelled the certificate of
authority.126 The purpose of the withdrawal statutes, according to
Justice Broussard, is to ensure the protection of California insureds.127 This purpose is evidenced in part by the requirement that
insurers discharge or reinsure their obligations before withdrawal.128
Justice Broussard concluded that permitting insurers, who merely
submit applications to withdraw, to issue nonrenewals is inconsistent
with the language and purpose of the withdrawal statutes. 129
Justice Broussard noted that an insurer is deemed "admitted" until
such time as the Commissioner approves the withdrawal application
and cancels the insurer's certificate of authority.13o Logically, an admitted insurer is bound to comply with the laws that govern admitted insurers, which include the mandatory renewal provision. 131
Justice Broussard criticized the majority for creating a new type of
insurer: an admitted insurer who is bound to all the laws governing
122. Id. at 112, 785 P.2d at 520, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 137 ("this whole can of worms can
be avoided").
123. Id. at 107, 785 P.2d at 516, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 109, 785 P.2d at 518, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Broussard, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (overview of the withdrawal statutes).
126. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 109, 785 P.2d at 518, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 135
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 110, 785 P.2d at 518, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Baer v. Associated Life Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 117, 123, 248 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239
(1988)).
128. Id. at 110, 785 P.2d at 518, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1071.5 (West 1972)).
129. Id. at 110-11, 785 P.2d at 519, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard characterized the withdrawal statutes as remedial and advocated
that they be liberally construed. Id. at 111, 785 P.2d at 519, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 136
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Bunner v. Imperial Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 14, 21,
225 Cal. Rptr. 912, 915-16 (1986)).
130. Id. at 112, 785 P.2d at 520, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 112-13, 785 P.2d at 520-21, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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admitted insurers except for the mandatory renewal provision and
who can not issue new policies. 132 He found that there was no statu13 3
tory or decisional basis for this categorical distinction.
Justice Broussard concluded that Travelers, which had merely applied for withdrawal, was an admitted insurer who was bound by all
the laws governing admitted insurers including the mandatory renewal provision. 3 4 Thus, he supported the Commissioner in her
finding that the nonrenewal notices issued by Travelers were ineffec35
tive under California law.1
V.

IMPACT

The immediate impact of the California Supreme Court's decision
in Travelers Indemnity Company v. Gillespie was that Travelers did
not have to renew or reinsure its approximately 22,000 automobile insurance policies.13 6 Undisputably, Travelers greatly eased the way
for insurers wishing to withdraw from the California insurance market to do so. 137 Commentators aligned with insurers praised the deci-

sion as reaffirming basic principles of free enterprise: the right to
38

quit.1

Despite the ease with which an insurer may now leave the California market, no market change is expected. Commentators agree that
a mass exodus from the California is unlikely,13 9 because California,
the largest insurance market in the world, retains the promise of
great profits to be reaped by insurers. Calfarm's guarantee of a fair
rate of return will curtail the number of withdrawals.40 In addition,
132. Id. at 113, 785 P.2d at 521, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 113-14, 785 P.2d at 521-22, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id. at 114, 785 P.2d at 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 115, 785 P.2d at 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
136. DiBlase, Insurer can Withdraw from California,Bus. INS., Feb. 5, 1990, at 2;
BNA, Daily Report for Executives, Feb. 1, 1990, at A8.
137. See, e.g., DiBlase, supra note 136, at 2; L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 5
(Home ed.); San Francisco Chron., Jan. 30, 1990, at Al; BNA, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 31, 1990, at A10; Haggerty, Prop. 103 Provisionson Renewal Overruled, National Underwriter, Feb. 5, 1990, at 1.
138. See DiBlase, supra note 136, at 2 (quoting spokesman for the Alliance of
American Insurers in San Francisco); Haggerty, supra note 134, at 1 (quoting Kent
Keller of Barger & Wolen, Los Angeles).
139. See, e.g., DiBlase, supra note 133, at 2. L.A. Times, Jan. 30 1990, at Al, col. 5
(Home ed.); San Francisco Chron., Jan. 30, 1990, at Al; BNA, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 31, 1990, at A10; Haggerty, supra note 137, at 1.
140. DiBlase, supra note 136, at 2 (citing James Holmes, California Insurance Department and referring to the California Supreme Court's holding in Calfarm Ins. Co.

as of this opinion, former Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie
had not yet established Proposition 103's "fair rate of return." Insurers are expected to await the results of the "fair-rate" administrative
141
hearings before making any withdrawal decisions.
Several commentators have speculated that the Travelers decision
will give insurers an upper hand in the fair-rate hearings. 14 2 Since
statutory withdrawal was rendered relatively painless by Travelers,
insurers are expected to threaten withdrawal in order to obtain a
favorable rate of return.
The long term impact of Travelers is contingent upon the outcome
of the fair-rate hearings.143 If insurers are unsatisfied with the rate
or become impatient with the temporary freeze on automobile insurance rates, Travelers has paved the way for an easy withdrawal. 144
VI.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's holding in Travelers signals a
green light for insurers to withdraw from the California insurance
market. Whether a significant number of insurers will do so remains
to be seen. The outcome of the Proposition 103 "fair rate of return"
hearings will be determinative.
ERIN NUGENT

XII.

JUVENILE LAW
Welfare and Institutions Code section 281 and
CaliforniaRule of Court 1450(c) create exceptions to the
hearsay rule for social studies that are admitted into
evidence and relied on by a juvenile court in
determining the court'sjurisdiction over a minor under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300: In re Malinda
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Malinda S.,1 the California Supreme Court considered
whether a juvenile court could admit into evidence original and supv. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989)). See supra
notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
141. See L.A. Times, Jan. 30 1990, at Al, col. 5 (Home ed.); San Francisco Chron.,
Jan. 30, 1990, at Al; Haggerty, supra note 137, at 1.
142. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (Home ed.); San Francisco Chron., Jan.
30, 1990, at Al; Haggerty, supra note 137, at 1.
143. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (Home ed.); San Francisco Chron., Jan.
30, 1990, at Al; Haggerty, supra note 137, at 1.
144. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (Home ed.).
1. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d 368, 795 P.2d 1244, 272 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990). Chief
Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Eagleson, Ken-
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plemental social studies, 2 prepared by a social worker, and specifically rely on those social studies in finding jurisdiction over a minor
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,3 even though the
social studies contained hearsay and multiple hearsay.
In 1987, Carol S., mother of the minor Malinda S., filed a complaint
with the San Diego County Department of Social Services (DSS)
claiming that Malinda's father, Russell S., had sexually abused
Malinda. DSS petitioned the juvenile court to find Malinda a dependent of the court because of her father's sexual and emotional abuse.
Social workers interviewed Malinda and compiled original and supplemental social studies which were admitted at the jurisdiction
hearing pursuant to section 355.4 Russell claimed that the social
studies were incompetent to support a finding of jurisdiction, and he
repeatedly objected to their admission on that basis.5 The juvenile
nard, and Arabian concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Mosk joined.
2. The supreme court defined social studies as:
written reports prepared by probation officers upon court order in any matter
involving the custody, status, or welfare of a minor. The reports must include
the probations officer's investigation of appropriate facts and a recommendation to the court. As in the present case, the board of supervisors may delegate to the county welfare department the duty of the probation officer to
prepare such reports.
Id. at 372 n.1, 795 P.2d at 1245 n.1, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 788 n.1 (citations omitted).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West 1984). In 1987, this section provided
that any person under 18 years of age "whose home is an unfit place for him by reason
of neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in whose custody or care he is" could come within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court which could then declare the minor a dependent of the court. In
re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 373 n.3, 795 P.2d at 1245 n.3, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 788 n.3. See
also 10 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Parentand Child §§ 648-724 (9th ed.
1989) (an overview of the operation of section 300); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and
Dependent Children § 44 (3rd ed. 1987) (discussion of juveniles that are subject to dependency proceedings); Legislation Review, Juveniles; Custody and Control, 19 PAC.
L.J. 650 (1988) (a brief look at section 1485 and dependency adjudication).
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1990). Section 355 establishes the
evidentiary standards for juvenile hearings. The section in pertinent part says:
At the [jurisdictional] hearing, the court shall first consider only the question
whether the minor is a person described by Section 300, and for this purpose
any matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances or acts
which are alleged to bring him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is
admissible and may be received in evidence; however, proof by a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must be adduced
to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300.
Id. See also 10 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Parent and Child § 687 (9th
ed. 1989) (evidence in dependency hearings); Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 299 (1987) (a look at parental rights in dependency hearings).
5. Russell argued that the court could not rely solely on the social studies in finding jurisdiction because they contained inadmissible hearsay, and section 355 requires

court overruled Russell's objections. It admitted and specifically relied on the social studies in finding jurisdiction under section 300.
The court of appeal affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's admission of, and reliance on, the social studies. 6 The appellate court
also rejected the holding in In re Donald R.7 to the extent that it
held a juvenile court could not rely solely on social studies in making
a jurisdictional determination.8
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the
language of section 355, the social studies were admissible because of
their relevance to a section 300 determination. 9 The court also affirmed the appellate court's rejection of In re Donald R.,1o and concluded that the social studies were competent evidence to support a
finding of section 300 jurisdiction. Although the studies included
multiple hearsay, section 28111 and rule 1450(c) of the California
Rules of Court 12 create exceptions to the hearsay rule for social
studies.13
that the finding of jurisdiction be based on proof by a preponderance of evidence ordinarily admissible in a civil trial. Thus, the social studies were not competent evidence
to support the determination. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 375, 795 P.2d at 1246, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 790.
6. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 375, 795 P.2d at 1246, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
7. In re Donald R., 195 Cal. App. 3d 703, 240 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1987).
8. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 375, 795 P.2d at 1246, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 790. See
In re Donald R., 195 Cal. App. 3d at 714-16, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
9. Section 355 provides that any relevant and material evidence is admissible.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1990). The social studies are relevant and
material because they provide "the court with a coherent picture of the child's situation." In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 426, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 350 (1976). Furthermore, in a section 300 proceeding "the jurisdictional fact is the lack of parental
control and the unfitness of the minor's home. The social study report is directly relevant to the issue to be determined by the juvenile court at the adjudication hearing."
In re Biggs, 17 Cal. App. 3d 337, 345, 94 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (1971). See also Legislation
Review, Juvenile Law; Dependency Hearings,8 PAC. L.J. 425 (1978) (a brief look at
burdens of proof in dependency hearings).
10. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 381-82, 795 P.2d at 1250-51, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 79495.
11. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 281 (West 1984). Section 281 says that the probation officer shall upon order of any court in any matter involving the custody, status,
or welfare of a minor or minors, make an investigation of appropriate facts and circumstances and prepare and file with the court written reports and a written recommendation in reference to such matters. Id. The court is authorized to receive and
consider the reports and recommendations of the probation officer in determining any
such matter. Id.
12. CAL. R. CT. 1450. At the time of this jurisdictional hearing, rule 1450, subdivision (c) was codified as rule 1365 subdivision (d). Because there was only a renumbering and no substantive change, the court looked to rule 1450(c) which says, "[A] social
worker's report that contains information relevant to the jurisdiction hearing shall be
admissible if, on request of the parent or guardian, the probation officer or social
worker is made available to be cross-examined on the contents of the report." Id.
13. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 376-82, 795 P.2d at 1247-51, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 79195. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary specifically stated, in its comment to the
hearsay rule, that exceptions to the hearsay rule were not limited to those set out in
the evidence code, but "may be found in other statutes or decisional law." Id. See also
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II.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The majority opinion distinguished section 281 and rule 1450(c)
from other code sections that the court had previously found not to
create hearsay exceptions. 14 The court noted that social studies prepared by disinterested parties in the regular course of their professional duties contain the elements of competency, reliability, and
trustworthiness that are necessary to exempt them from the hearsay
rule.15 Furthermore, the statutory scheme for dependency proceedings complies with the cross-examination requirement for hearsay
exceptions by requiring that the parent 16 be given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the social worker who prepared the re17
port and controvert the contents of the social study.
The court bolstered its opinion by presenting code sections which,
when compared with the language of section 281 and rule 1450(c),
suggest the Legislature never intended to limit a juvenile court's use
of social studies in making section 300 determinations.18 The court
also pointed out similarities between the language of section 281 and
other code sections that create exceptions to the hearsay rule. 19
Based upon such distinctions and comparisons, the California
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1966) (comment by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); Tuerkheimer, Conviction Through Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: a Logical ProgressionBack to Square One, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 47 (1988) (an examination of the
use of hearsay evidence in child abuse cases).
14. While there are many dependency hearing cases that address this issue favorably for the majority, see, e.g., In re Jose M., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1105, 254 Cal. Rptr.
364, 368 (1988), the court chose to focus on distinguishing section 281 and rule 1450
from a section of the Vehicle Code and conservatorship proceedings. In re Malinda S.,
51 Cal. 3d at 377-78, 795 P.2d at 1247-49, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92 (citing Daniels v. Dept.
of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 532, 658 P.2d 1313, 189 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1983) and Conservatorship of Manton, 39 Cal. 3d 645, 703 P.2d 1147, 217 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985)).
15. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 377, 795 P.2d at 1247-48, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
Competency and trustworthiness are requirements of traditionally recognized hearsay
exceptions. An example, and further statement of such requirements, can be found in
section 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
16. The term "parent" is used for convenience and refers to any person, such as a
guardian, who would oppose a finding of jurisdiction under section 300.
17. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 378, 382-85, 795 P.2d at 1248, 1251-53, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 792, 795-97.
18. Id. at 377-81, 795 P.2d at 1247-50, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 791-94. The court stated that
the broad language of section 281 and rule 1450(c), authorizing a juvenile court to not
only admit social studies, but to consider those studies in making its determination, indicated a legislative intent that the studies were "not merely to be used as background
consideration, but may form the basis of the jurisdictional determination itself." Id. at
377-78, 795 P.2d at 1248, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
19. Id. at 379-81, 795 P.2d at 1249-50, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 792-94 (comparing section
281 with section 233 and equating it with section 701).

Supreme Court concluded that section 281 and rule 1450(c) implicitly
20
create hearsay exceptions for social studies.
In construing section 355, the California Supreme Court rejected
the contrary language in In re Donald R..21 The court determined
that the second sentence of the section allows a juvenile court to base
its decision only on evidence that would be admissible in any civil
case, independent of the section's first sentence. 22 This means information that is admissible because of the broad admissibility standard
of section 355's first sentence can also be the basis for the court's decision if the information is also admissible under some other section,
such as section 281.23
Through an examination of actual legislative history and intent,
rather than implied indicia of such,24 Justice Broussard, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the social studies could be admitted into
evidence and that they could be relied on by a juvenile court in making a section 300 determination. 25 However, Broussard disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that a juvenile court could make a
finding of jurisdiction based solely on social studies that contained
26
hearsay.
Justice Broussard pointed out that section 281 says basically the
same thing as section 355: that a juvenile court can admit and consider social studies. However, neither of these sections say that the
court can solely rely on the social studies, he argued.2 7 Broussard accepted the majority's conclusion that section 355 requires a finding of
jurisdiction based on evidence admissible in a civil trial and that the
broad admissibility standard allowed by section 355 is not to be considered in identifying such admissible evidence. But, he countered,
that a section such as 281, which creates the same broad admissibility
standard as section 355 and does so for the same policy reasons,
should not be allowed to nullify section 355's evidence limitation.
Just because section 281 makes social studies containing hearsay ad20. Id. at 382, 795 P.2d at 1251, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
21. In re Donald R., 195 Cal. App. 3d 703, 240 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1987). In re Donald
R. said that evidence admitted under the broader admissibility standard for dependency cases is not evidence admissible in a "civil case" within the meaning of section
355. Therefore, the only evidence a juvenile court could rely on in finding section 300
jurisdiction is evidence legally admissible in ordinary civil cases. Id at 715, 240 Cal.
Rptr. at 827.
22. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 381, 795 P.2d at 1251, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 794.

23. Id at 381-82, 795 P.2d at 1250-51, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 386-90, 795 P.2d at 1254-57, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 798800 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 129
P.2d 349 (1942) and REP. OF THE GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COM. ON JUVENILE JUS-

TICE, pt. I, 29-30 (1960)).
26. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 390, 795 P.2d at 1257, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 800
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 391, 795 P.2d at 1257-58, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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missible in civil dependency hearings does not mean they should be
construed as making social studies ordinarily admissible as evidence
in civil cases.28 Justice Broussard viewed section 281 as a repetition
of the first sentence of section 355. Because that first sentence is limited by the evidentiary requirements of the second sentence, section
281 should also be limited,29 according to Broussard.
III.

CONCLUSION

The court's construction of an exception to the hearsay rule for social studies reduces the government's burden in a section 300 jurisdiction hearing to merely submitting the social studies and showing that
the studies contain indicia of reliability and trustworthiness.30 So
long as those two preliminary points are satisfied and the parent is
given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the investigating officer and to subpoena and examine persons whose hearsay statements
are contained in the social studies, such studies constitute sufficient
evidence on which the juvenile court can base a finding of jurisdiction.31 This places the full burden on the parent to seek out and subpoena witnesses mentioned in the report in order to elicit favorable
testimony or at least discredit the witnesses' adverse statements. 32
The majority's reasoning for placing the burden on the parent was
that it would be a waste of time to require the government to call all
the witnesses mentioned in a social study.3 3 This places the parent in
a virtually impossible situation. As the supreme court admitted, it
may be more advantageous to the parent not to elicit live testimony. 34 However, by allowing the state and the juvenile court to
rely solely on the social studies without having to call witnesses, the
parent is forced to call adverse witnesses or lose control over his
28. Id. at 391-93, 795 P.2d at 1257-59, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 384,
795 P.2d at 1253, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
31. See Long v. Long, 251 Cal. App. 2d 732, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1967); In re Jose M.,
206 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 254 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1988).
32. In his argument, Russell pointed out, and the court agreed, that this is an
unenviable task given the time constraints inherent in juvenile dependency hearings.
However, the court determined that the hardship to parents did not amount to a due
process violation. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 382-83, 795 P.2d at 1252, 272 Cal. Rptr.
at 795-96.
33. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 385, 795 P.2d at 1253, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97.
34. Id. at 385 n.20, 795 P.2d at 1253 n.20, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 797 n.20.

child based on nothing more than hearsay.3 5
The California Supreme Court says that it is legally permissible to
put a parent in this awkward situation because dependency hearings
are "designed not to prosecute the parent, but to protect the child."36
By creating a hearsay exception for social studies, the court is just
enhancing the juvenile court's ability to "protect the child."' 7 Be-

cause a juvenile court must be allowed to consider social studies to
obtain a coherent picture of the child's situation, the court must also
be able to rely solely on the study in finding jurisdiction if the child's
situation so demands. This interpretation may not be what the actual
language of section 355 says, but it is now what that section means.
JOYCE HETrENBACH

XIII.

PRIVACY
No judicial proceedingsprivilege exists for either
litigants or attorneys to record private conversationsfor
use in anticipatedlitigation: Kimmel v. Goland.

In Kimmel v. Goland,' the California Supreme Court unanimously2 ruled that neither litigants nor their attorneys may avoid
civil liability for illegal recording of private telephone conversations.
Justice Arabian, authoring the court's opinion, expressly rejected petitioner's claim that the privilege embodied in California Civil Code
section 47, subdivision 2,3 which protects the disclosure of information in judicial proceedings, also protects the act of unlawfully recording conversations for evidence in an anticipated lawsuit.
This case arose from a variety of tort charges, including intentional
infliction of emotional distress,4 brought against the management of a
35. See In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 382-85, 795 P.2d at 1251-53, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
795-97.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 384, 795 P.2d at 1253, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (quoting In re Mary S., 186
Cal. App. 3d 414, 418-19, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (1986)).
1. 51 Cal. 3d 202, 793 P.2d 524, 271 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1990). See B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 581 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (discussing

Kimmel).
2. Chief Justice Lucas, and Associate Justices Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, Eagleson
and Kennard concurred with Associate Justice Arabian's opinion.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47, subdivision 2 (West 1990) [hereinafter section 47(2)] provides, "A privileged publication or broadcast is one made...
2. In any... (2) judicial proceeding ....
See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 505(a), 505(f), 506, 667 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990); 6 CAL.

JUR. 3D Assault & Other Wilful Torts § 212 (1988 & Supp 1990).
4. The complaint also alleged interference with prospective economic advantage,
bad faith, and unlawful business practices. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 207, 793 P.2d at 526,
271 Cal. Rptr. at 193. The underlying dispute concerned whether repairs or modifications of certain mobilehomes were required before they could be sold. Park management asserted that such repairs were necessary, while the home owners contended
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mobilehome parks by several residents. 6 Fearing they lacked enough
hard evidence to prove their claims in court, the residents
clandestinely recorded their telephone conversations with management representatives. 7 The residents then transferred these recordings to their attorney, Richard Farnell, who had the tapes
transcribed.8 Despite objections raised by the park management, the
trial court ultimately received these transcriptions into evidence. 9
A cross-complaint by the park management sought damages from
both the residents and Farnell for invasion of privacy.' 0 The superior
court dismissed these charges on the pleadings, persuaded by Farnell's argument that because recording and transcribing served to
gather evidence for litigation, the privilege of section 47(2) afforded
protection." The court of appeal reversed, holding that the civil code
privilege did not create any form of immunity which would bar an
invasion of privacy suit.x2 The court reasoned that the "interest of

justice" would not allow a civil code privilege to shield against a pethat their mobilehomes satisfied current standards and that any restraint of alienation
by the park would violate CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.73. Id, at 206, 793 P.2d at 525-26, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 192-93.
5. The mobilehome park in question was Country Club Mobile Manor in Santa
Ana, California. George Brooks and Vaughn Drage were the park management representatives who spoke with the residents regarding the sale of their mobilehomes. Id
at 205-06, 793 P.2d at 525-26, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93.
6. Daniel Kimmel, his wife Elizabeth Kimmel, and Diane Volirath, plaintiffs in
the original action, were the residents who desired to sell their mobilehomes. Id at
205-06, 793 P.2d at 525, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
7. Id, at 206, 793 P.2d at 526, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 193. Mr. Kimmel and his sister,
Annette Brown, who posed as a potential purchaser of the Kimmel's mobilehome, each
recorded telephone conversations with Drage. Similarly, Vollrath taped conversations
with both Drage and Brooks. These incidents occurred during the first four months of
1983. 1I at 206-07, 793 P.2d at 526-27, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
8. Tapes were delivered to Farnell on five different occasions. Id. at 207, 793 P.2d
at 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
9. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d 208, 793 P.2d at 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 194. A jury verdict
from this trial in the Superior Court of Orange County (Case No. OSC 40 22 18, Judge
Jerrold S. Oliver presiding) awarded the residents $75,000 actual damages, plus
$495,000 punitive damages. Id,
10. Id at 207, 793 P.2d at 526, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 193. Specifically, the park management sued under California's Invasion of Privacy Act § 632(a), codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 630-637.5 (West 1990), which prohibits intentional recording of confidential
telephone communications. Id Damages were claimed under section 637.2, which provides for recovery of at least $3,000 for such a privacy violation. Id. See generally 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 11, 581 (9th ed. & Supp. 1990); 19 CAL.
JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 1981-85 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
11. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 208, 793 P.2d at 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 194. See supra note
3, which quotes the relevant statutory language.
12. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 208, 793 P.2d at 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 194.

nal code violation.13
The supreme court explained that while the civil code did protect
the residents and Farnell from liability for broadcasting the information in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, liability remained for
the actual covert tape recording of the conversations. 14 An act of recording a conversation without the consent or knowledge of the other
party creates an instantaneous right to recovery.' 5 The court emphasized the difference between the illegal recording, a noncommunicative act, and subsequent use of the material obtained by such
recording, a communicative act. The privilege granted by the civil
code protects communicative conduct only.16 Hence, liability exists
for noncommunicative acts regardless of the intended purpose of the
invasion.
The supreme court based its decision upon several important policy
considerations relevant to the practicing attorney. First, this ruling
once again highlighted the California right to privacy embodied in
the state constitution.17 Next, simple considerations of reason and
justice dictate liability. Justice Arabian illustrated the court's rejection of petitioner's privilege argument with an example of the extreme consequences this theory implies.' s For instance, a burglar
could escape punishment for criminal conduct merely by asserting a
need in future litigation for the materials stolen.19
13. The court of appeal remarked that "[Rlecordings made in violation of the Penal Code could hardly be said to be in furtherance of the litigation or to promote the
interest of justice." Id.
14. Id. at 205, 793 P.2d at 525, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
15. Id. at 212, 793 P.2d at 529-30, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
16. See the recently decided cases of Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App.
3d 1284, 1298-99, 275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 682-83 (1990) (citing and discussing Kimmel for the
proposition that section 47(2) applies to communicative conduct only) and Howard v.
Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 850-51 n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 896 n.2 (1990) (same).
Also, the supreme court noted that every successful application of the privilege outlined in California Civil Code section 47(2) involves damages claimed for the publication, not the acquisition, of information. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 211, 793 P.2d at 529, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 191. See, e.g., Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1985); Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal. App. 3d 907, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1987); Steiner v.
Eikerling, 181 Cal. App. 3d 639, 226 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1986); Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella,
135 Cal. App. 3d 121, 185 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1982); Asia Inv. v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d
832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982); Portman v. George McDonald Law Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d
988, 160 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1979) rev'd on other grounds, Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d
205, 786 P.2d 265, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1990); Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368,
148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978); Lerette v. Dean Witter Org., Inc., 60 CAl. App. 3d 573, 131
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976); Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972)
rev'd on other grounds, Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr.
638 (1990); Kachig v. Boothe, 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1971); Agostini v.
Strycula, 231 Cal. App. 2d 804, 42 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1965).
17. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (privacy is an inalienable right). See generally 7 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 454 (9th ed. 1988 &

Supp. 1990); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw § 237 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
18. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 212, 793 P.2d at 530, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
19. Id.
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Most importantly, the court rejected Farnell's contention that as

an attorney he should escape liability. 20 Farnell proposed that attorneys deserve special immunity with regard to illegal or tortious actions like the invasion of privacy in Kimmel. The Court rebuffed this
argument, responding that "[N]othing in the text of section 47(2) suggests the existence of... an 'attorney exception.' "21
Civil liability imposed upon a litigant for invasion of privacy startles no one. Likewise, a great need for evidence at trial furnishes no
justification for its acquisition by illegal means. However, this decision, which holds the attorney liable in addition to the clients, sends
a strong message to practicing lawyers. Increasingly, the court considers issues of professional responsibility when ruling on attorney liability. Given the professional duties regulating an attorney's
behavior and the power an attorney possesses in the discovery process, the court concluded that to allow Farnell to escape responsibility for his role22 would unacceptably place the bounds of zealous
23
advocacy beyond the limits of tortious liability.
The supreme court makes clear that taping confidential telephone
conversations as a means of discovery for a lawsuit comprises tortious, non-communicative conduct. Thus, since the litigation privilege of section 47(2) applies only to communicative acts within a
judicial or quasi-judicial setting, it provides no immunity to the
tortfeasor.
Furthermore, the court emphasizes that as figures of public trust,
20. Id. at 213, 793 P.2d at 530-31, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
21. Id. at 212, 793 P.2d at 530, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
22. The park management charged Farnell with civil conspiracy as well as aiding
and abetting a violation of the penal code's privacy act. See supra note 10. Id. at 20708, 793 P.2d at 527, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 914. The supreme court did make clear, however,
that Farnell's liability rested on his aiding and abetting, and encouraging his clients,
rather than his communicative acts of counseling or advising them. Id. at 208 n.6, 793
P.2d at 527 n.6, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.6.
23. In response to Farnell's argument that the lower court's ruling would impair
the zealousness with which an attorney could promote the cause of a client, the
supreme court stated that the hinderance in this case "is, in fact, healthy [because] it
inhibits an attorney from assisting clients in the commission of crimes." Kimmel, 51
Cal. 3d at 213, 793 P.2d at 531, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Cf.Silverberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.
3d 205, 213, 786 P.2d 365, 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643, modified, 50 Cal. 3d 343A (1990)
(privilege of civil code section 47(2) designed to encourage attorneys to zealously protect client's interests); Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 179 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1981)
(purpose to promote justice, even if this allows the immunity to be abused or misused).
Regarding the purpose behind section 47(2); see also Lerette v. Dean Witter Org. Inc.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976) (purpose to protect attorneys while representing clients).

lawyers should, behave with the highest degree of professionalism. 24
In Kimmel, an attorney attempted to protect himself not only with
section 47(2), but also with defensive claims of attorney-client privi27
26
and allegedly similar case law.
lege,25 work product protection,
None of these doctrines sheltered him.
Therefore, in what appears as an effort to further the respectability of the profession, the court refuses to grant any special form of
immunity to attorneys seeking to avert responsibility for client misconduct they prompted or aided.
BENJAMIN GROSS SHATZ

XIV.

PROPERTY LAW
A. A joint tenant in personal property may unilaterally
sever his or her interest in the joint tenancy and nullify
the other joint tenant's survivorship interest in the
absence of a prior agreement to the contrary: Estate of
Propst.

In Estate of Propst,' the California Supreme Court overruled seventy-five years of precedent when it held that a joint tenant may unilaterally sever his or her interest in joint tenancy property, thereby
24. Justice Arabian's conclusion emphasizes the ethical responsibilities incumbent
upon practicing attorneys. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 214, 793 P.2d at 531, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
198.
25. The court dismissed Farnell's claim of attorney-client privilege using CAL.
EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1990) which states "There is no Privilege ...if the services of
the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud." Id. at 213, 793 P.2d at 530, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197. See, 2 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, § 1153 (3d ed. 1986).
Regarding the attorney-client privilege, see generally 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence
§§ 433-442 (1976 & Supp. 1990); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery & Depositions§ 24 (1976 &
Supp. 1990).
26. The court found no basis for a work product defense. Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at
213, 793 P.2d at 530, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197. Regarding work product, see generally 27
CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery & Depositions § 33 (1976 & Supp. 1990).
27. Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1979) (joint tortfeasor status required to hold attorney liable). The supreme
court ruled that Farnell's alleged active participation invalidated this line of defense as
his "liability proceeds directly from the same course of conduct as his clients." Kimmel, 51 Cal. 3d at 213, 793 P.2d at 530-31, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
1. 50 Cal. 3d 448, 788 P.2d 628, 268 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1990). In Propst,a husband and
his wife held several bank accounts in joint tenancy. During his lifetime, the husband
closed some of the accounts and deposited the funds in new accounts bearing only his
name. His intent was to sever the joint tenancy status of the funds and cut off his
wife's right of survivorship. He then named his daughter as the residual beneficiary of
his estate. Following the husband's death, his wife challenged the transfer of funds to
the new accounts and claimed she was entitled to the withdrawn amounts since the
transfers had occurred without her consent or knowledge. The court of appeal "relucantly" affirmed the trial court's decision in the wife's favor. Id. at 453-54, 788 P.2d at
629-30, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
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2
nullifying the right of survivorship held by the other joint tenant.
3
Although the common law was to the contrary, a line of cases in
California had established that personal property held in joint tenancy retained the characteristics of a joint tenancy even when the
property was held in the name of only one joint tenant.4 Thus, a
joint tenant was "powerless to defeat the right of survivorship ...
unilaterally."5 This line of cases was based upon an incorrect interpretation of the leading case, Estate of Harris (Harris I).6
"[S]ubsequent decisions interpreted HarrisI as establishing a rulecontrary to the common law-that the proceeds of a joint tenancy in
personal property retain their joint tenancy character unless there is
7
an agreement to the contrary."
A joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy status of
real or personal property under the common law.8 This had the effect of converting a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. 9 California applied this common law principle to joint tenancies consisting
of real property, but not personal property.10 Although this applica-

2. Id. at 461-62, 788 P.2d at 636, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 122. Justice Kennard wrote the
majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and
Kaufman. Justices Mosk and Broussard wrote separate concurring and dissenting
opinions.
3. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
4. Propst,50 Cal. 3d at 451-52, 788 P.2d at 629, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (citing Fish v.
Security-First Nat'l Bank, 31 Cal. 2d 378, 387, 189 P.2d 10, 15 (1948)).
5. Id. at 452, 788 P.2d at 629, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
6. 169 Cal. 725, 147 P. 967 (1915). In Harris I, a husband and wife orally agreed
that any property they acquired would be held in joint tenancy. They then opened a
joint bank account and, with funds from the account, purchased stock. Following the
husband's death, a relative challenged the joint tenancy status of the stock. The
supreme court ruled that the stock retained its joint tenancy character since there was
no agreement to the contrary. Id. at 728, 147 P. at 968. It was this ruling which courts
misapplied for seventy-five years in California.
The court in Propst overruled the erroneous interpretation and distinguished the
facts before it from those in Harris L Nothing in the facts cited from Harris I indicated an intent by the decedent to sever the joint tenancy; the facts in Propst,however,
indicated otherwise. Propst,50 Cal. 3d at 457, 788 P.2d at 632, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
7. Propst, 50 Cal. 3d at 457, 788 P.2d at 632, 268 Cal. Rptr, at 118 (citing In re
Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 17 P.2d 117 (1932); Estate of McCoin, 9 Cal. App. 2d 480, 50 P.2d
114 (1935); Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306, 14 P.2d 580 (1932)).
8. Id. at 451, 788 P.2d at 629, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
9. Id. at 455, 788 P.2d at 631, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 117. The significant differences between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common are: (1) only a joint tenancy requires
the existence of the four unities, see infra note 15; and (2) only a joint tenant has the
right of survivorship. 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §§ 5, 18 (1983 &
Supp. 1990). When one joint tenant dies, his or her part of the estate is automatically
divided among the surviving joint tenants. Id. § 5.
10. Id. at 456, 788 P.2d at 632, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 118.

tion was contrary to common law notions, the court continued to uphold the application since it had become "'the recognized and
established law of [California], and ha[d] been followed in numerous
recent decisions.' "11 Thus, before Propst, California law did not follow the common law. Instead, a line of cases in California held that,
"in the absence of a contrary agreement, the proceeds of personal
property held in joint tenancy retain their joint tenancy character
even when held in the name of only one joint tenant."12
The majority in Estate of Propst overruled previous holdings to the
contrary' 3 and returned to follow the common law principle that a
joint tenancy in personal property can be unilaterally severed. The
majority reasoned that there is no logical grounds for treating personal property differently from real property.14 Furthermore, the
majority recognized that the right of survivorship established under a
joint tenancy is extinguished by the destruction of one of the essential unities.' 5 Thus, since unilateral action by a joint tenant intended
to sever the joint tenancy would result in the destruction of one of
the unities, there should be no corresponding right of survivorship.
Finally, the majority stated that there had been no widespread reliance on a right of survivorship to personal property held in joint tenancy, and the layman's expectation would be that a joint tenancy in
personal property could be severed unilaterally.' 6 They felt that a
rule contrary to general expectations would have adverse consequences.' 7 For example, the clearly expressed desires of a testator
might not be followed.18
Joint tenants in personal property may now unilaterally sever
11. Id. at 457, 788 P.2d at 633, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (citing Estate of Harris, 9 Cal.
2d 649, 655, 72 P.2d 873, 876 (1937) (HarrisIf)).
12. Id. at 452, 788 P.2d at 629, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (emphasis in original). See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, PersonalProperty § 22A (9th ed.
Supp. 1990).
13. Propst, 50 Cal. 3d at 462, 788 P.2d at 636, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (overruling Fish
v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 31 Cal. 2d 378, 189 P.2d 10 (1948); Estate of Harris, 9 Cal.
2d 649, 72 P.2d 873 (1937); and In re Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 17 P.2d 117 (1932)).
14. Id. at 458, 788 P.2d at 633, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
15. Id. at 455-56, 788 P.2d at 631-32, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18. To possess the requisite "essential unities," "the tenants must have: (1) the same and equivalent interests
(2) created under a single or identical instrument or conveyance (3) to commence at
the same time and (4) entitling them to have and to hold undivided possession simultaneously." 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 4 (1985). Simply stated,
there must be unity of "interest, title, time and possession." Id.
16. Propst,50 Cal. 3d at 458, 788 P.2d at 633-34, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 459, 788 P.2d at 634, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 120. " 'It is highly possible.., that
an entire estate may go through [a joint tenancy] account, and if a testator in his will
leaves to his children corporate stocks or bonds or other personal property acquired
with funds from the account, his plainly expressed desire would go for naught.'" Id.
(quoting Note, Joint Tenancy: Character of Personal Property Acquired with Withdrawalsfrom Joint Bank Accounts, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 224, 226 (1940)).
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their joint tenancy arrangements. This new rule will be more in accord with laymen's expectations since the average person would not
expect to be forever bound by an agreement to enter a joint tenancy.19 Furthermore, the old rule often resulted in the unfortunate
situation where a joint tenant clearly intended to sever his or her interest and took steps to do so, believing the interest would be severed, leaving the estate to find that legally, the joint tenancy had
remained intact. The new rule will, therefore, permit property owners to more easily execute their wishes.
The court's bold step in overruling a line of cases which originated
seventy-five years ago was warranted. There is no rational reason for
treating joint tenancies in personal property differently from those in
real property. The court had most likely strayed from its original, rational position when it misinterpreted Harris .20 Hence, contemporary courts had been forced to follow precedent while disagreeing
with the principles underlying the old rule. 21 The new rule is in accord with both the common law2 2 and the California legislature's
wishes.23 The rule of Propst,held retroactive in effect, 24 thus allows
a joint tenant in personal property, like a joint tenant in real property, to unilaterally sever the joint tenancy in the absence of a prior
agreement to the contrary.
CALIFORNIA SURVEY STAFF
19. Id. at 458, 788 P.2d at 633-34, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20. Therefore, the majority
ruled that its holding was to be applied retroactively, except in two situations: where a
prior judgment had enforced a right of survivorship based on the erroneous line of
cases, or where a party could show his or her reliance on the old rule. Id. at 462-63, 788
P.2d at 636-37, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
Justices Mosk and Broussard, while agreeing that the old rule was erroneous, disagreed with the majority's retroactive application of the new rule. Id. at 464, 467, 788
P.2d at 638-39, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25 (Mosk and Broussard, J.J., concurring and
dissenting).
20. See id. at 456, 788 P.2d at 732, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
21. See id. at 452, 788 P.2d at 729, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
22. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
23. Propst,50 Cal. 3d at 461, 788 P.2d at 635, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
24. See supra note 19.

B. A federal grazing permit is an interest in real property

sufficient to qualify its holderfor tort immunity under
Civil Code section 846: Hubbard v. Brown.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hubbard v. Brown,] the California Supreme Court considered
whether a federal grazing permit was an interest in real property sufficient to qualify its holder for tort immunity under California Civil
Code section 846.2 Section 846 provides that "[A]n owner of any estate or any other real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory,
owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by
others for any recreational purpose .... "3 In Hubbard, the plaintiff
was injured while riding a motorcycle in a national forest when he
collided with a barbed wire gate which had been erected across a
road by the defendant.4 The defendant held a federal grazing permit
and had erected the fence in order to control the movement of his
cattle.5 The defendant claimed immunity under section 846.6 The
plaintiff maintained, however, that the defendant did not have immunity under section 846 because the defendant possessed no "right, ti7
tle, or interest" in the property.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the holder of the
grazing permit based on section 846 immunity.8 The court of appeal
reversed, holding that the defendant was not immunized because the
grazing permit was not a sufficient property interest. 9 The California
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a federal grazing permit falls
within the "exceptionally broad definition of the types of 'interest' in
property which will trigger immunity."'1
1. 50 Cal. 3d 189, 785 P.2d 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1990). Justice Panelli wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard, Eagleson,
Kennard and Kaufman concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion.
2. Id. at 191, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 491. Note, however, that Civil
Code § 846 immunity applies only to private landowners, not to public entities. 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 163 (9th ed. 1988) (citing Nelsen v.
Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1980)).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West 1988). The 1980 amendment used broad language
"owner of any estate or any other interest in real property." This had been applied
liberally. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 913 (9th ed. 1988). For a
general discussion of liability for torts occurring on the land of another party, see 50
CAL. JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 2 (1979).
4. Hubbard v. Brown, 50 Cal. 3d at 191, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 192, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491.
7. Id. at 191-92, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491.
8. Id. at 191, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 192, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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II.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

In order to determine the breadth with which section 846 immunity should be applied, the supreme court examined the legislative
history of the section. Initially, section 846 only immunized "'[a]n
owner of any estate real property.'

",1

In 1980, however, section 846

was amended by the insertion of "or any other interest... whether
possessory or nonpossessory." 1 2 This amendment was enacted to

overcome the judicially created limitations placed on section 846 immunity. 13 The Legislature intended to broaden the application of section 846 by immunizing the owner of any interest in real property.

14

The supreme court found unconvincing the argument that a federal grazing permit is not an interest in property since the federal
government, the entity that issued the permit, does not recognize the
permit as an interest in eminent domain proceedings. "[T]he limitation of an interest in federal lands for purposes of avoiding compensation in eminent domain need not be extended to preclude finding a
property interest for purposes of a state immunity statute."15 The
supreme court based its broad reading of "interest" on the strong pol-

icy expressed by the Californian Legislature that land should be open
to recreational users.1 6 "Section 846 accomplishes this purpose by immunizing persons with interests in property from tort liability to recreational users, thus making recreational users responsible for their

own safety and eliminating the financial risk that had kept land
closed." 17 By including a federal grazing permit in the section 846
definition of "interest," the supreme court ensured that land covered
by federal grazing permits would be kept open to recreational users,
furthering the California Legislature's objective.
11. Id. at 194, 785 P.2d 1185, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (quoting 1963 Cal. Stat. 1959).
For a general discussion of who is an owner for purposes of tort liability, see Comment, Should Landowners Have Tort Immunity From Recreational Users?, W. ST. L.
REV. 201, 213-15 (1988).
12. Hubbard,50 Cal. 3d at 194, 785 P.2d at 1185, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 846 (West 1988)).
13. Id. at 195, 785 P.2d at 1186, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
14. Id. at 194-95, 785 P.2d at 1185-86, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
15. Id. at 195-96, 785 P.2d at 1186, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
16. Id. at 192, 785 P.2d at 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
17. Id. Further support for the position that landowners should be immunized
from tort liability in order to make their land accessible for recreational use is found
in a California court of appeals decision, which held that the immunity still applies
even if the public has an easement to use the land. See Collins v. Tippett, 156 Cal.
App. 3d 1017, 203 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1984). In this case, the land is still private property
and the owner is still protected by Civil Code § 846.

Justice Mosk dissented, agreeing with the analysis made by the
majority of the court of appeal. 18 Justice Mosk quoted extensively
from Justice Sparks' appellate court opinion which characterized the
federal grazing permit as a license.19 Justice Mosk stated that such a
20
revocable license created no interest in National Forest property.
III.

CONCLUSION

A "holder of a permit to graze livestock on federal lands in California is an owner of an interest in real property sufficient to come
within the immunity afforded by section 846."21 This holding broadens the definition of interest in property and bolsters the California
Legislature's policy of keeping land open for recreational use. This
holding may also indicate that other types of interests in real property, not previously believed to be sufficient for tort immunity under
section 846, may fit within the broad definition of "interest" as used
in that section.
CALIFORNIA SURVEY STAFF

xv.

TAX LAW
The CaliforniaConstitution provides that insurance
companies are subject to a gross premiums tax
precluding the state or its subdivisionsfrom exacting
any other taxes except local taxes on real estate: Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. City of Los Angeles.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Los Angeles,' the California Supreme Court considered whether, under the provisions of section 28 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, insurance
2
company income from investments is subject to local taxation. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (Mutual Life) brought
18. Hubbard, 50 Cal. 3d at 198, 785 P.2d at 1188, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
19. Id. at 201, 785 P.2d at 1190, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 197, 785 P.2d at 1187, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
1. 50 Cal. 3d 402, 787 P.2d 996, 267 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1990). Justice Panelli delivered
the majority's opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Eagleson and Kaufman concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice
Broussard and Kennard concurred.
2. Sections 28(a) and (b) of Article XIII of the California Constitution impose an
annual tax on all insurers "doing business" in the state based on the amount of gross
premiums they receive. This is referred to as the "gross preimums tax." Section 28(f)
states, "[t]he tax imposed on insurers by this section is in lieu of all other taxes and
licenses, state, county, and municipal, upon such insurers and their property ......
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28 (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
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suit for the refund of rental revenue taxes, parking lot fee taxes and
utility users taxes, which had been paid to the City of Los Angeles
(the City) pursuant to provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal
Code.3

The trial court ruled in favor of Mutual Life and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that the insurance company was not liable for
local taxes.4 The California Supreme Court upheld the court of appeal decision and, in doing so, reinforced the rule that insurance companies, which are subject to a gross premiums tax, are entitled to a
5
broad exemption from all other state and local taxes.

I.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The court stated that its sole task in deciding the issue in Mutual
Life was to determine the meaning of section 28 which provides that
the gross premiums tax is imposed "in lieu of all other taxes and
licenses, state, county, and municipal, upon . . . insurers and their
property." 6 The City argued that the statute was ambiguous and that
the court should look to the legislative history and intent in determining whether the taxes it had imposed on Mutual should be exempted. 7 The court, however, stated that the language was so clear
that it was unnecessary and improper to look beyond the plain mean3. Mutual Life, 50 Cal. 3d at 406, 787 P.2d at 998, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 591. Mutual
Life owned two office buildings in Los Angeles which produced rental revenues and
income from parking facilities located in the buildings. Mutual Life paid revenue
taxes on both of these and a utility users tax for electricity used in the rented offices.
Id,
4. In reaching its decision, the court of appeal refused to follow the decision in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 129 Cal. App.
3d 876, 181 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1982). In that case, an insurance company owned a hotel in
downtown San Francisco and received eighty percent of the profits from its operation.
The court of appeal held that the "in lieu" provision of section 28 did not apply to
taxes imposed on insurance company properties which were not used in the insurance
business. Id at 886, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 375. Mutual Life explicitly disapproves of Massachusetts Mutual Life. Mutual Life, 50 Cal. 3d at 416, 787 P.2d at 1005, 267 Cal. Rptr. at
598.
5. Id.
6. Id, at 407, 787 P.2d at 998, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 591. See supra note 2.
7. The City contended that the various uses of the term "business" in the statute
created a question of whether or not insurers were meant to be exempted from all
taxes or only those directly related to the conduct of their insurance business. Id. at
408, 787 P.2d 999, 267 Cal. Rptr. 592. In Massachusetts Mutual, the court of appeal apparently agreed with the City's argument and sought to interpret the statute in light of
its intent rather than by the plain meaning of its language. MassachusettsMutual, 129
Cal. App. 3d at 881, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (citing People v. Davis, 85 Cal. App. 3d 916,
149 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1978) (holding that intent should prevail over plain meaning in statutory construction)).

ing of the language to determine the issue.8 Since the authors of section 28 had declared that the gross tax was in lieu of all other taxes
and licenses, the "in lieu" provision simply could not be interpreted
to apply the exemption for some taxes but not for others.9
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk did not address this argument, but rather, contended that the negative consequences of such a
broad exemption are so great that they could not have been intended
by the authorslo He argued that Mutual Life gives insurance companies an enormously lucrative loophole whereby California insurers
operate a limitless variety of businesses wholly unrelated to the business of insurance, yet remain free of all taxes on their profits."'
The majority, however, wrote that these potential abuses are limited by the fact that the insurance companies are highly regulated
and strictly limited in the types of investments they are permitted to
make.12 Further, insurance companies must be allowed to re-invest
premiums in a variety of ventures in order to maintain an adequate
capital stock with which to pay off claims.13 In exchange for the
broad exemption of section 28, the gross premiums tax imposed on
insurance companies is fixed at a higher rate than it otherwise would
be.14 Further, if it is perceived that insurance companies are not
bearing their fair share of the tax burden, the legislature can easily
15
increase the rate of taxation on gross premiums.
8. The Mutual Life court stated:
[i]t is a prime rule of construction that the legislative intent underlying a statute must be ascertained from its language; if the language is clear, there can
be no room for interpretation, and effect must be given to its plain meaning
....The courts may not speculate that the legislature meant something other
than what it said. Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein.
Mutual Life, 50 Cal. 3d at 412, 787 P.2d at 1002, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (quoting Hennigan
v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 125 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1975)).
9. Id at 408, 787 P.2d at 999, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 592. The court stated "[i]f argument is required upon the meaning of plain words so clearly expressing an obvious
idea, it can only be because of an utter breakdown in our written language in its ability
to convey thought." Id (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 420, 143
P. 700 (1914) (in which the court interpreted a similar "in lieu" provision of a gross
earnings tax on utilities companies)). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 168
Cal. 270, 142 P. 839 (1914) (holding that an "in lieu" provision superseded a prior state
licensing fee for insurance companies).
10. Mutual Life, 50 Cal. 3d at 418, 787 P.2d at 1006, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 599, (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
11. Id
12. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1142-1150 (Deering 1876 and Supp. 1990) (restricting investment activities of California insurance companies).
13. Mutual Life, 50 Cal. 3d at 413, 787 P.2d at 1002-03, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96 (citing United States v. Atlas Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233, 247 (1965) (insurance company obligated to maintain reserves, which, if they are to be adequate to pay claims, must grow
at a sufficient rate each year).
14. Id. at 410, 787 P.2d at 1000, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
15. Id. at 413, 787 P.2d at 1003, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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III.

CONCLUSION

The decision to uphold the broadest possible exemption from taxation under section 28 is a victory for insurance companies which, assuming claims of poor profitability are true, may need to invest
premiums in businesses which are highly profitable, even though
they are not directly related to the business of insurance. However,
the celebration should be tempered by the court's statement that section 28's provisions apply only to companies whose primary purpose
is insurance; an implicit warning that. the exemption will be lost by
companies which attempt to become tax-free business conglomerates
with only a secondary focus on insurance.
MATTHEW J. STEPOVICH

XVI.

TORT LAW
A. Negligent misrepresentationsinvolving risk of physical
harm are now a separate and distinct cause of action in
tort to the exclusion of an action premised on ordinary
negligence. Accordingly, plaintiffs must now establish
that they reasonably relied on the defendant's
misstatements in order to recover damages: Garcia v.
Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Garcia v. Superior Court,1 a divided California Supreme Court
declared that negligent misrepresentations involving risk of physical
injury are a separate and distinct tort and thus actionable. 2 In so doing, the court decisively defined the scope of recovery for injuries
based on negligent misrepresentations. Traditionally, recovery was
allowed only for injuries which were solely commercial or financial
in nature. 3 Now damages may be sought for injuries resulting in
physical harm.4 Moreover, future actions premised on negligent mis1. Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 789 P.2d 960, 268 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1990).
Justice Panelli wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Eagleson and Kennard concurred. Chief Justice Lucas also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Eagleson concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Broussard and White (Presiding Justice, Court of
Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, sitting under assignment by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council) concurred.
2. Id. at 734, 789 P.2d at 963, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
3. See infra notes 12-18, 53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.

representation require a plaintiff's reliance on the mistatement; 5 a
6
claim based on "ordinary negligence" will no longer be actionable.
In Garcia, a woman was kidnapped and murdered by a parolee
with whom she cohabitated. Her children filed a wrongful death action against the state and the killer's parole officer. The plaintiffs alleged that the parole officer negligently misrepresented that the
decedent had nothing to worry about and that the killer was not going to come looking for her.
Writing for the majority, Justice Panelli recognized that negligent
misrepresentations involving risk of physical harm are an exception
to the general rule. Usually, liability may be imposed only on those
misrepresenting information for business purposes in the course and
scope of business. 7 Nevertheless, the majority strongly asserted that
plaintiffs may recover for negligent misrepresentations which involve
risk of physical harm because "the duty to use reasonable care in giving information applies more broadly when physical safety is
8
involved."
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A look at the development of the law of negligent misrepresentation in California reveals inconsistency in that there have been no
less than three views regarding when and how the tort applies. The
traditional view is that it only applies in instances where a defendant
supplies information in the course of business which results in losses
that are solely pecuniary in nature.9 A second view establishes a cognizable, separate and distinct tort action for negligent misrepresentations which result in physical harm.1O A third view recognizes that
5. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 20, 52-58 and accompanying text.
7. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 735, 789 P.2d at 964, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
8. Id (emphasis added).
9. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Connelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970). See 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 721 (9th ed. 1988); see also Hartwell Corp. v. Bumb, 345
F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1965). The tort of negligent misrepresentation "developed to protect
a purchaserinjured by a misrepresentation .... " in a commercial transaction. Id. at
455-56 (emphasis added). Note, Torts - Fraud and Deceit - Negligence - Negligent
MisrepresentationResulting in Bodily Harm, 22 S. CAL. L. REV. 77, 78 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1965). One reason supporting the "course of
business" limitation is that a plaintiff, in more casual settings, cannot expect a defendant "to exercise the same degree of care [in his communications] as he would when
acting in a business or professional capacity." 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAw, Torts § 721 (9th ed. 1988). Also, when the harm is only pecuniary, the magnitude
of loss is unforeseeable due to the uncertainty of who will receive the information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965). However, courts that bar negligent misrepresentation for personal injuries as a cause of action have permitted an action
under "ordinary negligence." See infra note 11.
10. Finney v. Curtis, 78 Cal. 498, 21 P. 440 (1889); Yanase v. Automobile Club, 212
Cal. App. 2d 468, 260 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1989); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d
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negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm are actionable, but that they are premised on an action in ordinarynegligence.11
A.

Case Law Dealing With Negligent MisrepresentationsResulting
In Physical Harm

1.

The Traditional View

The California Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Statel2 asserted that
"'misrepresentation,'

as a tort distinct from the general milieu of

negligent and intentional wrongs, applies to interferences with financial or commercial interest[s]."1l

In Connelly v. State,14 the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District
followed the traditional view put forth in Johnson. The Connelly
court acknowledged "the Supreme Court's definitive analysis and exposition of the term 'misrepresentation' . . ."15 and reasserted that
the tort of misrepresentation applies only "to interferences with financialor commercial interest[s]."16
In addition, the Court of Appeal for the Second District followed
Johnson's traditional view in Bastian v. San Luis Obispo.l7 In Bastian, the court declared that "[m]isrepresentation or concealment is
commonly a distinct cause of action only where the relationship between the parties

is financial or commercial."1S

680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (actionable negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm) (hereinafter
"section 311"). See infra note 46. There has been considerable confusion regarding the
application of this tort. It is usually used under the guise of "ordinary negligence." W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 33, at 205 (5th ed. 1984). See also Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 745, 789 P.2d at 971, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 790 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
11. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Fidelity
and Casualty Co. v. Paraffine Paint Co. 188 Cal. 184, 204 P. 1076 (1922). Courts that
assert tort based on ordinary negligence often require reliance, an element of misrepresentation, not ordinary negligence. See infra notes 52 & 64.
12. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
13. Id. at 800, 447 P.2d at 365, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (emphasis added). For a contrary interpretation of the holding in Johnson, see Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 738 n.8, 789
P.2d at 965-66 n.A 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85 n.8.
14. Connelly v\. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970).
15. Id. at 752, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
16. Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 69 Cal. 2d at 800, 447 P.2d at 365, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 253) (emphasis in original).
17. Bastian v. San Luis Obispo, 199 Cal. App. 3d 520, 245 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1988).
18. Id. at 531, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (emphasis added). The Second District asserted
that liability for negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm is limited to
commercial or financial interests. Michael v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions,
201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 868, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508 (1988). See also Note, Torts - Fraud

2.

Negligent Misrepresentations Resulting In Physical Harm As
A Separate And Distinct Tort Action

In 1889, the California Supreme Court, in Finney v. Curtis,19 recognized that an action may lie for negligent misrepresentation resulting
in physical harm.20 While the court in Finney did not specifically label the tort action an action for negligent misrepresentation, it nevertheless asserted that the defendant would be liable, "if in ignorance
of the fact whether the horse ...was gentle or not, he carelessly rep-

resented to plaintiff that he Was gentle, and the plaintiff relied on
2
such representation, and acting on it, received an injury." 1
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District also recognized a distinct cause of action for negligent misrepresentation resulting in
physical harm. In Hanberryv. Hearst Corporation,2 2 the court, relying on section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("section
311:), declared that the "respondent... is still subject to full liability
for [personal] injury resulting from tortious negligent misrepresentation."2 3 Accordingly, the court asserted "we... [hold] appellant has
24
stated a cause of actionfor negligent misrepresentation."
3.

Negligent Misrepresentations Resulting In Physical Harm
Premised On Ordinary Negligence Principles

In Johnson v. State,25 the plaintiff received personal injuries due to
the defendant's negligent misrepresentations.2 6 Though the court asserted that "'misrepresentation,' as a tort... applies to interferences
and Deceit - Negligence - Negligent MisrepresentationResulting in Bodily Harm, 22
S. CAL. L. REV. 77, 78 (1948); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(1965) (liability imposed for negligent misrepresentation where losses were pecuniary);
5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 721 (9th ed. 1988) ("liability is imposed only on those who supply information for business purposes in the course of a
business or profession").
19. Finney v. Curtis, 78 Cal. 498, 21 P. 120 (1889).
20. Id. at 503, 21 P. at 121 (Thornton, J., concurring).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
23. Id. at 686, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
24. Id. at 687, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (emphasis added). The Fourth District recognized a separate and distinct cause of action for negligent misrepresentation resulting
in physical harm in Yanase v. Automobile Club, 212 Cal. App. 3d 468, 260 Cal. Rptr.
513 (1989). In Yanase, the decedent's estate sued the automobile club for negligent
misrepresentation resulting in physical harm. The court impliedly acknowledged that
negligent misrepresentation is a separate and distinct cause of action by asserting that
"the third amended complaint does not state facts' sufficient to constitute a cause of
action in negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 473, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 516. The court
cited section 1710 of the California Civil Code which recognizes negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm. Id. at 472-73, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 516. See infra note 29
and accompanying text.
25. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
26. Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
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with financial or commercial interest[s], '27 it nevertheless reversed a
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, asserting that the
plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to trial on the merits of her
28
negligence claim.
B.

Statutory ProvisionsRegarding Negligent Misrepresentation
Resulting In Physical Harm

By statutory definition, California law permits a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm. 29 Section
1709 of the California Civil Code ("section 1709) puts forth the prima
facie case for negligent misrepresentation as:
[D]efendant must have made a representation as to a past or existing material
fact; representation must have been untrue; regardless of his actual belief defendant must have made representation without any reasonable ground for
believing it to be true; representation must have been made with intent to induce plaintiff to rely on it; plaintiff must have been unaware of falsity of representation and must have acted in reliance upon its truth and must have
been justified in relying upon
it; and, as a result of that reliance, plaintiff
30
must have sustained damage.

Section 1709 "does not limit recovery to pecuniary loss . . . action
may be maintained to recoverfor physical harm proximately caused
by a defendant's deceit."31
III.
In

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1974, Johnson was imprisoned for the murder of his wife.

In

August 1985, he was released on parole and Ybarra, the defendant in
27. Id. at 800, 447 P.2d at 365, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
28. Id. at 786, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
See also Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Paraffine Paint Co., 188 Cal. 184, 204 P. 1076 (1922).
In Fidelity, the defendants allegedly informed the deceased that roofing coating he
purchased was nonflammable, however it exploded when the deceased and another
party were working with the coating and struck a match. One of the plaintiffs' causes
of action was for negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm. The court
declared that "if any of ... [the respondents were] negligent in the manner alleged in
the complaint, then respondents would be liable. The negligence alleged in the complaint was in the making of representationsas to the explosibility [sic] of the roof coating." Id. at 195, 204 P. at 1081 (emphasis added).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1985) [hereinafter "section 1709"]. This section is
another basis for many misrepresentation actions. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710
(West 1985) and supra note 24.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709(11) (West 1985) (emphasis added). See also 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 722(a) (9th ed. 1988). Witkin also refers to section 1572(2) of the California Civil Code as providing a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. However, because section 1572 refers to contract actions
it is excluded from discussion here.
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709(50) (West 1988).

this action, became his parole agent. While on parole, Johnson began
cohabitating with Morales, the plaintiffs' mother. In March 1986,
Johnson moved out of Morales' home due to domestic problems.
During this time, Johnson "began a campaign of violence ... which
included attempted stabbings, repeated death threats at knife point,
32
forced sexual relationships at knife point and false imprisonment."
Sometime later, Johnson, Morales and Ybarra met to discuss these
threats. Johnson denied making the threats and Ybarra concluded
no threats had been made. One week after the meeting, however,
Johnson told Ybarra that he was looking for Morales and that if he
33
found her he would kill her.
Ybarra had Johnson placed in seventy-two hour custody for psychiatric observation. Upon his release, Ybarra instructed Johnson to
continue treatment with the parole department's staff psychologist.
Later, during a telephone conversation, Morales told Ybarra that she
was afraid Johnson would harm her. Ybarra responded by saying "I
don't think you have anything to worry about. He's not going to
come looking for you."3 4 In addition, Ybarra informed Morales that
Johnson was still in love with her. Johnson subsequently kidnapped,
shot and killed Morales.
The children of the decedent filed a wrongful death action against
the state and the parole officer alleging that Ybarra knew about
Johnson's threats but negligently informed the decedent that John35
son would not come looking for her.
The superior court sustained demurrers by the state and the parole
officer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend because the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. 36 The court of
appeal denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate. 37 The
supreme court agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action. The court asserted, however, that the plaintiffs were entitled
to leave to amend because the lower courts did not address the the38
ory on which the plaintiffs now rely.
IV.

A.

THE CouRT's DECISION

The Majority Opinion

The majority addressed whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation applied to injuries resulting from physical harm. In so doing,
32. Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 732, 789 P.2d 960, 962, 268 Cal. Rptr.
779, 781 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 733, 789 P.2d at 962, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
35. Id. at 731, 789 P.2d at 961, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
36. Id. at 731-32, 789 P.2d at 961, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
37. Id. at 732, 789 P.2d at 961, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
38. Id. at 738, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
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the court seized upon the broader opportunity to resolve judicial confusion regarding the tort of negligent misrepresentation resulting in
physical harm, and decisively established it as a separate and distinct
39
cause of action in tort.
First, the majority acknowledged that imposing liability for negligent misrepresentations involving risk of physical harm was an exception to the general rule which traditionally recognized liability
only for negligent misrepresentations involving injuries solely commercial or financial in nature. 40 The majority also asserted that "the
duty to use reasonable care in giving information applied more
broadly when physical safety is involved." 41 Accordingly, the majority flatly rejected the contention that this tort only applied to "economic injuries" and summarily declared that "it is unnecessary to
look beyond the ordinary rules that determine when misrepresenta42
tions are actionable."
Relying on section 311, 43 the majority outlined the prima facie case

or ordinary rules of when negligent misrepresentations resulting in
physical harm are actionable. First, the defendant must owe a duty
to the plaintiff. 44 Second, the defendant must have failed to exercise
reasonable care in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or in
communicating the information. 45 Third, there must have been actual and reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. 46 Finally, the
Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 734, 789 P.2d at 963, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
Id. at 735, 789 P.2d at 964, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
Id. at 735, 789 P.2d at 964, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (emphasis added).
Id. at 734, 789 P.2d at 963, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (negligent misrepresentation involving
risk of physical harm). Section 311 states in its entirety:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (emphasis added).
43. See supra note 42.
44. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 735, 789 P.2d 963, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 782. The majority observed that while parole officers initially have no duty to volunteer information, once
they take it upon themselves to do so, they must do so without negligence. Accordingly, the duty is established once the officer voluntarily speaks. Id. at 736, 789 P.2d at
964, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
45. Id. at 736, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
46. Id. at 737, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784. This is the element of the
39.
40.
41.
42.

plaintiff must show that reliance on the misrepresentation proximately caused the injury. 47 After applying the above elements to the
case at bar, the majority determined that the plaintiffs failed to satis8
factorily plead the third element.4

Accordingly, the majority held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
amend their complaint in order to "allege facts sufficient" to show
that the deceased actually and reasonably relied on the defendant's
misrepresentations, 4 9 and thus, to allege a cause of action premised
on negligent misrepresentation. 5°
B.

The ConcurringQpinion

In his concurrence, Chief Justice Lucas enthusiastically adopted
the majority's position that section 311 imposes liability in tort for

negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm.5 1 Thus, the
Chief Justice took the opportunity to clarify the majority's holding
and to criticize Justice Mosk's dissent.
The Chief Justice pointed out that by allowing a claim for negli-

gent misrepresentation for physical injury, a plaintiff would be precluded from bringing a claim under "ordinary negligence." 5 2 The
Chief Justice asserted that the majority opinion "implicitly held"
plaintiffs' claim that the majority found deficient. Id. at 733, 789 P.2d at 962, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 781.
47. Id. at 737, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
48. Id.
49. Id,
50. Id. at 738, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 784. The majority also dealt with
another issue regarding whether the plaintiffs have a valid cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id at 738-39, 789 P.2d at 965-66, 268 Cal. Rptr.
at 784-85; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The majority, relying on Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 488 U.S. 1039 (1989), declared that "neither a state nor a state
official acting in his official capacity is a 'person' subject to suit under section 1983."
Garcia,50 Cal. 3d at 739, 789 P.2d at 966, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 785. Additionally, the majority, relying on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989), asserted that "[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf." Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 739, 789 P.2d at 966, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (quoting
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). The majority concluded that Ybarra left the decedent "in
the same position as before, still free to take any measures she wished to protect herself from Johnson." Id. at 741, 789 P.2d 967-68, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87. The dissent
agrees with the majority's analysis and holding on this issue. Id. at 761, 789 P.2d at 982,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
51. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 744, 789 P.2d at 970, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
52. Id. at 741, 789 P.2d at 968, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). This
position seems to be correct since the tort of negligent misrepresentation imposes a
higher standard on a plaintiff, i.e., reasonable reliance, in which the plaintiff bears the
initial burden of pleading and proof. Under an "ordinary negligence" action a plaintiff
need only show duty, breach, causation and damages. By acknowledging that an action
may lie in tort for negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical injury, and by further acknowledging its higher standard of reasonable reliance, it logically follows that
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that proposition.
Moreover, Chief Justice Lucas denounced Justice Mosk's dissent
and the commentators on this tort in general as having "misperceive[d] the true state of the common law by asserting without
qualification that actions for negligent misrepresentation have long
been analyzed under simple 'negligence' principles." 54 He directly
confronted the authorities in support of position that one need apply
only "ordinary negligence" principles to maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm.55 The Chief Justice noted that "[i]n each case cited . . . the court implicitly or
expressly recognized a need for reasonable reliance by the plaintiff
.... ",56 He further asserted that in cases where reasonable reliance
was not found, recovery was not allowed.57 Accordingly, he reasoned,
"[t]he Restatement did not alter th[e] common law rule, but merely
'codified' it; the majority opinion, by following the Restatement, does
not depart from the common law rule, but rather adheres to it."5
Finally, the Chief Justice observed the "legitimate jurisprudential
and policy reasons" why, when imposing liability for negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical injury, a plaintiff must prove
reasonable reliance. He reasoned that:
In such situations the plaintiff will often be in the best position, and have the
final opportunity, to avoid any risk of harm. He must ultimately decide, based
on his own assessment of the circumstances known to him, whether to act on
the representations of the defendant. Moreover, a plaintiff will often be the
party most capable of correctly evaluating a risk. Finally, fairness dictates
that a plaintiff justify his reliance, and that the reliance be reasonable, lest
the speaker incur liability out of all proportion to his culpability for careless
59
speech.

Thus, the Chief Justice concluded by reasserting the majority's position "to adopt the Restatement view of liability for negligent misrepa cause of action for negligent misrepresentation based on "ordinary negligence" with
its lower standard would probably be barred. See infra note 64.
53. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 741, 789 P.2d at 968, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (Lucas, J.,
concurring).
54. Id. at 743, 789 P.2d at 969, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 788 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
55. Id at 742, 789 P.2d at 968, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
56. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). See infra note 64 & supra note
52. The Chief Justice also noted that both commentators cited by the dissent "cite section 311 of the Restatement in support of their" positions. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 742,
789 P.2d at 969, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 788 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). This is inconsistent
with their positions because section 311 requires reliance by the injured party. See id&
(Lucas C.J., concurring).
57. Id. at 743, 789 P.2d at 969, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 788 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. at 744, 789 P.2d at 970, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (Lucas, C.J. concurring).
59. Id. at 744, 789 P.2d at 970, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (Lucas, C.J. concurring).

resentation resulting in physical harm, to the exclusion of a
60
'traditional' negligence action."
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk sharply criticized the majority's holding and asserted
that it "create[d] new law that is ill-advised and potentially mischievous."61 He emphasized that the tort of negligent misrepresentation
"is generally confined to injuries to pecuniary interests, such as sales
and credit transactions." 62 He reasoned that negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm are not a separate and distinct tort
in which a plaintiff must plead reasonable reliance.63 Rather, when
confronted with negligent misrepresentations which result in physical harm, only the simple rules of negligence must be applied.64
Justice Mosk cited cases which held that the tort of negligent mis65
representation applied only to financial or commercial interests.
60. Id. (Lucas, C.J. concurring).
61. Id. at 745, 789 P.2d at 970, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 748, 789 P.2d at 973, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 745, 789 P.2d at 971, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 790 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Mosk, J. dissenting). Justice Mosk asserted that negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm have been premised on actions in "ordinary negligence" for many years prior to the distinct common law tort of negligent
misrepresentation which generally only protects interests that are economic or financial. Id. at 746, 789 P.2d at 971, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 790 (Mosk, J. dissenting). He acknowledged, however, that "during the first half of this century there was considerable
controversy and confusion over the theory of negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 751,
789 P.2d at 974, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (Mosk, J. dissenting). Justice Mosk declared that
"Johnson and its progeny put the confusion to rest." Id. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. Justice Mosk asserted correctly that reasonable reliance is not an
element in "any cause of action for negligence .... " Id. at 755, 789 P.2d at 978, 268 Cal.
Rptr. at 797 (Mosk, J., dissenting). When confronted with the issue in the instant case,
however, Mosk claimed that "[w]ithout question, a plaintiff who suffers physical injuries as a result of a defendant's misrepresentation must allege sufficient facts to show
that he relied on those misrepresentations. Without such facts, there is no showing of
causation, an essential element of a cause of action for negligence." Id. (emphasis added). Mosk is correct in stating that absent a plaintiff's reliance there is no showing of
causation. However, as he stated, reliance is not an element of negligence, it is an element of misrepresentation. Accordingly, the two causes of action have different focuses. The emphasis in a negligence action is on the defendant's conduct i.e., duty,
breach and causation. The emphasis switches to the plaintiff's conduct only to establish comparative negligence. In California, however, this only reduces rather than bars
a plaintiff's recovery. The focus in a negligent misrepresentation action, on the other
hand, is on the plaintiff's conduct, i.e., reasonable reliance. If his reliance is not
deemed reasonable he cannot recover. Hence, it appears that the two torts are distinct.
Since Justice Mosk acknowledges the reliance requirement, it appears his reasoning
indirectly supports the majority's holding that negligent misrepresentation resulting in
physical harm is a separate and distinct tort. For other distinctions between these
torts, see supra note 52.
65. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 748-50, 789 P.2d at 972-74, 268 Cal. Rptr. 791-93 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968);
In re Michael J., 201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1988); Bastian v. County of
San Luis Obispo, 199 Cal. App. 3d 520, 245 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1988); Connelly v. State, 3 Cal.
App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1970).
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He noted that the cases permited an action under "ordinary negligence" principles. 66 He further stated that the purpose of the negligence tort is to protect against harm to person and property, whereas
the purpose of the tort of negligent misrepresentation is to protect
against harm which is economic or commercial in nature. 67 Justice
Mosk, therefore, concluded that the majority's opinion created new
law and "reintroduce[d] confusion into an area of law that the courts
68
and commentators ha[d] endeavored to clarify."
Finally, Justice Mosk applied "ordinary negligence" principles to
the case at bar to determine whether the plaintiffs had stated a viable cause of action. Relying on seven factors from Rowland v. Christian,69 he concluded that six weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, and
70
therefore stated a valid cause of action in negligence.
V.

IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The holding in Garcia has significant impact on cases involving
claims based on negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical
harm. As with most issues in which there is lower court confusion, a
supreme court decision brings judicial conformity. For example,
plaintiffs in jurisdictions that recognized this tort in ordinary negligence must now meet a higher standard. In an "ordinary negligence
jurisdiction," the plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation and
damages, the emphasis being on the defendant's conduct. With negligent misrepresentation as a separate and distinct tort, however, a
plaintiff must establish reasonable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation, as well as the standard elements of negligence. Thus
the emphasis is on the plaintiffs conduct. Accordingly, it is much
66. Garcia, at 750, 789 P.2d at 974, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
67. Id. at 748, 789 P.2d at 973, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
68. Id. at 757, 789 P.2d at 979, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (Mosk, J., dissenting.
69. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The
factors include: "(1) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
70. Justice Mosk stated that the first six factors weigh in favor of the plaintiffs
and that the last factor, even if deemed to weigh in the defendant's favor, "could not
support a departure from the fundamental principle that all persons are responsible
for injuries caused by their failure to exercise due care." Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 761, 789
P.2d at 982, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

more difficult for plaintiffs to establish claims as they carry the initial burden of pleading and proof as to whether their conduct was
reasonable.71
A potential benefit to plaintiffs is that comparative negligence is
not a defense in misrepresentation. However, since California is a
pure comparative negligence state a defendant's inability to use the
defense actually works to the plaintiff's detriment. For instance,
under pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff will be allowed to recover damages even when his negligence is substantially greater than
defendant's negligence. Thus, a plaintiff may be ninety percent comparatively negligent and still recover ten percent of his damages.
With this defense abolished, however, a plaintiff who is ninety percent comparatively negligent would probably not be deemed to have
reasonably relied on the defendant's misrepresentations and therefore will be precluded from recovery.
Defendants will also feel an impact, but it will be a positive one.
They will benefit from the reasonable reliance. requirement. Rather
than a court solely looking at the defendant's conduct, as in an "ordinary negligence" action, the court will also consider the plaintiff's
conduct. If the plaintiff cannot meet the higher standard of reasonable reliance, then the claim will not be sustained. 72 Moreover, since
comparative negligence cannot be used, a defendant who is minimally
negligent need no longer pay damages commensurate with his negligence where the plaintiff fails to satisfy the reliance requirement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's strong language declaring that
negligent misrepresentations resulting in physical harm are a separate and distinct cause of action gives much needed guidance to the
lower courts. This doctrinal consistency will enable litigants to deal
with the more substantive merits of their claims and not clutter the
court dockets.
Additionally, the court seems to have struck an equitable balance
between the respective rights of plaintiffs and defendants. As Chief
Justice Lucas observed:
In such situations the plaintiff will often be in the best position, and have the
final opportunity, to avoid any risk of harm. He must ultimately decide, based
on his own assessment of the circumstances known to him, whether to act on
the representations of the defendant. Moreover, a plaintiff will often be the
party most capable of correctly evaluating a risk. Finally, fairness dictates
that a plaintiff justify his reliance, and that the reliance be reasonable, lest
71. See supra note 64.
72. In other words, in an action based on negligent misrepresentation, if a plaintiff

does not act reasonably he is precluded from recovery. Under an ordinary negligence
claim, however, if a plaintiff does not act reasonably he would only have his recovery
reduced; he could still recover something. See supra note 64.
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the speaker
incur liability out of all proportion to his culpability for careless
73
speech.

Defendants now have protection against careless misstatements
that, prior to this holding, could have exposed them to liability "out
of all proportion" to their culpability. On the other hand, plaintiffs
are still protected against personal injuries resulting from a defendant's careless misstatements as long so they can show their reliance
on the defendant's misstatement was reasonable.
BRIAN DOSTER CHASE
B.

A plaintiff seeking to state a claim for intentional
interference with contract or intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage due to a defendant
inducing a contractingparty to undertake litigation to
terminate the contract according to its terms, must allege
that the party brought the litigation without probable
cause and that the litigation concluded in the plaintiffs
favor: Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Bear Stearns &
Company.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Bear Stearns & Company,1
the California Supreme Court considered whether inducing a contracting party to seek a judicial determination on whether they can
terminate the contract according to its terms states a valid cause of
action in tort for intentional interference with contract, or intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The unanimous court decisively resolved that a plaintiff seeking to state a claim
for intentional interference with contract or prospective economic advantage due to a defendant inducing a contracting party to undertake
litigation to terminate the contract according to its terms, must allege
that the party brought the litigation without probable cause and that
2
the litigation concluded in the plaintiff's favor.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the plaintiff, Pacific Gas &
73. Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 744, 789 P.2d at 970, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (Lucas, C.J.
concurring).
1. 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 791 P.2d 587, 270 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990). Justice Broussard wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Eagleson, Kennard, Arabian and Puglia, Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council,
concurred.
2. Id. at 1137, 791 P.2d at 598, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 12.

Electric Company (PG & E), had a long term contract with the
Placer County Water Agency (Agency). The contract was entered
into in 1963 and was to "terminate in 2013 or at the end of the year in
which the Agency completed retirement of its project bonds, whichever occurred first." 3 Due to rising energy prices, the Agency wanted
to terminate the contract and sell its power at more favorable prices.
Defendant Bear Stearns & Company (Bear Stearns), an investment
brokerage firm, successfully sought to induce the Agency to attempt
to terminate its contract with PG & E. Bear Stearns agreed to pay
for legal fees to determine whether the Agency could terminate the
contract in return for 15 percent of any resulting increase in the
Agency's revenues above $2.5 million for 20 years. In addition, Bear
4
Stearns was soliciting buyers for the Agency's power.
PG & E filed suit against Bear Stearns alleging intentional interference with contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and attempted inducement of breach of contract.5
At the trial court level, Bear Stearns' demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.6 The court of appeal reversed the trial court's
holding as to the interference claims declaring that, while "no breach
of contract was threatened .

.

. either cause of action may be stated

without alleging an actual or threatened breach."'7 The California
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the court of
appeal with directions to affirm the trial courts judgment to dismiss
the action.8
II.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The California Supreme Court noted at the outset the well established rule that "a stranger to a contract may be liable in tort for intentionally interfering with the performance of the contract."9 The
3. Pacific Gas & E ec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1124, 791 P.2d at 588, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
4. Id
5. PG & E filed a separate suit against the Agency. The Agency then sought a
declaratory judgment "asserting that the contract could be terminated early by retiring the project bonds. The trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the Agency." Id at 1124, 791 P.2d at 588-89, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 2-3. The court of appeal
reversed, declaring that the trial court erred because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence which showed that the parties did not intend to terminate the contract before
2013. Id. As of the publication of the instant case, the action against the Agency is still
pending.
6. Id. at 1125, 791 P.2d at 589, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id at 1137-38, 791 P.2d at 598, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
9. Id. at 1126, 791 P.2d at 589, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 3 (citing Imperial Ice Co. v.
Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941); Lumley v. Guy, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng.
Rep. 749 (1853)). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977). For a general
history and current status of these torts in California, see 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 638-73 (9th ed. 1988). See also Dowling, A Contract Theory

for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference With ContractBeyond the Unlawful Means
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main issue before the court, however, was whether inducing a party
to a contract to seek a judicial determination on whether it can terminate the contract according to its terms states a valid cause of action in tort for intentional interference with contract or prospective
economic advantage.10 More specifically, the court narrowed the issue to whether it would be appropriate to subject someone to liability
for inducing a "potentiallymeritorious lawsuit."11
Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (1986); Perlman, Interference with Contractand Other
Economic Expectancies: A Case of Tort and ContractDoctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61
(1982); Carpenter, Interference with ContractRelations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928);
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663 (1923).
10. The prima facie case for intentional interference with contract is: (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant must
have knowledge of the contract; (3) an intentional act by defendant designed to induce
a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption
of the contractual relationship must occur; and (5) resulting damage. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1126, 791 P.2d at 589-90, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1984); Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enters., 177 Cal. App. 3d 1120,
225 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1986); Farmers Ins. Esch. v. State, 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1985). The prima facie case for intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage is: "'(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some
third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and
(5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.'"
Pacikf Gas & Elec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1126 n.2, 791 P.2d at 590 n.2, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.2
(quoting Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 71 n.6, 729 P.2d 728, 733 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294,
298 n.6 (1987)). See also Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 703 P.2d 58, 216 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1985); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). The
court noted that the distinction between intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is that a plaintiff need not
show proof of a legally binding contract in an action dealing with interference with
prospective economic advantage. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1126, 791 P.2d at
590, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
The court also dealt with the issue of whether actual interference is sufficiently alleged by inducing litigation on the contract. The court asserted that if the interference
makes the performance of the contract more expensive or burdensome, then actual interference is sufficiently alleged. Id, at 1129, 791 P.2d at 592, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 6. The
court then inferred that here the only additional burden or expense placed on the contract is attributable to the instant litigation, which, if meritorious, is not sufficient to
satisfy the expense or burden requirement. Id. at 1137, 791 P.2d at 598, 270 Cal. Rptr.
at 12. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently plead that the
defendant had made the enjoyment of the benefits of the contract more expensive or
burdensome. Id.
11. Pacfw Gas & Elec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1127, 791 P.2d at 587, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4
(emphasis added). It is important to note the court's use of the phrase "potentially
meritorious lawsuit" because the court also asserted that, generally, an action may lie
in tort for intentional interference of contract or prospective economic advantage for
inducing a party to a contract to terminate the contract according to its terms if there
is no colorable claim. See id. at 1126-27, 791 P.2d at 590, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The court

Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Broussard asserted that
express termination provisions do not create a privilege to interfere
with the contractual relationship.12 He reasoned that since courts
protect economic relationships which are solely prospective from
outside interference, then courts must also protect contractual relationships which are currently in effect but subject to termination.i 3
Next, the court dealt with the issue of whether it would be appropriate to subject someone to liability for inducing a potentially meritorious lawsuit. First, the court noted that the only actionable tort
for instigating a lawsuit is malicious prosecution. 14 It then reasoned
that if by bringing a colorable claim a party could be subject to liability, the law, then, would inhibit free access to the courts and the
right to petition for redress of grievances which is guaranteed by the
5
federal and state constitutions.'
Justice Broussard concluded by declaring that the "malicious prosecution cases strike [an] appropriate balance between the right to
free access to the court and the interest in being free from the cost of
defending [meritless] litigation."'1 The court thus adopted the elements of the tort malicious prosecution and adapted them to the "inanalogized this claim to an at-will contract wherein either party can terminate the contract at his or her will. The court asserted that "interference with an at-will contract
is actionable interference with the contractual relationship, on the theory that a contract 'at the will of the parties, respectively does not make it one at the will of
others.'" Id at 1127, 791 P.2d at 590-91, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5 (quoting Speegle v. Board
of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 39, 172 P.2d 867, 870 (1946), quoting Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915)). The court reasoned that "it is the contractual relationship, not
any term of the contract, which is protected against outside influence." Id at 1127, 791
P.2d at 590, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The court further expounded upon this point by emphasizing that "the contractual relationship is at the will of the parties, not at the will
of outsiders." Id. at 1127, 791 P.2d at 591, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
12. Id at 1128, 791 P.2d at 591, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 5. See also supra note 2.
13. Id
14. Id at 1131, 791 P.2d at 593, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 7. Malicious prosecution occurs
where one party forces another party "to expend financial and emotional resources to
defend a baseless claim." Id The plaintiff who asserts a milicious prosecution claim
must show that "the prior action was brought without probable cause and was [decided] in the plaintiff's favor." Id. (citations omitted).
15. Id at 1135, 791 P.2d at 597, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 3. The court acknowledged that it is the litigantthat is protected from
liability for bringing a colorable claim and that here Bear Stearns is not the litigant
bringing the claim, but rather the one inducing the litigant to bring a claim. Nevertheless, the court asserted that "the constitutional doctrine assuring the right to petition
may 'impose the outer limits upon the category of conduct that may be subject to liability on the basis of common law doctrine, and thus serve to shape the doctrine itself.'" Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., at 1135, 791 P.2d at 597, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (quoting
Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 188, 195,
680 P.2d 1086, 1091, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127, 132 (1984)). The court further reasoned that its
"concern not to chill the right to petition the courts for redress of grievances must inform [its] view of whether the act of inducing litigation is a tort." Id. at 1136, 791 P.2d
at 597, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (emphasis added).
16. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1137, 791 P.2d at 598, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 12.

California Supreme Court Survey

[Vol. 18: 623, 1991]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

ducing litigation" issue with regard to the torts intentional
interference with contract and prospective economic advantage. Accordingly, the court held that in order for a plaintiff to assert a claim
for intentional interference with contract or prospective economic advantage due to a defendant inducing a party to a contract to seek a
judicial determination on whether they can terminate the contract
according to its terms, the plaintiff must allege that "the litigation
was brought without probable cause and that the litigation concluded
17
in plaintiff's favor."
III.

CONCLUSION

The development of the law involving intentional interference
with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage has been shaped by two competing interests. First, there is
the contracting parties interest, as well as perhaps an even greater
societal interest, in protecting contractual stability. Second, there is
the societal interest in maintaining a free and competitive market or
economy. However, the California Supreme Court in Pacific Gas &
Electric Company, had to consider a third interest due to the specific
facts of the case. That interest being, a person's federal and state
constitutional right to petition the government' for redress of
grievances.
The court's treatment of the issues seems to have struck an equitable balance between these respective interests. First, contractual stability is protected via a vis the probable cause requirement which
protects parties to a contract from meritless claims. Moreover, contracting parties will now know that express termination provisions in
contracts are "invitations" for outside interference,., which, in turn,
should enhance contractual stability by alerting individuals to be
more careful in drafting their contracts.
Second, this holding actually enhances free and competitive markets. Individuals are now permitted to induce a party to a contract to
terminate the contract according to its terms without having to worry
about a tortious interference suit so long as they have probable cause.
Accordingly, as in the instant case, if a party wants out of a contract
in order to sell its product at more favorable prices, or if an individual wishes to induce a contracting party to seek a judicial determination on whether they can terminate the "contract,they will be allowed
to do so as long as the requisites of this hold are satisfied.
17. Id

Lastly, and more specific to the issue presented in the instant case,
the court found a way to protect an individual's constitutional right
to petition the courts for redress of grievances while at the same time
allowing protection to the contractual relationship and the free and
competitive market. By adopting the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution and applying them to the tortious interference issue presented here, the court maintained an individual's right to
petition the courts. For instance, if a plaintiff has probable cause to
initiate a lawsuit, then he may do so regardless of whether he intends
on interfering with an existing contract or some prospective economic advantage. On the other hand, the probable cause requirement places an appropriate limit on the instigation of this type of
suit, thus protecting contractual relationships and the free market.
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